The other obvious thing to point out is that morality is inevitably time-dependent if views can change over time. — Kenosha Kid

Like I said earlier in the thread, the people would need to be polled often enough that we would have time to implement the axioms that result from the process I outlined in the OP. This is also totally within the purview of the system I propose; through rational discourse one could persuade people to act in new ways via application of axioms that are established by consensus. Thus, the reformer is not always wrong and people can consider views that are not yet established via consensus. If the people are swayed by the discourse it will manifest itself in the polls.

Perhaps someone is autistic, for example. Their greater attention to detail could be considered a boon, yet most people wouldn't consider being autistic a good thing because of their lack of social intelligence. So is it maladaptive to be autistic? Furthermore, should an autistic person pressure themselves to fit in better with neurotypical people (or whatever you want to call them)? Maybe that would help them overcome some disadvantages they were born with, but that doesn't mean that they will be happier for it.

So what is inner peace or true happiness? Sorry if you already defined these terms, but I can't continue this discussion without knowing. Perhaps true happiness is achieving a happiness that is free of the constraints of one's maladaptive tendencies, experiences, and base desires? But what makes tendencies and experiences maladaptive? What are base desires? Drinking beer could be the height of sophistication for one person and be absolutely base for another.

Ok, if I'm correct your question here, "Can one be sadistic without it affecting their efforts of achieving true happiness?", and I would answer no. — Tzeentch

I looked up the definition of sadistic, it is defined as: "deriving pleasure from inflicting pain, suffering, or humiliation on others". So yes, by definition sadism is related to deriving pleasure and is thus related to your proposed morality. But also you have to admit that if someone does something sadistic they are also, by definition, actually deriving pleasure from "inflicting pain, suffering, or humiliation on others". The word you seem to be looking for would mean: "seeking pleasure from inflicting pain, suffering, or humiliation on others".

Not to try to get the thread back on track, but what do you think of the consensus morality I describe? MSC keeps telling me it is fallacious, but I don't think it is.

Acting in a way that works against one's true happiness is immoral.
Acting in a way that works towards one's true happiness is moral.
Acting in a way that works neither towards nor against one's true happiness is not a matter of morality. — Tzeentch

This actually seems like the no true Scotsman fallacy: If one acts in a way that is sadistic in order to achieve happiness, you say they never were actually pursuing true happiness. Your objective rule that one acts immorally in working against their own happiness then becomes relevant. But how is it known if doing sadistic things works against one's true happiness? Couldn't it be behavior unrelated to their happiness and thus not be immoral according to your third claim?

Actually, I see how it might be relevant. Doing what is right according to the consensus might interfere with your happiness theorem.

Acting in a way that works against one's true happiness is immoral.
Acting in a way that works towards one's true happiness is moral.
Acting in a way that works neither towards nor against one's true happiness is not a matter of morality. — Tzeentch

Thanks for elucidating that. I must say, that is pretty reasonable. And no, I wasn't playing devil's advocate, I genuinely believe that sadists can be truly happy doing sadistic things, but whatever, I'll drop it.

I find that this conversation is not all that relevant, . Can you relate it to the OP? I would like to talk about this with you, but you might want to make a thread yourself.

Enjoying something and true happiness are not the same. True happiness is a prolonged state of being, and not some short-term gratification of base desires. Perhaps inner peace would be another term to describe it. — Tzeentch

What if someone derives inner peace from torturing small children? From causing immense amounts of suffering? I've known sadistic people, and they genuinely revel in others' suffering and misfortune.

The Nazi’s thought they were creating a better world, they were in the pursuit of true happiness, they thought they were doing good.
— DingoJones

And they were wrong. Simply pursuing true happiness is not enough to be moral. One must achieve it for oneself. And if one actively works against it, then one can be said to be immoral. Thus, immoral actions lead to destruction of oneself, either physically or psychologically. — Tzeentch

So being immoral prevents one from achieving true happiness because you say that if one doesn't achieve true happiness one is acting immorally. Sounds like a tautology to me, and, thus, one is always immoral as long as they are not achieving true happiness.

you mentioned nothing of good, or making a decision. — god must be atheist

I didn't even make a reference to what is good in my last post. What are you referring to?

you deny that moral acts involve a decision. — god must be atheist

I'm not saying one isn't deciding; I'm saying that if one wants to be moral they have to decide a certain way. As for the oughts you provided: they do not serve a greater goal or project, except for the giving to the poor one. In fact I think an ought would have to serve an a priori morality. So while it would have saved you some headache if you had cleaned the chicken coop, the consequences do not feed into anything greater than a conviction that you should have saved yourself some trouble. Indeed, two of your oughts are appeals to prudence, not morality.

what is it in a moral act that distinguishes it from other acts, as being moral (or immoral). — god must be atheist

A moral act is an act you are compelled to take. Essentially it is what you ought to do. This is different from deciding what cereal to eat in the morning, or whether or not to exercise thirty minutes a day, or to work over time. People have different ideas of what one ought to do in certain situations, but the gap between is and ought means that moral acts are different from acts that are just approved of, for instance. It is a descriptive claim to say that most people approve of driving on the right side of the road, but to say one ought to is to transition to a moral claim.

Because when the full context is known and language is sophisticated enough to explain that, there would be an objective moral answer for any given situation. — MSC

Based on what? Sophisticated language and deep contextual knowledge does not give an objective moral answer to anything. Were do the facts that inform the act come from? An objective answer to a moral question does not follow from descriptive claims, this is just the gap between is and ought, unless I'm mistaken.

descriptive contextual relativism — MSC

Could you explain to me what that is?

I mean, we are naturally moral animals, to a certain degree, at least, if that means anything. It appears to have inherent value because it offers a guide on how to live one's life meaningfully, regardless of whether or not this guide is subjective. I mean, surely you believe some things are wrong? Maybe premeditated killing, for example? Or rape?

What exactly is fallacious about it? The claim isn't about something objective, it is about something subjective. It isn't like saying the earth isn't flat just because the majority of people believe it isn't, it's that something is true for all members of a group if it is true for the majority, given certain criteria, namely the a priori assumption that what is good behavior for most people some of the time is true for everyone. Where is the fallacy in that?

It provides an objective standard for any human, even if it is based on a consensus, and, thus, is subjective. This just makes it a more descriptive claim, but I don't see why that matters if it is relative to all of humanity.



Yes, I get it. I still don't think it is fallacious, but I'll think about it some more.

So you believe in divine command theory, eh?

Alright, I'll engage with you, even if you are exceedingly acrimonious.

who is doing the considering — god must be atheist

The majority of humanity.

The additonal qualifyer "some of the time" completely obliterates any usefully tangible meaning in this attempt at a definition of morality. Thanks for putting that in. — god must be atheist

It actually makes it considerably more cogent: certain acts are only moral at certain times, depending upon the situation and the agents' motives. Surely you do not believe that any given act could be moral in every situation?

Yes, this is the best I can do, I'm not a professional philosopher; I just like to dabble on occasion.

Literally just defined what morality would be in the post right before you: what is considered appropriate behavior for most humans some of the time. Do some reading next time, please, before barging in and demanding we answer your questions so we can have a "serious" engagement on morality.

discerntion — god must be atheist

Brah, are you drunk? I have no idea what you are talking about here either:

Please tell me what it is about morality that makes it different from everything else, and most prominently different from good and bad. — god must be atheist

your conclusion itself is a fallacy. — MSC

I'll say it again then: if I define morality as "what is considered good behavior by most people some of the time" that means that if most people believe something is the correct thing to do morally it is the moral thing to do in the appropriate circumstances. Not a fallacy.

You also assume 7 billion+ humans are the majority. — MSC

That is an interesting problem: animals are people too. I guess humans just need to advocate for better treatment of animals.

Alright, that's the last time I'm going to be snide. I mean it when I say thanks, Tzeentch, you make me think. Besides, circumstances do matter, along with motivations, in the moral system I propose; the action is matched up with the circumstances and motivations.

It totally is the opinion of the majority of people, yes, but the laws we currently abide by are implemented based on popular opinion or, even more often, the profits of corporations; you cannot just shoot someone in the face or not pay taxes. Sorry to overload your classical liberal brain. That being said thanks for engaging with me thus far.

I'll summarize what I have posted previously: if one defines morality as "what is considered good behavior for most people some of the time" then it becomes moral to act according to the consensus about what behavior is approved of, which is expressed as a ratio of people who approve over total people. Furthermore, any majority approved action would correlate to what should be done in a given circumstance with appropriately acknowledged motives.

You make a good if obvious point: circumstances and motivations are important. But these things would often be "baked into" the moral axioms that would arise. For instance: some people believe that torture is never okay. However some people think it is okay in very rare circumstances. If the majority believes it is rarely, but sometimes, justified, one could merely ask what circumstances it is justified under, or use rational discourse concerning the pre-existing moral axioms, to come to a conclusion as to what circumstances under which torture is justified. Additionally, one could do the same for the motivations behind the torturer: is it to save a young child locked away in the basement of a killer? Or is it to satisfy a sadistic hunger? One need only devise more and more complex axioms, or just rationally apply them on the spot, if one is analytical enough. Maybe a computer could do it. :chin:

I agree, groups can't be agents. But nowhere did I call a group immoral; I just said that they hold immoral opinions.

Are we talking about moral agency or just the philosophical concept?

Phew! That was a close one :grimace:

Terminating their membership might decrease the number of people who hold the immoral opinions, but it would do nothing to decrease immoral behavior provided the people with the immoral opinion accept the moral consensus and abide by it. Furthermore, making the moral axiom more popular past the majority doesn't make it more right. As long as the ratio is over 0.5 it is as right as it will get.

Perhaps. Let me think.

They could still be moral agents on an individual level, however. Additionally, they would still remain in humanity. Or maybe they wouldn't be agents at all. I need to think about this.

Oooh. Okay. Yeah, that's a good point. I would say a group can be an agent if they can reach a consensus about a course of action and act on it. This would mean that if the majority of humanity decided what is moral and decided to implement policies based on what they believe to be moral, those who disagree wouldn't be considered part of the agent-group.

Interesting question, but how is it relevant?

Well, I'm happy you find it enticing. I think it is valid to discuss axioms; they are essentially just "a statement or proposition on which an abstractly defined structure is based". Meta-ethics, and ethics in general, is full of both propositions and abstractly defined structures, so I see no problem.

Yeah, I see what you are saying. Thanks for that. I guess one would merely need to poll people about what they think on moral issues often and then discuss the resultant axioms to deal with all of the real, and sometimes intractable, moral problems we face. After all, there would be an interaction between the discourse and people's beliefs.

Are you saying that the meta-axioms wouldn't need to be run through the consensus process or that my previous post doesn't work?

Essentially: if one is looking to root out irrationality then that works, but yes, the reformer that wants to make moral proclamations still presents a problem.

Consensus would still be relevant in order to have objective standards for morality. The meta-axioms would need to be run through the consensus finding process I outlined in order to be objective standards, and, if the majority pays attention to the discourse, maybe they will be swayed.

I guess one might say that certain moral axioms come from consensus and then are amalgamated via rational discourse to create ever more complex or broad rational meta-axioms which could become more morally objective standards by which to measure behavior. Thus, one could justify not repressing gay people as a result of the moral axiom, which is accepted by most, that discrimination is bad. The most important thing is that rational discourse is concerned with rooting out irrationality, and not with making moral statements, so even if you are in the minority, if all you are doing is applying the consensus axioms in novel ways, you are not absolutely wrong. Thus, even if most people are homophobes, you are not wrong to work against discrimination.

Could you giver me some examples of other moral metrics that can accomplish the same things better? I don't doubt they exist.