Yeah I know it's a crap theory, I'm just presenting something from the point of view of someone who subscribes to divine command theory.

Oh yeah I meant moral commands, I think that might have been confusing. Sorry.

I don't prescribe to either, I'm merely attempting to reconcile a claim of amorality within the epistemology of divine command; and I think that divine command only causes events insofar as people believe a god's moral disclosures and act on them. I think we might be talking over each other a little. Divine command theory just makes morality objective, but still arbitrary. All of the existing moral facts would be derived from a supernatural source. The question you pose has little to do with ethics it seems to me, but, once again, I could be wrong.

I suppose that if I change it to "doesn't believe in god" then it makes it a lack of belief in revelation instead of a denial; it's more agnostic.

Sorry, had to make an important edit. I should have said in my first post that I'm referring to merely not believing in god.

First off most atheists don't deny god's existence, they just don't believe in him, so really there is no action to be judged. Second I'm not trying to ascertain whether or not it could be moral to not believe in a god, I'm trying to determine whether or not not believing in god is tantamount to denying god's commands after granting that divine command theory is infallible. I totally agree that there is nothing out there good enough to have been made by an omnipotent, omniscient creator as far as books go. Tell me if I'm misunderstanding you.

I don't believe a fetus can indeed desire to be alive. But correct me if I'm wrong. And it seems wise to me to demarcate human life and personhood. Not doing this is speciesist as Cows are more like cognitively developed humans than fetuses yet we torture and slaughter them without a thought. .

I assume at the end of your post you refer the paradox of the heap. I wrote this somewhere else:

The need to define fetal personhood does not indeed lead to a paradox of the heap, as some might suggest; changes in predicates of potential personhood occur at specific points in fetal development, regardless of the fact that it remains genetically identical throughout its development. These predicates are not vague; they are quite specific. This applies if you grant that being human doesn't constitute being a person per say, but rather self-awareness, consciousness, viability, etc. Thus one can retain the belief that a fetus is not a person with a right to life.

And no, fulfilling preferences is not the same as being happy. Perhaps I work hard writing good poetry when really what would maximize my pleasure would be eating a chocolate bar. Both fulfill preferences, but one results in greater happiness.

As for the meat of your argument: according to you it must me wrong to use contraception because one is preventing a being with a valuable future from being born. The same goes for celibacy.

I can't really respond to you too well, as I don't know much philosophy. I haven't read any Plato. But is my argument sound?

ok that makes sense. Thanks.

What do you mean by predicate? I looked it up but it has a few definitions.

Or maybe I should put in more work. nvm.

If god's moral commands are entirely dependent upon his will then they are arbitrary by definition. If its arbitrary for me then its arbitrary for god.

Read my latest post and tell me what's wrong with it. Please.

I define myself as the ultimate moral arbiter and everything I command is objective because I say so. Now kneel.

Yes but even if one takes the first horn god's commands are arbitrary. This is just a fact. If you say that these commands are made good by the properties of god you open yourself up to another dilemma: are properties that are associated with goodness good because God possesses them or does God possess them because they are good?

If you take the first horn then another argument applies:

One might ground moral values in god's nature without making the claim that god is the definition of the word good. One might say that divine command theory is an ontological argument. But an issue arises. Under this view both god and the presupposition of his commands hold the property of being good, even if they are not semantically related. This, however, means that god's nature is identical to the source of his commands. This appears to rob god of moral agency; he is a tool for relaying his own arbitrarily defined nature.

This god might as well not exist.

One could, however, drop the goodness property but then you subject yourself to Euthyphro's dilemma again.

Totally not calling you an apologist TheMadFool, btw. You seem honest and interested in the truth.

Perhaps this will be better.

I'm ascribing supreme prudence to my grandmother who, being supremely prudent in nature, issues supremely prudent commands (wash one's hands, look both ways before crossing the street, etc.) The question here is: if my grandmother's full nature is that of supreme prudence, as a property, and the property is a presupposition of her commands too, then it seems that her nature is the same thing as the source of her commands. This seems to eliminate any agency on the part of my grandmother; she is just a tool for relaying her own nature.

Yeah this is a thinly veiled criticism of DCT. I'm trying to expunge it from my mind still with reason.

And I say full nature because people assume god is only good.

What would you say if I attributed supreme prudence to my grandmother's nature, which is an ontological statement, and then claimed in the same breath that she doesn't embody the word itself, as that would be mere semantics. Could it be argued that she is still defined to be the concept of prudence?

And I appreciate your thoughtful reply. I need to read it a few more times.

Yes, I believe you are right. People look for meaning in a frightening world, often times turning to dogma and faith-based belief. They often times find a belief that makes them feel good then work backwards to justify it rationally. This often times does not work. I'm pretty certain that Divine Command theory can be disposed of. Not even the introduction of omnibenevolence helps the theory.

I'm still confused. What does the promoting or harming? And what is being promoted or harmed?

Yes, most secular people do seem to define good and evil for themselves. Not certain I understand the bit about increasing and decreasing meaning though. Could you explain that?

I'm trying to show that god being omnibenevolent is not a way of escaping Euthyphro's Dilemma. I'm judging by your lack of meaningful response that I made the point.

God says 'don't fuck your neighbour's wife', or whatever... what's the difficulty?

I am the last person to care about a god's commands. Why bring that up?

That's not a moral command but rather learned prudence. But even so her commands are intelligible because they are not tied to her nature but rather just known from experience. Its not inherent to her character or nature. She embodies no concepts. Furthermore for it to be a parallel mummy would have to command prudence exclusively.

My point remains.

I posted this in another thread but its relevant here too.

There is one objection to divine command theory that I used to find definitive but now realized needed more work.

It goes like this: if god is omnibenevolent and all that is good, and his moral commands are also defined as good, then his commands would be: "God commands god." Which of course makes no sense; that's not a valid command. This renders god's commands meaningless. If you want them to mean anything you have to drop god's omnibenevolence.

Can you try harder to contribute? Think before you post please. You don't even have to be correct, just on topic.

I have no idea what you're talking about. Did you even read mine or anyone else's posts? And what is creative agility?

William Lane Craig has a seemingly worthy objection to my posts:

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/reasonable-faith-podcast/the-euthyphro-dilemma-once-again?fbclid=IwAR0D-1TnBejeRSklINCFl-ZEI1s7YJukSQbdwOApsNAEdxuy2_AQuFaxpyk

Dr. Craig grounds the moral values in god's nature without making the claim that god is the definition of the word good. He says that divine command theory is an ontological argument. To say, however, that god's nature is good is to define it with a concept: the concept of goodness. Additionally to call god's commands good is to do the same thing. If good describes both of these things then this leads to the conclusion that God's commands are his nature. This renders god a non-person; a vehicle for arbitrary moral commands since his commands are not informed by his good nature but rather by whimsy.

god is good

God's commands are good

god's commands are god

I believe I read this in Practical Ethics.

Yes I believe its possible for god's commands to be moral, but one has to sacrifice the omnibenevolence bit. The now boring main issue is the arbitrariness. And I don't believe that there is a difference.

Yes but if god is omnibenevolent and all that is good, and his moral commands are also defined as good then his commands would be: "God commands god." Which of course makes no sense; that's not a valid command.

On point. But he actually says that nothing he's saying applies to normative ethics; he is just making a claim about the objectivity of god's commands. This is, of course, false. Indeed I think that Dennis Prager would just bite the bullet on this one, being he's a nut.

We all have on average the same nervous system, the same type of brain, the same intellectual and emotional profile

What about mentally ill people and those with personality disorders?

Making sure that populations are empowered by education to reach maximum achievement rather than hampered by an inadequate system is also an important concern. Enhancing medical treatment and technology in general is vital to the prospects for quality of life.

This is exceedingly obvious and doesn't need to be stated in my opinion.
This:

Assuring we do not destroy ourselves with our own technological development is a salient dilemma.

is somewhat interesting.

what detracts from one life detracts from every life in approximately equal measure.

You are really making quite a claim there. Being deprived of social media might be devastating to one person but not to another. I think you must mention privations.

Commonalities of need informing civilized social relationships and the mechanisms of institutions have obtained for roughly ten thousand years, while the window of time within which human decision-makers must exercise themselves to apply and augment social factors in institutional contexts is only a few generations at the most, a fraction of the single lifespan.

Are you saying that people have not acted within institutions to bring about changes in social norms or to change those institutions until less than one lifespan ago? I don't really have any idea what you're trying to say here.
What is this:

evolutionary relativism

to cover their asses

You cannot say this in a scholarly essay.

prevent this rampant destructiveness

Where did this come from? Why are you just mentioning it at the end of the essay?

I tried very hard to understand your essay but it just doesn't make sense to me. Sweeping claims are made with no evidence, such as those about human nature, and the language is muddled. I would recommend sticking closer to a functional thesis. Sorry.

I see more what you're saying. Yes I agree that if people value fetuses they should value the children they become,

Well I'm a white man so maybe I'm moralizing here, but I don't think that no one cares about the child; in fact I would argue that people care too much about fetuses, being they're non-persons for much of their existence. No one has these kinds of attitudes about factory farming. More to the point, I agree that it should be a personal decision on the part of the woman and that a better foster care system should be set up. But I think its okay to have these kinds of debates. But even if women are driven to get abortions by society, that doesn't make abortion moral. So I guess that's where we disagree. Nevertheless it might make condemning women extremely distasteful.

Yes but you should be writing copious essay about the cruelties visited upon ants.

I see that he did that. Fair enough. But if its immoral it ought not to be done right? Or am I missing something?

lol I feel stupid. Yes he should be focusing on those other things.

You didn't answer my earlier question. What's your argument against human life being intrinsically valuable because that life can eventually feel pleasure and have preferences?
Most argue that a woman's autonomy outweighs the fetus's life. You claimed that women should "bear the consequences", which I can only assume means carry the child to term. That, whether or not its correct, remains to be an erosion of autonomy. You did use the word should after all.

He just admitted that he cares about all life.

Well I respect you then. Many are very inconsistent on that point.

I don't think Tzeentch is depreciating the value of fetuses, but rather the autonomy of women. He just doesn't want anything killed.

But its a vegetable. It cannot feel; it is not sentient or conscious. If you think its wrong to kill fetuses that are non-persons then you must have a problem with killing vegetables, or all life. You must also abstain from eating meat. I don't see any tragedy in eating a head of broccoli.

Is it wrong to rip a carrot out of the ground and eat it? You might have to swear off vegetables.