Ethical Intuitionism by Michael Huemer. Now this is some actually-good analytic philosophy.

At most I think you could argue that being in possession of significant wealth, and the freedom that comes along with it, is a (typically) necessary but not sufficient condition for the sort of intellectual achievements that we attribute to those on Posty's list.

I agree with your other points though. — Erik

Sure, yeah, a necessary but not necessarily sufficient condition, I'll agree to that. The socio-economic situation is as much a factor in a person's development as is their particular physiology or character.

i'm hammered and dont give a damn about anything right now, ill get back to you tomorrow maybe, who knows and who cares honestly. life sucks and then you die. if god exists we won't know it cause he obviously doesnt give a damn about any one of us.

edit; dont ban me mods luv u bless u be well etc etc etc

dumb shits like the average internet atheists will say theism is a mental illness.

good thing nobody who has a single neuron gives a shit about what these fucks have to say.

i'm not wrong, and you atheist poseurs know it. read a goddamn book and come back once you realize your fucking retarded "secular humanism" is incoherent and groundless. new atheism is a mental illness you shills.

Probably this has less to do with being intelligent and more to do with being materially and socially privileged as to have the means to pursue personal interests in the depths these people did. Notice how every one of your examples was a white male, and everyone apart from Gauss I believe came from wealthy and powerful families.

Certainly there are plenty of intelligent and passionate people who are economically and socially underprivileged as to make the nurturing of these talents far more difficult. There is a lot of potential that is never realized simply because the economic and social circumstances don't favor many of those who have it. A shame, really.

I don't know the answer to this question, but I'll speculate and say that not everything evolution produces has to be functional and positive for the organism's persistence. There are some things that have evolved that are detrimental to the survival of an organism/species but not so much that it actually purges them. Or it takes many generations for the extinction to actually happen. There are also some traits that evolve that are completely accidental and neutral in functionality, that exist by chance and have no bearing on the survival of the organism.

The experience of free will may be an instance of a neutral trait. Though I'm also speculating that it may have arisen through a complex mental evolution, which might have taken many generations of fragile mental instability where many members of the species went insane, mad or otherwise "broke" mentally. I think it might be reasonable to say that the proliferation of mental illnesses today is only a fraction of what it would have been thousands of years ago, when the mind was still developing. Back then the mind may literally have been a chaotic maelstrom. Or the appearance of a "free will" experience may have come accidentally and only after the appearance of failed "free will" experiences.

It can be difficult to wrap one's head around the amount of time that took place in the evolution of biological life on Earth. It's a ton of time, with plenty of opportunities for accidental developments, most of which would have resulted in failure.

You're sure this is true? I can think of examples where you should do acts that aren't wrong if you don't. For example, you should brush your teeth twice a day, but there isn't anything wrong if you don't. Or, there's a really delicious donut at this bakery you should try it, but it's not because it's the right thing to do. — Purple Pond

I said it can mean the same thing. Asking why something is morally right or wrong can be the same as asking why we should be moral at all. Why should I respect people's autonomy? Why should I not hurt people? Why should I help those in need? etc. My point was that asking why we should be moral only makes sense if we ignore that morality has a claim upon us.

Then we don't necessarily disagree. For you the whole purpose of morality is to tell us what we ought to do. (not merely because of how society functions.) Doing what's right is acting in accordance to that purpose. — Purple Pond

Yeah basically. I'd say morality tells us what we ought to set ourselves to do with the aim of actually succeeding. Other factors may hamper our ability to perform this act that nevertheless preserve our innocence so long as we earnestly tried to accomplish an end. It's not directly our fault that it didn't happen as it should have.

But I'll note that for us personally as individuals, moral responsibility can take on more than we are actually capable of doing. We can feel guilty for not being good enough, remorse for failing to succeed even when the odds were stacked against us. We may not be able to ascribe blame to other people for failing to do the impossible, but we ourselves certainly can and do feel guilty for the same reason.

So why is stealing wrong? It depends on the point of morality. If morality serves to keep society functioning, then stealing is wrong because society can't function if everybody stole from each other.

What do you think? What's the point of morality? Do you see any problems with interpreting morality based on purpose? (Just and idea I want to test.) — Purple Pond

I think asking why something is right or wrong can be essentially the same thing as asking why you should(n't) do this act. For someone coming from an intuitionist angle, asking why we ought to be moral is an incoherent question. Morality is binding and universal; you ought to do what morality asks of you because that's what you ought to do.

Ultimately, "justifying" morality by appealing to its function in social stability only pushes the question back, since social stability must thus be seen as good, desirable, in a moral sense. Unless we deny this desire is anything more than a personal expression of our preferences, in which case this just leads us to non-cognitivism, which then results with the OP as being cognitively meaningless.

So I can "learn German", "read philosophy", "listen to music", sleep and avoid pain.

Personally I think you can't really "decide" your philosophical starting points logically. You can use logic and reason only after you assume certain beliefs to be true. Perhaps after a while of philosophizing you'll eventually vindicate these premises, but the initial jump can't be justified in a purely logical way.

But everyone can choose different starting points. Disagreement may just be traced back to differing preferences on which premises to take for granted. Hence why I think we should be tolerant to each other. Although you could also just disagree with this as well.

So I think there's two questions in your OP:

1.) whether we can freely choose what to believe in, and
2.) whether living without beliefs in relation to something else is possible.

With respect to 1.), I think you are right in that we don't (usually/ever) actually choose what to believe. I think we might even be able to get away with discarding the notion of belief entirely in many cases. In normal life, we "choose" to act based on whatever seems appropriate. It is pre-theoretical navigation, whereas beliefs are theoretical, abstract, and more importantly political.

But I think the argument that we don't choose what we believe is just another aspect of a deterministic argument. We don't choose what we believe, we don't choose what we desire, we don't choose what we ultimately do, because the deus ex machina of libertarian free will is incoherent.

With respect to 2.), this was a part of my recent discussion of agnosticism. If we're agnostics about, say, the existence of God, I think we actually end up "living" in a see-saw between atheism and theism, one moment theoretically considering theism but pragmatically navigating as an atheist, and the next moment the inverse. We have to make some commitment, even if it's temporary, or we're paralyzed by being unsure.

Dune by Frank Herbert

If you reliably demonstrate that God exists, this seems to put the whole concept of faith into jeopardy. Kant's maneuver allowed him to make room for faith by denying knowledge of God.

To the extent that someone thinks religion is about "being right", they're either a nincompoop or a fascist.

Does philosophical progress exist? — Agustino

It depends on what we see "progress" as. Is it just the "solving" of problems, in the "consumption" model of knowledge? Or can it be the appreciation of questions themselves, and the creation of new questions?

A lot of this I think has to do with whether we see philosophical issues as problems or questions. Problems implies we're anxious to figure things out and move on. Questions seems to imply a slower and more appreciative approach, where the attempt to answer a question is but an aspect of the overall "experience" or "process".

Some people may complain that this creation of questions is endless and pointless. Typically they ignore the fact that everything else is endless and pointless. The "magic" of philosophy is with the mystery, the endless folds and twists and perspectives. Once you think you've "solved" a philosophical problem it seems to end up being dull and banal, like a dead weight you drag around. You wonder what the whole fuss was about, and why it's seen as so important.

I'm not saying we shouldn't try to answer these questions, but we ought to keep in mind that finding the "Truth" might and probably will result with us being disappointed, maybe scared. To the extent that we deny this probable possibility, our dreams of escaping our illusions and attaining Truth will be founded on an illusion.

Hence why I'm finding it increasingly difficult to give a damn about any overly-theoretical or academic, "intellectual" pursuit. Enthusiastically pursuing Truth seems to me to already be distorting it. In some sense I think we're not really pursuing Truth as much as we're running away from what we already know to be True. If there's still a good reason to explore the world and discover new things it's because it's fun to hang out with friends and have a common goal. It's not very "aristocratic", but who cares.

Yes, very good. I see you've read your Heidegger.

Therefore compatibilism is impossible. — bahman

No, if we assume everything before you said is true, then libertarian free will is impossible. Libertarian free will is an incompatibilist position.

Free will in another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality. — bahman

This is the libertarian free will definition. Not compatibilism.

If consciousness is not the product of the brain, there seems to be two options:

Occasionalism, which holds that there is no causal relationship between the two substances, physical and mental (since they are actually different), and the appearance of there being causal relations is an illusion originating from the pre-established harmony at the beginning of the world.

Idealism, which holds there is no physical brain at all, and the only substance that exists is mental.

Both are compatible with the observation that bumping someone on the head makes them lose consciousness.

• Read more primary sources
• Self-initiate exposure therapy to anxiety triggers
• Organize my thoughts more for my book
• Regularly volunteer in the community
• Prepare for things to get worse

I'd have to try to find where he said it, but from my memory Wittgenstein wasn't necessarily saying that philosophy was "amazing" (especially since he saw it to be analogous to a sort of disease). He was rather saying that while some people may give up on philosophical questions because "they'll never be answered", he finds their continual resistance to answering to be a source of awe.

Not sure I understand what you're asking.

Kant said the prior triad, and Wittgenstein affirmed the awe of perennial questions.

In the words of Julio Cabrera, philosophy is like my oxygen. Most everything else is nuisance.

Part of what attracts me so much to philosophy is its limitless self-consciousness. You aren't doing philosophy very well if you aren't at least somewhat conscious of what it is you're even doing. This self-consciousness is unique to philosophy, I think. I don't think you've really done philosophy as well as you could have unless you question your own foundations. Only philosophy can ask whether there is a need for philosophy.

But more importantly, it's the dedication, the passion, for critical reflection that makes me love philosophy so much. That you have to have, and be prepared to defend, good reasons for holding beliefs makes philosophy a refuge from the rabble. To not take tradition at face value, to be skeptical of cherished beliefs, and to be ready and willing to question anything and everything is what I see to be necessary traits to a good philosopher.

That you can choose to profess an ideology or system of beliefs that may be thousands of years old yet still be valid to this day. Isn't that amazing? — Posty McPostface

For me it's less about aligning with a certain tradition (most are neither fully true or false but a mixture of both) and more with realizing that these questions are perennial. The same questions that bothered Socrates continue to bother modern thinkers. Like Wittgenstein said, this ought to amaze us, not make us question the value of philosophy.

Really, I think philosophy has most of the really cool and important questions. What we ought to do, what we can know and what we can hope for are infinitely more important than anything else. I hold this view very strongly, that ethics should be the driving force behind philosophy, or anything else for that matter, and not simply a "peripheral" to the "more pressing" topics such as, the migration patterns of walruses or the next iPhone or whatever. Most of that is pointless and banal which is why I find it surprising when people are interested in it. In some ways I think modern science has corrupted our self-image, making ourselves seem to be like technological gods. Some good philosophy will temper that image.

That is, the relief knowing that they could end their suffering at any time makes the suffering much more bearable. — Bitter Crank

I live only because it is in my power to die when I choose to: without the idea of suicide, I'd have killed myself right away.

Emil Cioran, All Gall is Divided

According to Philip Nitschke (not Nietzsche), supplying aging citizens with easy means for a painless suicide will actually increase life expectancy and "happiness". Part of the reasoning is that, since there will always be an easy way out, elderly folks will become accustomed to the idea of dying and will not fear it (as much).

As it should be. It honestly baffles me how assisted euthanasia hasn't been 1.) legalized broadly and 2.) socially acceptable. The age of dying-while-shitting-your-pants-and-moaning-in-constant-pain should have ended a long time ago. I want to die with dignity, and if the state won't provide the means then I'll take the manner into my own hands when I deem the time is right.

Examples of Feyereband in action is a distraction? — tom

...from the thread, yes. Go make another thread if you want to shit on Feyerabend.

OK, so why don't you give a few examples of where Feyerabend's theory was applied fruitfully? — tom

Why would I, when that would just distract from the point of this thread?

Interesting that Edward Feser, whose Five Proofs of the Existence of God has been the topic of several threads here, accepts that the causal chain can go back infinitely in time. His arguments are quite different. — Mitchell

Yes, Feser's arguments are not focused on the temporal cosmological arguments but are focused on hierarchical arguments.

Therefore, it seems that Aquinas would be wrong in denying the possibility of an infinite regress. — The Curiorist

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought Aquinas didn't say an infinite regress was impossible? I thought he actually specifically said that it could not be shown through philosophical argument that the universe came into being due to God's creative act, and that this was a faith-based claim.

So why don't you give a few examples of your problems with Popper's "theory of falsifiability"? — tom

Why are you changing the topic of discussion? just wants other theorists that are similar to Feyerabend.

An excellent rendition of this part of intellectual history, and more, can be found in Alan Chalmers' What is this thing called Science?, which I whole-heartedly recommend. — Banno

It is a decent introductory book, but I felt Chalmer's take on Feyerabend was far too short (only a measly seven-or-so pages) and failed to charitably represent Feyerabend's philosophy of science.

And if that is the case, we might as well go on doing what we have been doing - there is no need to change our minds. That is, if anything goes, then everything stays. — Banno

On the contrary, I believe Feyerabend was all about change. To say that since Feyerabend disapproved of the hegemony of science means that he approved of traditional modes of thinking would be false. Living in a free society entails using this freedom in a responsible and intelligent way. For Feyerabend, freely choosing to utilize science is far superior than simply going into science because society has already chosen it for you, even if in the end the results are the same.

To phrase this as confrontationally as possible - an approach that both Feyerabend and Lakatos might have approved -Following Feyerabend's appraoch to method leads to Donald Trump. — Banno

No.

You've responded by merely asserting mathematics is objective while morality is not. This discussion keeps going in circles.

All scientific testing involves the use of information discovered by other scientific research. — BlueBanana

Yeah but also mathematics, which isn't scientific strictly.

Mathematics and numbers are discovered by perceiving amounts in the physical world. They're a posteriori. — BlueBanana

No. We never "perceive amounts", since we need to already have the concept of amounts before.

The answer is that mathematics can be discovered and proven by scientific testing in practice while morals can only be figured out by subjective a priori intuition. — BlueBanana

Scientific testing involves the use of mathematics that have already been discovered by synthetic a priori analysis.

It seems to me that sincere mathematical propositions have no emotional component whereas moral propositions , if they're sincere, clearly demonstrate an emotional commitment (would you accept as sincere a claim that child torture was wrong made by someone who failed to to show any personal repugnance to child torture?). — ChrisH

That may be true, but how does this alter morality's truth value? And after all, many scientists and mathematicians are deeply amazed by the beauty of certain structures. This is an emotional reaction as well, even if it's not as often.

From what? — BlueBanana

From the a priori intuition that killing people needlessly is wrong.

The only conclusion you can make is that killing makes things dead. — BlueBanana

LOL no, I'd make the conclusion that killing this person was wrong.

We can demonstrate math law by showing that 5 objects + 5 objects = 10 objects. It is rational to believe this is knowledge about an objective math law, in terms of practical knowledge, because math law is applied in our daily lives constantly empirically. The same can not be said about morality.

If you don't think it's rational to believe that 5 objects + 5 objects will equal ten this time, it's probably because your a solipcist and care only about absolute knowledge. — SonJnana

I am not a solipsist by any means. How is 5+5=10 different from saying murder is wrong?

Mathematics knowledge is about a math law. We can demonstrate that the math law objectively exists. — SonJnana

How do we demonstrate mathematical law, and how is this different to moral law?

Can you explain to me what you see to be the difference between mathematics and morality in terms of objectivity, and why the former is objectively real but the latter perhaps not?

Feyerabend is so good man, and really funny too. He's ultimately concerned mostly about morality.