Depression, and its philosophical implications Maybe we can't get into this here, but I don't see a reason for the distinction. It seems to me that pain and pleasure are bad and good on their own terms, whether you think so or not, and that nothing else fulfills these criteria. So insofar as there's a notion of eudaimonia, joy, happiness, or contentment that is not about pleasure, it either doesn't make sense or isn't worth pursuing if it does. — The Great Whatever
Pleasure and pain are indicators of general well-being. The value placed upon these feelings, and others, such as meaning, eudaimonia, happiness, etc, is up to the person themselves to determine. For example, I think there are different types of pleasures, one that simply stimulates the nerve endings, and one that is actually meaningful. The former leaves the person in a state of emptiness after it goes away, while the latter is something that simply complements the feeling of happiness. But perhaps you are right in that this belongs in a different thread.
It is certainly related to the hypostatization of the mind as a substance with an active faculty of willing, as in Descartes' philosophy, which is probably related to the Christian notion of the soul. It's a historical question. The more important thing is just that I don't think this notion of an existentialist heroic free will is at all true to life. That's all. — The Great Whatever
Pre-Socratic philosophy explored the ideas of free will long before Christianity. In fact (correct me if I am wrong here), Christianity's "free will" ideas came from the influence of the Mediterranean region.
I don't buy into classical libertarian free will either. But the fact of the matter is, we are, at the bare minimum, trapped within an illusion of having free will. There's no escaping it. Every action we do feels like we have actively had a role in it. This kind of fictionalism, in my opinion, is compatible with the existential heroism you speak of.