Nihilism, schmihilism. Perhaps you solve it by understanding you accepted it, and are just as capable of rejecting it.

he difference though is in your journey to accept that. — Paul S

Not much of a journey as we remain in the same place in either case.

My question
Do you believe the universe is inherently deterministic or indeterministic (and why)?
(Do you believe God/the universe/your chosen deity plays dice?) — Paul S

My question (as to both questions):
What difference does it make to how we live, what we do?

If he plays dice, nothing is different than it has been. If he doesn't, nothing is different than it has been.

Can you imagine a person feeling demoralized, where this demoralization doesn't have to do with "the world not living up to the person's expectations" about the world? — baker

A person can be "demoralized" in the sense of being disheartened, losing confidence or spirit, for a number of reasons, none of which would address expectations regarding the world in general. Members of a team can be demoralized by losing all the time. Members of an army may lose morale for the same reason or due to the poverty of supplies or not hearing from loved ones. But it seems to me that this thread, or at least Constance, has focused on a far broader, very generalized, feeling towards the world at large, vaguely referred to as Horror, for example, which is "without context." To the extent I can understand this, I don't know how to describe it except as being in some sense a feeling about the entire world, that it's deficient and inspires a kind of revulsion.

This completely misses the point, or even deliberately detracts from it. — baker

You made statements about the ancient Stoics. I responded to those statements. I think my interpretation of their position is accurate.

The ancient Stoics didn't think that that we stand in judgment of the universe, though. They didn't believe that the universe must conform with our expectations or be condemned if it doesn't conform. According to them, we share in the Divine Reason which infuses the universe and carry a part of it within us, but shouldn't complain because the world is what it is. So, this quote from Cleanthes appears at the end of The Enchiridion of Epictetus:

Conduct me, Zeus, and thou, O Destiny,

Wherever your decrees have fixed my lot.

I follow cheerfully; and, did I not,

Wicked and wretched, I must follow still.

It's our part to live in accord with nature, and that means (partly) not be disturbed by events beyond our control. If we complain about the world being the way it is or think it indefensible, I think the Stoics would clearly believe that we're too full of ourselves.

Interestingly, both quotes may be considered expressions of the Stoic views that we disturb ourselves needlessly with things beyond our control, and have within us a part of the divinity immanent in the universe.

We're part of an unimaginably huge universe and fall into despair because it's not what we think it should be. It fails to meet our expectations. Doesn't it seem we're a bit too full of ourselves? The ancients, like Horace, were wiser than we are.

Leucon, no one’s allowed to know his fate,
Not you, not me: don’t ask, don’t hunt for answers
In tea leaves or palms. Be patient with whatever comes.
This could be our last winter, it could be many
More, pounding the Tuscan Sea on these rocks:
Do what you must, be wise, cut your vines
And forget about hope. Time goes running, even
As we talk. Take the present, the future’s no one’s affair.

I find it much more useful to address circumstances than abstracts, especially when it comes to considering the appropriateness of laws and government action.

I want to give an example. Recently, statues of slave owners were torn down by outraged teens - signalling their virtue. One man, Colston - was born in 1636, which - someone might have pointed out were free speech a protected right, was about 200 years before slavery was ended. — counterpunch

If the statute was one of Edward Colson, he was deputy governor of the English Royal African Company, which held a monopoly on England's African trade slave.

I suppose the erection of statues could be considered a form of free speech. If so, I think tearing them down could be as well.

Here in the U.S., the First Amendment applies only to laws and government action. So, teens toppling statutes wouldn't be considered a violation of the legal right of free speech. It would be considered vandalism or destruction of property, however. Government agents arresting or penalizing the teens for doing so could raise First Amendment issues, I think, which may be why there seems to be little effort to punish those who destroy or deface certain statutes.

Now, clearly there could be and are people who think destroying or defacing statutes of heroes of the Confederacy or other statues is improper, and even violates the right of free speech. I, personally, wouldn't weep if there were no such statutes. But there is no legal right of free speech that's violated in the U.S. in those circumstances. Thus, the importance of defining "the right of free speech." In the U.S., the government has no obligation to protect speech by some from others, except to the extent other law is violated (e.g., laws prohibiting disorderly conduct).

Much as people may object to the use of boycotts or protests by other people to restrict speech, this isn't a legal issue in the U.S. generally unless it becomes violent, or some law other than the First Amendment is violated. Otherwise, people may debate whether such conduct is or is not proper or moral, but law isn't a consideration. So unless the law changes very significantly, the government here won't become involved in claims of violation of the non-legal right of free speech. Nor will people who aren't associated with government be subject to claims they've violated the legal right of free speech. The government may be subject to claims it has violated the legal right itself, as may state owned/operated universities, however.

It seems that in the U.K. they're considering making or have made speech a right protected by the government; in other words, government would enforce the right of free speech at least in some circumstances, and even require it be "promoted." That would be interesting, and I think very difficult to do.

To see the world as it is, refrain from imposing on it what you fear or imagine. Take it from Wallace Stevens, who said it better than any philosopher could in The Snow Man:

One must have a mind of winter
To regard the frost and the boughs
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow;

And have been cold a long time
To behold the junipers shagged with ice,
The spruces rough in the distant glitter

Of the January sun; and not to think
Of any misery in the sound of the wind,
In the sound of a few leaves,

Which is the sound of the land
Full of the same wind
That is blowing in the same bare place

For the listener, who listens in the snow,
And, nothing himself, beholds
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.

Instead, why don't we discuss the need for these measures. What is going on in universities that government has to step in to ensure free speech? — counterpunch

You see, whether the government has to step in, and whether it should step in, and what it should do about it if it has to or should step in, all depend on what the "right to free speech" means. But you're clearly unable or unwilling to address that.

Huh? In what way are we unable to define free speech as a human right? There's a massive literature on the subject. Acquaint yourself with it and you'll have answers to your questions. — counterpunch

In what way? You've provided an example of a way of doing so, haven't you? And I even went to the trouble of asking questions which, had you responded to them, might have assisted in disclosing what you think that "right" entails.

But I understand it's difficult to do, though you apparently don't. The consideration of questions which arise in considering possible situations can tell us something of the beliefs of those asked.

Let's consider the human right of free speech (let's call it "the HROFS" for convenience) as you seem to think it exists, specifically with reference to the halls of the academy. We can at least thereby determine what questions you decline to answer. And, for good or ill, I know J.S. Mill well enough to know he wrote far more than On Liberty and that consistency wasn't one of his strong points.

Would a student's refusal to attend a class taught by a professor because he/she/whatever is a Marxist (or Objectivist--by which I mean a follower of the L. Ron Hubbard of philosophy, Ayn Rand--or Libertarian, etc.) be an exercise of the HROFS?

Would a professor's insistence on teaching the Marxist (or Objectivist or Libertarian) view of a particular subject be an exercise of the HROFS?

Would a student or professor's refusal to attend a speech by the proponent of a particular ideology be an exercise of the HROFS?

Would a student or professor's non-violent protest of a speech being given a person on campus (you know, "singing songs and a-carrying signs") be an exercise of the HROFS? Would it be a violation of the speaker's HROFS?

Would a university's refusal to invite a person to speak because it disapproves of what that person may be expected to say be a violation of that person's HROFS?

But I don’t like the idea that universities should be legally required to actively promote free speech for the same reason I don’t think they should be legally required to actively promote Marxism. When the state compels people to promote a certain stance under the threat of sanction we have entered the realm of censorship. — NOS4A2

That's a concern to me as well, as I noted previously, at least as a matter of definition. What will constitute promotion of free speech under the law? It happens defining "promotion" will involve defining "free speech" as well.

It's a human right, a cornerstone of western civilisation, and fundamental to academic integrity. — counterpunch

Well, just what does it mean to say free speech is a "human right"? Does it mean the state should be prohibited from restricting it? Does it mean that other people should be prohibited from restricting it, by the state? Does it mean that institutions, as opposed to individuals, should be prohibited from restricting it? What would constitute a violation of the human right of free speech? What would be the exercise of the human right of free speech?

If we're unable to define a human right we shouldn't insist there is one.

I am very simply asking, what IS this horror, pain and the rest. — Constance

You want to "honestly describe" the world, the world as it "really" is, before any human act. This apparently must be done "context free" though just what that means must remain unexplained, there being no examples to be given. You ask what "this Horror is" (Horror being, I would guess, something which must be also described, if at all, "context free").

Well, I'm just a simple country lawyer (sorry, not really), and phenomenology may be beyond my limited, brutish understanding. Perhaps your questions or statements must be gnomic, but it renders response, and communication, difficult. When we're ambiguous, though, I suggest we're merely ambiguous; we can't be credited thereby with any special knowledge or insight.

This may just be the nature of the beast, whatever that beast must be, it being one which can't be described except outside of context or--I suspect--at all. And so we or those like me come back to that which we must pass over in silence.

So, let's do just that. Wittgenstein was wise to recommend silence. Silence saves us from trying to say in words what can't be described in words, but can only be asserted or named as something. Or Nothing? Is Nothing something which can be shown, at least, even to such as me? Perhaps I'll know the Nothing only when and if I'm suspended in dread. But then, how will I know when I'm suspended in dread, or what dread is for that matter? Will I know it when I'm suspended in it?

Oh dear, not another one. I'm not going reply to any comment arguing that insisting on free speech implies universities having to entertain flat earthers. It's a disingenuous, and pretty damn stupid argument. I — counterpunch

Oh dear, you may be referring to my post, not Hanover's. But as more than a brief glance at it would reveal, I was making no argument for or against free speech, whatever that is supposed to be. I was wondering what might be meant by the anticipated legal obligation to "promote" free speech referred to as being part of this law. I exaggerated because I'm inclined to mischief, but think it a legitimate and interesting question. Just how is a university supposed to promote it? Promotion would involve an affirmative effort to foster free speech. Does that mean inviting those with unpopular views to campus; providing them with special venues or forums at which they may declaim; suppression of those who seek to keep them from speaking? Or would merely posting signs encouraging free speech be adequate? I'm interested in how the law would be drafted. It's a lawyer thing, perhaps.

I'd be interested in seeing the underlying legislation, to determine just what is meant by "free speech" and what is meant by a legal obligation to "promote it." How does one do that? Invite Flat-Earthers to speak at the union? Hold symposiums regarding whether the Holocaust took place? Here in our Glorious Union government is merely prohibited from restricting speech, it isn't required to impose penalties on those who fail to "promote it." Thar be dragons, or some kind of monsters, I think.

Alas, I really don't understand what you mean. The world is a world in which we commit acts, necessarily, because we're part of the world. It isn't a world in which we don't commit them, as we commit an act whenever we interact with the rest of the world; we do so every moment we're alive. The judgments we make are necessarily human, like all else we do resulting from our interaction with other parts of the world. We can't take ourselves out of the world to consider it or describe it as if we were outside it, nor do I know of any reason why we should want to do so, but that seems to be what you imagine can be done. How do you imagine a human would "simply report" what the world is if not as would any human embedded in and formed by the rest of the world?

For me, I want to honestly describe the world. Then, further thoughts may be warranted. I think the presence of suffering makes the world indefensible, and in need of a metaphysical counterpart to "redeem'" it. I — Constance

Dewey wrote of something he called "the philosophical fallacy" because he thought it so pervasive in philosophical thinking. Very simply put, he thought this was neglect of context. I think the use of concepts such as dread, anxiety, suffering and so on as appearing in the existentialist's lexicon, applied to describe (and perforce condemn) the entire world, is an impressive example of neglect of context. Neglect of context in using and applying concepts and making judgments and claims based on them is unreasonable and potentially dangerous.

The "room" you refer to is unimaginably vast. To claim that room is indefensible because of the act of a particular person (instead of making the altogether obvious and unobjectionable claim that the act is indefensible as is the person committing the act) is similar to claiming that the world is evil because of a sin committed by a single person, the claim we find in the doctrine of Original Sin--perhaps the most glaring example of neglect of context we've managed in our history. The concepts of "evil" and "sin" applied so broadly and thoughtlessly have been used for various purposes since St. Augustine came up with the notion, none of them laudable, or so I think.

Most are not disturbed by this, that is, until they start reading Heidegger — Constance

All the more reason not to read Heidegger. I'm not a fan of his as a philosopher, and especially not a fan of him as a person, as I've gently hinted in this forum now and then. But let's pass over that in silence. The path you describe is a path I can't follow, nor do I want to follow it, though I read all the Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky I could find in my distant youth.

From time to time I wonder when and why this hyperbolically negative attitude toward life and the world arose among and came to be expressed by intellectuals. We can't know all that was thought and believed by people in the past, but as far as I'm aware it doesn't appear until the 19th and 20th centuries, and seems to be peculiarly European. This view that living is a terrible thing and therefore requires explanation doesn't seem to have been held by ancient thinkers of the pagan West. The view that living, and the world, are terrible things became prominent with the rise of Christianity. No matter how nasty the world is, though, Christianity promised salvation and a vaguely defined happy and holy life beyond the world provided one is appropriately Christian. I speculate that as European thinkers lost their faith, they could think of nothing similar to replace it, and so succumbed to despair or sought refuge in alternatives that appear to foster melancholy, or a manic kind of romantic mysticism (leading some to be fascists or Nazis).

If it is, it may explain many of the problems associated with civilization as well as philosophy. The belief the world isn't truly real or important as something else, like heaven, is; the belief that nature and our fellow creatures are ours to do with as we please; the prevalence of self-conceit; the indifference to the state of the planet; all can be seen as resulting from an assumption we aren't parts of the world or somehow superior to it.

The difficulty I have with much of this is its de facto assumption of the world as something apart from us. I think that conception is embedded in any claim of being thrown into the world without choice, as if we're from one place and have come unwilling into another. I think it's also assumed whenever we speak of the world being suspended for our viewing and understanding, and perhaps most clearly when we complain of alienation.

Part of what attracts me to both Pragmatism and Stoicism is their acknowledgement that we're parts of the world. Once we come to that realization (which some may think too humbling) much of what's been called philosophy, i.e. the propagation of dualism, dissolves. In Stoicism, the acknowledgement we're part of Nature has a spiritual aspect, divinity being immanent.

And you've read Kant, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and the rest, and understand their analyses of the structure of experience, but none of this rings a bell? — Constance

In truth, I've read some Kant and some Heidegger and some Sartre; my old copy of Being and Nothingness is probably somewhere in my house with other old books. Some of this rings a bell, but is not of great concern to me.

I'm almost hesitant to admit it given the popularity and vulgarization of Stoicism these days, but I accept as wise the Stoic view (roughly stated) that we shouldn't allow matters outside our control to disturb us, and our concern should be mastering what's in our control, and we should strive to act accordingly. Accepting that, what rings a bell as you say doesn't have visceral significance to me--it isn't something which drives me to despair or distraction, nor do I feel a need to explain or understand philosophically why we're here if that means discovering the hidden meaning and purpose of our existence. It isn't clear to me we can do so by thinking, no matter how hard we try.

The Stoic view of us as parts of nature and our relation to nature has similarity to the view accepted by Dewey there are other similarities with Pragmatism as well (John Lachs wrote an interesting book called Stoic Pragmatism).

But my thoughts are that this goes deeper, begs questions, because this spear in my kidney and the excruciating pain is not a problem solving event — Constance

According to Dewey, we only think when we encounter problems; we're reflective when we encounter circumstances which we seek to control or change. Otherwise, we conduct ourselves largely by impulse and habit. James said, as I recall, that for the most part the world, to us, is a kind of blooming, buzzing confusion which takes focus only when we feel the need to pay attention to it. We feel pain and though pain itself isn't a problem solving event, reducing or eliminating it is. What is it about pain that we must otherwise understand or think about? Why, as a general matter, we should feel it? Theology has a ready answer via Original Sin--but why is this a philosophical concern?

Not sure what you're getting at here. — schopenhauer1

I was obscure.

It seemed from the quote that he had come to certain conclusions regarding which there was no more to be said that wouldn't be repetitious.

At any rate, this matter IS meant to be "treated as descriptions of "state of affairs". I see it like this: Many talk about what cannot be spoken clearly, but their talk is not meant to be poetic, but a provisional description, and hermeneuticsthematically removes the brakes from logical standards of acceptability.[ — Constance

As a description of a state of affairs, though, "The Nothing" does nothing for me. It doesn't communicate or express dread in any sense. In fact, it seems preposterous. On the other hand, I can understand what "dread" and "alienation" mean without much effort, and I can even understand, more or less, what is intended by "suspended in dread" as I think it can work, though clumsily, as a metaphor. A poet wields metaphor much more adroitly, though. I don't think anything is gained by resorting to such terminology when normal words suffice.

Then again, if I want to understand what dread is, or I'm seeking a strong description of dread, I don't think I'd ask a philosopher. I'd more likely ask a psychologist or an artist. I think, with Wittgenstein I suppose, that certain things must be shown to be understood or evoked. There are some things philosophers aren't good at, and when philosophers aren't good they're very bad. As Cicero said, "There's nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't already said it."

I've always wondered whether problems with translation account for some of my lack of sympathy for certain philosophers, and wish I was more familiar with languages other than English.

I think Rorty misunderstands Dewey in certain respects as do other neo-pragmatics, treating him as a kind of postmodern figure before postmodernism, and am more aligned to such as Susan Haack and Sydney Hook when it comes to interpreting him. Larry Hickman does a good job in his analysis of Dewey, particularly when it comes to his views on technology. I think the difficulty people have with his views on ethics arises from the fact that he's more concerned with developing an effective and intelligent method on which to make ethical judgments (any judgment, really) than determining what's inherently good and bad and acting accordingly. But when it comes to "everydayness" (if I understand what you mean by that) Dewey was there, and so was James, long before Heidegger.

That's the end of the book, right? It would seem he'd have nothing more to say.

I think of of W and philosophers in the analytic or ordinary language tradition as having, and serving, a particular purpose. That purpose was therapeutic. That purpose was to point out that certain of what had been called the problems of philosophy weren't actually problems, but instead arose from various misconceptions having to do with the confused and obscure use of language. W referred to showing the fly the way out of the bottle, and avoiding the bewitchment of our intelligence by the use of language. Carnap wrote of pseudo-problems in philosophy, and memorably commented on Heidegger's quasi-mystical writings. J.L. Austin in Sense and Sensibilia, Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind showed how philosophers had created problems and puzzles by treating, e.g., minds as if they were objects or things separate from the world.

So when they refer to words as being nonsense, or meaningless, I think they refer specifically to words as used by philosophers in writing philosophy. Carnap, for example, thought that Heidegger's almost occult references to "The Nothing" which only encounter when "suspended in dread" were nonsense as philosophical statements, as are other metaphysical statements, and could not be treated as descriptions of state of affairs, but could be conceived as expressions of attitude towards living; or perhaps as theology, or perhaps as a kind of poetry or artistic in some sense, in which case they wouldn't be nonsense.

When it comes to "reconstruction" of philosophy, which it seems many thought was necessary in the 20th century, I personally honor the efforts of Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ryle, Austin and others, but ultimately prefer those of Dewey. He argued against the dualisms and metaphysical presuppositions which had been enshrined in philosophy, but also felt that distinctions such as fact/value and is/ought were inappropriate. Ethical statements were not meaningless, though efforts to arrive at asummum bonum to guide conduct were misguided. Ethical judgments could be made reasonably, could be made better, just as practical value judgments could, by the application of intelligent method (which he called "inquiry" generally). He didn't come to the conclusion philosophy was futile, but thought its focus shouldn't be on the traditional "problems of philosophy" and should instead be on "the problems of men."

Who am I? How came I here? What is this thing called the world? What does this world mean? Who is it that has lured me into the world? Why was I not consulted, why not made acquainted with its manners and customs instead of throwing me into the ranks, as if I had been bought by a kidnapper, a dealer in souls? — Constance

I suppose I should pass over these questions in silence, following Wittgenstein's advise, but what the hell:

You're you, whatever that may be.
You "came" here because you were born.
The world is the environment of which we're a part and in which we interact with other constituents of the environment.
The world simply is, regardless of any meaning anyone assigns it. It doesn't require meaning to be.
You weren't consulted because you didn't exist.

There. Don't you wish I'd passed over those questions in silence?

Wittgenstein isn't saying we can't ask such questions, nor is he saying we can't "speak" of them. Obviously we can and do. I think he's saying, though, that to the extent those questions are raised, asked and addressed they're better addressed by such as poets and artists and those inspired religious/spiritual among us than by philosophers. I agree with him up to a point, as I think such questions unless addressed by such non-philosophers are answered as simply as I answered them, to the extent they admit of any answer. Beyond such answers, we enter the realm of speculation, imagination and feeling, even art--especially art, I think, and for me poetry and music in particular. Philosophers aren't artists, and merely appear silly and are obscure when they pretend to be.

Has any philosophy ever solved any problems? — Mww

Some philosophers concerned themselves with problems actually encountered in living and provided reasonable solutions to them, I think.

I solve my problems; philosophy just sets a proper stage for looking at them. — Mww

Well, I agree it can--to the extent it fosters the application of critical and creative intelligence to problems which actually arise.

Common usage. I keep forgetting what constitutes philosophy is these days — Mww

The contempt of certain philosophers' for the "common" or "ordinary" is their most revealing conceit, and likely the reason why they fail so consistently to grapple with and solve actual problems, preferring to create problems which they think important precisely because they admit of no solution.

Well, I've gritted my teeth and have read the article, but am disinclined to "have a go" at it, being disinclined to have a go at the issue or dispute itself.

"I don't know" seems to me the only possible intelligent response if asked whether God exists and I see no point in debating God's existence any further. I have no quarrel with those who believe or those who disbelieve until they insist on telling me so and, worse yet, insist on telling me why the believe or disbelieve. Similarly, I have no quarrel with those who claim to know whether God exists until they insist on telling me so and insist on telling me why or how they so know.

That said, I think it's possible for particular views of God to be less reasonable than others. Perhaps this is more an issue of religious belief than an issue of belief in God. For example, belief in God as envisioned by organized religions of which I'm aware are, I think, clearly less reasonable than the so-called "God of the philosophers" if only because belief in the former entails acceptance of a variety contentions which go beyond the question of existence and relate to the characteristics, conduct, intentions and desires, writings, rules, laws, and words of God, and the rituals and ceremonies, and even language, which must be employed in worshipping God and are required as expressions of belief.

"German philosopher Immanuel Kant never actually married during his entire 79-year lifespan." — fishfry

It's arguable he died a virgin, poor fellow. But it's known he was friendly, at least, with a number of women, if he didn't have sexual relations with them. Perhaps he, like General Ripper in Dr. Strangelove, didn't avoid women but denied them his essence.

I think insecurity can result in toxicity, but also mere aggressiveness.

Do you think there is a man who isn't concerned about his masculinity? — unenlightened

My guess would be that there are times when every man is unconcerned by it, e.g. if he's busy enough, or tired enough. There are times when what's immediately a matter of focus or desire (sleep, hunger, thirst) will distract even those most insecure or obsessed in their masculinity from their fixation with it, if only until those needs are sated. I would think that would be the case for any person regardless of what gender they have or identity they profess (this isn't mean to be offensive, I just haven't kept up).

But I think it is possible to be unconcerned by it more often than that--or perhaps indifferent is a better word, for those of a Stoic bent. And I think it's less of a concern to those who, like me, are growing old or just old. I believe that those who are concerned about their masculinity are too concerned about what other people think of them, and the older I get, the more I just don't give a damn what most people think of me.

.

I'm sure my knowledge of the kinds of naturalism is dated, but I'm sympathetic with SN2 and SN3 as described in Janus' quote from Gabriel. I suppose mine is a kind of fusion of Dewey's naturalism and the Stoic belief in immanence.

There is much to recommend this. Except that it applies to every male from the age they become aware of their sex and learn to insist on a blue toothbrush not a pink one. — unenlightened

Well, one can be aware of something without worrying about it. Men worry about their masculinity when they're anxious or concerned about it, e.g. when they are concerned they're lacking in it or anxious because others may be insufficiently impressed by it.

he objects of reason - numbers, logical laws, and so on, which are indispensible to the operations of reason - these certainly not observable in nature - nor need to be, in the case of a priori truths. These kinds of ideas are the basis of 'transcendental arguments' in philosophy. — Wayfarer

I think we err when we maintain that nature is made up only of observable objects or their equivalent, myself.

I see. It must have a location in order to exist in nature, where it may be seen, touched, smelled? It's a thing, then? Would it have a location if it exists outside nature?

Well, what can I say? Consciousness clearly exists in nature. Thus, we're conscious. It seems to me that if someone wants to establish it doesn't exist in nature, or somehow exists in and out of nature, they have the burden of proof.

Is there a reasonable possibility that you are, or can be, someone/something else? If not, then the question "Why am I me?" seems more like the question "Why do I exist?" That question can be answered if it's intended to mean "How did I come to exist?" We can come up with answers regarding how we or others come to exist. Otherwise, though, "Why" asks for a reason, and there need be no reason that things exist. Things simply are, regardless of what we think or believe.

. But physically, I am the center, from purely my own perspective, looking out at the world and all other beings. — Scott South

Well, you're part of the world, and having sight you look at the rest of it, just as all who have sight do. So, you're like many, many other people. I'm not sure why you think that makes you the center of the universe, though. We can all claim we're the center of the universe for the same reason, something which it seems to me is nothing for any one of us to be excited or concerned about. If you're speaking metaphorically, that's all well and good, provided you understand that's the case.