Well, that's no worse than other arguments we see offered in favor of the existence of God.

I've been practicing law for longer than I care to say, and have given it some thought. The law as a functioning system has little to do with ethics as philosophy, though practical ethics plays a larger role. I think it's a serious error to conflate law with morality.

You confuse debating the existence of God with considering whether God exists, and coming to a conclusion. I suppose others who cherish the task of repeating arguments made for centuries are similarly confused. There's no "fire" left in the debate. It's become a kind of elaborate ritual. Each side of the debate engages in a kind of special pleading, in any case.

Some views of God, and for that matter of religion, can be said to be less unreasonable than others, but I think that's as far as reason can take us, and debate is fruitless in the absence of reason. I find it impossible to accept a personal God, or a transcendent one, but like the Stoics I find it possible to accept an immanent God. it's not one that resembles the God most worship and too often try to make other people accept. But it's a God worthy of poetry and music of a sort that appeals me and by which I can catch a hint of it, and I think it's is in that fashion that we are best able to discern what's divine in the universe. It's fruitless to argue about or try to explain why we like poetry or music of a particular kind as well, I believe.

In arguing against an absolute claim (we should not have children, ever), I'm not required to adopt an absolute position contrary to it (we should have children, always). I may instead claim that we may sometimes have children, and in other cases we should not That's my position. It's a decision to made by thoughtful consideration of circumstances, one's duties and obligations, on a case-by-case basis.

Crime and punishment are functions of the law, and the law is one of the things we do.. And what we do, outside of philosophy classrooms and forums and other such places, has nothing to do with free will or determinism. We ignore them by living. We do things, with no consideration to determinism.

Praemonitus praemunitus then, I suppose. My personal feeling is that people should refrain from telling others whether they do or don't believe in God, but far too many of us seem unable to do so, thus inducing others to say yea or nay and perpetuating this tiresome debate (such as it is). When, oh when, will there be a respite?

I discount those cases whereby God is merely used as label for something that I do believe exists, such as the world. That is just wordplay - a triviality. — S

So is the quote, just above, you know.

But thank you for the unsolicited declaration. Secretly, I've always hoped you would explain your "stance in relation to God." I was too shy to ask.

I don't accept the argument that people should not have children because a person, once born, will suffer somehow, sometime.

I misunderstood. Sorry.

This can lead to mediocre parents making excuses for terrible parents with platitudes like "we all make mistakes" — Andrew4Handel

Well, there's always the eugenics option. That would eliminate those damned mistakes. Probably reduce the suffering inflicted on those unfortunate enough to be born, too, if successful.

I think like most or all antinatalists I despair for the current and future generations undergoing unnecessary hardship. The solution to all problem is not to create more people, but even if you don't go to that extreme you can at least rationally procreate in moderation — Andrew4Handel

It's quite possible to sensibly advocate the position that reproduction should be reduced. The key word in your post as far as I'm concerned is "rationally." For me, the claim that it is wrong in all cases to have children and right in all cases not to have them is far too absolute, and I don't know of any reasonable support for such a contention.

I doubt I can think of anything more futile than wondering whether I was born for a "good purpose" or complaining if I was not.

Read Xenophon, if you haven't already, for a somewhat different account of Socrates.

I dislike Plato's use of Socrates as his mouthpiece ("sock puppet" may be too harsh). Then again, I also dislike the use of the "dialogue" style of writing (if that's the appropriate term), where characters are made to yak at each other so artificially, expressing different views and debating. But it certainly was employed by many, even after ancient times, and may have been thought the best means of expression. If you're going to use that vehicle, inserting yourself as one of the participants in the manufactured debate seems both awkward and self-promoting. Maybe that's why Plato used Socrates. Maybe he wanted people to think Socrates shared his views. Maybe he thought the use of the Socrates character would cause people to pay attention. I can't say. But it's not unlikely that this practice may have seemed less disturbing back then.

I think I'm fated to believe, always, that there is not now, has never been, and never will be, any purpose in discussing "free will" or "determinism."

Some people claim everything started at a big bang moment.

The truth is existence starts when our parents create us. Then we grapple with existence. — Andrew4Handel

One does what one can, of course. But the beginning of the universe is just a tad remote in comparison with the sexual intercourse of our mommies and daddies, and assuming it's possible to determine the cause of the Big Bang, nobody (yet? who knows the extent of our self-pity and self-righteousness?) has been condemned as immoral for causing it.

The conceit that one exists because of the moral failings of others and as a consequence suffers due to their wrongdoing will taint any view of life.

Questions occur once you start to exist. They appear not to have answers. — Andrew4Handel

Ah, but to the antinatalist there are answers to some of them. For example, the question "Why am I (or we) here?" is easily answered. Plainly, it's because our parents combined in wrongdoing, causing us to be born; by all rights we shouldn't be alive. "What is the purpose of life?" Well, we shouldn't be alive, and wouldn't be but for the moral failings of our parents. They're responsible for us being here, and they did wrong in doing so. So, we clearly don't live for any good reason, we live because they found some pleasure in the thought of having children or just made a mistake, or were raped or somehow compelled to have children. See?

Well, no. I need believe nothing at all about the Bible but for the fact you quoted portions of it to point out your interpretation of those quotations is based on various assumptions. The quotations speak for themselves.

And what I point out, which I think is supported well by the history of the early Church, are the problems arising from the use of certain language in the gospels, and the need which arose to produce an explanation (such as it is) for it consistent with the claim Christianity is monotheistic.

That an analogy is intended. That scripture is (conveniently) strewn with symbolism. That Jesus said what is attributed to him in the gospels. That Jesus was God. That Jesus and the apostles knew Latin. That Jesus knew Greek. That Peter knew Greek. That "Khristos" is the equivalent of "Logos." That sort of thing.

I would think such questions wouldn't occur to someone who believes life is the unfortunate result of reprehensible conduct.

Well, let's just say I'm less inclined than you to accept an interpretation of this kind, which makes what I think are far too many assumptions.

It seems to me that if you believe that our parents should not have had children--that if they acted morally none of us would be alive--you would think a great deal if not all of philosophy is, like life itself, of little worth; merely something to be borne due to our parents' failings.

Dewey's writing is rather dense as well, I must say.

It's his views on education I thought of in reading the OP. That and his theory of logic, or inquiry.

As to Stoicism, from what I read Deleuze addresses it extensively. So, again judging only from what I read about him, did Foucault.

I don't know Deleuze and so may be talking through my hat, to use a charming old phrase, but damned if he doesn't sound a lot like Dewey here. And it seems he was fond of the Stoics, too. Perhaps I should read his stuff.

Moreover, in/felicity seems to me to be far more broadly applicable to language than truth: truth has always struck me as a 'regional' language-game, important in its own right and in the proper circumstances, but largely uninteresting outside of those contexts. Questions of felicity though, seem to me to saturate basically all our utterances. — StreetlightX

I'm surprised, and in a way pleased, to say I agree with you entirely. I think you put it quite well. I think it saturates all our utterances because language is fundamentally part of or related to what we humans do as social creatures living in the world, together with (creating and following or using) institutions, powers, history, rules, customs, etc.

I dunno. I think performative utterances as described by Austin are parts of an act, in combination with non-verbal conduct and recognized customs, in some cases the law, or rules. An utterance would be infelicitous if the words are such that the act does not take place. The "I do" in a marriage ceremony doesn't create anything in itself, but in combination with the rest of the ceremony (including the presence of a priest or minister or official with the requisite legal authority officiating and signing the necessary documents, witnesses, etc.) will result in two people being married. Words by which a bet is made must be accepted by another participating in the bet. One can't name a ship without the necessary authority to do so, and by smashing a champagne bottle against the ship's bow. (There are examples used by Austin, I think).

The words themselves do nothing; they're part of what is done. I don't think words in themselves create anything. Nor do I think Austin intended to make any epistemological points in How to do Things with Words..

You'll apparently be surprised to learn that when I make a claim, I do so with every expectation that I should be able to defend it. It seems we may differ in that respect as well.

I venture to make a suggestion. If you make an assertion, here or elsewhere, that you're unwilling or unable to support, you should make that clear when you do so. Then, those foolish enough to question your claim (which you invited people to respond to) rather than ignore it would at least have been given warning that you don't think you need to support it.

You're not required to accept this suggestion, of course, but as it would save others time and trouble, it would be a kindness. Vale.

I wish I could, but no. I have enough knowledge of Latin words, vocabulary, to arrive at the meaning of Latin sentences in some, perhaps many, cases--the meaning of the phrase I quoted in a prior post, for example, is clear enough. But I wouldn't call myself fluent. It's something I like to try to do, though, and perhaps sometime I will be.

But how do we justify, logically, this "moving on"? — Pattern-chaser

I'm not sure I know what you mean, here. Are you saying that if something is logically possible, there is no reasonable basis on which it may be disregarded?

And logic says that a plausible theory that can't be falsified or disproven is (at least until the arrival of new evidence) acceptable for use, and may not be casually dismissed. — Pattern-chaser

I think the significant word in this otherwise absolute statement is "plausible." A plausible theory is one that is reasonable, probable, feasible. So, it would first be necessary for the theory in question--e.g., that we're brains in a vat--to be plausible. If you maintain that we're brains in a vat, you must establish that is a plausible theory before you can say it may not be casually dismissed. You have the burden of proof--Onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non ei qui negat.

I may have a greater regard for considerations of utility in making judgments than you do. But It seems to me your position is based on a logical fallacy, i.e. the argument from, or appeal to, ignorance.

I'm inclined to follow C.S. Peirce when it comes to this kind of thing. Simply put, the question whether we're brains in a vat, and similar questions or claims, are frivolous. If there's no reason to think something, it's pointless to think it. Peirce put it well, I think.

"But the mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There must be a real and living doubt, and without this all discussion is idle."

"Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we don't doubt in our hearts."

We deal with theories without evidence by testing them. If they can't be tested, we move on.

From Merriam-Webster Online.

Death:

1 a : a permanent cessation of all vital (see vital 2a) functions : the end of life ·The cause of death has not been determined.
·managed to escape death
·prisoners were put to death
·death threats
— compare brain death

b : an instance of dying ·a disease causing many deaths
·lived there until her death

Also:
4 : the state of being no longer alive : the state of being dead

I think you folks are talking about something else.

Indeed, yet we are here talking about it. — Posty McPostface

Are we? It seems to me we're talking mostly about the fact people fear it, people and other animals mourn the death of other people and animals, and whether and why it's a taboo subject. True, there has been some mention of causes of death, and when death occurs. We can talk about planning for death, how to face death, how death is caused in various cases, how we react or should react to death, whether there's an afterlife, whether the soul survives death, whether there are ghosts, but death itself?

When you think about it, there's not much to talk about, is there?

To evaluate the argument, you must pick a property.

P1: If there exists beings who are flatulent, there must exist a being who is flatulent to the maximum degree.
P2: There exists beings who are flatulent.
P3: Flatulence to the maximum degree exists (which we call something...say "Thomas Aquinas").

It seems less than persuasive to me.

Flatulence is probably more a property than moral goodness, though. A person may be moral, but I don't know if a person possesses "moral goodness."

I don't quite understand what you mean by this. Care to expand? — Posty McPostface

My impression is that input from actual practitioners of disciplines which become topics in this forum isn't sought, and when given is unwelcome.

I feel as though we need a category dedicated to topics pertaining to psychology — Posty McPostface

If the treatment of topics pertaining to law is any indication, the treatment of topics pertaining to psychology wouldn't be well received particularly if someone with formal training participated.

Just saying.

How one exists in the moment and how that environment effects your experience. — Art

It would seem, then, that every experience is a metaphysical experience.

We regret the death of those we love, understandably, but we torment ourselves about our own. I hope that's not the beginning of philosophy, but perhaps someone can establish that's the case.

Really, though, one merely dies, just as one merely lives, just as things merely are. That may not be philosophy, but that's wisdom, I'd say--ancient wisdom, in fact. I don't think we've found a better way to sum things up. "I am not Eternity, but a human being—a part of the whole, as an hour is part of the day. I must come like the hour, and like the hour must pass." (Epictetus)

If you're curious, the death I saw take place came slowly, at the end of a long illness. He was not conscious by then, as far as I know. No last words, no farewell. We watched them carry him out of the house in a bag.

Would having an experience of "thinking, therefore I am" count? Or feeling existential dread? — Marchesk

I don't know. I'd call those experiences something else. The former, an experience of manufactured doubt; the latter, an experience of dread.

yeah and heres a poll: whos ever actually seen a person die? — csalisbury

I have.
.

actually seen it? — csalisbury

I have.

and how it progresses? — csalisbury

I have.