Now, you and I, andrewk, and whoever might read this, will probably want to judge the person as guilty of theft. But let's assume that absolutely no one, except the thief himself knows what happened. Doesn't it seem like the thief is "in fact" guilty? But, by what principle is this person guilty? There has been no judgement made by a court, nor by any human being, and the person feels no guilt. How can we say that there is any guilt here unless we assume that the judgement is made by God? — Metaphysician Undercover

If we assume a person is guilty of a crime when that person commits a crime, and we assume that person committed a crime, then the person is necessarily guilty of a crime. It's possible nobody but the person who committed a crime is aware that a crime was committed, but it doesn't follow in that case that a crime was not committed or that the person is not guilty of a crime.

Not quite, I think it can be reformulated as, "If no new person was born to experience the goods of life, would this be a tragedy?". Or it could be stated, "Is a world without people to experience the goods of life a tragedy? If so, why? So if that is correct question to ask, what is your answer to it? — schopenhauer1

I don't think the first example is a reformulation in any significant sense. The second, though, I believe to be an entirely different question. But I don't think the world would be a tragedy if humans didn't exist (we would have to exist to experience), because I don't think the world would be a disaster or calamity in our absence.

Literally speaking, you're right. But there are the people who will be born, and that involves a choice. — Marchesk

I merely say it's inappropriate to refer to what doesn't exist as if it does exist. So, the question posed would more properly be stated (I think) as "Is it a tragedy if a person does not experience the goods of life?"

Since it appears like a judgement is necessary in order that the person is actually guilty, and the court has not judged the person as guilty, yet you state that most people would say that the person is "in fact" guilty, then don't you think that most people assume God makes this judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

"Guilty" of committing a crime. I think most would say that a person who actually committed a crime is guilty of committing a crime, regardless of whether a jury found that person to be "not guilty" because the jury didn't think the state met burden of establishing that the person did so beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't think God is required in order to determine whether the crime actually is/was committed, however.

What do you think "guilty" refers to then? If the jury makes a determination of "not guilty", but you allow that this is not necessarily a true determination, and the person might actually be guilty, what does "guilty" refer to? The actual, factual, guilt or non-guilt of the defendant, according to this assumption, is something independent of the jury's judgement. So when the person is judged as "not guilty", and the person is "in fact" guilty, what does "guilty" here refer to? Is it a feeling which the person has, deep inside, this person somehow feels guilt, and this is what "guilty" refers to, that subjective feeling? Or, is it a judgement made by God, that the person is in fact guilty?

The question being, is actual or factual "guilt" a subjective feeling, or an objective judgement? If it's a subjective feeling, then if the person does not believe that they have done something wrong, there is no guilt here. But if it is an objective judgement, doesn't this require the assumption of God, to pass that judgement, and support your notion that the person whom the jury judged as not guilty is "in fact" guilty. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the law, a person is "guilty" of a crime when a court or jury determines the person has committed a crime (or confesses to a crime). A person is "not guilty" of a crime if a court or jury determines that it has not been established "beyond a reasonable doubt" the person committed a crime. There is no recourse to God in the law. There is only recourse to higher courts. The law is a system in itself.

There are no people who don't exist. There are no unborn children. There are no potential future people.

I like that reply, it's well composed. If it's the case, as Burr said, that "The law is whatever is boldly asserted and plausibly maintained", then why is God not the law? Many theologians boldly assert, and plausibly maintain the existence of God. But a theologian is not a lawyer. So, is it because there are not enough lawyers boldly asserting the existence of God? Why would a lawyer even try to defend the existence of God, because as the theologians know, this takes great effort, and a lifetime of dedication to plausibly maintain, and there might not be any financial benefit for the lawyer who tried this? — Metaphysician Undercover

Burr, as you may know, was the grandson of preacher/theologian Jonathan Edwards. I have the impression Burr wasn't religiously inclined, though. One of the stories you hear about Burr is that, when he was asked by an attending cleric while on his deathbed whether he renounced Satan, he replied that it wasn't the time to be making enemies. You can hear similar stories about Voltaire and Machiavelli, though.

The answer to your question may be that the law can't be God, or God the law But it would seem to me that many have been converted by bold assertions, which perhaps were plausibly maintained, and so have come to believe in God or one of a particular kind. What Burr was probably referring to as "the law" was, in fact, what people--a judge or a jury--could be persuaded was the law.

How can this be the case? Are you saying that there is a different form of "good", and of "true" which the law follows, which is not necessarily good or true for the individual? How could it be, that something which is true or good within the law, is false or bad in common society? Wouldn't this give lawyers license to do bad things, saying that it's bad for normal people to do these things, but it's OK for lawyers, working with the law to do them? Isn't that a double standard, like Plato's Noble Lie? It's good for the rulers to lie to the subjects, because the lying is for the subjects' own good, but it is bad for the subjects to lie. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, consider. In criminal law, in the U.S. at least, juries regularly decide a defendant is guilty or not guilty of a crime. That's a determination, a finding, in the law; subject to revision as the result of an appeal, but otherwise inviolate. However, that determination is not necessarily true (as commonly defined) or untrue. That's to say, a person may well be not guilty of a crime and yet have committed it--may in fact be guilty of it, or so I think most would say.

And, a judicial decision may be "good law" if it hasn't been overturned in the sense that it's binding even if otherwise bad under most definitions. The Supreme Court's Dred Scott was a perfectly "good" legal decision (it was appropriate given the law) until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Machiavelli addressed glory in the context of politics and power in The Prince.

Care to expound on this special kind of intelligence required to be an able lawyer? Is that the capacity to outwit the others, thereby proving your point, regardless of whether or not what you are arguing for is the truth? Would that be a type of intelligence to be proud of? — Metaphysician Undercover

According to Aaron Burr, an able lawyer and, I think, a much maligned figure in American history: "The law is whatever is boldly asserted and plausibly maintained." There's some basis for that claim, or was then. There's a lot more law now and the opportunity to "make" law solely by clever argument in a courtroom was no doubt much greater when Burr practiced then it is for practitioners now. But for a litigator, and particularly one that regularly does jury trials, what Burr referred to is primarily the ability to persuade others that a position being taken is reasonable and just and should be accepted. This involves the ancient art of discourse or rhetoric employed by such as Cicero, a great lawyer and politician and a great communicator of philosophy if not a great philosopher. I think that a degree of intelligence and skill is required for one to be a successful practitioner of that art.

Also required for one to be an able lawyer (I think) is the ability to study language closely, a good grasp of logic, a good memory, analytic skill (the ability to create or rebut an argument), and a practical knowledge of human nature. Self-regard, confidence and a thick skin are useful as well, but I'm uncertain that intelligence is a factor in those characteristics.

What is "true" in the law and what is "good" in it can be very different things than they're considered to be outside of it. The law is a vast system with rules which have developed over many centuries and one of the purposes of those rules, I believe, is to support the rule of law which can be opposed to individual views of what is "right." The advocacy system under which the law operates here contemplates a conflict between two opposing views played out in front of an impartial tribunal. For the most part I think the intelligence required to be a lawyer is something one can be proud of, but as is the case with other things the use to which the intelligence is put may in certain circumstances be unworthy.

don't have loved ones to bury, not for a very long time and what propelled me to an intellectual life despite my gender and appearances, hence why I spend time on places like this rather than entertain social networking en masse. And if I pursued the study of law for moral purposes, I did so for the utility to position myself in an adequately suitable profession in order fulfil that utility. I don't want to work in a low-paying job in the interest of this objective, but I do. — TimeLine

Alas, I've been involved in the burial of loved ones, long ago and fairly recently, and have practiced law for longer than I'd care to admit. Although being an able lawyer requires a certain degree and kind of intelligence, though, I don't think it or what one does regarding the corpses of loved ones have much to do with living an intellectual life. This I'll admit was intended as the point of my little comment; a modest attempt at irony.

I live an intellectual life, studied law when I didn't want to, but most of all I dedicate myself to those fleeing from the 'corpses' of their loved ones. — TimeLine

Ah, but to the extent living an intellectual life is related to law and corpses, you haven't lived a truly intellectual life until you practice law when you don't want to and have buried the corpses of your loved ones.

I've no idea what you're going on about, now. — Heister Eggcart

Not much, really, beyond the fact that I think the Caesars probably had friends, though not many, being Caesars, and that Jesus as putative God probably had none, being God.

Pirate. — Mongrel

Well, yes. But that's all.

I'll admit PICU personnel aren't particularly romantic about such things, as you probably aren't about the content of your job. — Mongrel

What could be more romantic than the practice of law?

The "or something" is a cocktail party. Possible offer of a chocolate martini on the table as junior's name has already been changed to "donor" in the medical records. — Mongrel

You seem bitter. But a chocolate martini? There's no accounting for the taste of an atheist, it seems.

But being a friend of Caesar isn't the same as being a "friend" of Jesus. — Heister Eggcart

I suspect Jesus never had a friend, really. At least, we never hear of one, though it's claimed he "loved" John--according to John, in any case. It seems he was fond of Lazarus, however. I suspect the many Caesars had friends, though very few.

Parents who stand at the bedside of their dying child acting like we're at a barbecue or something.. — Mongrel

I can't help but wonder what "or something" refers to, here.

When I took Latin in high school salvo meant "sustain", more or less. So, salvation would entail whatever might be permanently sustained, such as, in the Christian tradition, one's lower being residing within God after death, for example - this predicated by faith whilst living, of course. — Heister Eggcart

Well, perhaps salus is better as a word from which "salvation" is derived, which is to say "safety." So, believe in Jesus and you'll be safe in the after-life, or saved from Satan or sin or whatever naughty things all good Christians deplore. I prefer, though, to think of it as derived from Salve, a Latin greeting, which can be translated I'd think as "Hello!". Such a happy thought. So "salvation" would be the state of being able to say something along the lines of "Hi, Jesus!", as one would be a friend, a pal, of the Lord. Salve Regina is of course a Marianist hymn to his mother as queen of heaven.

Which of course is why religion will win. Everybody wants to be "a friend of Jesus" just as everybody wanted to be "a friend of Caesar."

Given the circumstances, I think its more likely the Statue of Liberty was intended to be a representation of the Roman goddess Libertas, whose temple was built on the Aventine Hill after the defeat of Hannibal

I have enough laws to deal with, thank you, and so will decline to read and comment on this one, which seems rather silly according to the blurb appearing in the OP. "[P]rotection to moral rights", forsooth. It seems simply to benefit artists to the detriment of those foolish enough to acquire, or accept, their onanistic output.

Just to be clear, I was ciceronianus. I am Ciceronianus the White.

have a right to be treated with dignity and you have a duty to treat me that way.

And we can make it more clear than that. If you kidnap me and hold me against my will, you have violated my right to live freely. Such would be the case regardless of what the law is. — Hanover

Well, no doubt I have a right to disagree with you, and you have a duty not to infringe on that right. So, that's the end of that, I suppose. Who knew morality was so simple?

That's a quibble really. I think it makes perfect sense to say "I have a right to be treated with dignity" as much as it is to say "You should treat me with dignity." — Hanover

There is a difference, though, between "I have a right to be treated with dignity" and "I should treat you with dignity." In the first sentence, the speaker is making an essentially selfish claim, asserting that they must be treated in a certain way." In the second case, the speaker is asserting he/she should act in a certain way towards another. The speaker in the second case has accepted or acknowledges an obligation to act in a certain way; in the first case, the speaker claims others have an obligation to the speaker, by virtue of the fact that he or she is the speaker.

Is it the case that I have an obligation to act towards X in a certain way solely because X has a "right" to be treated in a certain way? That would require quite a multiplicity of rights. Perhaps I should act in a moral way for reasons which don't require that I assume the existence of rights which cannot be infringed.

Virtue ethics might be an example of normativity without rights. — Michael

Yes, I think that's so.

Non-legal rights are just another way of saying what morality requires, but I don't see the quibble over whether to call them "rights" or not is significant. We typically speak in terms of our moral duties to others, which would imply the other person has a certain right to be treated a particular way, and none of that implicates law. — Hanover

I think it's more appropriate to say we should or should not treat another person a certain way, rather than he/she has a "right" to be treated or not treated in a certain way. To say we have "rights" which are unenforceable, and may be flaunted at will--which are not, in other words, legal rights--makes little sense to me. I think it's much like saying "I have a right which should be enforceable and which you should not flaunt, but I can't enforce it nor can you be penalized for infringing it. It is, nonetheless, a right." That, for me, is confusing.

Such is the quandary of the non-religious in offering a foundation for morality in every instance. I'm not suggesting that God is necessary to be moral, but removal of some higher authority from the equation does make it difficult to explain why your moral beliefs are more correct than another's. — Hanover

There is no quandary presented, though, unless you think it necessary that the creator or governor of the immense universe thinks, or has somehow mandated, we creatures living here have certain "rights" or has granted us such, in order for there to be moral conduct.

But can't there be an unjust government and unjust laws? If so, it seems the government and laws are being judged by a higher authority. — Hanover

There are both. I don't think there is a higher authority who acts as a judge would, though, nor do I think one is required for that purpose. I don't think we need a notion of non-legal rights in order to maintain that governments and laws are bad.

When we speak of having a right to do something, or of our rights being infringed, I think we say simply that we should be allowed to do, say or think something or that someone should not be preventing us from doing, saying or thinking something. I personally find it difficult to maintain that God says I--or anyone else for that matter--should be allowed to do, etc., something, or that it is a law of nature that I of anyone else should be allowed to do, etc., something.

Although I agree with the general idea, I think you're forgetting non-legal rules that are recognised and enforced, e.g. employment, family, religion, etc — Michael

I'm not sure what you mean. There certainly are non-legal rules, i.e. rules of conduct which are generally observed without being law, but I don't think they're necessarily founded on the concept of "rights."

Rights, schmights.

The only rights worth speaking of are legal rights; that is to say, those are the only rights which matter, as they are (generally) recognized and may be enforced. We may claim we have rights of all kinds, of course, and ascribe them to God or Nature--for all the good it will do us--but unless they're recognized in the law we're merely expressing our self-regard.

Rights in the law serve the purpose of restricting the government and others from restricting us from doing, saying or thinking what we wish, or at least discouraging them from doing so and making them subject to penalty in that event. It's not clear to me that a conception of something along the lines of inalienable rights granted us in some obscure manner by a creator or inherent in the universe is needed to serve such a purpose, however.

Ah well, thought I'd make a statement.

Amateurs. Leiden University had its first university course in 1575 and Leuven probably before that. Tssk. Tssk. No wonder US law is such a morass, it's still 200 years behind continental Europe — Benkei

The School of Law at Bologna was founded in 1088, and is by my understanding the oldest in the Western world--one of the many great things brought into the world by Italy.

and also happened during the Roman Empire - not last week. — Wayfarer

Well, I wrote in response to a statement by Mariner about Roman persecution of Christians. I couldn't think of a way of responding to that statement by reference to what took place last week.

When did the Roman State stop beheading women for sorcery? — tom

Perhaps when it stopped beating its wife. But alas, that's not an aspect of Roman history I've researched.

Remember that a Roman persecution against Christians (for example) was a "killing of apostates and blasphemers — Mariner

The greatly exaggerated persecution of Christians by the Romans was characterized in various respects, depending on the need and circumstances. Sometimes, Christians were described as atheists. Primarily, I think, they were persecuted because of their contempt for and objections to pagan expressions of religious belief, such as public festivals held honoring the gods, violence towards temples, their refusal to participate in the imperial cult, their public criticism of ancient customs and traditions, their refusal (at first) to hold public office or serve in the legions.

But generally the Roman imperial state cared very little about religions of any kind, unless they became threats to public order or were seen as threats to the state itself. Trajan's famous letter to Pliny about pursuing Christians advised they not be actively persecuted. The Jews were, for the most part, tolerated because of their ancient and seemingly tribal god, and were exempted from compliance with the imperial cult. Of course, when they tried to throw off Roman rule, they were ruthlessly suppressed.

Regarding the "Great Persecution" under Diocletian, unfortunately the imperial edicts describing the reasons for the persecution didn't survive, and we must rely on the descriptions from Christian sources. But I don't think they were ever persecuted because of their belief in Christ; it was their attitude towards other gods and their conduct towards other religious practices (including perhaps most importantly the cult of the emperors and practices supportive of the imperial state) that would occasionally result in persecution.

The Roman state didn't become involved in active persecution solely because of belief in particular gods until it became Christian.

Then you need to read more. As I said, I'm not getting into an anecdote battle. — Thorongil

Why read more? To collect more "anecdotes" regarding Christianity or Islam that you'll disregard, being adverse to an "anecdote battle"?

Really, though, I'm aware of the fact that Islamic fanatics exist and by all accounts wish to impose a cruel and primitive theocracy on all, and are killing and otherwise great harm. I have no problem at all in saying they're a menace to civilization. You may well be right, and Islam may be the most violent of the historically violent Abrahamic religions. And, I'm inclined to say the New Testament has far less references to violence than either the Old Testament and the Quran. I think, though, that has made little difference in the propensity of Christians to do harm. I think the fact that Christians are not doing violence in the name of their religion now isn't attributable for the most part to their study and regard for the New Testament. It's never stopped them from doing violence in the past.

In 1095 you say?

Meanwhile in Muslim countries, atheists are killed, children are raped, homosexuals are thrown from high places. In the putative Caliphate, Yezidi children are placed in industrial bread-kneeding machines and fed to their parents, while the girls are bought and sold as sex-slaves. This, in full compliance with Sharia in the 2017. — tom

Ah, I see. We're to ignore the history of the Christian religion, or perhaps history in general, in comparing Christianity and Islam for purposes of this thread. As you will; carry on then.

But this is massively misleading. Were there such Christians? Sure, but there were many more who did follow the example of Jesus and the principles found in the NT. Anecdote battles are pointless, though. We're talking about the overall historical trajectories of the religions in question and the societies they formed. On that score, Christianity clearly has the better record than Islam. — Thorongil

Christian intolerance and oppression, not merely of pagans but of others believing themselves to be Christians, began almost immediately as Christian orthodoxy took form, starting with the reign of Constantine. Constantine issued edicts prohibiting Christian heretics from assembling and confiscating their property. The Christian emperor Theodosius was zealous in extirpating heresy (and also closed pagan temples and schools) and barred Christians who didn't follow the dictates of the Council of Nicea from holding public office and decreed that only Nicene Trinitarian Christian was the true religion. Augustine famously claimed that religious error has no rights. A fifth century abbot commenting on the religious violence taking place claimed: "There is no crime for those who have Christ." In 1095 at the Council of Clermont, Pope Urban II sanctioned the idea of bellum sacrum ("holy war").

Forced conversion of heretics, pagans and Jews, violence against Jews, the Inquisition, the Crusades, all led up to Christian religious wars on a large scale (which probably first commenced in the 16th century in Europe). The importation of Christianity outside Europe into the Americas and the East had very unfortunate results for native peoples as well.

So, I'm not sure which religion has been more violent over time. I have no desire to defend Islam against claims of violence, but I think violence is inherent in any belief that a particular religion is exclusively true and God wants us to act only in a certain way and believe only certain things. Muslims have not been and are not the only people who have held, or hold, such a belief.

Arguments to the effect that "Islam hasn't had enough time to develop" (which leads to a kind of soft bigotry of low expectations) or "you can find some verses in the Quran that sound alright" (which ignores the general flow of the book) are red herrings — Thorongil

Thinking of me? But I have no "high expectations" of any kind where (organized) religions are concerned, and if that's bigotry, it applies to all of them, not to any in particular. I merely note that the religion of Christianity has had a notably bloody history; something to bear in mind when comparing it with other religions, including Islam. The fact that the gospels don't preach violence or intolerance has had little or no effect on the conduct of Christians, who've been cheerfully killing and persecuting themselves and others for centuries, for religious reasons.

If Christians themselves disregard the gospels and the NT in their conduct, why should we "regard" them it in coming to conclusions regarding the conduct of members of other religions, or in comparing them to Christians? That merely establishes that Christians haven't honored their holy books, which doesn't say much for Christianity, the religion.

Well, think of it this way. Mohammed died approximately 600 years after Jesus died. Christianity has had a 600 year head start, so to speak; it's had more time to "mature" and become peaceful. The bloodiest Christian religious war, the Thirty Years War in which Catholics and Protestants laid waste to each other and central Europe, took place in the 17th century, ending in 1648, a little over 400 years ago.

So, fair being fair, give Islam another 400-600 years before comparing it with Christianity as a religion. See you then.

There were nothing like what we know of as law schools at the time of birth of our Great Republic. Harvard and William and Mary claim to have the oldest law schools (Litchfield does too), starting around the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, but those claims seem to be based on something like the fact they had a person who was called a professor of some kind of law. In those days, aspiring lawyers would "read the law" by serving as interns, or apprentices, to practicing lawyers. One can still become a lawyer in this fashion in a few of the older jurisdictions. I think a 7 year period of "reading the law" is required. My opinion is that if someone wants to actually practice law "reading the law" is the best way to learn what it means to be a lawyer. So, typically, students at law schools will clerk for law firms part time if they want to get an idea of what they're getting into--or they should.

So I think it likely that Hamilton became a lawyer by "reading the law" as most did. How good of a lawyer he was I don't know really, but from what I understand he was generally successful though long-winded, unlike his nemesis Aaron Burr, who was succinct and on-point. They tried a few cases together.

Jefferson, of course, was a lawyer as well (we are a nation of lawyers, not men). Both were remarkable, highly intelligent men. Who was the better thinker? John Adams.

That guy died in a maze. — Mongrel

True, but he got to talk to Lloyd. It was worth it.

When the Nothing nothings, does it do nothing? In other words, is there nothing the Nothing nothings?