This period of American history reminds me of the immediate post-Flavian era of Rome.

Post-Flavian? Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius?

Sorry, but only a god (perhaps he caught himself before he said "Fuhrer") can save you.

Hell hath no fury like a being-lover scorned? Well, "Let be be the finale of seem." We're in the kitchen with the concupiscent curds. Or Dinah; I'm not sure which. It's not so bad.

Ah, you wish to make me sad.

You want to know what is? Read The Light of the World.

Can't let "being" be, it seems.

I'm not entirely concerned about what you do or don't think — StreetlightX

Help! StreetlightX is depriving me of my being!

But if your concern is whether Quine does or does not in principle limit the question of being to what's said, I'd say that in this article he does not, perhaps because that possibility doesn't occur to him, perhaps for other reasons.

You see, I was trying to respond to what seemed to be your thoughts regarding the application of ontology. Your thoughts concerned me regardless of whether mine concern you. Perhaps we have different ontological commitments, though.

I suspect that ignoring them is considered to deprive them of their being, which would thus render treating someone poorly, unfairly, improperly--or it would seem treating them well--an ontological commitment or the result of an ontological commitment. Presumably it would do the same as to any conception or perception of anything as well as any interaction with anything, or so it would seem to me.

I think of the Academy Awards as silly as well, and am uninterested in them for that reason but also because my preference is to watch movies only when they appear before me, gratis, while I'm sitting in a comfy chair in my living room, if indeed I watch them at all. So I tend to have little or no knowledge of or interest in the movies the industry congratulates itself over when it's time for the Oscars to be given, let alone the actors who appear in them.

I don't mean to be tiresome, but wonder whether ontology is properly or usefully applied in this or other cases of social, political, legal, cultural controversy. What do we accomplish by treating such controversies as matters of "being"? In what sense is "being" at issue? It seems that there are objections because too many (or only) whites are nominated, too many (or only) whites involved in deciding who is nominated for and receives an Oscar. If the Oscars are about dispensing awards to outstanding movies and outstanding participants in movies, ideally race wouldn't be a factor in making any determination. But the situation is not ideal. So, what are the concerns? If the concern is that what is considered outstanding is prejudiced because too many whites are involved in determining who and what is outstanding, how does this involve "being" or how can it be rectified by the study of "being"? Would ontological analysis result in there being less whites involved? If the concern is that non-whites are being actively discriminated against when it comes to nominations and awards, is that the case because non-whites are denied "being", and will that cease when they are accorded "being"?

In what sense wouldn't it be doing so? Call it a value judgement if you like: this would just to be say that our ontologies are based on value judgements; call it a desire for revenue through property taxes: this could just be to say that a particular ontology is motivated by such a desire. When Quine simply defines 'the ontological problem' as 'what is there', nothing in the question motivates a response in terms of our saying 'such and such is'. When, as a disabled person, a city doesn't build the ramps and elevators required to access otherwise "public" space, is not your very existence (or being, as Quine is wont to say) being in some way denied? When, as a gay person, your ability to express your desire is curbed by draconian laws that make "sodomy" a felony, is not the same at work? Perhaps you think this is overwrought, but some of the largest political movements in history - over race, over gender, over class - have been born from just this impulse to wring social and cultural existence out from systems which do not acknowledge them to exist in some way or another. — StreetlightX

I don't think "being" is involved in any significant sense in such issues, unless it is defined in such a fashion as to mean something which presumes existence and includes other considerations, ethical, legal and political. In that case, though, it would seem ontology isn't a distinct area of study or inquiry.

Of course, those who achieved the adoption of laws or obtained court decisions addressing the rights of the disabled and gays didn't do so by maintaining that their being was being denied. Maintaining that it was denied or is being denied would only serve to obfuscate the questions addressed by the courts and legislatures which are and have been decision-makers as to such issues. I don't think treating social, political or legal problems as involving ontological questions would be beneficial to their resolution.

It appears that "ontology" may be defined rather more broadly than the study of what there is, but I question whether a city can be said to commit itself to a particular ontology when it makes land use decisions; or whether it's at all useful to characterize such a commitment as ontological in nature. In what sense is the city committing itself to an ontology by doing so, instead of or distinct from something else? It would seem it would be making a value judgment, or acting out of a desire for revenue through property taxes, for example, or due to prejudice of some kind. Do such things depend upon a particular ontology beyond an acceptance of, e.g., the existence of people, dwellings, money?

Fred Koch was one of the founding members of the John Birch Society.

I suspect there's an emotional argument for not discussing whether there is a God. I'm sure it would be at least as persuasive as those arguments we keep making that God is or is not.

Everyone is really a realist. Which is to say that we all treat the rest of the world of which we're a part just as we would if we were all realists, rendering philosophical debate in this area for the most part one over a difference which makes no difference. But that's just me.

The Making of a Murderer is interesting only as an example of manipulation, gullibility and the disturbing power of social media in an age where nobody takes the time to think, being consumed by the need to react, in print or on video, as quickly as possible.

It's interesting to review how the study of philosophy and its significance is described on the website of the university where these gentlemen teach, in light of this article: http://www.unt.edu/majors/uphil.htm

Shoes for Industry!

However, should we attempt to not latch on to any intellectual theory (scientific and philosophical alike), since it most likely is false?

If it's most likely false, there's no reason to treat it as anything but most likely false.

I tend to think much of the problem with traditional metaphysics results from a refusal to accept the fact that we and our "minds" are as much a part of the world as anything else is; that we're not spectators of a world apart from or external from us. We're participants in the world, which makes it rather odd to maintain that we can't know what it "really" is or even whether it is, because we're "in here" and it's "out there." I can't recall if Wittgenstein writes about this, but others have.

There is no need for certainty, though. The fact that we deal in probabilities and that conclusions are subject to revision doesn't render philosophy or anything useless or less than legitimate. Intelligence consists of acting, inferring, based on best available evidence. If we require certainty we commit ourselves to futility, but not otherwise.

I can see how the need to distinguish kinds of things would arise, as we regularly enough engage in comparisons and the association of certain characteristics with certain things would be necessary. In medicine, for example, we would associate certain symptoms with certain diseases. Dewey's instrumental logic, for example, can account for the generation of "universals" of a sort as the result of common or specialized inquiry resulting from encounters with problems and their resolution. But the characterization of them as entities, and even as entities having a special status, is something I find bewildering.

I'm not sure what you refer to is that kind of universal.

I'm fond of Roman history, and of some of the Romans. My nom de forum/blog gives that away. Roman Stoicism appeals to me more than Greek Stoicism; it's more human. Though Cicero claimed to be an Academic, he clearly favors the Stoic view.

As for pre-battle rituals, a favorite Roman of mine, due to one act only, is Publius Clodius Pulcher. He commanded a Roman fleet during the first Punic War. It was thought appropriate to consult the Sacred Chickens before battle. They would be brought forth and given food. I assume this was done with whatever solemnity was possible. If they ate the food, things would work out well for the Romans. Before this battle, however, they wouldn't eat. When told of this, Publius Clodius famously remarked "Then let's see if they will drink" and had them thrown into the sea. The Claudii were generally arrogant to the extreme, but I think kindly of him for his conduct in that case. The Romans lost the sea battle, by the way. The Sacred Chickens would not be mocked.

Ritual was important to the Romans and used to be important to that remarkable ghost of the Roman Empire, the Roman Catholic Church. But though I might admire the beauty of ritual, it doesn't impress me as far as providing guidance is concerned. Lucretius, though an Epicurean and not a Stoic, was wise in many respects as was Epicurus.

I think it's possible to determine with some accuracy and is a basic manner what people desire, what they love and hate, want and dislike. So, it's possible to use that as a basis on which to make judgments of value, moral judgments, in the exercise of practical reason. Just as it's possible to make intelligent value judgments (regarding what we ought to do, who we should consult, to obtain certain ends) it's possible to make intelligent moral decisions.

What does "murder is bad" mean to you? Is it just true instinctively? Is it true because a lot of people agree that it is? Is it empathy that makes it bad? I guess I'm asking for your theory of morality.

That's quite a request. If you want a theory, I'd have write a book or essay, and I'm not sure I have what would constitute a formal theory in any case. So, a summary must suffice.

I think murder is bad because I think I shouldn't kill without good cause. I think that we should have reasons, good ones, for what we do. Sometimes, what is moral is determined by asking "Why?" instead of or in addition to "Why not?" Thus, "Why should I murder someone?" I'm something of a Stoic, or try to be. I accept that it's foolish and destructive to desire or be overwhelmingly disturbed by what isn't in my control. What's in my control, as a rule (to which there may be exceptions), are my thoughts, emotions and actions. Hate, avarice, envy, anger result when we want or fear things beyond our control. Generally, our desire to murder is due to our concern with things beyond our control and our inability to self-regulate what is in our control due to our desire for things beyond our control.

I suppose that's the essence of one "theory." Another might have its basis in the fact that I think I should not be murdered, and this should be respected by others. As that is the case I think it's likely others feel the same way, and I'm unable to believe that I'm so special or unique that my desire not to be murdered should be honored but the desire of others not to be murdered should not be honored.

Simple answers to a difficult question, I know.

I think I saw this film a good deal of time ago. I have little memory of it. Based on the scene, my guess is Woody Allen had been reading Dostoevsky. That would explain the move's title as well.

People do indeed get away with murder. Some feel guilty over it. Some do not. I don't know if, in this movie, prosperity resulted from the murder. Dostoevsky and others pondered whether the fact that people get away with murder indicates the universe, or God, is unjust and whether getting away with it establishes it is no wrong.

It's unclear to me why anyone would believe that the fact people get away with murder bears any relation to whether it's good or bad to murder, unless they assume that murderers must be punished somehow in order for it to be bad. I think that begs the question. It's also unclear to me why the fact that a person prospers after doing something bad indicates that the universe is unjust or is an injustice.

There's no reason why the universe should conform to our expectations. The fact it doesn't shouldn't be surprising, given that we're such a tiny part of it.

Ah. I misunderstood. It's possible, certainly.

I'm game for most anything, but I think you'll find that any thread relating to Ayn Rand will be spurned by most members of the forum.

As to the Kripke example, the "ordinary man" using the name "Walter Scott" is in fact using it to refer to Walter Scott. The "ordinary man" is mistaken, however, in believing Wally wrote that most enchanting work Waverly. Why think anything else about such a situation?

By the way, is the "ordinary man" referred to by philosophers a kind of cousin of the "reasonable man" we lawyers like so much? My guess would be he isn't, as the philosophers' "ordinary man" seems to be considered a dimwit and the "reasonable man" by definition is not.

Well, she was a rather nasty piece of work as a person; intolerant, humorless, wildly egotistical. She was a kind of cult leader, and even old friends who came to disagree with her were banished. It's possible she did herself no favors by being prone to exaggeration, perhaps for publicity. She was an operatic character. Her worshipful followers today are generally pricks, and no doubt this impacts her reputation. Her exceedingly silly, hectoring books of fiction are an embarrassment if read after adolescence. As a thinker, she was derivative at best. Jon Oliver's show did an amusing little bit about her in one of it's "Why is this still a thing?" segments.

As presented here, I think her assertions are entirely unremarkable, and even trite. I'm not sure what old Mike thought was so revolutionary about her responses. She was on her best behavior in this interview.

Any state west of the Mississippi is relatively new. Louisiana, of course, isn't really a state at all.

The BLM leases public land, BACK to the ranchers that have been there since before the BLM. Does that not sound a bit illogical to you?

I'm sure what you mean by this, Tiff.

I'm no expert on the history of Oregon, but know it to be relatively new as a state. Before becoming a state it was a federal territory, of course, but as such was formed by my understanding from land possessed by Native Americans who were breezily disregarded by the U.S. and Great Britain as they alternately disputed and resolved their claims over the land. The federal government, I believe, legally owned what is now Oregon until it began giving and selling its property to white settlers. It didn't sell all its land in Oregon, however. It retained land, including that which is now this wildlife refuge. Under a law which in 1908 authorized the president to designate federal lands as such a refuge, Teddy Roosevelt created Mulhear Wildlife Refuge by Executive Order, that year.

So, my understanding (which may be incorrect) is that no rancher ever owned this property. Whether they were "there" before the BLM I don't know; it's a fairly new federal agency. I don't know whether they were there before Oregon became a territory either, though I doubt it. If they were, however, their presence would make no difference as far as legal ownership of the property is concerned, no more than the presence of the Native Americans long before any white person settled on the land made any difference. It belongs to the federal government; only the federal government can lease the land, and it has every right to do so. What the ranchers may think about title to the land is not relevant. The federal government has no reason to recognize any ownership claim of the ranchers.

This dispute is about money, which is being manipulated for their benefit by people who want more money.

I dreamed I saw Joe Hill last night. Hanover was a scab crossing a picket line while telling him to blame that cheap bastard, Bitter Crank.

What is it, though, that induces us (or some of us) to conceive of Universals, Being and Not-Being and such? Not something we encounter in everyday life, I would think. We become aware of red houses, red roses, etc. We may in certain cases be prompted to remark on the fact that a house and a rose are both red. How get from that to speculation regarding redness as an attribute and thence, worse yet, to redness as an attribute having some kind of separate existence rather than limiting ourselves to noting as it seems we would in certain circumstances that we painted the house red to go with the roses or because we like how red roses look, for example? What induces us to speculate on what it is to exist and not to exist, the difference between something and nothing?

It strikes me that these issues are contrived, in that they don't arise naturally (or so I think) but we manufacture them nonetheless. Language or its misuse may create confusion, lead to untenable conclusions, but there is something that precedes language used in an effort to describe the contrivance. Well, this may be a psychological issue and is in any case not something addressed in the article, so I'm probably going off topic, and will stop.

Ammon Bundy bears a startling resemblance to Torgo from Manos: The Hands of Fate a movie dear to the hearts of fans of MST3K. I wonder if they would best be besieged, as it were; nobody in and nobody out, until there is a resolution.

A very nice read, but I'm dismayed that such exercises were required. The positions he disposes of so neatly seem so silly it's difficult to believe they were, well, believed. Perhaps this may be attributed to his skill or rhetoric. It's said Aristotle was something of a dandy, so I assume his beard was trim and well combed, but Plato's was tangled indeed. Still, I can't help but wonder why, and how, the question of "What is?" in the philosophical sense arises. The question makes sense to me in particular contexts, but it seems to me a real, and most peculiar, effort is required to raise the question as a philosophical issue.

For older white guys with guns, it's all about money unless it has to do with erectile dysfunction, prostrate issues or the failings of those who are not older white guys with guns. In this case, supporters of convicted arsonists have taken over a refuge established over 100 years ago by Teddy Roosevelt because they want to make more money grazing cattle or exploiting mineral rights.

I took a quick look at it, and it seems to be predicated on a significant distinction between our bodies and ourselves. Thus, references to what "my body" does or doesn't do, and how it impacts "me." But I merely glanced at it. It's interesting, though, to note the different ways men throw. We Americans, perhaps because we play and/or watch baseball and football, seem to me to throw differently than British men, for example (at least as shown hurling hand grenades in WWII movies).

I just wanted to suggest, if nobody has done so yet, a penalty for the crime of adultery. The wearing of a scarlet letter, of course. In this case, "A" would stand for adultery and Ashley Madison.

I can't wait to find out what there is. I assume there isn't much, though, as it seems Quine addresses it all in a single essay. Will it include feminine body comportment, mobility and spatiality?

I'm busy setting up my Tauroctony scene on my lawn, complete with Mirthras, his bull, Helios, Cautes and Cautopates. I hope the neighbors don't mind.

The Quest for Being, Sidney Hook. The essay, that is, in the book of the same name.

OK. I admit I reference it only because the word "Being" appears in the title, so I figured it might have a chance of being selected. But in all honesty I don't think those who consider "Being" an object of study and discussion will like it.

It's natural to have desires, certainly, but most of us recognize that some desires are unlikely to be satisfied, for various reasons. Among those is the desire that the universe explain itself to us.

In my more Stoic moments, I'm inclined to believe in a form of pantheism, which for me is a suspicion based on suggestion, that the universe is imbued with a kind of intelligence in which we partake, now and then. But this isn't to say there is a design, which implies the existence of a designer of the universe Instead, it's to say the universe has a particular, more or less ascertainable, nature, constantly changing and growing. As to purpose, I find it impossible to assign anything like a purpose of the kind we might conceive to the universe. Unless it's possible to speak of growing or changing as a purpose.

C.S. Peirce had a most interesting view, which it may surprise some to learn was based on his work as a practicing scientist. As such he know that imprecision was characteristic of science and so wasn't inclined to believe in determinism, or in any mechanistic laws which govern the universe or any particular design inherent in it. He felt that chance played a continuing part in the universe, although he also thought that as the universe evolved over millions of years certain discoverable patterns or "habits" would arise. So, eons ago, the universe was far more spontaneous than it is now. He didn't believe in a designer or even a design as such as far as I can make out, but that the universe like an organism evolves over time.

[ I still believe that the problem of personal suffering is essential, and I remind you that many schools of philosophy (Epicureanism, Stoicism, Cyrenaicism, Skepticism, etc.) were aimed at solving precisely this problem, that you deem to be insignificant to philosophy

I don't think Epicureanism or Stoicism has anything to do with solving the problem of WORLD-PAIN! (I think it should be written this way; it's such a HUGE pain, after all). The others I haven't spent much time on, but I suspect they wouldn't have anything to do with it, either. I think WORLD-PAIN! is a peculiarly Romantic notion ancient philosophers would have had no time for, and indeed would find baffling. Epicureanism or Stoicism may be remedies for WORLD-PAIN! but Epicureans and Stoics didn't address disappointment or disillusionment with the world, but fear, anger, worry, etc. of the kind encountered by people with no expectation that life would or should be good and satisfying to them, but every expectation that they would encounter pain and suffering in this world if not the next if there was to be one, through war, famine, disease, slavery, the malice of the powerful or the gods, and natural disasters.