Mmmmmmmm. Horseradish.

They make it themselves. It's served chilled, in a shot glass, with black bread and sliced pickles.

A great addition to The Great American City, the place of my birth, a town that will never let you down and which even Billy Sunday couldn't shut down. The Bean is a short walk from Miller's Pub, the Palmer House, The Gage and other fine establishments like Russian Tea Time (I recommend the horseradish-flavored Vodka), and of course the Chicago Art Institute and unrivaled architecture.

Huh. The title of the thread first, I think.

An armed society has been a very polite society. In those happy days when the code duello applied and gentlemen carried swords and even for some time afterward, into the early 19th century, politeness reigned, at least among the upper classes. When gentlemen were impolite to one another, they were subject to being called out. Once called out, they very politely arranged through seconds (who were also very polite) an encounter with swords or firearms where they politely sought to kill or wound each other.

The samurai during their heyday were also it seems very polite to one another, and impoliteness could lead to sudden death.

That's not to say, though, that an armed society has always been a polite one. There are various myths regarding the Old West, but it seems to be the case that most everyone was armed. Nonetheless, politeness isn't a characteristic normally ascribed to those of its society.

So it seems simplistic to speak of any causal relationship or even correlation between the prevalence of arms and politeness. A concept of honor was probably essential to the establishment of the code duello and the culture of the samurai.

I know many gun owners, and am one myself (I enjoy shooting clays with a shotgun). Those I know who own guns are extremely careful with them. There is a kind of etiquette involved, at least among shotgun owners and users, the purpose of which is to assure the firearm is unloaded and not pointing at anyone until it is to be used, safely. So I think there are many responsible gun owners.

The fetishistic regard for the Second Amendment we see here bewilders me, though, as does the very dubious, even bizarre, belief that we need guns to protect ourselves from the government which is intent on taking away our guns, which seems to be a part of that regard.

The fact remains, though, that guns are too easily available to those with the intent or the proclivity to use them to do harm to others. Gun control is therefore a necessity. The only issue should be what the extent of that control should be, and that should not be an issue we should allow to be influenced by the gun shills who currently comprise the leadership of the NRA and have the capacity to corrupt our legislators. Their purpose is merely to sell as many guns as they can.

For those it might benefit this essay, or rather the book in which it appears, Inquiries into Truth and Representation, is in Scribd. Perhaps if the entire book is read it would be easier to understand, but I've read only this essay, and am uncertain if my problem with it arises from a lack of understanding or a lack of interest. Probably both to varying degrees. I have trouble understanding, at the least, the significance of the issue, and will take my leave by noting for what it's worth that I think treating language as something distinct from the world (or us), and thereby requiring a relation to the world, may be unwise, and that language includes more than words (gestures, sounds).

I hesitate to say anything about particle physics, but if "progress" includes an increase in knowledge and understanding of the subject matter of inquiry, then I think we can speak of progress in the areas of science you refer to.

You're quite right; there are philosophers who are addressing those problems now. I should have noted that.

As for the more abstract, there is no problem with them, but if the "problem" addressed is one that isn't subject to a satisfactory resolution, even to a reasonable degree of probability, it's hard to even speak of progress being made. I don't know what pie in the sky science you're referring to, but it may be that the author of the article would maintain that progress isn't being made as to that kind of science.

"Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men." John Dewey

Progress requires that problems we face be resolved or mitigated. Traditional philosophical problems don't lend themselves to resolution in any manner that can be confirmed to the satisfaction of more than a few. I would say that those who have established that certain philosophical problems are illusory have in a sense resolved those problems, and to the extent their efforts have resulted in a lessening of the time and effort spent in address non-problems, there has been progress of a sort. Perhaps this sort of thing is related to the disenchantment you speak of.

Perhaps Dewey was engaged in wishful thinking in proposing that philosophy become a method for dealing with the "problems of men." But if philosophers turned their attention to considering those problems and recommending solutions to them (and if anybody paid them any attention, I suppose I should say) it might become possible to assess whether those recommendations solve the problems, and therefore whether philosophy could be said to progress, based on whether the recommendations were successful.

I feel bad about hijacking this thread, but in for a penny...

Certain of the ancients and probably most of those living in the middle ages thought there was such a thing as Providence. They also thought, generally, that we humans held dominion over the world, and considered the world to be a resource for use in achieving various goals. Our dominion was ordained byProvidence. I personally think it's something of a stretch to maintain that when Genesis speaks of subduing the world and having dominion over its creatures, it refers to kindly stewardship.

Frankly, I think if we believe that there was a time that we didn't look upon the world as being available for our use, we fool ourselves. We necessarily use it, to live. We will do whatever is necessary in order to live. Certainly there have always been those who treated the world with reverence, but I doubt there was a time when all humans did so, just as I doubt there was a Garden of Eden. It's far more likely only a few were so enlightened. Any pantheistic view requires reverence for nature, and we know the Stoics to have been pantheists, for example. Otherwise, belief in providence or belief that certain powers or gods must be propitiated before making use of what we want to make use of doesn't amount to the kind of reverence I think is being referred to here.

If Plato and Aristotle were falling away from this reverential attitude, just when does Heidegger think we had it? Sometime prior to recorded history? Someone who makes such a claim has the burden to establish it, and Heidegger does nothing to do so, though it seems to be essential to his argument, such as it is. To say we were "closer to nature" or more reverent towards it sometimes in the distant past and therefore our technology at that time was better or less dangerous, or we had a better attitude, isn't much of an argument or in my opinion.

The problems we encounter with technology now don't arise from the fact our Being is out of joint. The problems result because we now have the capacity to use up resources very quickly and even lay waste to the world, there are a lot more of us than there has ever been, and we are greedy, thoughtless, and selfish That isn't being "more detached from nature." In fact, we've always been greedy, thoughtless and selfish. There's evidence that environmental degradation, soil exhaustion and deforestation were taking place in ancient Greece as the result of human activity. Studies indicate environmental degradation in Polynesia as a result of human colonization beginning about 1000 years ago; as a result of human activity in modern Turkey (Asia Minor) about 5000 years ago. The increase in population and trade and improvements in travel during the Roman Empire and resulting demands for food and commodities is said to have resulted in environmental degradation as well.

Claiming there was a time when all revered nature and that we must become as we were then doesn't strike me as an intelligent way to address the dangers of technology and the problems we face, nor is it helpful to claim that "only a god will save us."

You may of course think whatever you like regarding my views on Heidegger. But if you seek textual support, a better use of your time may be to try to find support in Heidegger's texts for the highly speculative claims he makes regarding humans and our evolution; that is to say, support from sources other than his own intuitions.

A machete blade is normally less than two feet in length (I have two of them). It's what I like to call a very personal weapon, which is to say that those who would use it to harm others must necessarily be in close, personal contact with their victims. That's the case with all swords, of course.

This is significant because someone wielding a machete is a direct threat "only" to those within close range, as opposed to someone wielding a firearm. I think it's also significant in that those wielding a personal weapon intending to do harm with it, unlike those with a firearm, have made a commitment to do harm in a very visceral manner, to see and perhaps be splashed with the blood, bodily fluids, and guts of their victim, and to expose themselves to the dangers which are attendant to close personal conduct if their victim fights with them. Those wielding a firearm have no such exposure and may kill or wound from a distance without directly experiencing the "messy" aspects of the harm they inflict. They have the luxury of being detached in a sense from the results of what they do, unless they face guns themselves. It's far more easy to kill or inflict harm with a gun than with a machete.

So I think that when police encounter someone with a machete, they're in a situation where the bad guy presents less of a danger to others than someone with a gun if there is nobody near him, but are probably dealing with someone who is more dangerous in the sense that though his ability to do harm is limited, he is more willing to do harm even if it means being intimately involved in the "mess" and danger of it.

In a situation like this, where, apparently, there is no hostage and nobody is close to the relatively small blade, there is no immediate threat to anyone and so would be no need to resort to firearms to protect anyone. Firearms should be used only where immediate harm is threatened. I don't know that 30 cops would be required to subdue someone with a machete, but I think several of them could in the manner employed in this case or in some other manner without using guns (though stun guns or rubber bullets may be another alternative).

I personally wish the Constitution provided a right to bear swords rather than "arms." My guess would be people with swords would present less a danger to others than those with guns, because it takes a certain skill and courage to use a personal weapon, and a willingness to intimately encounter death and harm rather than inflicting them from a comfortable distance.

Well, I disagree, and think Heidegger's belief that we were once innocents relying on and relishing the providential bounty of nature is indicative of his Romanticism. We've long looked at the world and other creatures as merely a resource for our use, going back at least to Genesis and God's injunction there that we subdue the earth and have dominion over the animals. And I think his beloved Greeks thought much the same, with some few exceptions.

It's been some time since I read the Question concerning Technology as well. I just took a quick look at it again.

I don't see how you get the impression that the "monstrousness which reigns here" doesn't refer to the hydroelectric plant, but instead to what it represents. It seems to me clear he isn't referring to "what it represents" whatever that's supposed to mean, as monstrous. It's the plant, which he seems to deny is even built into the river though the bridge somehow was. I think Heidegger is often interpreted as saying, or meaning, something he doesn't actually say (perhaps because of the limitations of language, which must be a poorly built house of being in some respects).

The bit about "challenging" is interesting as well. According to Heidegger, a tract of land is "challenged into the putting out of coal and ore." I assume he refers to mining. Different from this challenging is the act of the peasant "putting seeds" into the forces of growth and watching over its increase.

I must assume Heidegger was aware of the fact that mining has been going on for thousands of years. Slave labor was used by the Greeks and Romans for this purpose. Were they challenging the land into putting out coal (more likely tin) and ore? I also must assume he was aware of the fact that irrigation was practiced, rivers and lakes damned, channeled, rivers used to produce the energy required for grinding grain (the wind too) and other purposes, peat challenged out of the ground and firewood challenged from trees, both then stored for future use, all by the ancients. This sort of thing then was not monstrous, presumably, though it is now.

Heidegger is obviously employing metaphor in making these largely unexplained assertions. That's fine I suppose, but I would prefer a clear expression of a thought rather than emotive expressions. I'm reminded of the comment I think was made by Carnap regarding Heidegger, concerning his writing possibly being poetry. That's merely my recollection, though. But I for one am not looking for poetry from philosophers.

Well, okay, but I think there's a difference between establishing there is no basis for great philosophical claims and making great philosophical claims. I don't think Wittgenstein thought he solved philosophical problems; rather, he thought he showed they weren't problems to begin with.

No, by using the words "would never" and "even if he was" my intent was to indicate what I felt would have been likely had there been influence, not what was the case.

I have, alas, read some things by Heidegger, yes. Specifically, the Question concerning Technology and Letter on Humanism and his addresses when he was Rektor at Freiburg.

Did I understand what I read? Well, the intent of his speeches while he was Rektor was quite clear, I think. I think I understood them, certainly, and suspect those hearing them and reading them did as well.

The Question concerning Technology was clear enough also, in my opinion, so I think I understood it. I thought his reference to the "monstrous" hydroelectric plant and other horrifying modern technology and their juxtaposition with good, simple peasants placing seeds in Nature's loving bosom was rather silly, though, and felt the essay was more an expression of romantic sentiment and hyperbole than anything else.

As to the Letter on Humanism, reading it was a trial. Let me say at once that I think discussions of Being (or being) and essence should have ended long ago. I remember reading Aquinas' De Ente et Essentia as part of a tutorial on Medieval philosophy and hoping that it would be the last time I'd have to encounter such concepts. It pretty much was the last time, as my reading of philosophy usually involved philosophers who were seemingly unconcerned with these hoary, ancient ideas, or in any case didn't address them in the works I read.

So it may be that I tend to become irritated when I see these words. Frankly, I don't think they're at all enlightening or even useful. Contemplating what it means to exist, or why we exist, or what our essence is, as a separate inquiry, strikes me as an academic exercise at best; at worst as an invitation to mere speculation and even mysticism.

This attitude may seem to indicate that I'm against all metaphysics to begin with, but I don't think that's the case, as I don't think metaphysics need involve the consideration only of Being and essence, or be based or be in response to ancient, probably mostly Aristotelian, metaphysics. In any case, I don't think the use of such terminology is required.

This creates problems with reading Heidegger's Letter and presumably other works, obviously. Heidegger seems to refer to Being constantly, and I think unhelpfully. References to humans as "shepherds of Being (or being)" and language as "the house of Being (or being)" do nothing for me, I'm afraid, and make me wonder just what is being said, and why it's being said in what I think is an unnecessarily unclear manner.

My inability to understand the varied mysteries of Being may prevent me from understanding Heidegger, or it may be that Heidegger is indulging in bullshit. Some I've read believe the latter; I really don't know. It may be that he insists on addressing in detail what can't usefully be addressed by language. It may be that one must be an initiate to the mysteries, or brought up in an environment where Being and essence are the concerns of philosophy, to understand him.

For all I know, Heidegger beats up old Aristotle better than anyone else ever has, though.

You know, I've always felt Carnap was a logical positivist, a card-carrying member of the Vienna Circle. But perhaps I have a restricted idea of analytic philosophy and those I think of as analytic philosophers are merely a subset of that group. Perhaps logical positivists are also a subset. Is Russell considered an analytic philosopher? I tend to think of the later Wittgenstein and his followers, along with such as Austin, Ryle. Perhaps these are "ordinary language philosophers." Anyhow, I (wrongly?) associate analytic philosophy with quietism, and quietism as I understand it doesn't deal in the grandiose.

I'm slowly reading the following:
Ad Infinitum: A Biography of Latin--Ostler
Studies in Ancient Society--Finley, Ed.
The Life and Riotous Times of H.L. Mencken--Manchester
The Wall: Rome's Greatest Frontier--Moffat
Spinoza and the Stoics: Power, Politics and the Passions--DeBrabander

No, by saying "purported new insights" I mean insights thought to be wholly new, which are, in fact, not new.

I have already said that I don't think Dewey directly influenced Heidegger or that Heidegger directly influenced Dewey, so I'm not sure why you ask if I have "well documented evidence" that Heidegger was aware of Dewey's work. If I did, you may be sure I wouldn't have said that I don't think there was a direct influence. And I make no argument at all about Heidegger's significance as a philosopher. He certainly thought he was significant, and clearly thought his work not only new but essential to our well being. So, according to him: "The future of the West depends upon the proper understanding of metaphysics as presented in my thought." Not, you see, a proper understanding of anybody else's thought.

I merely disagree with his assessment of himself, and that of others. I think several philosophers were thinking along similar lines at the turn of the 19th century and into the 20th, contra traditional metaphysics and epistemology. There are similarities between Dewey and Wittgenstein as well. I simply think Dewey isn't given the credit he is due.

It certainly may be I'm simply unaware of those analytic philosophers who claim to have ascertained our fundamental nature, or that of the universe.

The only work by Schopenhauer I'm certain I read is The Wisdom of Life. I may have read other essays by him, but if so I've forgotten. If I did, it was pre-college, as the philosophy professors at the university I attended ignored him and only grudgingly taught courses on the history of philosophy. They were likely the kind of analytic philosophers (and a pragmatist) mentioned by PB. I didn't think much of The Wisdom of Life, by the way. I thought it entirely derivative.

But I think certain philosophers are subject to "dissing" by philosophy departments and apparently graduate students not merely because they're outside the analytic tradition, but also because they claim to divine, as it were, our fundamental nature and perhaps that of the universe through introspection ("Will" in Schopenhauer's case), and there is a tendency to mock those who make such grandiose claims. That kind of claim is not made anymore, it seems, so it appears antiquated and even somewhat silly. But again this may be peculiar to the Anglo-American tradition, which is the only one I have any recent knowledge of, as limited as that may be.

I don't know what you mean by "preempted." A more accurate word would probably be "anticipated." I doubt either directly influenced the other, though if that took place it's most likely Dewey influenced Heidegger as he was years older and had published significant work by the time Heidegger was a university student. If Heidegger's vile treatment of his mentor and friend Husserl is any indication, however, he would never have acknowledged he was influenced by Dewey even if he was.

But if you would read the article I linked to a few posts ago, you'd see mentioned there that Dewey rejected the belief that the mind is disassociated from the body and the world, and instead took the position that mind body and world were interwoven, long before Heidegger did. He also rejected the subject object distinction and did pioneering work in the philosophy of technology long before Heidegger did.

I certainly don't think they were similar thinkers or men. I would never compare Dewey as a man to the nasty, odious Heidegger. Dewey championed democracy and civil liberties; Heidegger was a Nazi. Philosophically, Dewey's work was always grounded in the world, not in mystic speculations regarding Being and of course the Nothing (which as Heidegger would say "itself nothings"), and though he recognized the danger in technology he didn't succumb to romanticism and confabulations regarding the past as did Heidegger.

Larry Hickman has written books and articles concerning Dewey and the relationship between his work, that of Heidegger and continental philosophy in general if you want to delve into that further or seek more specific examples.

The "destructive" part may derive from the political influence of nihilism, first in Russia in the 19th century and then elsewhere. Political nihilism seems to have involved the rejection of all authority. Bakunin is usually considered a nihilist from the political perspective. It seems to have become common to brand as nihilist--and so bomb-throwers and assassins--anybody radical or who violently objected to government or private property, whether they were or not, and especially if they were foreign (here in the U.S.). So, Sacco and Vanzetti were called nihilists, though it seems they were, if anything, men with anarchist leanings.

I forgot about Essays in Experimental Logic. Dewey's essays are more readable than his longer works. Perhaps his writing style is responsible for the fact he's been ignored and underrated by more recent philosophers. But I'm always surprised by the extent to which philosophers of the past 100 years or so have purportedly new insights which he had and wrote of before them. When someone had him read something by Heidegger, Dewey is said to have commented that "Heidegger reads like a Swabian peasant trying to sound like me."

I don't know what "innately impressive" means, not even when it is capitalized, nor do I know why it matters whether or not the universe has this characteristic. So, Ligotti may sodomize himself in an innately impressive manner as possible as far as I'm concerned.

For those who may be interested, here's a link to an article discussing how Dewey anticipated (and I think effectively dealt with) many of the issues being addressed, though he's been largely ignored by those who subsequently addressed them: http://home.ieis.tue.nl/kvaesen/Dewey_ONLINE.pdf

@jamalrob: I would say , Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Studies in Logical Theory and Experience and Nature.

Be warned, though; Dewey's a hard read. Not a master of style, I'm afraid.

@jamalrob: The problem is the assumption that there is (must be) a location in which thinking takes place, isn't it? A location beyond, that is, the environment in which the interaction takes place. Human thought requires a human, of course, but never involves a human in isolation, apart from the world. We wouldn't think if there was nothing to think about. But why assume the thinking takes place inside us or outside us, as if thinking was a thing instead of an interaction, an activity, engaged in by humans as part of what humans do in the world?

I find it surprising that this conception is apparently believed to be something new or unusual. But I may be misinterpreting what's being said.

What fun!

Currently, several herniated discs in my cervical spine. As far as I know, I still carry a stent in me from the heart attack I had a few years ago. I'm not sure whether skull fractures go away; I think they do. Anyway, I had three of them and a perforated eardrum and Bells Palsy as a result of a car accident. The odd slow-blinking eye and twisted mouth I had as a result of the palsy went away eventually, spoiling my dream of being a pirate-lawyer with an eye patch and a leering smirk, charming judges and juries. Kidney stone last year. Those hurt like hell, by the way. Mostly old guy stuff outside of the accident.

If these people are right, then we can no longer claim somebody is "out of his mind." "Out of his brain" perhaps, but this wouldn't be quite the same.

Despite this obvious drawback, I find nothing surprising or new, or objectionable, in the thrust of the article as it's described to the extent it's a recognition of the fact that our lives and our thoughts are the result of our interaction with the rest of the world of which we're a part and a rejection of the tendency to separate ourselves from the world. I'm not sure about the claim that there exists a "complete cognitive system" though, being suspicious of the tendency to treat concepts of this sort as if they were things floating about somewhere.

I should also say, though, that I think the authors distinction between epistemic and pragmatic is inappropriate, as it preserves the distinction between cognition and action. This seems odd, as I think much they have to say is reminiscent of Dewey, especially his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, who felt that thought involved the active interaction with and manipulation of the environment in which we live.

Behold, I'm no longer ciceronianus, a mere ciceronian. I am THE ciceronian. I'm not sure what that means, though.