Am I among the "numerous members" of this forum you mention?

In fact, I'm very much a man of the West, and am fond even of Spain, except for its time under El Caudillo; nor am I a fan of the Hapsburgs.

Western civilization is admirable in many respects, but sadly it's been tainted by the exclusive and intolerant Abrahamic religions.

Like medicine, modern infrastructure and agriculture, and technology in general that allowed them to multiply further than it could ever been possible within the Iron Age. — Lionino

Well, consider what was written by Bernal Diaz del Castillo, one of the conquistadors accompanying Cortez, regarding the Spaniards first impression on arriving at the city of Tenochtitlan:

"When we saw so many cities and villages built in the water and other great towns on dry land we were amazed and said that it was like the enchantments (...) on account of the great towers and cues and buildings rising from the water, and all built of masonry. And some of our soldiers even asked whether the things that we saw were not a dream? (...) I do not know how to describe it, seeing things as we did that had never been heard of or seen before, not even dreamed about."

Later, of course, the conquistadors destroyed that city and much else. It's estimated that about 8 million of the indigenous people died in the immediate aftermath of the Spanish conquest primarily due to the diseases they brought with them (so much for medicine). The Tudor court in England, during the 16th century, constantly moved from place to place when the accumulation of human and other waste made whatever location they were at unbearable. I suspect that things weren't all that different in Spain at that time. At Versailles, in the 17th century, it was common for courtiers and others to urinate and defecate in convenient corners or under staircases, there being no facilities to use.

Don't be too hard on the Iron Age. Roman infrastructure during the Iron Age, particularly when it comes to the use of water but in other areas as well, wasn't matched in Europe until the 19th century.

No, not on that point. And just to be clear, my other comments weren't intended to address what seems to be your acceptance of Christianity, which is something I can't do, but rather what appeared to me to be a failure to recognize the enormous debt Christianity owes to the ancient pagan world.

It also teaches that truth is higher than any human social organization on Earth (apart from churches, which typically have some claim to infallibility), which is the ultimate nullification of any other cult. It also teaches that while on Earth, we are to love our neighbors as ourselves, which runs directly counter to our cult instinct to attack and kill the stranger and take what is his. It is my belief that the Christian cult was a prerequisite for the scientific method to occur, because it asserted objective truth beyond any Earthly authority. The teachings of loving one's neighbor as one's self were probably also the prerequisite to equality under the law and individual liberty. What has been more typical in other times and places was that a person's true value was not different than his perceived social value. — Brendan Golledge

None of this is peculiarly Christian, I'm afraid. These "teachings" as you call them were arrived at by pagan philosophers long before Jesus was a twinkle in his father's (or his own or and his own, if you're a fan of the Trinity) eye. While Christianity was relentless in extinguishing much of pagan civilization, it was also exceedingly eager to assimilate pagan philosophy and, in certain respects, religions.

For my part, I'm with Dewey in believing that we only think when confronted by problems or situations we wish to resolve. What we consider problems or wish resolved will be determined by what we value in many cases, obviously.

Spain's arrival was a great thing for Mexico, for example, otherwise in a case of isolation from the rest of the world¹, they would not be too far past the Iron Age today and likely still be conducing human sacrifices. — Lionino

Indeed, Bartolome de las Cases provides a contemporary description of the many great things done for the indigenous people of Mexico by the Spanish after they arrived.

CBT, regularly used as I understand it to treat trauma and with some success it appears, is based in large part of Stoicism. So, I wondered what was meant when it was claimed Stoicism fails to by "address trauma."

provided they accept a natural right, — Count Timothy von Icarus

A belief in natural rights may inspire or inform the decision to adopt a law (or not adopt one, or enforce or not enforce a law). Until there is a law, however, that belief is nothing more than a belief there should be a law, or a right recognized by law.

I think suicide is always wrong. — NotAristotle

Why?

I think it is better to address trauma rather than "objectifying" it. — NotAristotle

And how should we "address trauma"?

The concept of natural rights is a fairly modern development; say, from Grotius forward. As has been pointed out, it's very much a product of the Enlightenment.

Natural law, however, is different. The Stoics were the greatest proponents of it in the ancient world, probably. Natural law and natural rights are often considered one and the same, but are different.

According to natural law theory as developed in antiquity, from the study of nature and humanity's place in it we can infer that certain conduct is in accordance with nature, and human nature is such that we can infer that we have certain duties towards each other. Right conduct, duty and justice were far more important than individual rights. We should treat each other in a certain way, yes, but we didn't have the right to be treated in a certain way as we believe that to be the case now. It's a point of view I think preferable, personally. It's not all about ME and what I'M entitled to or owed.

For example, slavery was common in the ancient West. Slaves didn't have the right to be free, but they could be granted freedom. However, the Roman jurist Ulpian wrote that the the condition of slavery was contrary to nature. Nature tells us that humans should be treated equally, i.e. that we should treat each other as equals and shouldn't enslave each other. The focus is on what we should and should not do rather than on what each of us is entitled to.

Won't they mean something in that we can point to the evil being done in their violation? Rights, as the defense of the good, seem like they should exist outside of any given system of laws. Molesting children isn't just bad in contexts where it is illegal, or only in cases where there will be punishment. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The law is one thing; morality is another. A law will be a law regardless of whether it's moral or not; regardless of whether it prohibits immoral conduct or allows it by not regulating it.

Molesting children should be illegal (prohibited by law). If it isn't, though, then it won't be a crime. It won't be subject to punishment by the state, nor will it be subject to civil action. In such cases, we may say "there oughta be a law." We may say what we claim are universal rights, or natural rights, should be recognized by the law, but if they're not that's all we're saying.

So, documents or pronouncements like the U.N. Declarations of Human Rights, or the Declarations of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen adopted by the French National Assembly, may indicate what people think should be the case, be need not be the case. The Consulate and the First French Empire weren't very faithful to the Declarations of the Rights of Man in practice. Many members of the U.N. disregard the Declaration of Human Rights with some frequency.

Oliver Stone's film on the subject bears witness to this. — Wolfgang

If you believe Stone's film is accurate, my guess would be you think De Palma's The Untouchables is as well.

Be that as it may, my feeling is there are no rights which aren't legal rights. Unless claimed universal rights are enforceable by law, they may be proclaimed by anyone and will mean nothing, in fact. It happens certain legal rights are useful in limiting the power of government. Others can be misused, and promote little more than selfishness. It becomes a question of judging which rights should be made law.
We haven't judged well, in many cases. That's all, folks.

You'd think, given the atrocities committed against the aborigines by the white settlers, that their ghosts, if there were such actual entities, would haunt us plenty. — Janus

Well, if that's what ghosts do--haunt, that is, because of the wrongs done to them. Many of the "ghost stories" we find in the writings of ancient Greeks and Romans involve the ghosts of those who didn't receive the appropriate burial rituals, for one reason or other. They'd haunt until their bodies were found and given their burial rights, at which time the hauntings would stop. Hauntings for the purpose of torturing those who did the ghost wrong while alive are fairly rare, and then it's often the Furies who torment the wrongdoer at the behest of the dead or just because what was done annoyed them. Ghosts also were encountered when the living went to the Underworld for one reason or another, like Ulysses, or in dreams. There are a few revenge hauntings I can think of orchestrated by a ghost, but surprisingly few, relatively speaking.

No doubt there's been a study of some kind devoted to what ghosts were thought to do by different cultures throughout history.

Any thoughts on this topic? — Manuel

Those who legitimately claim to have experienced something likely have experienced something.
Just what that may be, I don't know. I think we still have much to learn about the universe, so I don't assume everything reported is necessarily a hallucination.

I don't think I understand what you mean by "foundational metaphysically." Do you mean that it involves the subject matter of metaphysics?

Ever been working on something passionately and experienced a time warp via tons of productivity? That is the artist's method. — Vaskane

Well I have, but as a lawyer. There have been cases where this has generated legal briefs and arguments which I think would quality as legal works of art, if my natural modesty didn't prevent me from saying so. That may be the method of an artist, but I would say it doesn't result in art, because the law isn't art and can never be art. In that the law's like philosophy.

Right, art doesn’t want to explain anything. — Noble Dust

But philosophers do, or do nothing at all, I think. My feeling is that when someone tries to explain an experience of the kind you describe, they necessarily fail. A work of art, though, may impart it but not in a rational way.

And understanding Nietzsche's art, is an art, in and of itself. It's why so many "philosophers" here are stumped by Nietzsche. — Vaskane

Well, he's stumped me now and then. But while I've always thought him to be a outstanding art (and cultural) critic, I haven't considered him an artist. Even his Zarathustra seems to me more like one of the Old Testament books named after prophets, which I don't associate with art. But I'm obviously struggling with the definition of art.

It also doesn't hurt him that the Democrats are running someone who is brain dead and they think if they deny it everyone will think he's sharp as a tack. — Hanover

The Democrats have yet to master the art of the lying.

It seems conservative justices are perfectly willing to be activists when it pleases them.

This isn't to contend that what is (or at least should be) the actual holding of the court, that Colorado cannot disqualify someone from being on the ballot for the presidency under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, wasn't agreed to by all the Justices. It was. But as the concurring opinions point out, the decision goes beyond what was required to resolve the issue before the court, generally a no-no, and also assets that Congress must adopt legislation before Section 3 is enforceable at all. It hasn't done so, and there's no assurance it ever will. In which case, it seems Section 3 is superfluous until that occurs. Usually, it's also considered a no-no to construe a law in such a manner as to render it ineffective.

We can be thankful that the court didn't hold that there was no insurrection while it was at it.

hilosophy of art studies the nature of art and how individual art pieces are evaluated and experienced.
Aesthetics is the study of beauty and taste, though ill-defined. — Lionino

So neither is the study of how art is made, or what prompts some of us to make it?

At this point, for me the most sublime experiences I’ve had of art feel like fleeting glimpses into the nature of reality that a lifetime of philosophical study might never achieve (but maybe it can for some). Of course, philosophy is generally seeking more like the whole picture, rather than a glimpse. — Noble Dust

I think what you describe is what I'd assert is the difference between art and philosophy. Art, or at least great art, evokes, sometimes only in a fleeting way; it doesn't explain. Our reaction to it isn't thoughtful, or careful.

Now I'm inclined to think of this institutional theory of art as in opposition to theories of art which rely upon defining art by our feelings, at least, but I can't say I'm certain you do -- you're attempting to apply the pragmatic principle in defining art, and then offering "feelings" as a possible effect, but would still include institutional acts and effects? — Moliere

It would seem to be an effect, in that it would be a reaction to art, or the result of our reaction to it.

Damnation. Sorry. Well, this way I can claim it as my own.

"More affective than effective." Well put.

A more traditional view, perhaps, but suggestive. Maybe Philosophy of Art is an inquiry into why and how what is shown or is done by artists effects us as it does.

I hate being conventional. But I see what you mean.

Say art is an act, for the sake of argument. Something done remarkably well. Great athletes do things most cannot do. It's not something that can be explained except in a trivial sense; but they posses an ability or talent at which we marvel.

Is there such a thing as the Philosophy of Sport? Should there be?

Thanks. Must read.

Difficult questions, I admit. And very annoying, the more I think of them. Are they the kind of questions Wittgenstein spoke of, regarding which we must, or should, be silent?

Maybe art is something which must be shown, or more broadly experienced, or felt.

Well, we know what Plato thought of artists, and poets in particular. I think he does more to demonstrate the distinction between art and philosophy than I ever could, banishing artiists from his grim Republic. Lucretius was a poet who expressed philosophical thoughts of Epicurus in his poetry. I think it's far easier for an artist to do that than it is for a philosopher to create a work of art.

A philosopher may write a novel, or a poem, or paint a picture or compose music, but I suspect that philosopher would distinguish between them and works devoted to philosophy.

As you say, there's a difference between art and philosophy. Art need not address philosophical subjects, and if it does it's not expository; it doesn't explain. It evokes in a way that isn't prosaic, through music, sculpture, painting, and language which inspires and elicits feelings and emotions.

Consider, though, that if we contend that anything is a work of art if it's done very well (e.g. Grant's memoirs) or that anyone who writes very well is an artist, we may be broadening the definition of art to a point where most any talented person is an artist, and any well-crafted product becomes a work of art. That seems to me to be a misuse of "art" and "artist" or at least an exaggerated use of those words. I don't think it makes much difference to say that is the case only with respect to something very, very well written or a person who writes really, really well.

But I suppose to continue this discussion we should do so in another thread.

Literature, though, can simply mean prose, or writing, which includes more than art. Someone can write well and not be an artist. U.S. Grant wrote very well (in his memoirs), but isn't considered an artist. Christopher Hitchens wrote excellent essays, but wasn't an artist. We speak of legal literature, medical literature, etc., without meaning to refer to art or artists. Literature as art would more properly refer to novels and short stories, I think.

But you're correct that if we start debating what art is, we'll be going on a journey beyond the scope of this thread and one that may never end.

Growing up, art was a talent that came naturally to me — Joshs

I envy you, then.

I'm quite willing to acknowledge there can be an overlap. Santayana's three philosophical poets no doubt address philosophical issues. But I think there's a difference between evocation and exposition. I shouldn't say a philosopher can't be a poet. I know that a lawyer can be one, as Wallace Stevens was a great one, though an insurance lawyer. I find that astonishing and so believe it's very rare, though some lawyers enjoy quoting poets and especially Shakespeare. Lawyers and philosophers are prosaic, ultimately. The creation of beauty is beyond them; analysis is no friend to expression.

I think my request for examples of the great philosophical works of imagination akin to art will go unanswered, and with good reason. As for Nietzsche, he was a cultural critic, and a critic of art, but I wouldn't call him an artist. His Zarathustra is more like one of the prophetical books of the Old Testament than art.

It's interesting that artists have sometimes been called "philosophical" but philosophers haven't, to my knowledge, been called artistic. Santayana thought that Dante, Goethe and Lucretius were philosophical poets, for example.

Art is distinguishable from philosophy because it is evocative, and can be supremely so through the ability of an artist. Philosophy tries to explain, sometimes in dull detail. These are different things. When philosophers try to be artists, they fail miserably because they don't have the talent.

Take Munch's The Scream. It achieves in a single image what page after page of plodding, repetitive, self-pitying descriptions of angst and existential dread cranked out by some philosophers seek to explain and expound on. Take Picasso's Guernica, and imagine a philosopher trying to describe, let alone explain, what it evokes, about modern warfare and fascism. Take Wallace Stevens' Sunday Morning and try to imagine a philosopher addressing with such subtlety and in such a memorable way the failure of Christianity in the modern world and the preference for pagan naturalism which arises in its place.

I'd be interested to know what those may be. But I think it takes more than imagination to create a work of art.

God's teeth. Let's not sully art by claiming philosophers are artists.

I confess I got carried away somewhat.

I was trying to respond to your claim that analytic philosophy somehow nearly killed philosophy by "cutting off its relevance to how people live and what they care about." I don't think it did nor that it could do so, because I think it and OLP primarily address the dissolution of problems which most people don't care about and have nothing to do with how they live, but have become typical philosophical problems. Which is to say metaphysical and epistemological problems peculiar to philosophers like those addressed by such as Ryle and Austin. They're valuable in that respect, and I think the clarity, precision and close analysis used in that task have value generally.

I know that Marcuse thought as it seems you do, but I think he overreacted and didn't understand the focus of analytic philosophy and OLP. I view them as concerned primarily with method.

I think philosophy starting becoming irrelevant to how we live and the problems of living long before analytic philosophy and OLP arose. I don't think that Descartes or Kant, to name a few, have much to say of any relevance to how we live or should live.

As for contemporary philosophers who address matters of concern in living our lives, I'd mention Martha Nussbaum and Susan Haack as among them. The former has an affinity for Stoicism and other ancient schools, and the latter is a pragmatist, which no doubt explains why I refer to them.

It's quite possible for philosophy to address how people live and what they care about without having recourse to the kind of obscurity, and sometimes even esotericism, analytic philosophy and OLP were and are intended to expose and avoid. But in any case their therapeutic value applies primarily to metaphysics and epistemology.

I enjoyed the reference to the "scriptures" of Hegel.

But I tend to doubt that people find philosophy to be idle merely because you find in it contradictory positions. You can find that to be the case in law, medicine, engineering, sociology, psychology; most any human endeavor in which expertise is claimed, in fact.

They may be more inclined to find it to be idle because much of it has no bearing on how we live. That wasn't always the case, and isn't entirely the case now, but I think that would be a fairly common belief.

The general issue then is: are there regularities in nature or are we only imposing them to be able to better plan our lives. — Pez

I wonder just how we would "plan our lives" if there were no regularities in nature. Very ineffectively, I would think.

If this is the issue, I also wonder if it has ever been asked just how likely it is that what is useful to us in planning our lives--in living--would be in some sense inconsistent with or at odds with nature. This would require, for one thing, an assumption that we're not part of nature, or not wholly part of it, which sadly is an assumption that's been made too often with unfortunate results (including the belief that there's an "external world" separate from us). But much as some would like to think we are apart from nature, I fear we're a part of it like everything else. And as parts of nature we interact with the rest of it necessarily, are formed by the rest of it and form the rest of it as well in some respects as part of that interaction.

This thread is just a dream. Do not trouble to respond, folks. — unenlightened

More a disturbingly recurring nightmare, surely. Sorry for calling you "Shirley."