You'd think, given the atrocities committed against the aborigines by the white settlers, that their ghosts, if there were such actual entities, would haunt us plenty. — Janus

Well, if that's what ghosts do--haunt, that is, because of the wrongs done to them. Many of the "ghost stories" we find in the writings of ancient Greeks and Romans involve the ghosts of those who didn't receive the appropriate burial rituals, for one reason or other. They'd haunt until their bodies were found and given their burial rights, at which time the hauntings would stop. Hauntings for the purpose of torturing those who did the ghost wrong while alive are fairly rare, and then it's often the Furies who torment the wrongdoer at the behest of the dead or just because what was done annoyed them. Ghosts also were encountered when the living went to the Underworld for one reason or another, like Ulysses, or in dreams. There are a few revenge hauntings I can think of orchestrated by a ghost, but surprisingly few, relatively speaking.

No doubt there's been a study of some kind devoted to what ghosts were thought to do by different cultures throughout history.

Any thoughts on this topic? — Manuel

Those who legitimately claim to have experienced something likely have experienced something.
Just what that may be, I don't know. I think we still have much to learn about the universe, so I don't assume everything reported is necessarily a hallucination.

I don't think I understand what you mean by "foundational metaphysically." Do you mean that it involves the subject matter of metaphysics?

Ever been working on something passionately and experienced a time warp via tons of productivity? That is the artist's method. — Vaskane

Well I have, but as a lawyer. There have been cases where this has generated legal briefs and arguments which I think would quality as legal works of art, if my natural modesty didn't prevent me from saying so. That may be the method of an artist, but I would say it doesn't result in art, because the law isn't art and can never be art. In that the law's like philosophy.

Right, art doesn’t want to explain anything. — Noble Dust

But philosophers do, or do nothing at all, I think. My feeling is that when someone tries to explain an experience of the kind you describe, they necessarily fail. A work of art, though, may impart it but not in a rational way.

And understanding Nietzsche's art, is an art, in and of itself. It's why so many "philosophers" here are stumped by Nietzsche. — Vaskane

Well, he's stumped me now and then. But while I've always thought him to be a outstanding art (and cultural) critic, I haven't considered him an artist. Even his Zarathustra seems to me more like one of the Old Testament books named after prophets, which I don't associate with art. But I'm obviously struggling with the definition of art.

It also doesn't hurt him that the Democrats are running someone who is brain dead and they think if they deny it everyone will think he's sharp as a tack. — Hanover

The Democrats have yet to master the art of the lying.

It seems conservative justices are perfectly willing to be activists when it pleases them.

This isn't to contend that what is (or at least should be) the actual holding of the court, that Colorado cannot disqualify someone from being on the ballot for the presidency under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, wasn't agreed to by all the Justices. It was. But as the concurring opinions point out, the decision goes beyond what was required to resolve the issue before the court, generally a no-no, and also assets that Congress must adopt legislation before Section 3 is enforceable at all. It hasn't done so, and there's no assurance it ever will. In which case, it seems Section 3 is superfluous until that occurs. Usually, it's also considered a no-no to construe a law in such a manner as to render it ineffective.

We can be thankful that the court didn't hold that there was no insurrection while it was at it.

hilosophy of art studies the nature of art and how individual art pieces are evaluated and experienced.
Aesthetics is the study of beauty and taste, though ill-defined. — Lionino

So neither is the study of how art is made, or what prompts some of us to make it?

At this point, for me the most sublime experiences I’ve had of art feel like fleeting glimpses into the nature of reality that a lifetime of philosophical study might never achieve (but maybe it can for some). Of course, philosophy is generally seeking more like the whole picture, rather than a glimpse. — Noble Dust

I think what you describe is what I'd assert is the difference between art and philosophy. Art, or at least great art, evokes, sometimes only in a fleeting way; it doesn't explain. Our reaction to it isn't thoughtful, or careful.

Now I'm inclined to think of this institutional theory of art as in opposition to theories of art which rely upon defining art by our feelings, at least, but I can't say I'm certain you do -- you're attempting to apply the pragmatic principle in defining art, and then offering "feelings" as a possible effect, but would still include institutional acts and effects? — Moliere

It would seem to be an effect, in that it would be a reaction to art, or the result of our reaction to it.

Damnation. Sorry. Well, this way I can claim it as my own.

"More affective than effective." Well put.

A more traditional view, perhaps, but suggestive. Maybe Philosophy of Art is an inquiry into why and how what is shown or is done by artists effects us as it does.

I hate being conventional. But I see what you mean.

Say art is an act, for the sake of argument. Something done remarkably well. Great athletes do things most cannot do. It's not something that can be explained except in a trivial sense; but they posses an ability or talent at which we marvel.

Is there such a thing as the Philosophy of Sport? Should there be?

Thanks. Must read.

Difficult questions, I admit. And very annoying, the more I think of them. Are they the kind of questions Wittgenstein spoke of, regarding which we must, or should, be silent?

Maybe art is something which must be shown, or more broadly experienced, or felt.

Well, we know what Plato thought of artists, and poets in particular. I think he does more to demonstrate the distinction between art and philosophy than I ever could, banishing artiists from his grim Republic. Lucretius was a poet who expressed philosophical thoughts of Epicurus in his poetry. I think it's far easier for an artist to do that than it is for a philosopher to create a work of art.

A philosopher may write a novel, or a poem, or paint a picture or compose music, but I suspect that philosopher would distinguish between them and works devoted to philosophy.

As you say, there's a difference between art and philosophy. Art need not address philosophical subjects, and if it does it's not expository; it doesn't explain. It evokes in a way that isn't prosaic, through music, sculpture, painting, and language which inspires and elicits feelings and emotions.

Consider, though, that if we contend that anything is a work of art if it's done very well (e.g. Grant's memoirs) or that anyone who writes very well is an artist, we may be broadening the definition of art to a point where most any talented person is an artist, and any well-crafted product becomes a work of art. That seems to me to be a misuse of "art" and "artist" or at least an exaggerated use of those words. I don't think it makes much difference to say that is the case only with respect to something very, very well written or a person who writes really, really well.

But I suppose to continue this discussion we should do so in another thread.

Literature, though, can simply mean prose, or writing, which includes more than art. Someone can write well and not be an artist. U.S. Grant wrote very well (in his memoirs), but isn't considered an artist. Christopher Hitchens wrote excellent essays, but wasn't an artist. We speak of legal literature, medical literature, etc., without meaning to refer to art or artists. Literature as art would more properly refer to novels and short stories, I think.

But you're correct that if we start debating what art is, we'll be going on a journey beyond the scope of this thread and one that may never end.

Growing up, art was a talent that came naturally to me — Joshs

I envy you, then.

I'm quite willing to acknowledge there can be an overlap. Santayana's three philosophical poets no doubt address philosophical issues. But I think there's a difference between evocation and exposition. I shouldn't say a philosopher can't be a poet. I know that a lawyer can be one, as Wallace Stevens was a great one, though an insurance lawyer. I find that astonishing and so believe it's very rare, though some lawyers enjoy quoting poets and especially Shakespeare. Lawyers and philosophers are prosaic, ultimately. The creation of beauty is beyond them; analysis is no friend to expression.

I think my request for examples of the great philosophical works of imagination akin to art will go unanswered, and with good reason. As for Nietzsche, he was a cultural critic, and a critic of art, but I wouldn't call him an artist. His Zarathustra is more like one of the prophetical books of the Old Testament than art.

It's interesting that artists have sometimes been called "philosophical" but philosophers haven't, to my knowledge, been called artistic. Santayana thought that Dante, Goethe and Lucretius were philosophical poets, for example.

Art is distinguishable from philosophy because it is evocative, and can be supremely so through the ability of an artist. Philosophy tries to explain, sometimes in dull detail. These are different things. When philosophers try to be artists, they fail miserably because they don't have the talent.

Take Munch's The Scream. It achieves in a single image what page after page of plodding, repetitive, self-pitying descriptions of angst and existential dread cranked out by some philosophers seek to explain and expound on. Take Picasso's Guernica, and imagine a philosopher trying to describe, let alone explain, what it evokes, about modern warfare and fascism. Take Wallace Stevens' Sunday Morning and try to imagine a philosopher addressing with such subtlety and in such a memorable way the failure of Christianity in the modern world and the preference for pagan naturalism which arises in its place.

I'd be interested to know what those may be. But I think it takes more than imagination to create a work of art.

God's teeth. Let's not sully art by claiming philosophers are artists.

I confess I got carried away somewhat.

I was trying to respond to your claim that analytic philosophy somehow nearly killed philosophy by "cutting off its relevance to how people live and what they care about." I don't think it did nor that it could do so, because I think it and OLP primarily address the dissolution of problems which most people don't care about and have nothing to do with how they live, but have become typical philosophical problems. Which is to say metaphysical and epistemological problems peculiar to philosophers like those addressed by such as Ryle and Austin. They're valuable in that respect, and I think the clarity, precision and close analysis used in that task have value generally.

I know that Marcuse thought as it seems you do, but I think he overreacted and didn't understand the focus of analytic philosophy and OLP. I view them as concerned primarily with method.

I think philosophy starting becoming irrelevant to how we live and the problems of living long before analytic philosophy and OLP arose. I don't think that Descartes or Kant, to name a few, have much to say of any relevance to how we live or should live.

As for contemporary philosophers who address matters of concern in living our lives, I'd mention Martha Nussbaum and Susan Haack as among them. The former has an affinity for Stoicism and other ancient schools, and the latter is a pragmatist, which no doubt explains why I refer to them.

It's quite possible for philosophy to address how people live and what they care about without having recourse to the kind of obscurity, and sometimes even esotericism, analytic philosophy and OLP were and are intended to expose and avoid. But in any case their therapeutic value applies primarily to metaphysics and epistemology.

I enjoyed the reference to the "scriptures" of Hegel.

But I tend to doubt that people find philosophy to be idle merely because you find in it contradictory positions. You can find that to be the case in law, medicine, engineering, sociology, psychology; most any human endeavor in which expertise is claimed, in fact.

They may be more inclined to find it to be idle because much of it has no bearing on how we live. That wasn't always the case, and isn't entirely the case now, but I think that would be a fairly common belief.

The general issue then is: are there regularities in nature or are we only imposing them to be able to better plan our lives. — Pez

I wonder just how we would "plan our lives" if there were no regularities in nature. Very ineffectively, I would think.

If this is the issue, I also wonder if it has ever been asked just how likely it is that what is useful to us in planning our lives--in living--would be in some sense inconsistent with or at odds with nature. This would require, for one thing, an assumption that we're not part of nature, or not wholly part of it, which sadly is an assumption that's been made too often with unfortunate results (including the belief that there's an "external world" separate from us). But much as some would like to think we are apart from nature, I fear we're a part of it like everything else. And as parts of nature we interact with the rest of it necessarily, are formed by the rest of it and form the rest of it as well in some respects as part of that interaction.

This thread is just a dream. Do not trouble to respond, folks. — unenlightened

More a disturbingly recurring nightmare, surely. Sorry for calling you "Shirley."

Sorry, that You can see these questions as mere 'maundering'. I am interested in serious discussion, so, if You can, come up with something less idle talk. — Pez

Ah, but I am serious and I ask a serious question: How have a serious discussion over something (like Kant's thing-in-itself, or Hume on causation) which our conduct demonstrates we don't take seriously? And indeed something which there is no reason to take seriously during the course of our lives?

From the standpoint of our conduct, we never normally think or act as if what we interact with all the time isn't what we think it to be or use it as, except in extraordinary circumstances. So, I didn't wonder what my car really is when I drove to the office this morning, neither did I wonder whether it is something like a car, which does just what a car does, but is something different from a car, which cannot be ascertained.

From the philosophical standpoint, Kant's "thing" (for example) is a perfect example of a "difference which makes no difference" to paraphrase Wild Bill James, or somebody. Peirce admired Kant, but knew maunderings (slow, idle wanderings) when he saw them. So, according to Peirce: "The Ding an sich...can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all reference to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage."

So, let's just agree that you take seriously what I don't as respects Kant and Hume.

But though I understand civil law quite well, at least as someone who has practiced it for many years, and you seem interested in it and whether it has any relation to natural law, I suspect the views of a mere lawyer wouldn't be welcome in that discussion either.

I tend to look at maunderings of these kinds as a kind of affectation, or residue of the belief that the only true knowledge is absolute, certain knowledge which we poor humans cannot obtain, because we're humans and not something else, often God, but in any case something that isn't human. So we forever remain "only human" and thus inferior beings to thinkers of this kind. But if they're correct true knowledge and certainty, if there are such things, are unattainable and simply irrelevant. Much like Kant and Hume themselves in certain respects.

Acceptance of the lack of certainty, and the lack of any need for it, alters the conception of natural law. The most interesting view of natural law I've come across is the "evolutionary view" of natural law favored by C.S. Peirce. It happens that the universe evolved the way it did, and as a consequence certain "habits" developed on which we can rely (statistically, but not as absolute laws), but in other respects the universe remains subject to inquiry and undetermined.

How many, and which, acts are involved depends on what one is doing with the description... — Banno

I'm late to this (language?) game.

But I'd say it more properly has to do with context. "I promise" may create a contract, for example. What the act is depends on what it's for, in a given set of circumstances.

Stoicism appeals to me because of its simplicity. No visions, no frenzy, no ennui; a simple and sensible acknowledgement of the folly of disturbing yourself with matters over which you have no control, and determination to govern yourself instead of trying to govern others, or events.

I wonder whether any of this amounts to more than the not very profound claim that we're human beings, and interact with our environment as human beings do.

Should we ditch Stoicism or the descriptor of "Stoic" or Epicureanism and the descriptor of "Epicurean" for similar reasons? — schopenhauer1

I don't know. It may be too late for that. They seem to be far older than philosophical pessimism. But Stoicism has also been called "Zenoism" or "Zenonism" after the school's founder, Zeno of Citium, and I'm not adverse to calling it either one of those names if it pleases you.

Right, but I guess I am perplexed because no one (Ligotti or I at least) is saying that you can't make a "the worst" anticipation of a negative outcome without "making a general judgement regarding life or the world"... So I am not sure what it is this straw man you are arguing against, as no one as I see it, is claiming thus. — schopenhauer1

I think the fact a word like "pessimism" means something in ordinary discourse makes its use to describe a philosophical position inadvisable, as confusing, but say no more than that regarding philosophical pessimism at this time. In other words, I think "pessimism" as it's apparently used in philosophy is something of a misnomer. That I'm not a philosophical pessimist should be obvious, and I think I've said why that's the case already.

To mix the two up would be intentional for rhetorical purposes in a debate to deny Pessimism its proper place in philosophy, or it is simply ignorance of the difference. Which is it for you? Or am I missing what you have done here in your mixing the two? — schopenhauer1

I didn't think I was mixing them. I merely say that "pessimism" as I understand it, as I would use it in a sentence, isn't "philosophical pessimism" as I understand it. One can anticipate negative outcomes, or think that "the worst" will more likely happen than not, without making a general judgment regarding life or the world. I don't question whether there's such a thing as "philosophical pessimism."

I tend to interpret "pessimist" and "optimist" according to their more common, less philosophical, meanings. I think I can be called a pessimist because I don't expect a good, or the best, result in practical matters of the world, nor do I expect the best of people in such matters. Years of practicing law and seeing the mess we can make of matters and each other may have contributed to the development of that point of view. But this is a view of people and what to expect of them. It's not something which constitutes a view of the greater world. I'm not "pessimistic" regarding the world; I don't think it will act in its own self-interest, or is lazy, or malicious, or inclined to act badly--those are human attributes.

Not everything. Just the parts that are smug and parochial.

My point is simply that the Crusades were holy wars waged in the name of God, like jihad, and the crusaders were promised heaven if they died while waging war, as it seems jihadists are promised. I don't consider holy war, killing in the name of God, "noble and good", regardless of the God invoked, but you are of course free to do so. I think war fought for reasons of religion disturbing.