Im not sure I agree that we have any duty at all. — AmadeusD
Hey mate, thank you for your thorough reply. Some of my utterances below will seem combative. THey are not - we just disagree in ways that look combative. But, your incredulousness at my position should at least allow you to understand that however we disagree, I simply do not care. You're giving me the time of day and I enjoy locking horns in this way. — AmadeusD
I don't know about you but I came here for an argument.
Be at ease, you're clearly debating in good faith, which warrants respect.
My disrespect is reserved for people arguing in bad faith, which I define in a philosophical or political context arguing positions they do not actually believe; i.e. not arguing on substance but simply deploying a wide range of propaganda tactics to manipulate perceptions of said substance.
I ask you to clarify your position to both be confident you're arguing in good faith but also to understand your position. Most emotivists or moral relativists, in my experience, generally have moral absolute limits and are just arguing plurality within a limited "nice and acceptable" moral terrain. Which is a perfectly coherent view to have, I am myself an emotivist and moral relativists in this sense, but it is clearly a moral absolutist position in which some plurality and diversity and various internally consistent positions, even if at odds, are perfectly acceptable; as you are clearly aware, it is the moral absolutist framework which is the far more important foundation in such a theory in which adding some compatible plurality can be pretty trivial; such as, in stoicism (my moral point of view), if moral goodness is the effort towards the good then pretty much any expressed moral system in attempting to do so, as either a linguistic / notional system or then simply doing things expressing the moral content, is morally laudable, whatever it is (however wrong it is from some epistemologically omniscient point of view) as long as it's the result of genuine moral effort towards the good (taken as either or revelatory a priori knowledge in stoicism: i.e. once one is ware of there are better and worse decisions, one is duty bound to try to make good decisions resulting in a moral journey throughout the cosmos in which advancing on one's journey, regardless of the starting point of present situation, is what is of moral worth)—to show my cards, as it were, in reciprocity to you showing yours.
I do. Sincerely apologies if, at any point, I seem a bit short. I have heard just about all of the infantalising responses to my position (despite recognizing they aren't intended that way!!). I have thought about this. I have read a lot on it. I have discussed it with laypeople and philosophers. I have fully embraced the consequences. They don't strike me the way they strike you. That's all. I still have good reasons to act or prevent acts, that I am sure you would, overall, agree with teh results of. — AmadeusD
I ask for clarification just to be sure my understanding of your position is correct.
The best way to clarify a moral position is to consider the social consequences (as morality is mostly, though not entirely, socially contingent).
However, social consequence is only a clarifying and cannot possibly be an evaluative factor of moral positions and theories. For, obviously we cannot evaluate what social consequences are good or bad without first committing to a moral theory to make such an evaluation. To say this moral or political scheme is wrong because it has these or those social consequences is not a complete argument without first establishing the moral scheme required to make such an evaluation, which if we happen to already know is true then it is trivial that anything incompatible with it claimed to be good will be evaluated to be bad.
Of course, it just so happens that the vast majority of people operate this way as they are unconscious of their foundational moral or evaluative framework in which they evaluate any new moral claims. Therefore, if you take a moral scheme for granted the fastest way to resolve the acceptability of any new moral claim is to work out it's social consequences and decide if they are good or bad based on what one already believes.
The reason I ask so much clarification of emotivist and moral relativistic positions is that most people in modern society explicitly believe they have such a theory while implicitly believing in moral absolute limits (in which case those moral absolute limits are far more interesting and the actual heart of the debate in such a case).
Correct. This is not a problem to my mind, other than because It makes me uncomfortable. Not sure how it could be 'wrong' in any other sense. — AmadeusD
I think it's pretty clear we'll need a new thread to go deeper here. I should have time this week to transcribe MacIntyre's core objections to emotivism / moral relativism, as I'm sure you'd agree his position is worth considering and it would anyways benefit the forum to gain insight into such a powerful thinker. I do not actually agree with MacIntyre's overall framework, but my own position is only a slight upgrade in strength of several of MacIntyre's statements; basically in some foundational places MacIntyre hesitates to simply make an absolute claim all while denying he's simply made moral relativism more complicated. His sort of "riding the line" and very Buddhist "neither is true but it is true" I think is worth considering (and his whole argument is a brilliant insight into how society works and I am 100% convinced by his epistemological claim that moral content can only develop and make sense within a moral tradition), but at the end of the day I'm simply not convinced it's possible to avoid "we have a duty to the good of society" for the virtues MacIntyre promotes to be actual virtues and even if it is possible as MacIntyre sets out to do that there is any need to do so.
Not at all. I just think you're making an obvious mistake. — AmadeusD
If you mean by mistake using social consequences to evaluate moral positions (i.e. that moral consequences I find unsavoury for exterior reasons is a valid argument against a moral claim, without first establishing my moral theory can be taken to be true to begin with), then I hope that has been clarified above.
If the social consequences of a position are accepted (what MacIntyre refers to as "paying the price") then of course that "I don't like those consequences" or "people don't like those consequences" is not an argument. It's only an argument if you also agree that those consequences are unacceptable and you are not assigning equal moral merit to those consequences as compared to others.
They do, but you've named instances that include the other reasons I've alluded to. Suffice to say at this stage that I formulate in these scenarios (though, I'm not yet at a fine-grained version of this view, so bear with) that hte actor has, in fact, chosen to accept hte subject's emotional position, rather than a moral obligation. — AmadeusD
Well if your invoking some sort of social contract that is to me a moral absolutist position (that people should do what they give their word to do, as a moral duty): i.e. the cop should fulfil his duty of honest impartiality and not plant evidence because he's accepted that duty, the surgeon should finish the surgery because of the hypocritical oath, and serial murderer has (probably) entered into all sorts of explicit or implicit agreements with society to respect the law and not go around murdering people.
If there are no duties, then there are no duties to keep one's word either. You can give your word because you feel like it and are of equal moral weight in breaking your word because you feel like that too.
Not at all. It seems clear to me that these lines of yours are somewhat unhinged. *shrug*. — AmadeusD
This seems to me nearly a tautology. Even if we could imagine a society that "just so happens to function" even if no one is doing anything that can be described as "political" eventually an existential crisis will arise and the only solution is "doing politics" which if no one is willing to do then society will end, being the definition of existential crisis.
Which you seem to accept in your very next sentence:
I think the bolded in sufficient, but apparently you do not. That said, If no one in the country wants to defend it - Okay. That's the situation. — AmadeusD
In my experience, this is the main problem emotivist have to contend with as there's all sorts of institutions requiring duties to be performed to maintain any sort of comfortable life that "feels good". Generally, at least in my experience, emotivists want others to perform social duties so that they can feel good while denying those duties actually exist.
Libertarian oriented emotivists will usually try to solve this problem with hazard pay—fighting a war is dangerous and so soldiers are compensated for it—while ignoring that obviously this wouldn't work in practice for two reasons: first, if every soldier demanded market based hazard pay it would simply be unaffordable to have an army, but second, and more problematic, hazard pay in the market deals with risks in which the plan is not to die (there are no jobs in which the advertisement is "you'll definitely, probably be killed" but we'll compensate you for that), but for a war to be prosecuted successfully almost always involves plans where the risk of death is acute and so a market solution would require increasing the hazard pay as the risk increases. Not only is any actual military far from being hazard pay based, but nearly all states reserve the right of conscription which is as far from compensating soldiers for risk as is possible. If people have no duties then of course they should abandon their posts as soon as the risk to their person warrants it.
This may not be your case, but at least for libertarians "free riding" they view as a bad thing and it usually causes them problems to become aware they are free riding on other people willing to self-sacrifice for their security and comfort all while they claim any self-sacrifice (even in the form of taxation) is not only not a duty but many go so far as to say is evil. In other words, for the market to exist in the first place requires a long list of institutions and whole host of individuals dedicated to refuse economically rational choices (abandon the battlefield as soon as the hazard pay doesn't cover the risk; take a bribe to rule in one party's favour as soon as soon the reward outweighs the risk of being caught by people equally rational and willing to take bribes, and so on).
I'm not sure this sort of criticism applies in your case (libertarians generally have plenty of morally absolute positions such as theft is wrong and contracts are sacred and they are doing "good" by being self interested, and so on, and the cause of the problem above is in relying on soldiers doing in their view "bad" and entering into non-market based labour exchanges and willing to self-sacrificing, paying a life tax, for the benefit of the state and moochers, including people enjoying the fruits of market relations due to the maintenance of the state that makes those market relations possible).
I would point you toward Heydel-Mankoo for a perspective on this aspect that seems to me inarguable, and exposes the preening nonsense of anti-colonial sentiment in te 21st century. But we are likely to almost violently disagree here. — AmadeusD
We literally have actual settler colonialist genocide happening right now fully supported by Western governments, and you seriously believe that considering that as a moral failure of the West (along with the destruction of the natural world and the habitat we depend on to continue the whole civilization project) is "preening nonsense".
However, by "sentiment" are you also referring to all the colonialism in the past? Aka. that the current distribution of wealth and power globally has nothing to do with colonialism at all, neither now nor in the past?
This is seems laughably wrong, and nothing you've provided seems to move the compass. He's an impassioned writer that seems to ignore two or three fundamentally important aspects of what he's talking about (one, being the above - the vast majority of people (who consittute the culture!!!) simply are not involved in this side-show - it goes on, in spite of hte ridiculous Political stupidity. This seems true in most cultures, and the West is not unique in that way. — AmadeusD
This is MacIntyre's starting thesis, so I will transcribe the key parts hopefully this week.
However, insofar as I've represented MacIntyre's position accurately, it seems bold to dismiss an argument of a pretty well respected philosopher as laughable. He's received criticism from many different schools and many other well respected philosophers and I have yet to hear the criticism that his arguments are laughably wrong. So we'll see if your claim here holds up.
As for the substance of your rebuttal, it's equally bold to simply assume society will simply muddle on despite ridiculous political stupidity. For example, if there was a general nuclear exchange started by the United States due to ridiculous political stupidity, would you evaluate this as a success?
Now, if your definition of success is just whatever happens (for example a nation is invaded, no one bothers to defend it as no one feels like it, they're all killed and this is successful because it happened), then seems there's no content in success or failure; anything that exists or ceases to exist represents success.
More fundamentally, if you have no moral standard, which seems implied in a position in which there's no duties to do anything, then how are you even judging success? So my first charge here is that you seem to be invoking some moral absolutes in critiquing my statements, whereas if we're basing morality on feelings then my position is equally valid to yours as I clearly feel Western society, the enlightenment project, has failed whereas you feel it's successful, and my feeling is just as good as yours. Even if you proved me to be factually wrong based on invoking a shared reality neither of us have a duty to accept is real, I would still have no duty to accept any particular facts about it.
What's hte issue? That's the choice that Nation made. Forcing the populus into a War seems to be a much, much worse thing to do. — AmadeusD
I didn't say anything about forcing.
The alternative to no one defending the interests of society and forcing people to, is a society in which duties are really believed to exist; soldiers feel bound to their duties because they think those duties are morally binding on them, not contingent on insofar as they feel like it or then their hazard pay (insofar as things aren't too hazardous and it makes economic sense). As described above, the moral tensions is if there's expectation soldiers (or anyone taking any risk to protect the interest of society) carry out duties all while denying there are any such duties.
I can only roll my eyes at the baked-in biases here.
I have to be entirely honest in that the type of vibe your views encompass a little bit funny. I'm sorry for that coming through as I know you're good faith and being honest with me. It just seems childish and I have a hard time. This is likely a flaw in me, but wanted to be clear about why some responses might seem flimsy. I think that's what they call for. I mean no offense. — AmadeusD
What's childish?
This is "the debate" when it comes to moral relativism v moral absolutism. If every point of view is valid and there are no absolute moral claims, then the Nazis were and are equally valid and the holocaust is as laudable social project as creating a health care system. Obviously Hitler felt he was doing good and so if no moral feeling is better than another, then Hitler was doing as much good as anyone else.
It's easy to argue moral relativism if the only moral positions under consideration are those pre-selected by the society you live in as acceptable. However, that's no the implication of moral relativism. If every position is equally morally valid (or invalid, but result in equality) then implication is that a serial killer has just as valid a moral position as a honest and compassionate doctor.
You've claimed no one has duties ... Ok, well that clearly means no one has duties to not engage in serial killing nor then stop anyone from doing so. People who "feel like" stopping the serial killer are just as morally justified as the serial killer and anyone who would do likewise, obviously they feel like serial killing.
Where you get pluralism, which to me clearly seems your comfort zone, is when you allow for a wide range of faiths and goals, but place absolute moral limits on what is morally acceptable in pursuit of those goals. Pursuing pleasure by skipping a stone on a lake: acceptable, approved. Pursuing pleasure by torturing little children to death: unacceptable, not approved.
The position that there are no duties (as you say, you'd report child sexual abuse only if you felt like it and wouldn't consider it wrong to not-report it if you didn't feel like it; there's no duty to report crimes against children as there are no duties at all).
Now, if you're willing to "pay the cost", as MacIntyre put it, and just flatly say that though you are happy people perform various duties to maintain your situation of comfort that you feel good in but they are simply wrong if they performed those duties because they thought those duties were real and not because they "happened to feel like it", which seems to be what you're saying, then I fail to see how its childish to point out the consequences.
Obviously a society in which no one performs any duties (no one keeps there word, no one tells the truth, no one protects any social institution required for society to function) wouldn't be comfortable society to live in.
Insofar as people "feel compelled" to actually perform duties due to the social consequences it is because of a history of society repeating to itself those duties are real: you should actually do them, you should actually reject a bribe as a judge and tell the truth as a witness. If those duties aren't real and people shouldn't feel compelled by them and people hear your message which clearly you are happy to share and then they see the light, then what's childish is to then simply assume that things would go on as before.
The adult position is to just accept that indeed society would basically fall apart if no one performed any duties and that's perfectly acceptable to you as an outcome. Which in one comment you seem to accept, that no one has a duty to defend the country and so if no one happens to feel like doing that then there's no way to defend the country and so be it, but then here with similar considerations the retort is it's childish.
If no one has any duties, then it's clearly perfectly morally acceptable to just lazily go about your day and contribute nothing to the general welfare just as it's perfectly morally acceptable for soldiers to abandon their posts as soon as they don't feel like risking their lives any more. The only difference in the soldier case is your invoking the false dichotomy that the only alternative is to force people to serve (the alternative you leave out is people serving their country because they feel a duty to do so, that they believe is very real and if they didn't believe that they wouldn't continue on based on merely happening to feel like it).
If you fall back to social norms (that we expect a judge to refuse bribes and soldiers to follow orders) and so there's negative consequences for failing to do what people expect, well the big incentive to conform to social norms that maintain society (not well by any stretch of the imagination, but not yet totally destroyed either) is the belief of others that those norms are real moral precepts. So, to say those norms aren't actually moral precepts, no one should believe them truly binding in any moral sense, but people act like they are real because other people think they are real and so impose a cost for violating those norms, obviously doesn't work anymore once enough people sees the truth that those norms aren't real. Which in a long list of cases is a good thing (according to the new norms of society) because it turns out the basis of those norms (slavery, racism, killing homosexuals, wife and child beating, and so on) weren't well supported: feelings changed and so what people felt compelled to do by social pressures also changed (in a process that is far from complete). However, the feelings changed (historically) not because people started to believe there are no moral truths at all but rather due to the consequences of debates about what those moral truths are.
I think the idea that a critical mass of a population would act against not only their own self-interest, but their own relations in the world is far-fetched enough to simply not care about this potential. — AmadeusD
As I just explained, this is the philosophically naive position.
If you aren't concerned about the consequences of no people believing they have any duties (as, according to you, they should believe because that's the truth) then you're basically in the free riding problem as above. A critical mass of people won't agree with you and so you don't have to worry about that happening.
However, there's a lot more fundamentally wrong with your statement here.
First, you're clearly bait-and-switching individual self-interest with collective self-interest. It is in the collective self-interest for a soldier to self-sacrifice (by explicitly jumping on a grenade or then just taking on extreme risk) but it is obviously not in their own self-interest (as their dead now).
This is the core problem of politics, essentially before any other as maintaining any political system whatsoever requires a significant amount of self sacrifice, starting with both facing extreme risk (risking life and safety for the "self-interest" of society) as well as refusing advantages (bribes and favouritism and so on) but is a tension that goes far deeper (for example we not only expect the judge to refuse bribes, we also expect the judge to put in the work required for a fair trial even if that goes against his self-interest to have a pleasant life or is in conflict to important, but not as important, duties to his own family, such as disappointing his spouse or children due to late nights considering the merits of the case at hand).
"Self-interest" in your statement above is actually referring to collective-interest which may or may not be compatible with self-interest. It maybe in your self-interest and also the collective-interest to get a job, but it's in your self-interest and not the collective-interest to steal from your job, as a general rule (even if you are guaranteed to get away with it).
Economists just randomly invent abstracted entities (families, companies, organizations, government and the like) and then just randomly say those abstracted entities will act in their self interest to describe how society "should work", but any entity that represents a collection of individuals has collective-interest and not self-interest. Collective is a bad word in Neo-liberal economics so they just ignored what they're doing: confusing collective-interest with self-interest to solve the problem of self-interest being in conflict with collective-interest in the first place; this problem is not solved by simply stating:
"a critical mass of a population would act against not only their own self-interest".
This is just wrong. A critical mass of a population, in pursuing their individual self-interest, can definitely act against their collective interest of both themselves and dependents. That is exactly what are environmental problems are: we have no collective interest to have a system in which pollution can be externalized, but we each have an individual interest to externalize the costs of our pollution in pursuing our own pleasures. We could solve the problem but that would require a critical mass of people acting against one's self interest to ignore the political process altogether (something you see as perfectly fine, even morally superior to the many "rediculously stupid people" engaged in politics) because one's effect on outcomes is lower than the cost-benefit of the resources it requires (mostly time and brain calories).
The only 'duty' the West actually imposes is to not interfere with others against their will. I'm quite absolute in this regard. People should be allowed to hurt themselves, and contract into self-disinterested behaviour. — AmadeusD
Ok, well all this discussion to come to the fact you are a moral absolutist, exactly as a suspected.
Why say things like:
Im not sure I agree that we have any duty at all. — AmadeusD
When you are perfectly sure, quite absolute, in that people have a duty to not interfere with others against their will.
So ok, "feelings" mean nothing, we have a quite strict absolute moral rule to abide by.
Fortunately, all the criticism above is still completely relevant, as your absolute moral rule doesn't really mean anything unless we (aka. a critical mass) have a duty to violate our own self interest in applying this standard to others on behalf of others violated by it (aka. maintain a government, police, prosecutors, judges or then analogous law-enforcement system), which in order to function require a long list of duties that go far beyond simply avoiding interfering with someone. Indeed, if that was the only rule then police and judges wouldn't interfere with the lives of people interfering with people (and there would be no police and judges).
Anyways, you could just say "I'm a libertarian" and so believe the rules that maintain market conditions are absolutely inviolable, the original acquisition of resources that created market conditions being unjustifiable is a "myth", and I want to free ride on soldiers sacrificing their self-interest without market based hazard pay, praise them to keep going all while knowing I (and others) are cheating them of just market relations by manipulating their naive natures.
We've had plenty of debated on libertarianism already, but it's always refreshing to have another: see how you solve the issue of taxes and democratic participation and corruption and externalities and so on without people having a duty to the collective interest under any circumstances (except of course to stop anyone interfering with you, then of course the entire mechanism of the state must be taken for granted to stop that).
Now, I still think we should discuss MacIntyre, but his argument is with actual emotivists and / or moral-relativists where there is no claim to absolutes whatsoever, they "pay the cost" as I've mentioned and simply accept the Nazis had as good claim to moral goodness as anyone else.
Libertarianism is basically agreeing with MacIntyre's framework, just joining the libertarian tradition instead of MacIntyre's Aristotelian "heroic society" tradition, which has prima-facie equal claim to moral justification in MacIntyre's framework. Where we could evaluate one tradition as "better than another", for example in this case libertarianism with Aristotelian heroic virtuism, would be in demonstrating inconsistency in one or the other position or then being able to solve moral dilemmas in one tradition that are insoluble in the other tradition.
Therefore, it is 100% MacIntyrish to pit MacIntyre's preferred moral tradition to yours (something similar to if not exactly libertarianism), or to mine (stoicism), and see if one seems superior to another and we may switch from or then amend our own tradition, all while avoiding moral relativism (we really did believe our tradition at the start was the best available and if that changes at the end then we really do believe that's an even better moral tradition).