The alternative, for which I have great sympathy, is that the notion of cause cannot be cashed out in any great depth, to follow Hume in concluding that cause is more habit than physics. — Banno

I neglected to respond to some of what you wrote.

As I noted, this view of cause is one I also find convincing. At this point my goal is finding a more formal and convincing argument than "seems to me."

A few things to note. Firstly, by taking the example of billiard balls, and especially the description of electron repulsion, as epitomising cause, we run the risk of falling into the common philosophical trap of reaching a wrong conclusion by limiting the examples we are considering. — Banno

Sure. I wanted to start with a very simple, familiar example of cause and then break it out in as much detail as I could think of. I found it helpful. It raised interesting questions with me. I guess I figure, if I can't figure this one out, I won't be able to get anywhere with more complex examples.

And secondly, it is well worth noting that scientists, especially physicists, rarely if ever make use of the word "cause". — Banno

In 1912, Bertrand Russell wrote an essay called "On the Notion of Cause" in which he makes a similar point.

Perhaps the breadth of the issue will become apparent as the discussion proceeds. — Banno

I think you're right. My hope to keep things focused on simple physical causes as a way to getting an understand what causality is probably isn't going to work out.

I'd suggest that the apparent way to cash out the notion that A caused B, where A and B are considered to be two distinct events, is something like that in each and every case in which A occurs, B follows. Implicit in this are modal considerations, the is, necessarily, A causes B if and only if every event A is followed by event B. We thus arrive at counterfactual theories of causation, which, despite having all the apparatus of possible world semantics at hand, fail to produce a coherent account. — Banno

I read through several paragraphs describing counterfactuals and causality. I think I understood what it was saying, but it seems much to complicated. That's why I wanted to start out with such a simple example. I guess my take, perhaps my prejudice, is that, if it's all that difficult, why not just get rid of the idea of causality completely and look at it some other way.

A second try might be to soften "A causes B" from B always following A to B mostly following A; to treat causation as probable rather than certain. Hence the present preoccupation with causal models, which I am forced to admit show great promise in both their usefulness in practical application and to some extent their correspondence to our mundane notions of cause. — Banno

I read through the section on probabilistic models of cause. Again, I think I understood it, but I think it's too complicated. Maybe this is my problem - at bottom, I've always seen causality as a complement to determinism. The ways of seeing things that you've described are much less rigid, I guess deterministic, than that, which is a good thing, but it seems like it loses whatever philosophical explanatory power it originally had. What value is there in loosey-goosey causality.

Causes always lead to events if we accept that every event has a cause, which is a basic metaphysical assumption. What you have identified isn't a metaphysical problem, but an epistemological one, meaning every cause doesn't have a predictable event, and by "predictable," I mean knowable. That we don't know whether you will contract Lyme's disease by the bite of an infected deer tick doesn't mean that there will not be an event that is caused by the bite of the infected deer tick, it just means you don't know what it will be. — Hanover

I've thought about this some more and I don't think I have much more to add. Your point about causes having effects that aren't, and perhaps can't, be known is interesting. It's something I've thought about before without coming to a final conclusion. I'm not sure that is at the heart of what I'm calling the metaphysical issues with the idea of causality.

So an identity is set, as well as its scale. We might consider the cue ball, but ignore the subatomic level. Time is one of those identities that we can consider, but we set a scale for this as well.

Do we want to consider seconds? Nano-seconds? Months, years? The scale and identities we pick for our consideration all need to be considered. — Philosophim

I think you're exactly right, and that's why I wanted to look at the billiard ball example at a molecular level. I wanted to bring those framing, scaling issues out into the open so I could take a look at them. I think they are really important. The fact that we have to choose the scale and frame we are going to look at things at is also important.

Causes always lead to events if we accept that every event has a cause, which is a basic metaphysical assumption. What you have identified isn't a metaphysical problem, but an epistemological one, meaning every cause doesn't have a predictable event, and by "predictable," I mean knowable. That we don't know whether you will contract Lyme's disease by the bite of an infected deer tick doesn't mean that there will not be an event that is caused by the bite of the infected deer tick, it just means you don't know what it will be. — Hanover

I've been thinking about the right way to respond to your post. Your points are good ones and are at the heart of the questions I want to get to eventually, which I think are metaphysical questions. I was going to try to avoid metaphysical issues in this discussion. Maybe that was an unrealistic hope.

I find this an unsatisfactory response to your post. I'll think some more and come back later.

I think currently in physics they haven't put up a narrative as to what's a necessary component of cause and what's sufficient (such as quantum spin etc). It seems they're still trying to find more particles and trying to order them. I know string theory fell out of favor but quantum field theory has an argument for accounting for cause in quantum mechanics and general relativity (which both supplanted classical mechanics in manners of their own). In classical mechanics I believe kinetic energy was what caused things. — Shwah

It is certainly true that I could have gone even deeper into the interactions of the billiard balls than I did. I could, theoretically, done an analysis using quantum mechanics. But where I drew the line makes sense to me.

This seems more of a focus on the physics question of what causation is as opposed to the philosophical issues related to causation. — Hanover

I do, eventually, want to have a discussion about philosophical issues related to causation. I've already tried to have some of those discussions in various threads, but it's been a muddle. My plan is to make sure I am clear on what I mean by "causality" before I dig deeper.

Statistically speaking, the best you can say is that A is 100% correlated to B after n number of trials, but you can't ever say that A causes B. — Hanover

I think it goes further than that. Once you get past over-simplified situations like the billiard balls, it get's much more complicated. Most events have more than one and perhaps many causes. Events we call causes may not lead to events we call results 100% of the time. Being bitten by an infected deer tick causes Lyme disease, but not everyone who is bitten by an infected deer tick gets Lyme disease.

That's why I wanted to start out with something very simple.

Necessitarianism is stronger than determinism because determinism allows for the possibility that the causal chain as a whole could have been different, even though every cause within the chain could not have happened differently, given the antecedent causes. — Paul Michael

To me, as the saying goes - it's a distinction without a difference.

If one takes libertarian (or even certain versions of compatibilist) free will to mean that one could have done otherwise, then necessitarianism being true would make this impossible because nothing in reality could have been otherwise, including our choices and actions. — Paul Michael

How is that different from plain old, vanilla determinism?

If necessitarianism is true, then libertarian free will definitely cannot exist — Paul Michael

I don't understand why this would be true. I don't see why either philosophical option couldn't be consistent with determinism.

On the other hand, I did think of a potential philosophical effect - If necessitarianism were true, then the fine-tuning argument for God would never arise.

There might be a way to determine which is true logically, but I do not think we can determine which is true empirically. — Paul Michael

To me, that means it is a metaphysical question. I won't inflict my oft preached sermon on metaphysical entities here.

Necessitarianism suggests there is exactly one way reality can be, which is the way it actually is. In contrast, contingentarianism suggests there is more than one way reality could have been. — Paul Michael

A couple of questions:

1) Are there any physical consequences if necessitarianism is correct and contingentarianism is not?

2) Is there any way to determine whether necessitarianism is true and contingentarianism is not?

If the answer to these two questions is "no," and I suspect they are, then the difference is either metaphysical or meaningless.

A third question:

3) Are there any philosophical consequences if necessitarianism is correct and contingentarianism is not?

If the answer to that question is "no," then the difference is meaningless.

Those who receive a transplant must pass the "good candidate" test for receiving the organ. Meaning, the person must be suited for the transplant. — L'éléphant

My brother had a kidney transplant about five years ago when he was 67. Before the doctors would allow the operation to proceed, he had to meet health requirements, including losing a lot of weight. There are a limited number of organs for transplant. They want to make sure they go to people who will benefit from them. Makes sense to me.

3. If some evidence is not improbable under A but very improbable under B, then that evidence provides strong evidence for A. — SwampMan

To be clear, premise 3 is the only one you want to discuss here. Is that correct? I have some issues with the first two premises, but that's not what we're discussing.

Let's simplify. I have a die with six sides. On five sides there are single pips. On the sixth there are two pips. I'm going to roll the die and ask you to bet on what number will come up. What do you choose?

Let's change that a little to make it more comparable to your situation. I roll the same die but hide it under a cup so you can't see the result. Is there "strong evidence" that there is a single pip on the side of the die facing up?

So - is a high probability the same as evidence? I want to say "no" but I'm not sure I can justify that.

I am looking for some strategies to appeal to why multiple deaths are worse than one (specifically in the realm of Taurek cases). I am hoping to find methods to make this claim that do a little more than just repeat consequentialist beliefs. — Camille

Isn't the answer straight-forward and obvious? Isn't it clear that five deaths are worse than one death? It has nothing to do with weighing one person's life against other's. What if it were 10 to 1. 100 to 1. 10,000 to 1. There's a line somewhere when it becomes silly to argue it doesn't matter. I don't think there should be any moral quandary with 5 to 1 - five deaths is worse than one.

Another question - Where would I draw the line if the one person in question was my daughter?

Welcome to the forum.

He was arguing that he could not make sense of it. — Constance

He wrote that causation is "...a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm."

Intuition is far from common sense. — Constance

I am a strong believer that intuition and introspection are valid, powerful, means of gaining knowledge and understanding. But, in the end, their results are still subject to the scrutiny of observation, experimentation, and reason. When you give intuition primacy over those factors, you've left philosophy and crossed the border into the bleak wasteland of voodooism, mysticism, and Republicanism.

I've had my say. You can have the last word if you'd like.

As previously, you have provided a speculative, unsupported, and far-fetched idea with no evidence to back it up. It is not science, it's pseudo-science. I won't poke my head into your thread again.

They didn't have enough of this knowledge. Logical conclusion: their refusal is unwarrented. — EugeneW

I'm done. Unless someone pulls up one of my previous posts for criticism again without attribution.

Every happening, on the other hand, is made up from a cause and effect, as they are spread in spacetime. — EugeneW

And I say "no." And you say "it's obvious." And I say, "no, it's not obvious." You are arguing that cause is real and obvious. My only argument is that it is not obvious. We're not getting anywhere with this.

Every effect has a cause. — EugeneW

That's a bit muddled. Do you mean that every event has a cause? If so, then no, not necessarily. If you don't want to argue, then don't contradict things I write.

It's all there is to logically conclude. — EugeneW

You haven't provided any logical argument. As I noted, "it's obvious" is no argument at all.

But the idea is not what is discussed here. — Constance

You brought up my previous post and were dismissive.:

Someone argued that causality was debatable because Bertrand Russell wrote a paper saying so. Russell was actually waying we can't make sense of causality, but he was not contradicting the basic intuition that a spontaneous cause is impossible. I wonder how this went with him. Does he understand that a spontaneous cause is apodictically impossible. — Constance

I was that someone. So I responded and it is exactly the idea that is being discussed here. And, by the way, yes Russell was exactly contradicting the basic intuition that a spontaneous cause is impossible.

What makes causality so intractable to analysis is that it is intuitive, and not empirical, and such things are not reducible. — Constance

So, is it your position that your intuition trumps reason? Common sense must be right? I know the feeling you are talking about. When someone says that x caused y, I know what they mean. I've thought about that a lot and come to the conclusion that, except in a few very simple situations, it just doesn't work.

Which is obvious nonsense, — EugeneW

[condescension] Let me explain this to you. Just saying "it's self-evident", "it's obvious", "it's a priori knowledge", "it's nonsense", or "it's undeniable" is not an argument.[/condescension]

had he had some knowledge of physics. The problem in physics is why cause precedes effect.. — EugeneW

He actually made his arguments based on and with reference to his understanding of modern physics at the time. Take a look at his argument - "On the Notion of Cause," 1912. I actually don't find that part of his argument especially convincing. I focus more on the fact that I think causation is a metaphysical entity. As with all metaphysics, it is neither true nor false, only more or less useful. Let's not go any further into it right now. The point I'm trying to make is that it is very much not obvious that things are caused. It's not obvious to me. It wasn't obvious to Russell. It wasn't obvious to R.G. Collingwood in 1943. We're not the only ones.

he was not contradicting the basic intuition that a spontaneous cause is impossible. — Constance

He went further. He said the idea of cause in physics is meaningless.

I suppose it is true, that women need love. Do you think that men and women have the same needs? — chiknsld

I'm talking about loving something outside themselves. I love lots of things - reading, writing, science - especially writing. I am most myself when I am thinking and trying to explain myself to others. It fills me with pleasure and it gave me a career that allowed me to make a decent living and do something worthwhile.

Are you referring to women? — chiknsld

I'm referring to everyone.

Great Books? I don't know. I'm not sure it matters as long as you teach them to think well. How to write. To love reading, if that's possible. Math and science, as needed for practical life, but also as a way of understanding the world. History and geography so they know where they fit in the world. Wood shop so they know how to work with their hands. What we used to call "home economics" so they know how to get along in the world - also cook and sew on a button. One of the most useful courses I took was typing. I'm using it now.

Good teachers matter more than specific curriculum. I still remember the best teacher I ever had, Mrs. Koepcke, my 11th grade English teacher. I still feel gratitude for what she gave me.

Teach them to love something, something that is theirs and they'll have for the rest of their lives.

one cannot imagine a spontaneous effect. — Constance

I can.

But to just sit an imagine an object moving by itself, in good faith, it is clear as anything can be: impossible. — Constance

No.

What if someone theorized in a way that violated the principle of causality? Putting aside that someone has in fact done this, ask your self how well this sits with your understanding. It is a blatant absurdity, apodictically impossible. — Constance

In 1912, Bertrand Russell wrote "On the Notion of Cause" in which he makes the argument that causation is not a useful way of thinking about the world. In 1943, R.G. Collingwood wrote "An Essay on Metaphysics" in which he wrote something similar. My point? It is not "absurdity" to deny the principle of causality.

I think that goes to show that you and I think too differently about the world for this to be a fruitful discussion.

To know at all is to take up the world AS this knowledge claim is expressed. Taken APART from the knowledge claim, pure metaphysics. The cup on the table, e.g. is qua cup, a cup, but qua a palpable presence not a cup at all. — Constance

I don't know what this means. More evidence you and I do not have the language to talk to each other about this.

As I see it, to bend absolutely requires a medium in which a thing can bend. — Constance

People used to think that there must be a luminiferous aether because they thought that electromagnetic waves had to have a medium to propagate through. Turns out they were wrong. I don't see how your inability to conceive of space bending without any outside space to bend in is any different.

I think quantum physicists "doubt" quantum mechanics, meaning they really don't understand it because it itself is not clear...yet. — Constance

I don't think that any reputable physicist doubts quantum mechanics at all. They may argue about the interpretation, but I think that is a metaphysical argument, not a scientific one. Fact is, it works. As they say, shut up and calculate. It doesn't make any difference if you can understand why. Science isn't about understanding why things happen, it's about understanding how things happen. Your "...yet" is a bit too cute for my taste. Most physicists don't think further study will make QM any less counterintuitive. The world is not obligated to arrange itself in a way that fits into your way of thinking about it. You can't change the world, but you can change your thinking.

They presuppose space. Space bending is like saying logic implying: to imply is to USE logic. It cannot be its own presupposition. — Constance

I'll say this one more time, then I promise I won't say it again - You've fallen into the same trap of mistaking the words for the world that you identify in the OP.

The curvature of space. Is this an idea that makes sense, not as it is theorized about, but as a singular concept? — Constance

Yes.

What do you do with theory that explains things well, but is radically counterintuitive? — Constance

Science is all about finding out situations where our intuition is wrong. Intuition doesn't come from the great beyond, it can be changed by experience and understanding. Do you also doubt special relativity and quantum mechanics? Those theories are certainly counterintuitive.

Is it wrong to think empirical science dis really not about the actualities lie before us. After all, the actual world is not a quantified presence; language and logic make it so; — Constance

If this is true, and I think it is, why can't spacetime bend?

isn't science's claims about being about the world a hidden reification of logic? — Constance

Everything put into language is a reification of something. Every word is reification. Reification and metaphor, that's all there is. I guess reification is the same thing as metaphor.

Space is real, and I don't think space bending is a metaphor. — Constance

Seems to me, most ideas refer back, or at least originally referred back, to something at human scale. That certainly makes sense with "space." Of course, there's always been space - the three-dimensional volume in a room, etc. I wonder if the development of the idea of space was changed by the development of Cartesian geometry. It certainly seems like it would have been as people learned that there were long distances between those bright things up in the sky. Science and science fiction probably changed the meaning of the word even more. General relatively just continued those changes and added another dimension. So, no. Space is not real, if by that you mean that it hasn't changed and can't change again.

And of course space bending is a metaphor. People can bend a tree branch or a piece of metal, but you can't bend air. Until, suddenly, you can.

So, I say, "He is an animal!" and the sense of it depends on the person in question and animals being both familiar. — Constance

It doesn't make any difference who the person in question is, if it's male, he is an animal. Sorry, a little cute.

As I said, I think you are caught up in the same paradox creation that you started out writing about.

The point? It is a diffuse point, sort of bound up in the ideas presented, each one in its own right a challenge, but the general point would be that the perversity extends from the thinking that logic can serve as a structured way to speak about the actual world. — Constance

I think that Zeno's arrow paradox and performative contradictions, a term I hadn't heard before, are examples of what we call paradoxes. I agree they arise from a misguided attempt to apply rigorous logic inappropriately. I think that's also true about seeming contradictions that come up when trying to talk God into a corner and yell "Gotcha!"

General relativity is something different. GR is a theory, a model, which very effectively predicts the behavior of certain aspects of the world. Talking about space bending is a metaphor that helps people picture and understand what is happening. GR redefined what "space" means. I don't see it as a paradox at all. If you were talking about the different interpretations of quantum mechanics, I would be more likely to agree with you.

Unless I've misunderstood what your trying to say, this:

Einstein's space time: Space bending?? Nonsense. The concept of bending presupposes space. I am not a physicist, but it is an analytic certainty that if something bends, it must bend in a medium which allows things to bend IN it. — Constance

is a good example of this:

a perverse belief in a logically structured world can generate a false sense of paradox. — Constance

Or is that your point?

I think subjects as well as arguments can be reasonable as well as unreasonable. For an atheist (is it me or is there unusual much activity abouts gods?) theism is unreasonable. Close to madness even. Is madness reasonable? — EugeneW

Given that you and I are reasonable people, does that mean there are some subjects we should not be able to talk about? That doesn't make sense to me.

"The argument" can be very unreasonable though... — EugeneW

Yes. My point is that the term "reasonable" can apply to arguments but not to subjects.

I'm not sure they would agree. But even if they did, it's pretty easy to point to what is traditionally (and commonly) used as examples of what a "philosopher" is. I don't think that tells us much — Xtrix

I laid out what I see as the requirements for being a philosopher. The people I listed all met those requirements. My point was to show that my set of criteria will identify people who we normally think of as philosophers. That helps show that my definition is consistent with everyday usage.

Before the word "philosopher" was even coined, what was happening? Was there no "philosophy"? I don't think so. I think Parmenides was as much deserving of the label "philosopher" as anyone. — Xtrix

I don't see how this relates to the things I've written.

Every human being can think; not every human being is a thinker.

[Also, it may be useful in an everyday sense -- but certainly not in a technical sense. So while I find nothing wrong with "work" as a useful word in everyday life, that itself doesn't make it useful in physics (where that string of letters takes on a completely different role, and is given a technical meaning).] — Xtrix

Sorry, you lost me.

I rank/rate creativity highly, right up there with reason & knowledge. The reason it seems to have dropped out of philosophical discourse is because we're still in the early stages. Nevertheless parallel processing has been/is/will be done with amazing results. There should be another branch of philosophy specifically developed to beautify philosophy. Compare an automobile from the 1890s to one in 2022. — Agent Smith

I had a thought that I think we both can agree is a good one. I plan to avoid discussions with you in the future.

Sometimes the word used is epistemic such as epistemic priviliege (where one is privilieged with a unique epistemic set, or way to deal with reality, based on your upbringing (or based on ontological events that happened in your life vs epistemic ones which you may have participated in epistemically but not actually such as watching a horror movie or waving back at someone who was not waving at you)). — Shwah

I'm still lost. I don't see what this has to do with causation or creation.

I sometimes do [fail]
— T Clark

That's all that matters, no? — Agent Smith

As I said, if I fail, criticize me for my failure, as I am criticizing you for yours.

Creativity? Irrationalism? — Agent Smith

Are you proposing these as standards by which philosophical arguments should be judged?

Is Taoism (one of your pet subjects) reason(able)? — Agent Smith

Subjects aren't reasonable, arguments are. I think my discussions about Taoism have been reasonable. As I'll say again, if you find some that aren't, criticize them.

Just to make sure I've got this right. Requiring arguments based on knowledge and reason rather than prejudice is setting the bar too high. Is that correct? Your directness is refreshing. I can't think of anything else of value to add in response
— T Clark

Beware of adopting principles which when applied to yourself will only get you an F-. — Agent Smith

I'm willing to be judged by that standard. When I fail to meet them, and I sometimes do, I deserve criticism. Have at it.