Comments

  • How do you think the soul works?
    The brain recognizes that it did not generate this movement on its own because it notices there was no conscious reason for it. In the context of the situation, the brain can easily deduce what happened.punos

    But that comes close to what is described as the mereological fallacy - the attribution of an action to a part (the brain) when it actually originates with the whole (an agent. The mereological fallacy is described in an influential if controversial book called The Philosophical Basis of Neuroscience, Bennett and Hacker.)

    I don't believe (but could be mistaken) that Penfield suggested an operation could be performed that would give the subject the illusion of having initiated an action that the surgeon actually initiated.

    So the better expression would be that the subject can easily deduce what happened.

    I do not believe there is a single, literal region of the brain responsible for the conscious unity of experience because it is the unified integration of the entire brain and nervous system that gives rise to this unity.punos

    Quite right - once again, an echo of the Aristotelian psuche, the 'principle of unity' that characterises living things.
  • The Mind-Created World
    The noumenal world does exist independentlyJ

    But 'exist' is precisely the wrong word! 'To exist' is to be apart, to be separated, to be this as distinct from that. Which is why I say in the original post that the in-itself neither exists nor does not exist (if existence is the wrong description, then non-existence is the negation of something which doesn't apply.) So to think of 'the noumenal' or the 'in-itself' is already to designate it as an intentional object, a 'this here' or 'that there'. Hence the 'way of negation', neti neti or wu wei.
  • How do you think the soul works?
    If you were to allow a brain surgeon to open your brain and begin poking at different areas while you were still awake and aware, you would notice that when the surgeon stimulates a specific spot in the brain, you would experience a specific memory, thought, or emotion associated with that area. This demonstrates that the material and the ideal are causally and efficaciously connected.punos

    However one crucial point that Penfield noted was that the subject could always distinguish a movement or a memory that was elicited by the surgeon from something the subject themselves did. They would say 'you did that'.

    This suggests that conscious will or subjective agency is not reducible to mere activity in the motor cortex or memory centers. There's an interpretive or integrative function in the mind that is able to recognize the source of an impulse, distinguishing between self and non-self. Penfield himself was so struck by this that he became increasingly open to the idea that mind and brain are not identical—that perhaps consciousness is not fully explainable in terms of brain processes alone.

    In The Mystery of the Mind (1975), Penfield wrote:

    “The mind seems to act independently of the brain in a way that we do not yet understand. ... It is not possible to explain the mind on the basis of neuronal action within the brain" (ref}.

    Another crucial point is that neuroscience has not been able to identify the area of the brain that is responsible for the conscious unity of experience. 'enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience'. And yet this sense of subjective unity is the fulcrum around which all our inner life turns.

    I think the brain is an infrastructure in which information is exchanged between the conscious and subconscious minds. So, we cannot think when a certain part of our brain is damaged.MoK

    Sure.
  • The Mind-Created World
    No one confuses the photo with the object, but neither is the photo the object “as it is in itself.
    — Wayfarer

    It's not an hallucination or an illusion, but it does not possess the inherent reality that we accord to it.
    — Wayfarer

    But could you explain to me what you mean, exactly, by the bolded phrases?
    Ludwig V

    Certainly—I'll try to explain.

    The idea is that a photograph presents the appearance of an object as mediated by the camera’s optical and technical structure. It’s not the object itself, but an image of the object—structured by the mechanics and limitations of the device. In this conversation, the photograph was being used as a metaphor for perception itself. Just as a photograph is a camera-dependent image, so our perception of the world is mind-dependent, shaped by the structure of our perceptual and cognitive apparatus.

    This is one of the central themes in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. He distinguishes between the appearance of things—how they present themselves to us—and the thing in itself (das Ding an sich), which is how things are independently of how they appear. Now, this idea has been the subject of extensive debate, and there are many interpretations. But one sympathetic reading is to see the “thing in itself” as a philosophical placeholder: it marks the limit of our possible knowledge. It also preserves a sense of mystery that no amount of empirical or conceptual inquiry can dissolve—the mystery of what reality is in itself, outside of its appearance to us. In this way, Kant's philosophy continues the classical distinction between appearance (what seems) and reality (what is).

    If you look again at the original post, this ties in with the quote from Charles Pinter’s Mind and the Cosmic Order, where he describes how the gestalts or objects we perceive are not merely “given” but are assembled through the interplay between sense data and cognitive interpretation. The kind of world we experience depends on the kinds of senses we have—and, in our case, also on the concepts and structures we use to interpret them. This doesn’t mean the world is illusory. But it also doesn’t mean it exists independently of the properties and meanings our minds contribute to it. That’s what I meant by saying it lacks the "inherent reality we accord to it." The reality we perceive is not free-standing in the way objectivist realism assumes; it is co-constituted by the perceiving mind.

    Here’s another way to put it: try to imagine the Universe as it would be if there were no living beings anywhere in it. You can’t—not really. Whatever you imagine is still ordered by a perspective. What you’re visualizing is a Universe as if there were no observers—but the very act of visualizing already imposes a kind of structure, a standpoint. That unknowable, perspective-less universe is what I refer to as the “in itself.” And as mind evolves within that background, the Universe begins to ‘take form’—not merely physically, but in terms of meaning, appearance, and coherence. There's a sense in which we are the universe coming to know itself (an idea which is by no means original to me.)
  • The Mind-Created World
    You are going to be accused of not getting the point,Janus

    I gave up at:

    you have to explain why the world would not appear to us "as is".Apustimelogist
  • The Question of Causation
    Physical Monism may be what you are getting at, but this is generally regarded as a kind of Physicalism.

    >Generally described under the title 'physicalism'. In slogan form 'mind is what brain does'.

    Panpsychism?

    >Matter has some latent consciousness, Patterner is an advocate.

    Eliminativism? As you strongly deny what you are expressing is physicalism we have to rule this out. This basically describes Mental Terms as misleading (I am sympathetic towards this approach despite its faults).


    Neural Monism is a kind of physicalism too, so we have to rule this out.

    >Neutral monism is not usually desribed as physicalism - it is the idea that at bottom, being or reality is neither mental nor physical but can appear as either.

    Non-Reductive Physicalism would mean you have to face the Supervenience Problem.

    >Correct. It's probably the majority view.

    Epiphenomenalism would be another option possibly?

    Usually associated with physicalism> mind is an epiphenonenon that appears in sophisticated beings.

    Your list doesn't mention idealism. Bernardo Kastrup is an advocate.

    David Chalmer's paper Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness was one of the origins of 'consciousness studies'.
    I like sushi
  • The Question of Causation
    Notes on David Chalmer's 'Naturalistic Dualism'

    At its core, naturalistic dualism says:

    There are two kinds of fundamental facts in the world:

    • Physical facts (e.g. brain states, neurons firing)
    • Phenomenal facts (e.g. the what it’s like of seeing red)

    And crucially:

    Phenomenal facts are not reducible to physical facts.

    But phenomenal facts are part of the natural world, so they should be studied by science—just not physical science as currently understood. (This part sounds a lot like phenomenology!)

    Hence, it's dualism, because it posits two fundamental kinds of properties or facts, but it's also naturalistic, because it's not invoking supernatural entities or a mind outside of nature.

    (However, much rests on what 'outside of' means here.)
  • The Question of Causation
    How can it be that thinking consciousness is a fundamental property of reality is not challenging the presuppositions of naturalism?Patterner

    We have to use words very carefully here. What panpsychism says is that consciousness is a fundamental property of matter. Matter can be studied objectively, via physics and chemistry. But the nature of reality is a different question and a much broader question. The scientific analysis of what can be known objectively doesn't consider many elements that science itself relies on - the reality of natural laws, the reality of numbers and abstract objects, the reality of the wave-function. All of these are philosophical questions rather than scientific, hence also a challenge the pose for naturalism insofar as naturalism is confined to what can be know objectively.

    I don't see it (consciousness) as "grafted", "inserted", or "added on", any more than properties like mass or electric charge are.Patterner

    That's what panpsychism does, though. Mass, charge and other physical properties are observable and measurable, whereas the idea that matter possesses properties of consciousness is purely conjectural. Again, it is an attempt to rescue the credibility of materialism by saying it must be a property in all matter - instead of questioning materialism itself. That is explicitly what Galen Strawson says about it, mine is not a straw man argument.

    The problem is that we are so used to thinking of things in only one way that it's difficult to consider there might be other ways.Patterner

    Careful with this 'we'. I've looked at philosophy of mind from many perspectives. The 'one way' that you have in mind, is still very much influenced by early modern science, the division between mind and matter, subject and object. There are many ways to tackle the hard problem other than panpsychism. Chalmers says in various places that a kind of naturalistic dualism is required, that has to acknowledge the fundamental differentness of mind and consciousness while still keeping within the general bounds of naturalism (although I confess I haven't read much about his proposal there.)
  • The Mind-Created World
    I don't know why you keep phrasing it as if the object is dependent on your mind when you should be talking about what you see or perceive.Apustimelogist

    You're still missing the point of the critique, which isn’t about denying that there is some kind of reality independent of our particular perceptions (no one here is advocating solipsism), but about the structure of knowledge itself—specifically, that so-called “sense objects” are only ever known as appearances within a framework of consciousness.

    The analogy you offered—of calling the photographed object “camera-dependent”—actually illustrates my point rather well, if unintentionally. A photograph is an image produced by the optical and mechanical structure of a camera. No one confuses the photo with the object, but neither is the photo the object “as it is in itself.” It’s the object's appearance as mediated by the particular structure of the apparatus. Likewise, our perception is not of the thing in itself, but of its appearance as structured by our perceptual and cognitive apparatus. A dog won't recognise a photo of itself because it can't smell it.

    What you describe as “information about the world” presumes precisely what is at issue: that the world is available to us as it is, rather than as it appears under our particular modes of access. This is the very presupposition that transcendental arguments (like Kant’s, and many idealist successors) call into question. The point is not to deny that there is something that gives rise to experience, but to insist that what we experience is never “raw” reality but always reality as structured by mind.

    Your appeal to prediction and effective interaction—“if it works, it's real”—simply substitutes pragmatism for ontology. That's fine if your goal is engineering, which is where I think your actual interests lie. But it's not a rebuttal to the philosophical question: what is the nature of the reality we claim to know? You’ve asserted that “there’s no mysterious barrier between perception and the world”—but that’s not an argument; it's a declaration of faith in the transparency of perception, which is precisely what’s being contested!
  • The Question of Causation
    This is not interesting though.Apustimelogist

    Have you encountered phenomenology as a field of study?
  • The Mind-Created World
    I engage with plenty of people here thank you. I've been discussing this post and the related The Blind Spot of Science for two years, most of your comments are that you don't see the point of either of them. I will deal with constructive critcism but not uninformed hostility, which is mostly what I get from you. Over and out!
  • The Mind-Created World
    If all you're saying is that what we experience is mediated by our senses, our bodies and brains, then you are saying nothing controversial.Janus

    You alternate between saying that it's obvious, and that it's absurd. Wrong on both counts, but then I've noticed your inveterate tendency to regard your own educational limits as binding on the rest of the community here.
  • The Question of Causation
    Don't be like Wayfarer who acts childish when he realizes he's beat.Philosophim

    :rofl: You don't understand the criticism that are made of your posts, and then think that your not understanding them is a counter-argument. You don't understand what it is you don't understand even if it's explained to you, as a number of other people have said to you in this thread. That's why I gave up trying. Nothing to do with being 'beat'.

    We should be aware that there are many who won't recognize the 'hard problem of consciousness' or who will say it's a pseudo-problem or philosophical sophistry with no real meaning. I'm not one of them.

    The 'hard problem of consciousness' is connected to the blind spot of science. This is the failure to acknowledge the primacy of subjective experience—the fact that all observation and knowledge occur from a conscious point of view, which science treats as external or irrelevant, despite the obvious fact that science is conducted by subjects. This tendency grew out of the fact that early modern science divided the world up into primary attributes (measurable in mathematical terms) and secondary attributes (taste, color, smell etc), and also into mind (res cogitans) and matter (res extensa.)

    I've also noticed a pattern - that when I bring this topic up, especially in relation to panpsychism, you will not respond to those posts, even if they're addressed to you. I think this is because you don't understand the point, but I suspect it is also because you don't want to know. Perhaps you can help me out here.
  • The Mind-Created World
    Noodling around on the Internet, I happened upon a book by one Robert Ornstein, who's earlier book on the evolutionary roots of consciousness I bought in the 1990's. (He died in 2018). On Amazon, I find his last book (published posthumously) is called God 4.0:

    The book explores how our "everyday" mind works as a device for selecting just a few parts of the outside reality that are important for our survival. We don't experience the world as it is, but as a virtual reality – a small, limited system that evolved to keep us safe and ensure our survival. This system, though essential for getting us safely across a busy street, is insufficient for understanding and solving the challenges of the modern world. But we are also endowed with a quiescent "second network" of cognition that, when activated, can dissolve or break through the barriers of ordinary consciousness. We all experience this activation to some degree, when we suddenly see a solution to a problem or have an intuitive or creative insight – when we connect to a larger whole beyond the self. By combining ancient teachings with modern science, we have a new psychology of spiritual experience – the knowledge to explore how this second network can be developed and stabilized. ...they emphasize the need to reflect on and explicate, both individually and collectively, the functional value of virtues such as generosity, humility and gratitude, and of service. These attitudes and activities shift brain function away from the self and toward an expanded consciousness – an experience of the world's greater interconnectedness and unity and an understanding of one's place in it.God 4.0 - in the Nature of Higher Consciousness and the Experience called God, Robert Ornstein, Sally M. Ornstein

    Which seems thoroughly compatible with the ideas expressed by the O.P.
  • The Mind-Created World
    Let's recall what this thread is about. Scientific instruments vastly expand the sensory capabilities of humans, but the data they generate are still essentially empirical in nature. The OP is a more about insight into the way the brain or mind interprets experience. It's about the meaning of empirical experience, not its veridicality.

    My claim in the OP is that cognitive science validates at least some important aspects of idealist philosophy - that what we perceive as the external world is, in an important sense, mind-dependent, because what we know of it is constantly being assimilated and interpreted by the mind.

    And that therefore empiricist philosophy errs when it seeks a so-called 'mind-independent object', as sense objects are, by their very nature, only detectable by the senses (or instruments) and cannot be mind-independent in that way.

    Being aware of the way ‘mind constructs world’ is more a matter of self-knowledge and self-awareness - something with which phenomenology and Eastern philosophy (and indeed Greek philosophy) is much more familiar with than science or much of modern philosophy.
  • The Christian narrative
    The whole thread may have been given too much credit. It's fairly hard to salvage a thread that begins that way.Leontiskos

    You gotta know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em.
  • How do you think the soul works?
    'Duty' is a rather odd word to use.

    The graphics provided by @punos in the above post are instructive. They illustrate the massive proportion of the forebrain in h.sapiens, and primates generally, in relation to other species. The human brain and human anatomy, generally, evolved very rapidly, in geological and evolutionary terms (compared with evolutionary changes in other lineages).

    In any case, with h.sapiens, the capacity for language, abstract thought, story-telling, art, tool-making, has arrived. Plainly that is linked to the development of the forebrain, but in my view, the evolutionary account doesn't capture the full significance of that.

    There's a lot of reading to do in that subject - evolutionary psychology, linguistics, anthropology, paleontology to mention a few subjects. But again, the philosophical question of whether mind and brain are the same may not be answered even by all of that.

    Very briefly, I think the development of the kind of self-awareness that h.sapiens has, means we're no longer just biologically determined, in the way that other creatures are. We can enquire into nature, our own and generally, in a way that animals cannot. We still bleed, breed, sweat, and die, but we are able to awaken to intellectual and spiritual capacites beyond the biological. That's what I think the ancient intuition of 'soul' is pointing to.
  • The Question of Causation
    Some people are unaware of physicalism for the same reason fish are unaware of water :lol:
  • Language of philosophy. The problem of understanding being
    One has to examine
    what this means in practice in the way a culture conducts itself, treats expressions of otherness i. one’s family and community, avoids war and other violent acts which define the boundaries of ‘interconnectedness’.
    Joshs

    Indeed. And on the whole, with some notable exceptions, Buddhism has been a civilizing influence through the East.
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    By way of contrast this is where the Buddhist model is relevant. In the early texts, the Buddha emphatically denies that there is a ‘what’ that survives death. This is laid out clearly in two key discourses: the Sāti the Fisherman’s Son sutta and the discourse to Ariṭṭha.

    In the first, Sāti claims that consciousness is the “what” that transmigrates. The Buddha responds by firmly rejecting this as a wrong—and even pernicious—view. It is not simply mistaken, but actively obstructive to insight. After attempts to correct him fail, the Buddha dismisses Sāti as unable to grasp the teaching, and then clarifies with the monks the correct understanding: that consciousness does not persist as a self-same entity, but arises dependent on conditions, ceasing when those conditions cease.

    In the second dialogue, when Rādha asks the Buddha what the constituents of a ‘being’ are, the Buddha replies:

    “Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, Rādha: when one is caught up (satta) there, tied up (visatta) there, one is said to be 'a being.'”

    So again, the picture is not of an ego, soul, or substance that is born, dies, or survives. It is of a process: craving and clinging give rise to the experience of continuity, both within this life and beyond. What “continues” is not a person but an impersonal dynamic of becoming.

    Interestingly, this resonates with Schopenhauer’s conception of the will as the blind striving underlying phenomenal existence. But the Buddha goes further in prescribing a path by which this process can be understood and released (which is the entire thrust of his teaching.)

    In later Buddhist traditions—particularly Tibetan—the Bardo Thödol offers detailed accounts of what is said to occur in the intermediate states after death. These are rich with imagery and vivid experiences, including visions of light, peaceful and wrathful beings, and karmically influenced encounters. But the subject undergoing these experiences is not taken to be an enduring self, but rather a locus of karmic momentum—an apparent subjectivity without essence ('citta-santāna'). The continuity is real, but not personal in the conventional sense. This provides a philosophical model that avoids both materialist reductionism and dualism. And it arguably offers a conceptual framework within which to interpret NDEs—especially those that are less reassuring and more morally charged, like the account by Sam Bercholz in A Guided Tour of Hell.
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    it doesn't affect the strength of my argument.Sam26

    Indeed. A point to consider.
  • Language of philosophy. The problem of understanding being
    Brook Ziporyn. And it's not just nostalgia. Indra's Net is hardly a primitive ontology.
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    For NDEs, with 200-300 million reports….Sam26

    I read your rationale for this the other day but it easily seems like overreach. It is inferred that there would be that number of reports, on the basis of scaling up the numbers of reports from a sample population, but if many of these experiences are not formally written down or described then it’s purely conjectural. And it’s a large number! I don’t think it would hurt your case to omit references to such large speculative numbers, while still pressing the point that they are frequently reported and may be far more common than we're inclined to believe.

    When astronomers observe distant galaxies, when biologists examine cellular structures, and when physicists read instrument displays, all involve sensory experience. The suggestion that our senses are "the worst data-taking devices" would collapse the empirical foundation of science itself.Sam26

    But it’s not directly comparable. Third-person validation is obviously missing from near-death experiences. The difference is not merely in kind of object observed but in what sort of epistemic access is possible. Empirical science rests on public reproducibility, while SME research often relies on private, unrepeatable events. True, there is the ‘replication crisis’ in science, which is probably of special relevance in your subject matter, as it is much more common in the social than the physical sciences. But even so, the experiences reported by these subjects can only be validated first-hand by actually having them. Otherwise they remain anecdotal.

    Subjective vs. Objective Elements

    NDE testimony includes objective elements (verifiable details like surgical procedures) and subjective elements (e.g., feelings of love, encounters with deceased relatives). Corroborated objective elements, such as a child's verified ER observations, lend credibility to subjective reports, suggesting genuine experiences. Cultural variations affect interpretation (e.g., light as Jesus or ancestors), but core phenomena remain consistent, indicating universal features of consciousness.
    Sam26

    Fair distinction between the subjective and objective elements of NDEs, and I agree that verifiable observations—such as accurate descriptions of surgical instruments or events during clinical death—are especially significant. They do suggest that something more than imagination is at work, and lend weight to the credibility of the overall report, although it’s important to stay mindful of the epistemic difference between first-person and third-person validation. While veridical cases strengthen the evidential basis of NDE studies, many of the other reported elements—particularly those involving feelings of peace, tunnels of light, or meetings with deceased persons—remain inherently subjective. This isn’t a criticism, but a caution about evidential weight.

    Cultural frameworks may shape the interpretation of NDEs —whether the “being of light” is perceived as Jesus or an ancestor—and while that may point to a universal phenomenological core, it could also reflect how deeply interpretive structures are embedded in the unconscious. That cultural dimension was also encountered by Ian Stevenson in his research of past-life memories, where children in cultures like India were far more likely to be believed than those reporting such memories in Western cultures. ('In the West', he once said, 'people ask "why would you research that? Everyone knows it's a myth". In the East, the reaction was more like "why would you research that? Everyone knows it happens all the time.")

    Open questions persist, such as the timing of experiences or the mechanisms of survival, but these do not negate the robust evidence for consciousness persistence.Sam26

    Your argument highlights what I think is a central and underappreciated point: that materialist objections to NDEs and (and related phenomena such as past-life recall) often rest on explanatory gaps of their own, especially when faced with rigorously investigated cases of veridical perception. But I think the real challenge lies not just in identifying the limits of materialism, but in what the alternative is. Your metaphor of “survival” still implies a kind of thing that persists, and a mechanism by which it does so—concepts which themselves are grounded in the very materialist kind of ontology that you're seeking to question.

    If these phenomena point to anything, perhaps it's that we need to rethink the ontological categories themselves—maybe life and mind are not simply functions of biology, but expressions of a deeper order that isn’t bounded by physical birth and death. That doesn’t give us a ready-made metaphysical framework, but it may point to the need for one. I think there are hints of this emerging all over the place at this point in history, but it's obviously a very deep subject. So while I agree that NDEs may well 'transcend current theoretical frameworks', what the emerging paradigm might be is still, as you say, an open question.
  • Virtues and Good Manners
    One thing to bear in mind is that philosophical disputes may involve disagreements about what the participants think is real - and that can’t help but generate heat at times. (‘How on earth can he honestly believe that?!?’) One habit I’ve adopted is to say that views I think are wrong are incorrect - rather than some more inflammatory term, which I was often tempted to use in the past. But disagreements are disagreements, and there’s no getting around that.
  • Virtues and Good Manners
    I've always found your posts to be a model of courtesy and have no idea why you think you might be 'thrown out' for saying so. I completely agree with the importance of manners (and wish my grandsons had more of them ;-) ) I think the more delicate point is, how to disagree with others whilst remaining civil. That is especially important in philosophy and in navigating online discussions. My experience is, I have plenty of disagreements, some of them quite heated, but I try and refrain from inflammatory language and bomb-throwing. But it's especially difficult in this polarised time, where standards of civility are under constant assault by people in high places (some more than others, if you catch my drift.)

    Anyway - overall in total agreement, and the model of 'paideia' is certainly one that we should all aspire to.
  • Artificial Intelligence and the Ground of Reason
    Thanks! I found the essay itself very insightful, I think he makes a really important point about the distinctin between human abilities and artificial simulation.

    without a human body for internal reference, the simulation may be lacking substance. A metal frame robot may come closer to emulating humanity, but it's the frailties of flesh that human social groups have in commonGnomon

    :100: I elaborate on some of these themes in Part II

    Part Two

    This brings us to the deeper and more elusive question: what does it mean to reason? The word is often invoked — as if self-evident — in contrast with feeling, instinct, or mere calculation. Yet its real meaning resists easy definition. Reason is not simply deduction or inference. As the discussion so far suggests, it involves a generative capacity: the ability to discern, initiate, and understand meaning. The following references are an attempt to explore the question of the grounding of reason, in something other than formal logic or scientific rationalism. The basic premise here is that the question must have some real concern - it needs to grapple with the 'why' of existence itself, not simply operational methods for solving specific problems.

    A Phenomenological Perspective

    This is the deeper territory Edmund Husserl, founder of phenomenology, explored in The Crisis of the European Sciences, his last work, published after his death in1938. He sees the ideal of reason not merely as a formal tool of logic or pragmatic utility, but as the defining spiritual project of European humanity. He calls this project an entelechy — a striving toward the full realization of humanity’s rational essence. In this view, reason is transcendental — because it seeks the foundations of knowledge, meaning, and value as such. It is this inner vocation — the dream of a life grounded in truth and guided by insight — that Husserl sees as both the promise but also as the crisis of Western civilization: promise, because the rational ideal still lives as a guiding horizon; crisis, because modern science, in reducing reason to an instrumental or objectivist pursuit, has severed it from its original philosophical and ethical grounding.

    The Instrumentalisation of ReasonThe idea of the instrumentalisation of reason was further developed by the mid-twentieth century Frankfurt School. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer described the instrumentalisation of reason as the idea of reason as a tool to achieve specific goals or ends, focusing on efficiency and effectiveness in means-ends relationships. It is a form of rationality that prioritizes the selection of optimal means to reach a pre-defined objective, without necessarily questioning the value or morality of that objective itself, morality being left to individual judgement or social consensus.  

    
Instrumental reason focuses on optimizing the relationship between actions and outcomes, seeking to maximize the achievement of a specific goal, generally disregarding the subjective values and moral considerations that might normally be associated with the ends being pursued. According to them, instrumental reason has become a dominant mode of thinking in modern societies, particularly within technocratic and capitalist economies.

    In The Eclipse of Reason, Horkheimer contrasts two conceptions of reason: objective reason, as found in the Ancient Greek texts, grounded in universal values and aiming toward truth and ethical order; and today’s instrumental reason, which reduces reason to a tool for efficiency, calculation, and control. Horkheimer argues that modernity has seen the eclipse of reason, as rationality becomes increasingly subordinate to technical utility and subjective interest, severed from questions of meaning, purpose, or justice. This shift, he warns, impoverishes both philosophy and society, leading to a form of reason that can no longer critically assess ends—only optimize means.

    Tillich’s Ultimate Concern

    For humans, even ordinary language use takes place within a larger horizon. As Paul Tillich observed, we are defined not simply by our ability to speak or act, but by the awareness of an ultimate concern — something that gives weight and direction to all our expressions, whether we are conscious of it or not. This concern is not merely psychological; it is existential. It forms the background against which reasoning, judgment, and meaning become possible at all.

    “Man, like every living being, is concerned about many things... But man, in contrast to other living beings, has spiritual concerns — cognitive, aesthetic, social, political. They are expressed in every human endeavor, from language and tools to philosophy and religion. Among these concerns is one which transcends all others: it is the concern about the ultimate.”
— Paul Tillich, The Dynamics of Faith (1957)

    Without this grounding, reason risks becoming a kind of shell — formally coherent, apparently persuasive, but conveying nothing meaningful. Rationality divorced from meaning can lead to propositions that are syntactically correct yet semantically meaningless — the form of reason but without content.

    Heidegger: Reason is Grounded by Care

    If Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern frames reason in theological terms — as a responsiveness to what is of final or transcendent significance — Heidegger grounds the discussion in the facts of human existence. His account of Dasein (the being for whom Being is a question) begins not with faith or transcendence, but with facticity — the condition of being thrown into a world already structured by meanings, relationships, and obligations.

    Even if Heidegger is not speaking in a theological register he, too, sees reason not merely as abstract inference but as embodied in concerned involvement with the world. For Heidegger, we do not stand apart from existence as detached spectators. We are always already in the world — in a situated, embodied, and temporally finite way. This “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) is not a flaw but essential to existence. And we need to understand, because something matters to us. Even logic, for Heidegger, is not neutral. It emerges from care — our directedness toward what matters. This is the dimension of reasoning that is absent from AI systems.

    What AI Systems Cannot DoThe reason AI systems do not really reason, despite appearances, is, then, not a technical matter, so much as a philosophical one. It is because for those systems, nothing really matters. They generate outputs that simulate understanding, but these outputs are not bound by an inner sense of value or purpose. Their processes are indifferent to meaning in the human sense — to what it means to say something because it is true, or because it matters. They do not live in a world; they are not situated within an horizon of intelligibility or care. They do not seek understanding, nor are they transformed by what they express. In short, they lack intentionality — not merely in the technical sense, but in the fuller phenomenological sense: a directedness toward meaning.

    This is why machines cannot truly reason, and why their use of language — however fluent — remains confined to imitation or simulation. Reason is not just a pattern of inference; it is an act of mind, shaped by actual concerns. The difference between human and machine intelligence is not merely one of scale or architecture — it is a difference in kind.

    Finally, and importantly, this is not a criticism, but a clarification. AI systems are enormously useful and may well reshape culture and civilisation. But it's essential to understand what they are — and what they are not — if we are to avoid confusion, delusion, and self-deception in using them.
  • On emergence and consciousness
    That’s a marvelous anecdote—almost a miniature case study in how meaning emerges through social practice. It nicely illustrates the distinction between the physical substrate of the pawn (as a wooden object subjected to forces) and its role within the normative structure of a game. The chipped pawn becomes a functional sign within a shared rule-governed space, which the young observer grasped in her own intuitive way – but without even knowing the rules!

    It brings to mind Alicia Juarrero’s insistence that causation in complex systems can’t be understood solely in terms of efficient causes. (This is the subject of Part One of her book 'Why Action Theory Rests on a Mistake'.) Constraints—especially those arising from intentional and socially embedded contexts—play a formative role. They shape not only how things unfold, but also determine which patterns of behavior are recognized as meaningful actions within the system. The 'downward causation' you describe is not merely an influence from “macro” to “micro,” but a change in the frame of reference for explanation—from physical movement to meaningful action. It's a different kind of 'why'.

    Another essay on the topic says
    We commonly explain occurrences by saying one thing happened because of — due to the cause of — something else. But we can invoke very different sorts of causes in this way. For example, there is the because of physical law (The ball rolled down the hill because of gravity) and the because of reason (He laughed at me because I made a mistake). The former hinges upon the kind of necessity we commonly associate with physical causation; the latter has to do with what makes sense within a context of meaning.Steve Talbott, What do Organisms Mean?
  • The Question of Causation
    @Patterner I’d like to respond to your thoughtful posts on panpsychism, particularly the idea that consciousness is latent in all matter, and to clarify where I think this position runs into difficulty.

    You quoted Brian Greene:

    And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? — Patterner

    This is the crux of the so-called "hard problem": how consciousness could possibly emerge from wholly non-conscious components. But note the implicit assumption — that a configuration of matter and forces gives rise to inner experience. What if this assumption is itself misguided?

    This assumption reflects the standard materialist framework, in which physical entities and causal interactions are ontologically primary, and organic life and consciousness are emergent or derivative phenomena — i.e., products of physical complexity.

    Panpsychism doesn’t abandon this framework but tries to accommodate consciousness within it by attributing some form of proto-consciousness to matter itself. This leads to the position Strawson articulates:

    Naturalism states that everything that concretely exists is entirely natural; nothing supernatural or otherwise non-natural exists. Given that we know that conscious experience exists, we must as naturalists suppose that it’s wholly natural. And given that we’re specifically materialist or physicalist naturalists (as almost all naturalists are), we must take it that conscious experience is wholly material or physical. — Galen Strawson

    But this, as Joshs points out in another thread, is a kind of conceptual sleight-of-hand:

    Strawson is among many within the analytic community who have been unable to make the leap to a post-Nietzschean way of construing objectivity, causality and subjectivity. They don’t see that the problem is their reliance on an inadequate formulation of the physical, and an inadequate biological model. As a result, Strawson finds subjective experience to be so qualitatively alien with respect to his understanding of the non-experientially physical that he has no choice but to create a new category of the physical to make room for it.Joshs

    In other words, instead of questioning the conceptual framework that makes consciousness seem alien to materialism, Strawson redefines matter to include it — which looks suspiciously like moving the goalposts. That's the sleight-of-hand that panpychism tries to get away with.

    The deeper problem, I would argue, is the assumption that only objective knowledge — that is, publicly measurable, intersubjectively verifiable data — qualifies as real knowledge. But consciousness is not something that shows up in that framework. It doesn’t appear as a quantity in equations or an observable in experiments. Its existence is given only in the first-person mode, and this makes it invisible to objectification (the rationale behind 'eliminative materialism').

    Hence the various contortions in contemporary philosophy of mind — from eliminativism and behaviourism to panpsychism — all share a desire to naturalise consciousness, but without challenging the presuppositions of naturalism itself.

    To make a broader point: maybe it’s not that consciousness needs to be shoehorned into a redefined "physical," but that our concept of the physical itself — inherited from early modern science — is too narrow to account for the kind of being that consciousness represents. And we're still labouring in the shadow of the cartesian division between mind and matter. If that's so, then rather than grafting mental properties onto matter, perhaps we should revisit the metaphysical assumptions that led us to this impasse in the first place.

    But this kind of “revisiting” isn’t just a terminological matter. It calls for a deeper philosophical reorientation — a kind of conversion, a 'meta-noia'. It means stepping outside, or seeing through, the objectivist framework that assumes reality is fundamentally mind-independent, and instead recognising that our very notions of “reality,” “existence,” and “nature” are themselves shaped by our modes of access to them. Consciousness isn’t simply another puzzle to be inserted into a pre-existing picture of the world; its existence requires us to reconsider what it means to be at all.

    Phenomenology has seen this from the outset, as made clear in this snippet:

    In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. — Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology, ed. Dermot Moran, p144

    The question isn’t merely how does consciousness arise from matter? but what kind of understanding allows us to see consciousness as a problem in the first place? And from there, we might begin to entertain a radically different vision: not of matter with consciousness as a puzzling add-on, but of a world already shaped by and through the possibility of experience.
  • How do you think the soul works?
    Not all souls are self-awarepunos

    Agree. But consider again Aristotle's view of 'psuche' (psyche). There was the vegetative, animal, and rational soul, each with different levels of capability, and each possessing the powers of the lesser kind, plus additional powers - in humans, the capacity for rational thought and speech (hence humans, the 'rational animal'.)

    This view is deprecated nowadays with decline of the belief in soul. But phenomenology of biology explores the sense in which even very primitive organisms are 'intentional' in some basic kind of way, which can be seen as an analogy for Aristotle's psuche. Phenomenological biology takes seriously the distinctive features of living beings—purpose, self-organization, and intentionality—and tries to show how these features can be understood in a way that respects both the insights of modern science and the wisdom of philosophical traditions, particularly Aristotle's.

    However, again, agree that overall humans are uniquely self-aware in a way that other creatures are not.

    Consider animals that do not recognize themselves in a mirror.punos
    Ah, but some do. See The Mirror Test
  • I've been trying to improve my understanding of Relativity, this guy's videos have been helping
    Seems a very good presentation. Have you encountered Matt O'Dowd and the channel PBS SpaceTime? He also has a large collection of lucid videos on physics and cosmology.

    Later, bending of light around large masses, and gravitational redshift were verifications, but neither of these had been done at time of GR publishing.noAxioms

    Those were the subject of the measurements carried out by Sir Arthur Eddington, which provided observational validation of Einstein's theories. Specifically, the 1919 expedition aimed to measure the bending of starlight as it passed near the Sun. The position of stars observed during the eclipse was compared to their known positions when the Sun was not in the sky. Eddington's team found that the starlight was indeed deflected, and the amount of deflection was consistent with the predictions of general relativity, not the predictions of Newtonian gravity. This finding propelled Einstein to international fame and was a crucial piece of evidence in favor of his new theory. It also made Eddington a notable scientific hero - his books sold hugely in the period between the World Wars, and helped make Einstein's theories understood by the broader audience.
  • How do you think the soul works?
    There was a famous and highly influential experiment conducted by Dr. Álvaro Pascual-Leone and his team at Harvard Medical School in the 1990s. This study is a cornerstone in the field of neuroplasticity and motor learning, and it beautifully illustrates the power of mental practice.

    Here's a breakdown:

    The Experiment:

    The Task: A group of volunteers who had no prior piano experience were taught a simple, five-finger piano exercise.

    The Groups:

    Physical Practice Group: This group was instructed to physically practice the exercise on a piano for two hours a day, for five consecutive days.

    Mental Practice Group: This group was given the exact same instructions, but with a critical difference: they were told to only imagine playing the piano exercise. They were not allowed to move their fingers or touch a piano. They simply "played" the piece in their mind.

    The Measurements: Before and after each daily session, the researchers used a technique called transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to map the volunteers' brains. TMS allowed them to measure the size of the motor cortex region dedicated to controlling the specific finger movements required for the exercise.

    The Remarkable Results:

    Both groups showed a measurable and significant change in their neural configurations.

    The brains of the students who physically practiced the piano piece showed a clear expansion of the motor cortex area responsible for controlling the fingers used in the exercise. This was the expected result—that physical skill acquisition leads to brain reorganization.

    However, the most groundbreaking finding was that the brains of the students who only mentally practiced also showed a similar, and in some cases, almost identical expansion of the motor cortex.

    The Conclusion and Implications:

    This experiment provided compelling evidence that the brain's "plasticity" is not solely dependent on physical action. The mere act of mental rehearsal or motor imagery is enough to trigger the same kind of neural changes that occur with actual physical practice.

    This has profound implications, not just for musicians and athletes who use mental rehearsal to improve their performance, but also for fields like rehabilitation. For example, the findings suggest that patients who are physically unable to perform an action (e.g., due to a stroke or injury) can still stimulate and rewire their brains by mentally rehearsing the movements they wish to regain.

    The Pascual-Leone experiment is a perfect example of how "mind" (or in Buddhist terms, citta-santāna) can directly and tangibly "change the brain" (or its neuroplastic structure), providing a powerful scientific bridge between contemplative practice and neuroscience.

    Ref: Pascual-Leone, A., Nguyet, A. D., Cohen, L. G., Brasil-Neto, J. P., Cammarota, A., & Hallett, M. (1995). Modulation of muscle responses evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation during the acquisition of new fine motor skills. Journal of Neurophysiology, 74(3), 1037-1045. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/7500130/.

    Also

    Begley, Sharon. Train Your Mind, Change Your Brain: How a New Science Reveals Our Extraordinary Potential to Transform Ourselves. New York: Ballantine Books, 2007.
  • How do you think the soul works?
    Well, my main point is that the soul - not that you have to believe in such a word! - is not something you have, like an appendix or a limb, but what you are. It's a question of identity. Someone (might have been you?) mentioned the Ship of Theseus puzzle. It's that kind of question - how something or someone can remain the same while also changing.

    Here again the Buddhist view is instructive. Buddhists firmly reject the idea of the soul as something unchanging that travels from life to life. But there is a 'stream of consciousness' (citta-santāna), an ongoing flow of existence-experience. It is not a static entity but a dynamic series of arising and passing mental moments (dharmas).

    Interestingly, there has been research on the connection between citta-santāna and neuroplasticity, showing that brain function can be measurably altered by persistent patterns of attentional activity. See Exploring Meditation's Role in Neuroplasticity.
  • How do you think the soul works?
    Over a period of seven to eight years, almost all the cells in your body have been replaced,punos

    I thought your depiction had merit. I'll also add that it is now thought that neurons are actually generated in specific regions of the adult brain throughout life, and also that new neural connections and pathways are being created and destroyed regularly through the process of neuroplasticity.
  • On emergence and consciousness
    Jaurrero’s Dynamics in Action begins with Aristotle.
  • On emergence and consciousness
    That’s well taken, and I appreciate the elaboration. What I was aiming to highlight—perhaps somewhat obliquely—was a structural contrast between classical physics and the perspectives emerging in complexity science. Classical physics, as Nancy Cartwright says, tends to abstract away context by focusing on isolated, idealized systems—leading to the formal time-reversibility of its laws, which abstracts from the temporally asymmetric character of actual processes. But in non-equilibrium thermodynamics and the study of complex systems, contextual factors are not just boundary conditions; they are essential to the system’s dynamics. I’m studying that through Alicia Juarrero.
  • The Question of Causation
    You are being far from clear. But grass is considerably more complicated than are stars, although admittedly there would be no grass if there had not been stars. But more is involved and required than physics to understand grass, otherwise biologists would only have to study physics.
  • The Question of Causation
    What does ‘plays by physics’ mean?
  • On emergence and consciousness
    even within physics, especially when the thermodynamics of non-equilibrium processes is involved, many phenomena are strongly emergent in the sense that they aren't intelligible merely in light of, or deducible from, the laws that govern their smaller components.Pierre-Normand

    Would you say they need to take context into account in a way that classical physics did not?
  • The Question of Causation
    ‘Thought operates according to different rules than matter, but that shouldn’t cause us to conclude that the world is anything other than physical.’