Nothing of what you're saying here rises to the level of philosophical analysis.

Fair enough. A thing and the idea of a thing are separate, in that sense.

It is a fact that the United States of America is not in the Bible. — Arcane Sandwich

Did you know that the Mormon religion, founded in the United States, actually believes that Jesus Christ visited America on a spiritual plane?

According to the Book of Mormon, Jesus appeared to a group of Nephites in the Americas in 33 AD. That the Nephites were descendants of ancient Israelites who traveled to the Americas around 600 BC.
That Jesus visited the Americas to establish his church, as he did in Jerusalem. That when Jesus returns to Earth, he will first go to Jerusalem and then to Missouri. So the Mormons kind of retro-fit America into the Biblical myth.

There was also a myth that Jesus visited England, subject of the poem, and later the hymn Jerusalem, Oh Did Those Feet In Ancient Times. (Rather a stirring hymn, too.)

Does it matter, in any meaningful way, for ordinary citizens, that none of the aforementioned countries are not in the Bible? — Arcane Sandwich

It never seemed to matter to me, although clearly it does to others. I suppose it depends on whether you believe the facts related in the Biblical texts are significant due to matters of geography and history, or whether the symbolic and spiritual truths they are intended to convey are meaningful outside that context. Plainly for much of the history of the Christian West, the 'Holy Land' occupied the role of the Axis Mundi, the spiritual 'centre of the world', however with the discovery of the New World, and increased awareness of global cultures other than the Christian, this sense cannot help but have faded in the popular imagination.

(Also see The Jerusalem Syndrome.)

What do you think the actual idealism is? What is your account for non-naive idealism? — Corvus

Explained in the OP The Mind Created World. Not that I'm wanting to hijack your thread, but I also don't want to try and explain it all again here.

If I had to explain it in a sentence or two, it would be that the world (object) always exists for an observer. That while we can know what the world would be like as if there were no observer, the observer is still the basis of that imaginative act. That this doesn't mean that the world doesn't exist without an observer, as existence and non-existence are conceptual constructions.

The only way to change this, is to change the fundamentals of the US, to focus on running society as a society and not as a business. — Christoffer

In other words, Vote Democrat.

But if you divide the world into reality and representation, then you are back in the old dualistic view of the world. We have been on that road before. — Corvus

Have you been on that road before, or are you relying on a second-hand accounts?

If you go out, and see the tree in front of you feeling and confirm the physical tree, then you have the physical tree as well as the sensation and ideas of the tree. — Corvus

You think philosophers don't recognise this?

You need to do some homework on what idealist philosophy actually is. The Brittanica has a decent introductory article on it. It's not nearly so naive as you're making it out to be.

When the perceiver is only thinking about the world without direct visual or material sensation or perception, the world is in the mind of the perceiver as ideas only. — Corvus

‘Naive realism’ is the philosophical attitude that things just are as they appear, and there is no question to solve about the relationship between reality and appearance.

Although it’s not as common an expression, ‘naive idealism’ is the view that idealists believe that the world is simply a figment of the individual mind, or what goes on inside a conscious mind.

I think your post presents a pretty naive version of both materialism and idealism. Serious philosophers in both schools have long grappled with the conundrums of mind and matter, or matter and form.

Idealism cannot explain the coherence in reality therefore it is false. — MoK

And that is a naive depiction of idealism. No idealist philosophy of record will claim that ‘the world is all in the mind’ as you are claiming. If you want to illustrate the point you’re attempting to make, you’ll need to back it up with some citations from recognised idealist philosophy which say what you’re claiming it says.

The explosion of another SpaceX rocket is not really part of the 'Musk Plutocracy' but it is at least the occasion for a little wholesome schadenfreude. (The burning fragments witnessed falling to earth might also include fragments of Tesla's plummeting share price.)

More to the point:

Sorry PoeticUniverse, whilst I appreciate what you're trying to express, it doesn't capture my interest, as I don't know if poetic meter is really an appropriate medium for exploring ideas of this kind.

You're welcome.

I'm not concerned with questions of 'materialism vs idealism' or 'realism vs antirealism' because I think these questions are not definitively decidable....Science for me offers a far more interesting, rich and complex body of knowledge. — Janus

Probably just as well, as you show little aptitude in philosophy.

It's a kind of confabulation, hand-waving. — Janus

We can test it! I'll wave, and you vibrate.

Yes, I think you're right. I think it's a fact. Matter of fact, I've got one now. It's called 'irritation' ;-)

:clap:

We've been through all of this already. Fields in physics specify mathematical values for every point, as physics is quantitative in nature, comprising the measurement of objects and forces. Where 'field' entered the discussion was in a different sense, also discussed, as a 'field of awareness', which is a perfectly legitimate expression, albeit not describing a physical field. The remark that I made that precipitated two days of eye-rolling, was that physicalism (or materialism or what have you) attempts to resolve everything about the mind to the product of physical forces. In times past, this would have been understood atomistically, but since the quantum revolution, 'fields' have replaced atoms as the fundamental ground of physical existence. Hence, the analogy went, if physical fields can be understood as the ground of existence, as physicalists intend, then what of the nature of awareness, consciousness or mind, understood as a qualitative field?

Of course I understand that in the Austin/Davidson/Wittgenstein field of philosophy, no consideration whatever is given to the issue of the nature of the subjective unity of consciousness, and as you never tire of pointing out, hardly anyone in the academic world takes philosophical idealism seriously. Hence the eye-rolling. But the analogy stands as far as I'm concerned.

You are welcome to produce an alternative definition of "field" that does not invovle a value at every point in a space. — Banno

Already done: morphogenetic fields.

Stop blurting things out, just take a little time to actually think about it. I'll leave it with you.

The magic hand wave of "The subjectivity in me is the same subjectivity in you" contradicts the very use of terms such as "subjective" from which it derives. — Banno

That is also part of the point of the essay I've referred to:

we must... differentiate the subjective from the merely personal. The subjective refers to the structures of experience through which reality is disclosed to consciousness. In an important sense, all sentient beings are subjects of experience. Subjectivity — or perhaps we could coin the term ‘subject-hood’ — encompasses the shared and foundational aspects of perception and understanding, as explored by phenomenology. The personal, by contrast, pertains to the idiosyncratic desires, biases, and attachments of a specific individual. Philosophical detachment requires rising above, or seeing through, these personal inclinations, but not through denying or suppressing the entire category of subjective understanding.

The science you castigate and beg to become more "subjective" functions exactly because it works to overcome subjectivity by building on what we do share. — Banno

Hence my essay on the superiority of philosophical detachment to scientific objectivity. Here's a gift link for you.

...becasue a field has a value at every point... — Banno

Dogmatic? Me?

Not a field. — Banno

Why not? If you were amnesiac, you would presumably be conscious, even if you didn't know who you were. Your autonomic and parasympathetic nervous systems would be functioning. You would see things around you in the room, and other people, even if you didn't know who they were. All of those would be part of your field of awareness.

Reply to that, if you would, instead of changing the topic. — Banno

You're the one who changed the topic, and you're now trying to shift it back within your comfort zone.

Where was it you lost those car keys? ;-)

..so what is left that is shared? — Banno

The fundamental level of self-awareness that characterises beings. What would remain if you had complete amnesia and forgot who you were.

Still not an argument....

You're not answering the question, you're simply deflecting.

The subjectivity in me is the same subjectivity in you.
— Bernardo Kastrup
is exactly wrong. — Banno

Why? What's wrong about it? A mere assertion does not an argument make.

The context was this quotation:

Under objective idealism, subjectivity is not individual or multiple, but unitary and universal: it’s the bottom level of reality, prior to spatiotemporal extension and consequent differentiation. The subjectivity in me is the same subjectivity in you. What differentiates us are merely the contents of this subjectivity as experienced by you, and by me. We differ only in experienced memories, perspectives and narratives of self, but not in the subjective field wherein all these memories, perspectives and narratives of self unfold as patterns of excitation — Bernardo Kastrup

What precisely is the matter with that again?

Not forgiven so much as expected ;-)

:pray: I watched an archival 60 Minutes documentary about Mt Athos the other day and found it very affecting.

'field' as an encompassing environment of some sort, a philosophical notion — jgill

The field of conscious awareness is how I intended it. Aside from physical fields in biology there are morphogenetic fields. "A morphogenetic field is a region in a developing embryo where cells communicate and coordinate to form a specific organ or structure. The spatial organization of cells within these fields is controlled by chemical gradients (morphogens), gene regulatory networks, and cellular signaling (biosemiosis). Morphogenetic fields guide pattern formation, ensuring that tissues and organs develop correctly in relation to the body plan." It would hardly be surprising if 'field' used to describe consciousness has resonances with the biological rather than the way it is understood in physics.

Why call it a field? — Banno

Because it's an apt description of the nature of conscious awareness. In this context it is being used phenomenologically rather than physically referring to the way awareness manifests as a unified, continuous whole rather than as collection of discrete elements (per the 'subjective unity of perception'). Within that field, specific phenomena - specific aspects of 'phenomenal consciousness' - manifest as qualia, the qualitative attributes associated with specific stimuli or circumstances or cognitive challenges.

Thanks, nice of you to say! Glad someone does ;-)

On further reflection, there is a self-evident subjective field immediately experienced by every subject, namely, the field of their own conscious awareness. Things appear within it, and disappear from it, without literally being either inside or outside of it in any spatio-temporal sense. It is demonstrably a unified field, insofar as to be aware of oneself a subject, is precisely to be the subject in whom a single field of awareness exists.

So the question for you is, does every point in that field have a mathematical description, as do the points within physical fields? And if not, does that disqualify its description as ‘a field’?

He has a pretty compelling diagnosis of the psychological impetus for the "disengaged" frame of Hume and Gibbon vis-á-vis questions of religion as well. It represents a sort of control and insulation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn’t that close in meaning to Taylor’s ‘buffered self’? Which is not coincidental with the advent of liberal individualism and the primacy of the egological point of view.

‘Trump’s speech was 10 minutes longer than the Lion King, but had twice as much lyin’ in it’ ~ Jimmy Kimmel.

as long as we're born into history, we can't but move in that world of codes. — ENOAH

That’s one for the scrapbook! :clap:

You make that clear. At least I try and articulate a philosophy rather than hanging around just taking potshots at other contributors, just for the sake of it.

perhaps Husserl's prejudice — Janus

:roll:

It's virtually all you talk about — Janus

It's a philosophy forum. I write about philosophy.

Kant did at least attribute space and time and maybe causality as innate categories of mind. — prothero

Yes, as his 'answer to Hume'. As I said, I'm an admirer of Whitehead, at least of what I know of him, but I'm a bit uneasy about the panpsychist element, that's all.

Everything we know about reality is shaped by our own mental faculties—space, time, causality, and substance are not "out there" in the world itself but are the conditions of experience.
— Wayfarer

You are blithely assuming that. How do you know it's true? — Janus

It's not an assumption, it is a philosophical observation and nowadays with ample support from cognitive science.

In what does that causality inhere?
— Wayfarer

From the point of view of science that question doesn't matter. It may well be unanswerable. Whatever the explanation, the fact is clear that we understand the physical world in terms of causation, which includes both local processes and effects and global conditions. — Janus

Right! 'The question doesn't matter'. And yet, you continually defer to science as the arbiter for philosophy.

The Husserlian approach, and the phenomenological approach in general I am fairly familiar with on account of a long history of reading and study. It is rightly only concerned with the character of human experience, and as such it brackets metaphysical questions such as the mind-independent existence of the external world. — Janus

But notice that Husserl says that consciousness is foundationally involved in world-disclosure, meaning that the idea of a world apart from consciousness is inconceivable in any meaningful way. That is the salient point.

I'm not concerned with questions of 'materialism vs idealism' or 'realism vs antirealism' because I think these questions are not definitively decidable. — Janus

But you have long since made up your mind, going on what you say.

Something that is not in question.
— Wayfarer

What is your explanation for that?
species, language-group, culture
— Wayfarer
don't suffice. — Janus

Everything we know about reality is shaped by our own mental faculties—space, time, causality, and substance are not "out there" in the world itself but are the conditions of experience. So when you blithely assume that

I've often said that the physical nature of the world is understood in terms of causes — Janus

In what does that causality inhere? Wittgenstein remarks that 'At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.' Why does he call it an illusion? I say it's because the perception of causal relations is itself mind-dependent. It is because we can form ideas of what things are, and then perceive the necessary relations of ideas, that we can establish causality in the first place. It's not merely 'given' to us in the way that naturalism assumes. Which is also the basis of Husserl's criticism of naturalism:

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge,
all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot
be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness
should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since
consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in
the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in
any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a
consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is
cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made
meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable
apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world,
reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational,
disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point
of departure, for Husserl (PRS 85; Hua XXV 13). Since consciousness is
presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the
study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one—one which, in
Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge,
...

I know form observing their behavior that my dogs perceive the same environment I do — Janus

Something that is not in question.

Do you seriously want to deny that there are differences between individuals, that people may do different things for the same reasons and the same things for different reasons? — Janus

That's not relevant. What I'm criticizing is the view that matters OTHER than those that can be measured scientifically - such as values - are, therefore, up to the individual, that they're essentially subjective in nature.

If you believe that is wrong, then you would need to explain how those commonalities could explain the specific shared content of our perceptual experiences. You haven't done that. — Janus

The fact that you and I see the same things is precisely because we belong to the same species, language-group, culture, and the rest. I'm not, again, saying that the world exists in your or my mind which is what you think I'm saying. We draw on a common stock of usages, meanings, and so on. But there are times when that breaks down - when individuals from two cultures meet, for example, with completely incommensurable understandings of the same thing, they will see different things. Again, I'm not denying objectivity or that there is an external world, but that all our knowledge of it is mediated.

I've already said many times that understanding human or even animal behavior cannot be achieved by physics. I've often said that the physical nature of the world is understood in terms of causes, and animal and human behavior in terms of reasons. — Janus

But you also say that those reasons are individual, that they're subjective, that they're matters of individual opinion. Again that can be illustrated with reference to your own entries. The point about philosophy generally, is to ascertain the nature of that framework - the space of reasons, as it has been called - such that it's not just a matter of opinion or individual proclivities. Metaphysics, originally, was intended as the foundation of that enquiry, the 'philosophy of philosophy'.

Right, it's an abstract entity, an idea, not an ontologically substantive being then. — Janus

You mean, not a thing, therefore, not real. What you mean by 'substantive' means 'can be verified scientifically'. There's no conflict between the fact that ideas and languages change, and that they are real.

so you haven't really answered the question. — Janus

Just be clear about this: I've answered it, but you either don't understand that answer, or don't accept, the answer. So instead of constantly complaining that I'm evading the question or not answering it, just recognise that. OK, you don't accept it, but don't say I'm not addressing it. I am saying that the cognitive systems through which we view the world are also constitutive of the world we view, meaning that the world is not really mind-independent in the sense that empiricism presumes.

You never fail to mention positivism, apparently in an attempt to discredit what I argue, rather than dealing with it point by point on its own terms — Janus

Because you constantly appeal to what is empirically verifiable by science as the yardstick for what constitutes real knowledge. If I had time, I could provide many direct quotes from you, saying that. It's not as if I'm accusing you of something radically objectionable: positivism is an identifiable and powerful influence in modern thinking, and you frequently appeal to it and to verificationism. Folllowed by 'and what about OSHO?!?' ;-)