QM launched a revolution when is made science shake hands with humanities by insisting that cognition is integral to the causal process that determines the final state of a system operating through changes. — ucarr

I see where you're going with all of this, and even agree. You have a rather idiosyncratic way of expressing your ideas, but I do detect a convergence with some of the source materials I've been studying.

So, I would paraphrase the above by expressing it like this: Quantum physics introduced the necessity of accounting for 'the observer,' a factor previously excluded or bracketed out in classical science. This led to the well-known 'observer problem' in physics, which challenges the assumption that the objects of analysis exist independently of the observer. Although the wave equation predicts how a system evolves, it does not explain why a specific outcome crystallizes upon measurement. This explanatory gap highlighted the need to incorporate the observer into the framework. Whereas prior to the quantum revolution the idealised models of physics were taken to reveal a view of nature as it is in itself, with this development, the role of the observer had to be taken into account as well. This was one of the main causes of disagreement between Einstein's scientific realism and the anti-realist tendencies he found in the so-called Copenhagen school.

Freud once remarked that ‘the self-love of mankind has been three times wounded by science’, referring to the Copernican revolution, Darwin’s discovery of evolution, and Nietszche’s declaration of the death of God. In a roundabout way, perhaps the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics has given back to humanity what th Enlightenment had taken away, by placing the mind in a constitutive role in the observation of the fundamental constituents of nature.

All of this leads me to conclude that the hubbub over misinformation is a campaign for more power rather than a legitimate plight for public safety. — NOS4A2

Is it coincidental that you're one of the major boosters of MAGA disinformation on this forum?

I believe bonobos have the potential for learning language but it is dormant because they lack the epigenome and inherited use of language that humans have. — Athena

It's genetics, not simply epigenetics. And don’t overlook the fact that not only are their brains not equipped for language, but neither are their vocal tracts, for which the h.sapiens anatomy is uniquely suited.

My suggestion is that there is a tendency to see animals as inherently other than us, human beings, mainly on the ground that they are in what one might call the state of nature, before humans came and developed societies. It's a way of thinking that was prominent in 18th century philosophy, but the roots of it in our way of life are deeper than that. The difference is that they are now openly contested. — Ludwig V

Well, you said that neither Christianity nor Darwinism are a philosophy, but Christianity absorbed a great deal of Greek philosophy, which resulted in the unique synthesis of Christian Platonism.

In traditional theology and metaphysics, the natural was largely conceived as the evil, and the spiritual or supernatural as the good. In popular Darwinism, the good is the well-adapted, and the value of that to which the organism adapts itself is unquestioned or is measured only in terms of further adaptation. However, being well adapted to one’s surroundings is tantamount to being capable of coping successfully with them, of mastering the forces that beset one. Thus the theoretical denial of the spirit’s antagonism to nature–even as implied in the doctrine of interrelation between the various forms of organic life, including man–frequently amounts in practice to subscribing to the principle of man’s continuous and thoroughgoing domination of nature. Regarding reason as a natural organ does not divest it of the trend to domination or invest it with greater potentialities for reconciliation. On the contrary, the abdication of the spirit in popular Darwinism entails the rejection of any elements of the mind that transcend the function of adaptation and consequently are not instruments of self-preservation. Reason disavows its own primacy and professes to be a mere servant of natural selection. On the surface, this new empirical reason seems more humble toward nature than the reason of the metaphysical tradition. Actually, however, it is arrogant, practical mind riding roughshod over the ‘useless spiritual,’ and dismissing any view of nature in which the latter is taken to be more than a stimulus to human activity. The effects of this view are not confined to modern philosophy. — The Eclipse of Reason, Max Horkheimer

I don't know how much science Nagel knows, but do you really mean to say that any perspective is not scientifically well-informed is not worth having? — Ludwig V

Those who push scientism seem never to understand what it is or that this is what they're doing. I think the reason is, that the distinction between a philosophical and a scientific question is itself a philosophical distinction, therefore unintelligible in scientific terms.

Strategic Incompletness wisely keeps human individuals from knowing themselves finally. — ucarr

Well, Roger Penrose said in his Emperor's New Mind that the mind was not reducible to algorithms, although I must say, I bought that book and the maths was beyond me. I don't see the point of speculating about entropy and thermodynamic resistance, if it's not an attempt to make the conversation seem as if it's scientifically informed. But as far as the incomprehesibility of your true nature is concerned, and putting aside the rather idiosyncratic jargon, I think the basic intuition is the right one :up: .

// see only don't know//

But since you grant intelligence to "higher" animals, I take you to be granting rationality in some sense to them, but then maintaining there is a different sense that is available to human beings. I don't have a clear grasp of these two different senses, much less of why the difference is important. It may be merely pedantic. — Ludwig V

I'm not clear just what philosophical naturalism is. — Ludwig V

The meaning is not clearly defined, but SEP tells us that it 'aims to ally philosophy more closely with science. Naturalists urge that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing “supernatural”, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the “human spirit” '. Specifically it takes the natural sciences, including the biological sciences, as authoritative regarding what is validly knowledge, and rejects any claims of religious revelation or the possibility of a spiritual enlightenment.

The idea that we are "just monkeys" was a major issue at the time. But I gather than many Christians are now at peace with evolution, so they must have found some resolution of the issue. For myself, I notice that we did still carry many of the basic animal behaviour patterns and that we find predecessor or proto- versions of many of our patterns of behaviour in animals (and even insects). So the idea of a radical discontinuity seems a bit implausible. — Ludwig V

What I've tried to explain here and especially here is that, even accepting the facts of biological evolution, the development of language, tool use, and the other characteristically human capabilities, means we cross a threshhold which separates us from the natural world in an existential sense as well as a practical sense. Through it, we become different kinds of beings, namely, human beings, and we're not just another class of primate. I harked back to both the Biblical Myth of the Fall and to Aristotle's definition of man as 'rational animal' because I think they represent something real about the human condition, which has been lost sight of in modern culture.

Thomas Nagel has an interesting essay I often refer to, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. I've mentioned it a few times on the forum, it's generaly not well received, but I find it very insightful. (Nagel is not pushing a religious barrow, he's an avowed atheist but one with the chutzpah to call scientific materialism into question.)

Right. Well, unlike Descartes, who thought animals had no soul whatever, many of the pre-modern and Asiatic religions recognised that human beings can also be born into the animal realm (presumably from behaving like them.) There's a legend about Pythagoras that he once exclaimed that he recognised the soul of one of his departed friends in the howl of a dog. Buddhist sermons would say that if you held to wrong ideas, you would find yourself 'in the womb of a cow'. I suppose it's simply poetic mythology, but then.....

(Actually brought a bit of a tear to the eye, posting that photo of Woody. We really loved that little guy, I walked him nearly every day of his life.)

anima-endowed beings — javra

and also, Aristotle's 'De Anima', translated as 'On the Soul'. I love the connection between Anima, Animal, and Animated. (More I read of the old guy, more I like him.)

I'd say "come" at a distance after he'd misbehaved and he'd sit his ass on the ground and calmly stare in all directions except toward me — javra

For nearly 15 years we had a smallish (10kg) sheltie cross, who was a very polite little dog (except towards postmen and motorcyles). This is him:


Woody

He had this quirk of hanging around near the kitchen or the dining room table at meal times, presumably hoping for a hand out. But if you looked at him while he was doing this, he'd never meet your gaze, always looking down or away from you, as a kind of feigned indifference. ('What? Me? Beg?')

In Zen as well (and most schools of Buddhism teach similar ideas), it's believed that the concept of zen cannot be taught at all through language and that any attempts to do so immediately betray the concept of Zen. Zen can only be experienced, not taught or communicated. — Dorrian

True, that, although there's some irony in the fact that Zen monasteries generally maintain an enormous library of canoninical literature and commentary. I agree that Zen relies on realisation (not necessarily the same as experience) but the actual monastic environment is highly structured and very disciplined. Within that milieu, it is certainly true that the aim is to convey an ineffable insight.

But what does this mean ? Does it mean there’s flaws in our language or that some parts of human experience are just ineffable ? — kindred

'The ineffable is not something mystical or mysterious; it is merely that which evades description. But while It evades description, it pervades experience.' ~ Thomas Short (a quote I read somewher on the internet, but can't recall the exact source.)

Well, either I'm not recognizing the distinction, or I'm not recognizing how fundamental it is. Perhaps if you were specific, it would be possible to discern which. — Ludwig V

Throughout this conversation, whenever you seek to justify an argument, you give reasons. If you wish me to justify my position, you ask me to do the same. Obviously animals cannot do that, in part because they lack language, but also because of the lack the cognitive skills which the ability to speak brings with it. That's the distinction I'm making between human and animal reason. Yes, animals can act intelligently, especially higher animals like cetaceans, primates, birds, canines, etc. But they lack reason in the human sense (which, as you say above that you're 'a pedant' might be, I would have thought, a distinction a pedant would recognise ;-) )

As noted, I think this distinction is resisted in contemporary culture because it's politically incorrect. There's an aversion to the Christian doctrine of mankind's sovereignty over nature as it is associated with religion and old-fashioned cultural attitudes. It's today's 'popular wisdom'.

There's also the sense that we believe Darwinism has shown that we're on a continuum with other species, and this provides the satisfaction of us being part of nature, which is consistent with philosophical naturalism.

This is where I think a philosophical critique of naturalism fits in, but I won't advance it again, as it's clearly not registering.

:up:

The ability to create science and technology, art and social institutions and so on, is unique to humans. But as uniqueness is a characteristic of every species, then our uniqueness is not unique, and so being unique is not unique to any species. — Ludwig V

That’s what I thought you would say, although I still say there’s a fundamental distinction you’re not recognising.

Perhaps another issue worth considering in this thread is, do animals think critically? Do humans think critically? — wonderer1

To think critically one first has to have abstract reasoning skills, which I don’t believe is possessed by animals, for the reasons stated.

It is not difficult to find a unique feature or features in any species. (That's largely how we identify them). The interesting question is what is the significance of those unique features. — Ludwig V

So, your argument is that all species are unique - after all, uniqueness is what makes them identifiable as separate species. The ability to speak, think rationally, plan, create science and technology, and so on, is unique to humans. But as uniqueness is a characteristic of every species, then our uniqueness is not unique, and so we're really no different to to other species.

Do I have that right?

And mental activity is neuronal. And we know that's physical. — L'éléphant

Ah, materialist philosophy of mind. I’ll try out some objections. First, you’re up against ‘the hard problem’ - there’s never been a plausible account of how the first-person nature of lived experience arises from the processes described by objective science. Experience has a qualitative dimension which never appears in the equations of physics by design, due to the ‘Cartesian division’ at the origin of modern science, the separation of primary (measurable) and secondary (subjective) attributes.

Practical illustration. You arrive home to discover your house and everything in it has burned down. If there was an instrument that could capture your precise neuronal and physiological state at that instant, it might capture data from which a suitably-trained user might be able to infer a state of acute emotional distress, and which would be an objectively accurate account. But on the basis of that data no matter how detailed, there would no way to determine how it feels and what it means to you. Saying that this is ‘neuronal’ or ‘physical’ might be objectively accurate but it would also be meaningless in the absence of the first-person perspective - namely, yours - which you bring to it.

I don't think I agree that physics is mathematical in nature. I think many aspects of it can be described mathematically. Is it the same thing? — Patterner

It is called ‘mathematical physics’ for good reason. Have you read Eugene Wigner’s The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences? Wigner won a Nobel for discoveries prompted by mathematical symmetries in atomic physics. He argues in that essay that there have been very many cases where empirical discoveries were made as kind of unintentional consequences of mathematical calculations. He says we seem to get much more out of the equations than we have apparently put in. He doesn’t claim to explain this fact - actually the word ‘miracle’ appears quite a few times. But then, Pythagoreanism's ‘all is number’, is suggestive of these kinds of ideas, and that is a rich vein of philosophy in the Western tradition. After all Galileo famously said the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics. And I would have thought a great deal of the success of modern science arises from the ability to apply mathematical logic to physical objects and forces.

Then again, much of physics itself is based on ‘ideal objects’, like perfect gases or perfectly smooth planes, which don’t actually exist but which enable highly accurate predictive power over things that do physically exist.

So I think the case can be made that mathematics is intrinsic to physics itself, and that the basic elements of mathematics are not themselves physical. (The SEP entry on Physicaism has an entry on this.)

We know one thing for sure, that matter went from being inanimate to animate in this universe at least. — kindred

God breathed life into the dust, in the Biblical myth, which is at least an evocative allegory.

People seem to be saying that animal behavior, like human behavior, shows evidence of being influenced by some level of that animal's thoughts. Thinking, conceptualizing, wanting and choosing leading to actions. I disagree, for many reasons. — Fire Ologist

:up: As do I.

...something that might anecdotally be termed a sixth-sense. — javra

I rather fancy the idea that there might really be a kind of field effect, analogous to but different from electric fields, that is only detectable to organisms. Maybe something like the akashic field, or the morphic field.

do other animals laugh? — Athena

I think the key issue here is repeatability. The capacity to reproduce a similitude of the experience (the observation), commonly known as the repeatability of an experiment, induces the conclusion that the observed phenomenon is understandable. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see what Scheler is driving at, but I don't really agree that 'For the modern thinker, only those experiences that can be proven in a rational or logical manner are true or evidential experiences' really captures it. What should be said is, 'only what can be demonstrated empirically and/or proven logically or mathematically is taken to be evidential'. Here 'empirically' means 'validated by sensory observation' (including observation amplified by instruments).

Later in the same article we find 'For Scheler, the experience of the holy or of the absolute is not given through rational proof, but in the distinctive evidential mode of revelation'. What I think he's wanting to describe is 'transcendent insight' or gnosis. But the use of the term 'revelation' is problematical, in my view. 'Revealed truth' is generally understood to be a prophetic vision or communication by and from the deity. Again, I think I understand what he's driving at, but I would express it differently. But in the Western lexicon, there are many terms for what Buddhists and Hindus would describe as 'Jñāna' (or gnosis). It's invariably understood in terms of revelation rather than insight.

And I don't know if I agree that such insights are 'unique' in the sense of only pertaining to one individual. Consider the lineages of Mahāyāna Buddhist orders, which have for many generations practiced the transmission of the teaching from teacher to student, and recorded the sayings and teachings of its adepts in a recognisable framework of principles and practice. There are recognised stages of realisation in Buddhist literature (see for example the Ten Bhumis). There's really nothing synonymous in Western culture to my knowledge.

I'm thinking more along the lines of James' classic The Varieties of Religious Experience. In that book, there are many examples of various kinds of religious or spiritual insight. But of course that is all 'behind the firewall' as far as our culture is concerned. It doesn't amount to admissable evidence of anything save the subjective experience of individuals.

The point about many kinds of scientific observations, is that they often occur within a highly specified set of circumstances - the lab or the workshop. They are contrived to generate very specific kinds of evidence. Whereas a deep philosophical insight might not depend on any apparatus or any specific situation whatever. It might arise in a mind that is especially attuned or sensitive to a high level of insight, but that doesn't necessarily mean that this is subjective, in the sense of pertaining only to an individual. 'Transcendent' is neither subjective nor objective.

Deep issue, I guess.

I take it that you have in mind the ability to see, hear, etc, in the same ways as we do (roughly) and with all due deference to any possible sixth sense. So my dog can see (and recognize) me and respond appropriately to my return home, can hear her meal being prepared in the kitchen and present herself in good order, and so forth. Would that be fair? We can agree also that it shows intelligence (in the more generic sense of "understanding"). But what grounds are there for withholding the accolade of rationality? — Ludwig V

Try explaining the concept ‘prime number’ to her.

I can only agree with you that it would have been helpful if someone had paid more careful attention to what you said. — Ludwig V

Why that’s very courteous of you! An anecdote: the first undergrad essay I ever submitted was in psychology, on the subject of intelligence testing. I wrote an essay along the lines that intelligence was not something that can be tested. I got an F with the comment ‘wrong department’ (the implication being it was a philosophy essay.) It was the only essay I ever failed. Served me right, too.

So the rabbits screamed in agony. In an effort to be objective, they described this behaviour as vocalizing. The public thought differently, and controls on vivisection were, eventually, strengthened. — Ludwig V

I know about that story - but what is the point? I've never claimed anywhere in this thread that animals are insensitive, or even that they lack intelligence. What is at issue is whether they're rational. And despite all the bluster and whataboutism, very little is being said about that by yourself or the other defenders of the view that they are.

There's a book I'm aware of, although I haven't read all of it, by Noam Chomsky, the famous linguistic philosopher, and Robert Berwick, a computer scientist, called Why Only Us? Language and Evolution. The first point to note is that Chomsky is adamant that only humans possess language (hence the title!) I've found an online presentation by Berwick who presents a synopsis, and he points to something called "Wallace's Problem". This refers to the issue raised by Alfred Russel Wallace, co-discoverer of the theory of natural selection, concerning the apparent disconnect between human intellectual abilities and the evolutionary pressures that could have led to their development. Wallace argued that certain uniquely human traits—such as higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thought—seemed to far exceed what would have been necessary for survival in the early human environment.

Wallace believed that natural selection could not fully explain these advanced cognitive faculties because they seemed disproportionate to the practical demands of survival in hunter-gatherer societies. He speculated that some form of higher intelligence or spiritual intervention might be responsible for these traits, which led to a divergence from Charles Darwin, who maintained that natural selection alone could account for the full spectrum of human abilities (see his Darwinism Applied to Man). This was one of the factors that caused a rift between Darwin and Wallace, with the former wishing to stick to a strictly Enlightenment-rationalist account, while Wallace fell into Victorian spiritualism.

In any case, Chomsky's book does acknowledge that the development of language is a very difficult thing to account for in naturalistic terms, but this is what the book tries to do. In pointing to what is unique about human language (and I think this applies to reason also). From a review of his book:

The starting point is a radical dissimilarity between all animal communication systems and human language. The former are based entirely on “linear order,” whereas the latter is based on hierarchical syntax. In particular, human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. ...

Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky (already mentioned) was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.

Berwick and Chomsky develop a theory about a genetic mutation that enabled an ability called 'merging' which is enables the kind of heirarchical syntax decribed above. I'm not able to summarise that, as it's quite an intricate theory. But the main point remains, which is that they see a difference iin kind between human and animal communication.

This is why I pointed back to the Aristotelian notion of 'nous' (rational intellect). The philosophical point is that reason is able to grasp universal terms, such as 'man' or 'dog' or 'energy'. That itself relies on the ability to abstract, to grasp that very disparate objects belong to a class or group. Of course that comes so naturally to us, it is so innate to how our minds work, that we don't notice (and don't need to notice) that we're doing it. But that ability to abstract particulars into general forms, is also a key differentiator of the human intellect from animal sensiblity.

And most of the objections to that are, as I say, mere sentimentality. As if it's cruel or discriminatory to say that humans are capable of a kind of intelligence that animals are not.

And, for what it's worth, I agree with Alfred Russel Wallace, against Darwin. Not that there is a literal 'spirit' guiding evolution, but that evolutionary and neo-Darwinian theory does not account for the higher intellectual, artistic and contemplative achievements available to h. sapiens. Darwinism does not, in other words, account for a Mozart. Terribly non-PC, I acknowledge, but a position I'm quite happy defending.

However, I do have serious trouble attributing these concepts to bacteria and amoeba. Insects also seem to me to be too mechanical to qualify — Ludwig V

Another point - I'm coming around to the view that organic life is 'intentional' from the get-go. The quotes are because it's not intentional in the sense of acting in accordance with conscious intent, as rational agents do, but that as soon as life exists, there is already a rudimentary sense of 'self' and 'other', as the first thing any living organism has to do, is maintain itself against the environment, as distinct from simply dissolving or being subsumed by whatever processes are sorrounding it. So right from the outset, living organisms can't be fully explained in terms of, or reduced to, physical and chemical laws. This is an idea I'm trying to explore through a couple of difficult books, Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature' and Evan Thompson's 'Mind in Life'. (Pretty slow going, though :yikes: )

Someone who doesn't see rationality in animals will define it in one way, likely by appealing to "language", which is assumed to apply only to languages of the kind that humans speak. Someone who empathizes with animals will be more inclined to a more flexible definitions. — Ludwig V

Sentimentality, you mean ;-)

These efforts are a far cry from the work of 9/11 and 1/6. — Paine

Yes the thought occurred that if a professional had been involved, DJT would have been long gone. But many of the usual suspects would rather see him prevail.

Hi wayfarer thanks for your post. The question boils down to inevitability, possibility and actuality. Working in reverse we know that life (intelligence) has emerged which means it was possible. Now the last step is whether it was inevitable and since it was both possible and currently actual then it must follow that it is inevitable in an eternal universe. — kindred

Paul Davies has some writing on that:

Given a random distribution of [gravitating] matter, it is overwhelmingly more probable that it will form a black hole than a star or a cloud of dispersed gas. These considerations give a new slant, therefore, to the question of whether the Universe was created in an ordered or disordered state. If the initial state were chosen at random, it seems exceedingly probable that the big bang would have coughed out black holes rather than dispersed gases. The present arrangement of matter and energy, with matter spread thinly at relatively low density, in the form of stars and gas clouds would, apparently, only result from a very special choice of initial conditions. Roger Penrose has computed the odds against the observed Universe appearing by accident, given that the black-hole cosmos is so much more likely on a priori grounds. He estimates a figure of 10 raised to the power of 10 raised to the power of 30 [ie 10^10^30] to one...

...The upshot of these considerations is that the gravitational arrangement of the Universe is bafflingly regular and uniform*. There seems to be no obvious reason why the Universe did not go berserk, expanding in a chaotic and uncoordinated way, producing enormous black holes. Channeling the explosive violence into such a regular and organised pattern of motion seems like a miracle. Is it? Let us examine various responses to this mystery:

1. HIDDEN PRINCIPLE:

One could envisage a principle (or set of principles) which required, for example, the explosive vigour of the big bang to exactly match its gravitating power everywhere, so that the receding galaxies just escaped their own gravity...

Unfortunately, it cannot be that simple. If the Universe were exactly uniform, then no galaxies would have formed anyway. According to present understanding, it seems that the growth of galaxies from the primeval gases can only have occurred in the time available since the creation if the rudiments were present from the outset... If a fundamental principle does exist, it seems that it must allow just enough deviation from uniformity to permit the growth of galaxies, but not so much as to produce black holes. A delicate and complicated balancing act indeed!

2. DISSIPATION:

One possible explanation for the uniformity of the cosmic expansion is to suppose that the Universe started out with a highly non-uniform motion, but somehow dissipated the turbulence away...

...Two objections have been raised against this scenario. The first is that, however efficient the dissipation of primeval turbulence may be, it is always possible to find initial states which are so grossly distorted that a vestige will remain, in spite of the damping. At best one can only succeed in showing that the Universe must have belonged to a class of remarkable initial states.

The second objection is that all dissipation generates entropy. The violence of the primeval turbulence would be converted into enormous quantities of heat, far in excess of the observed quantity of the primeval heat radiation...

3. ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE:

Because a Universe full of black holes, or turbulent large scale motions is unlikely to be conducive to life, there is clearly room for an anthropic explanation of the uniformity of the Universe... One may envisage an [infinity] of universes covering every possible choice of initial expansion motion and distribution of matter. Only in the minute fraction which comes close to the arrangement in the observed Universe would life and observers form...

4. INFLATION:

Very recently (as of 1983) an entirely new approach to the cosmic uniformity problem has been suggested. It originates with the grand unified theories, and depends crucially on a number of assumptions about ultra-high energy matter which are debatable, and in any case hard to verify. Nevertheless it vividly demonstrates how an advance in fundamental physics can change our whole perspective of the origin of order in the Universe...

5. GOD:

If the grand unified theories fail, and if the anthropic argument is rejected, then the highly uniform nature of the Universe on the large scale might be advanced as evidence for a creative designer. It would, however, be negative evidence only. No one could be sure that future progress in our understanding of the physics of the early Universe might not uncover a perfectly satisfactory explanation for an orderly cosmos...

...There is, however, more to Nature than its mathematical laws and its complex order. A third ingredient requires explanation too: the so-called fundamental constants of Nature. It is in that province that we find the most surprising evidence for a grand design.

Let us look at a simple example due to Freeman Dyson. The nuclei of atoms are held together by the strong nuclear force whose origins lie with the quarks and gluons... If the force were weaker than it is, atomic nuclei would become unstable and disintegrate. [In deuterium, the link between the proton and the neutron] would be broken by quantum disruption if the nuclear force were only a few percent weaker. The effect would be dramatic. The sun, and most other stars, uses deuterium as a link in [the fusion reaction]. Remove deuterium and either the stars go out, or they [must] find a new nuclear pathway to generate their heat.

Equally dire consequences would ensue if the nuclear force were very slightly stronger. It would then be possible for two protons to overcome their mutual electric repulsion and stick together... In a world where the nuclear force was a few percent stronger, there would be virtually no hydrogen left over from the big bang. Although we do not know why the nuclear force has the strength it does, if it did not the Universe would be totally different in form. It is doubtful if life could exist.

What impresses many scientists is not so much the fact that alterations in the values of the fundamental constants would change the structure of the physical world, but that the observed structure is remarkably sensitive to such alterations. Only a minute shift in the strengths of the forces brings about a drastic change in the structure. Consider as another example the relative strengths of the electromagnetic and gravitational forces in matter. Both forces play an essential role in shaping the structure of stars...

...[Two types of stars, blue giants and red dwarfs] delimit a very narrow range of stellar masses. It so happens that the balance of forces inside stars is such that nearly all stars lie in this very narrow range between the blue giants and the red dwarfs. However, as pointed out by Brandon Carter, this happy circumstance is entirely the result of a remarkable numerical coincidence between the fundamental constants of Nature. An alteration in, say, the strengths of the gravitational force by a mere one part in 10 40 would be sufficient to throw out this numerical coincidence. In such a world, all stars would either be blue giants or red dwarfs. Stars like the sun would not exist, nor, one might argue, would any form of life that depends on solar-type stars for its sustenance...

...It is hard to resist the impression that the present structure of the Universe, apparently so sensitive to minor alterations of the numbers, has been rather carefully thought out. Such a conclusion can, of course, only be subjective. In the end, it boils down to a question of belief. Is it easier to believe in a cosmic designer than the multiplicity of universes necessary for the weak anthropic principle to work?... Perhaps future developments in science will lead to more direct evidence for other universes, but until then, the seemingly miraculous concurrence of numerical values that Nature has assigned to her fundamental constants must remain the most compelling evidence for an element of cosmic design — Paul Davies, God and the New Physics

* The 'baffling regularity' of the universe’s initial conditions, as described by Paul Davies and the astronomically low probability that Roger Penrose estimates, connects to what is known as the "naturalness problem" in physics.

The naturalness problem refers to the question of why certain physical parameters in the universe appear to be extremely fine-tuned or balanced in ways that seem highly improbable or unnatural, given the expected outcomes of random initial conditions. In the case of cosmology, this problem often arises in discussions of the early universe's smoothness, the distribution of matter and energy, and the apparent low entropy at the start of the Big Bang, which Penrose and others have pointed out should be overwhelmingly unlikely if chosen randomly. The same issue appears in particle physics, where the values of constants (like the cosmological constant or the Higgs boson mass) seem fine-tuned to allow for a universe like ours.

Davies and Penrose both highlight the improbability of our universe’s configuration, suggesting that a random distribution of matter would have led to a universe filled with black holes rather than one with stars and galaxies. This tension between the "expected" outcome and the "actual" outcome is central to the naturalness problem, prompting physicists to explore deeper explanations, such as multiverse theories, anthropic principles, or as-yet-undiscovered physical laws.

In any case, the upshot of all of this is that the notion that the universe exists as it does 'because of chance' holds no water.

I don't have my own suspicion as to the strength of their argument because, to me, consciousness is physical. As in atomic. As in leptons. The fluidity of our own experience is physical. — L'éléphant

Curiously, physics itself is largely mathematical in nature. The standard model of particle physics is understood in purely mathematical terms. But mathematics itself is not physical, but conceptual. How would you account for that?

The evidence I've followed contradicts that assertion. — Vera Mont

You've yet to cite any.

The definition of reason and rational thought does not include language as a prerequisite.

Reasoning:
the action of thinking about something in a logical, sensible way. Oxford
the process of thinking about something in order to make a decision. Cambridge
It [rationality] encompasses the ability to draw sensible conclusions from facts, logic and data. In simple words, if your thoughts are based on facts and not emotions, it is called rational thinking. Rational thinking focuses on resolving problems and achieving goals. — Vera Mont

I agree that these are the definitions of 'rational'. But I'm also saying that rational and conceptual thought and language are strongly related. Animals and other organisms plainly exhibit problem-solving behaviours etc, but I don't agree that they rely on abstract thought and reasoning to do so. If we can impute that to them, it's because we ourselves rely on it for explanations of all manner of phenomena. In saying that, I'm not denying that animals communicate, as they do so by all kinds of means. But they lack language in the human sense, which is based on an hierarchical syntax and the ability to abstract concepts from experience. Crucial distinction.

To believe that only humans are capable of any rational thought requires not believing one's own eyes. — creativesoul

But doesn't that contradict what you've said here?:

We know that no other known creature is capable of knowingly looking forward to Thursday. We cannot check to see if that's the case. But we can know that it is.

That kind of thought/knowledge requires naming and descriptive practices. All naming and descriptive practices are language. Deliberately, rationally, and reasonably looking forward to Thursday is an experience that can only be lived by a very specific type of language user. Us. Knowing how to use the word is required for having the experience. — creativesoul

Language less rational thought must be meaningful to the thinking creature. The process of becoming meaningful must be similar enough to our own in order to bridge any evolutionary divide between language users' thought and language less creatures' thought( — creativesoul

What is the evidence that there is any such thing? What, about animal behaviour, cannot be described in behaviourist terms, i.e., when confronted by such and such a stimuli, we can observe such and such behaviour.

I've seen cats, for example, gauging whether they can make a leap up a height or across a stream. They'll pause for a few seconds, their eyes will dart about, sometimes moving back and forth a little. They'll be weighing the leap up before acting. But I don't see any justification to say that this implies they're thinking.

The question I have is…has intelligence always been around before this world was created prior to the Big Bang or was it simply an emergent phenomenon thereafter ?

In my opinion intelligence must have been pre-existing and manifested (or re-manifested) itself in life and nature and through us human beings. — kindred

I'm sympathetic to this line of thought, probably more so than others. But philosophically speaking, there's an issue with the question of the sense in which such an intelligence, were there one, could be said to exist.

Consider the idea of 'laws of nature'. It is naively assumed that these laws exist, but that has been called into question by philosophers of science (for example Nancy Cartwright, 'How the Laws of Physics Lie'.) Others will argue that there are such laws, or at least natural regularities that are law-like. But without going into the intricacies of those arguments, notice that the question of the existence or non-existrence of those laws or regularities, is of a different order to what can be predicted and explained by virtue of such laws. Taking the regularities of physics as an example, these allow for incredibly accurate predictions and explanations which are at the basis of much of the success of modern science. But why the laws of physics are as they are - why F=MA or e=mc² - is of another kind of question. Explanations on that level, if there are to be any, must be meta-scientific or metaphysical.

So what I'm arguing is that the nature of the order which is essential to and assumed by science, is not itself a scientific question. Science relies on there being an order, but does not, and need not, explain why there is. And accordingly, statements about whether a designing intelligence or divinely-ordained order pre-exists or exists, are by their nature metaphysical statements. Which is not to say they're wrong, but that they are not subject to scientific analysis or demonstration. But claiming that these influences or entities [i[exist[/i] you're inviting the question, 'how can you show that or demonstrate that?' And I doubt that question can be answered in terms of the criteria of those who have a commitment to not believing it (who are legion!) You're essentially trying to bring a transcendent order of being down to the level of what can be said to exist.

I was perusing the SEP entry of a second-tier German philosopher that I hadn't heard of until recently, Max Scheler. He has this to say about religious experience:

According to Scheler, the modern worldview harbors a prejudice with respect to what counts as an experience or what is evidential. For the modern thinker, only those experiences that can be proven in a rational or logical manner are true or evidential experiences (GW V, 104). The prejudice is not that matters of faith or religious experience are not meaningful, but that they are not subject to rigorous scientific or critical investigation. Because they lie outside the bounds of reason, we are, as Wittgenstein would say, to remain silent. — SEP

Speaking from long experience, I think you will find that describes the majority view, at least on this forum.

(See also God Does Not Exist, Bishop Pierre Whalon.)

It's quite readable. But I'm with you on preferring to read philosophy in physical form, for the most part. — Manuel

I will definitely have a look at it. That said, I find 17th philosophy quite challenging to read, as the style is difficult. But from what I've read of the Cambridge Platonists, they're definitely 'kindred spirits', so to speak. Someone with the appropriate scholarly skills would do well to publish an updated 'Cambridge Platonist Reader', in my view.

The case I've been attempting to make is that words have ideology-neutral meanings, and are not defined by "philosophical stance". — Vera Mont

:chin: I thought the issue was what you are calling 'human exceptionalism', that is, you are contesting the view that the human capacity for reason and language entails a categorical distinction between humans and rest of the animal kingdom. Myself along with several others are saying that there is a real distinction to be made, that h.sapiens are fundamentally different in some basic respects to other creatures. The precise point we're at right now, is whether animals, such as dogs, can form concepts in the absence of language. I'm saying that conceptual thought is dependent on language. I thought you were saying that it is not dependent, and I was questioning you on sources for that contention.

I'm not here to win a contest for my knowledge of philosophy — wonderer1

Probably just as well ;-)

What, pray tell, is the school of thought that says that language is *not* a prerequisite to rational thought?
— Wayfarer

Probably lots. I only checked Oxford, Collins and Webster and they don't mention language. — Vera Mont

C'mon. You're making the case, it requires more specifics, don't you think?

Chimps are more aggressive than Bonobo. They look the same but they are totally different creatures, as are wolves and domesticated dogs different. — Athena

That chimps are aggressive wasn't the point of the Nim Chimpsky experiment. It was an attempt to teach chimps language, and it failed. I now find the experimenter, Herbert Terrace, wrote a book on it, 'Why Chimpanzees Can't Learn Language and Humans Can'. The cover blurb says 'Initially, Terrace thought that Nim could create sentences but later discovered that Nim’s teachers inadvertently cued his signing. Terrace concluded that Project Nim failed—not because Nim couldn’t create sentences but because he couldn’t even learn words. Language is a uniquely human quality, and attempting to find it in animals is wishful thinking at best.' And that is directly relevant to this dicussion.

Dogs (I'll stick to the concrete example, if I may) have concepts, but not language. Their concepts are shown in their (non-verbal) actions - as are ours, if you recognize meaning as use. — Ludwig V

I think a case can be made that concepts must be able to be expressed in symbolic form (e.g. linguistic or arithmetical) if they are to be considered as such. Certainly we (and dogs, cats, etc) have innumerable non-verbal skills and intuitions, but concepts proper are the prerogative of language-using beings. A dog might have a memory or association with an object or person and as a consequence be scared of it, but I would argue this is still explainable in terms of stimulus and response rather than with reference to conceptual thought. (This is why I presented the passage earlier from Jacques Maritain.)

concept /ˈkɒnsɛpt/ noun: an abstract idea.
"structuralism is a difficult concept"
Similar:
idea notion conception abstraction conceptualization theory hypothesis postulation belief conviction opinion view image impression picture
* a plan or intention.
"the centre has kept firmly to its original concept"
* an idea or invention to help sell or publicize a commodity.
"a new concept in corporate hospitality"

Language is a prerequisite to rational thought only according to one particular philosophical school of thought, not according to the meaning of the word. — Vera Mont

What, pray tell, is the school of thought that says that language is *not* a prerequisite to rational thought?

And also Richard Burthogge - extremely, extremely interesting - An Essay Upon Reason — Manuel

Listed on Michael R. Thompson Rare Books for US$4,600 :yikes: It would want to be interesting! (Although that is for a first edition.) Nevertheless I will persist in looking around for a bootleg copy.

For example, things I have said to you, that I would expect to result in a raging response if directed towards a grandiose narcissist, have coincided with you taking long breaks from the forum. Such behavior on your part fits the characteristics of covert narcissism, rather than grandiose narcissism. — wonderer1

You flatter yourself. You evince no evidence of learning in philosophy beyond a smattering of popular neuroscience.

not before Trump turns it into a souvenir tea-towel and fund-raises off it.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/09/15/republicans-react-apparent-assassination-attempt-trump-florida/

Sure. Interesting idea for discussion but probably another thread.

I'm very cautious about transcendence. — Ludwig V

Our culture and philosophy generally lacks the language within which to interpret the word. It is usually treated as synonymous with religious dogma and rejected on those grounds.

I presume that shooter understands that he’ll spend most of the rest of his life in federal prison. What a fool.

Since we're on a philosophy forum, no other animal - great ape, dolphin, or elephant, for example - can comprehend the concepts we can when addressing the many diverse philosophies that have occurred. Thereby, again, making us of a distinctly different kind from all other lifeforms of which we know. — javra

Right. That's what I've been arguing for, and also, why is it that it seems such a hard thing to grasp. Apparently that makes me a pathological narcissist, although of course I don't possess the insight to see it.

Incidentally, speaking of animal awareness of death, there was a spooky and touching story about 15 years ago, concerning a fellow named Lawrence Anthony, who had devoted his life to helping and caring for elephants in southern Africa.

Back in March 2012, Lawrence Anthony, a conservationist and author known as "The Elephant Whisperer", passed away.

Anthony, who grew up in rural Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, was known for his unique ability to communicate with and calm traumatized elephants. In his book 'The Elephant Whisperer: My Life with the Herd in the African Wild', he tells the story of saving the elephant herds, at the request of an animal welfare organization.

Anthony concluded that the only way he could save these elephants, who were categorized as violent and unruly, was to live with them - "To save their lives, I would stay with them, feed them, talk to them. But, most importantly, be with them day and night".

When Anthony died of a heart attack, the elephants, who were grazing miles away in different parts of the park, travelled over 12 hours to reach his house. According to his son Jason, both herds arrived shortly after Anthony's death. They hadn't visited the compound where Anthony lived for a year and a half, but Jason says "in coming up there on that day of all days, we certainly believe that they had sensed it". — CBC

Work that one out!

Yes, and.....?

I happen to very much agree with that. Though I'm uncertain as to how this might relate to reasoning among lesser animals in your own view. — javra

I’ve already said, I don’t deny that the so-called higher animals (including some birds) are intelligent. But rationality in the sense h.sapiens possess it displays a kind or level of intelligence that they don’t, even if it is present in them in a rudimentary degree. This is based on abstract reasoning and language (see for instance Terrence Deacon The Symbolic Species). It has been suggested that because there is some continuity between h.sapiens and other species, then the difference is only one of degree rather than of kind. That is what I’m taking issue with. Maybe what I’m arguing for could be described as a question of philosophical anthropology, a philosophical view of what is significant about humankind. I know this is a very non-politically-correct argument, so a lot of what I’ve been trying to spell out in this thread, is what I see as the motivation for the currently popular view that we’re no different to animals.

Also in relation to AI, I’ve used ChatGPT since day one, I run a lot of ideas by it and use it for all kinds of things. It’s truly amazing. But are large language models beings? That’s another thing I question. I put it to ChatGPT which responded as follows:

The question of whether large language models or AI in general qualify as "beings" touches on deep philosophical and ethical issues. From a philosophical standpoint, it connects to topics like consciousness, personhood, and agency, all of which are traditionally considered key aspects of what makes a being.

In the case of large language models like me, while we're able to process language, respond meaningfully, and simulate conversation, we don't have consciousness, intentionality, or subjective experiences. So from a metaphysical or philosophical point of view, most would argue we're not "beings" in the traditional sense. However, this opens up debates about how we define terms like "being" and "intelligence."

It sounds like a lively thread—did the mention spark any follow-up questions or reactions?

I said I’d provide updates ;-)

I don't believe there is a black and white line between us chimps and bonobos, they are animals we are humans. I think we are on the same line of evolution and under the right conditions bonobos could have more complex communication than we want to admit — Athena

You should have a read of the story of Nim Chimpsky. He was born and raised like a human child with the hope that he could be taught to communicate like humans.

As chronicled in the 2011 documentary "Project Nim," [Columbia University psychology and psychiatry professor Herbert S.] Terrace decided to see if Chimpsky could learn human language by placing the infant monkey into the home of one of his former students, Stephanie LaFarge. The goal was to see if Chimpsky could acquire human-like language if he was raised like a real human being. Starting in late 1973, Nim Chimpsky began his life/experiment — but controversy soon arose. Despite being treated kindly, Nim Chimpsky showed unexpected aggression toward his human caretakers. His behavior was so sporadically violent that, after he attacked one of the people taking care of him in 1977, Terrace moved Nim Chimpsky back to a regular laboratory. At that point, Terrace called off the experiment.

Additionally, Terrace and his colleagues reached a disappointing conclusion: Although Chimpsky had appeared to learn language — he moved his hands and body in a manner consistent with American Sign Language, using over 120 combinations, in order to seemingly ask for things like food and affection — the evidence indicated that he was simply mimicking the behavior of the humans around him. It is possible that Chimpsky understood at least some of the "words" he was forming, but it is also very, very far from being proven.

"Nim learned to sign to obtain food, drink, hugs and other physical rewards," Terrace later explained to Columbia University. "Nim often got the signs right, but that was because his teachers inadvertently prompted him by making appropriate signs a fraction of a second before he did. Nim's signing wasn't spontaneous. He was unable to use words conversationally, let alone form sentences." — Salon

When the experiment failed, the poor little chimp was then packed off to a home for retired lab animals, where he was reported to seem very depressed. Ends up being a sad story.

why would the dog go mad — javra

I would say because of cognitive dissonance. I don't find it hard to see that many higher animals could experience that.

A couple of paragraphs:

According to Cudworth, Descartes’ mistake was that his conception of the soul was too narrow. Descartes thought that animals’ inability to speak or think reflectively like humans was explained by their not having souls and thus being purely physical machines, but Cudworth saw a problem with this: animals might not speak or reason, but they still do an awful lot. As Cudworth saw it, anyone who can look at the incredible variety and complexity of animal behaviour and decide that it is all merely physical mechanism “will never be able clearly to defend the incorporeity and immortality of human souls” (The True Intellectual System of the Universe, 1678, p.44). In other words, if animals feel and move and communicate as they do purely because of their physical makeup, then there’s no reason to introduce a special, immaterial soul to explain human behaviour. If Descartes is willing to explain the behaviour of all animals as resulting from nothing but ‘blood and brains’, why shouldn’t he draw the same conclusion about us?

For a seventeenth-century Platonist, that’s a surprisingly modern insight; in fact, it’s not unlike the sort of argument many materialists would use to refute Descartes’ dualism today. But Cudworth was not a modern man, and like Descartes, he accepted the orthodox assumption of his time that conscious minds are souls. As we have seen, he was also committed to bridging Descartes’ radical gap between human and animal life. And so, instead of showing that neither animals nor humans have souls, he tried to show that animals have souls too. And although Cudworth thought that animal souls were less perfect and less conscious than human souls, he believed that nevertheless, their existence gives us moral responsibilities towards animals that we do not have towards soulless, mindless objects. So for Cudworth, the specialness of human souls does not entail the worthlessness of animal ones: rather, animals are simply less complex, less developed examples of the same sort of thing that humans are.

Substitute 'soul' with 'mind' and I think Cudworth makes a valid point.

None of which vitiates the arguments I've been presenting on the matter.

Ralph Cudworth - right! He was one of the Cambridge Platonists. @Manuel has mentioned him several times. I'll read that with interest later.