If you google Plotinus on the Gnostics there’s a ton of material out there. As I understand it, the basic drift is that he wouldn’t countenance their claim that matter was evil. (The top hit is from a Wiki article which seems quite comprehensive and as always has links for further reading.)

You can find that book online - which is just as well, as it's out of print and very expensive in hard copy. It was one of the books mentioned in the video series this thread is about, which is how I found it.

Updates for this thread: I've belatedly started working through the lecture series for Awakening from the Meaning Crisis which was the origin of Vervaeke's online material.

The playlist can be found here. There's also a companion website here which contains, among other things, transcriptions of the series.

The lectures all contain bibliographies of the books mentioned. I stress again Vervaeke is first and foremost a cognitive scientist, and many of the books he references are from cognitive science and psychology. When he discusses mysticism, which he does, he has a way of framing it so that it makes sense from a cognitive science perspective. But he's also pretty well-versed in philosophy and the history of ideas. New Age dross, it ain't.

There's a lot of material - I've generally been listening while working out or driving, both of which I'm doing a fair amount of at the moment. But it does form a comprehensive curriculum.

:up:

There's a passage from David Bentley Hart which I've quoted a number of times recently:

In the pre-modern vision of things, the cosmos had been seen as an inherently purposive structure of diverse but integrally inseparable rational relations — for instance, the Aristotelian aitia, which are conventionally translated as “causes,” but which are nothing like the uniform material “causes” of the mechanistic philosophy. And so the natural order was seen as a reality already akin to intellect. Hence the mind, rather than an anomalous tenant of an alien universe, was instead the most concentrated and luminous expression of nature’s deepest essence. This is why it could pass with such wanton liberty through the “veil of Isis” and ever deeper into nature’s inner mysteries. — David Bentley Hart, The Illusionist

I'm exploring the idea that the reason the natural order was seen as 'akin to the intellect', is because the ancients and pre-moderns did not have the sense of separateness or 'otherness' to the Cosmos that we ourselves do. That in turn is because of a different conception of the nature of self. It's very hard to identify or articulate, because it's a foundational or intuitive sense of the natural order, our innnate intuitive sense of 'the way things are'. (I'm not claiming their sense is superior to ours in any scientific sense, as the ancients were not scientifically informed as we are, but that it is highly significant as an existential stance or way-of-being.)

See for example the beginning of the chapter on Plotinus in Eric Perl's 'Thinking Being':

Plotinus follows Plato, and, indeed, Aristotle, in identifying being, τὸ ὄν, that which is, as form. As in Plato, sensible things exist just insofar as they have and display intelligible forms. The forms themselves, therefore, as that which is intelligible and in virtue of which sensible things are at all, are reality (οὐσία, ouisia). Sensible things thus are not reality itself and are not beings in the full and proper sense, but, in that they have some share of intelligibility, are images of true, intelligible reality. But Plotinus goes further than Plato and Aristotle in developing both Plato’s συνουσία, synousia, the togetherness of intellectual apprehension and intelligible reality, and Aristotle’s doctrines of pure form as one with the act of thinking and of intellect as one with the intelligible, into a far more thorough and explicit account of the coinciding, the unity-in-duality, of being-as-form and intellectual apprehension. — Eric D Perl, Thinking Being, p 119

That sense is also preserved in Aquinas, in the 'union of the knower with the known', which characterises the apprehension of the forms of particulars:

Knowledge presupposes some kind of union, because in order to become the thing which is known we must possess it, we must be identical with the object we know. But this possession of the object is not a physical possession of it. It is a possession of the form of the object, of that principle which makes the object to be what it is. This is what Aristotle means when he says that the soul in a way becomes all things. Entitatively the knower and object known remain what they are. But intentionally (cognitively) the knower becomes the object of his knowledge as he possesses the form of the object. — Aquinas Online, Cognition in General

This theme of 'union' in some ways echoes the idea of union in many different schools of the perennial philosophy. This is what is lost in the transition to modernity, particularly with the advent of Cartesian dualism and the separateness of mind and matter.

Only to another subject ;-)

It has always struck me that the ability to treat I as me, as just another one of the things in the world, is the essence of consciousness. — T Clark

And it's always struck me that 'all the other things in this world' are objects of consciousness, whereas I am a subject of experience.

Hi Dan - welcome to thephilosophyforum. You might have a look at the help article on how to quote. Without those methods, the poster you are quoting will not be notified that he or she has been quoted and so will probably not respond.

Reminds me of the Lankavatara Sutra. It might implicitly reference the same sort of "unconscious.", no? — ENOAH

Very much. The Laṅkāvatāra is one of the central texts of Yogācāra. (See this entry.)

Which now makes me wonder if Buddhism accepts/rejects the concept of a sub(un)conscious. — Heracloitus

Not every school of Buddhism does, but the Yogācāra, one of the principle Mahāyāna schools, has a theory of the unconscious. See the Wikipedia entry on the ‘ālāyavijñana’ the ‘storehouse consciousness’ which is functionally similar to the unconscious.

But is this not essentially cultivation of certain states that are not natural? These jhanas are not normal everyday experiences, rather they are only possible during the practice of deep meditation — Heracloitus

True, but not necessarily a criticism of Buddhism per se. One of the epiphets of the Buddha is 'lokuttara' which means literally 'world-transcending'.

My question is: why would a cultivated state be considered as basis for the true nature of reality? Especially a state that most people cannot experience. — Heracloitus

I would say that Buddhism sees it as being about the true nature of being, or the human condition.

I can see what you're wrestling with, I've been down this path myself. It is true that Buddhism, at least 'early' Buddhism, the form preserved in the Pali texts, is in some fundamental way world-denying. The Buddha renounced homelife and encouraged those who followed him to do likewise. It is also true that the later form of Buddhism, Mahāyāna, adopted a more cosmopolitan perspective, which allowed that even householders and merchants might be enlightened. But that world is vastly different to our own.

I think there's a lot of illusions about Buddhism and 'mindfulness' in modern culture. For us, it's a way of better coping with life, of being happy or being a better person. Buddhism really is a lot less domesticated than that. It's not about having a better life in the way us comfortable secular moderns envisage it. It is a religious philosophy.

There's a perceptive scholar called David MacMahan who's written a book on Buddhism in the modern world. Here is a book chapter of his that came up in my feed the other day, about whether meditation 'works' and what that might mean, in the context of the original Buddhist texts, and our own secular modern worldview. All very deep questions.

How does Buddhism account for this? — Heracloitus

Consider this verse from the early Buddhist texts:

Then the wanderer Vacchagotta went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there he asked the Blessed One: "Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?"

When this was said, the Blessed One was silent.

"Then is there no self?"

A second time, the Blessed One was silent.

Then Vacchagotta the wanderer got up from his seat and left.

The 'wanderer Vachagotta' is a figure in these texts associated with the posing of philosophical questions. The Buddha's non-response in such circumstances is generally designated a 'noble silence' wherein he declines to answer questions positively or negatively.

The verse continues:

Then, not long after Vacchagotta the wanderer had left, Ven. Ananda said to the Blessed One, "Why, lord, did the Blessed One not answer when asked a question by Vacchagotta the wanderer?"

"Ananda, if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of eternalism [the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul]. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism [the view that death is the annihilation of consciousness]. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, would that be in keeping with the arising of knowledge that all phenomena are not-self?"

"No, lord."

"And if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered Vacchagotta would become even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not exist?'"

By not affirming or denying the existence of a self, the Buddha avoids reinforcing a dualistic view that could lead to further attachment or confusion which leads to the formation of dogmatic views (ditthi) in either a positive (religious) or negative (nihilist) sense. In Theravada Buddhism, this insight is foundational, directing the mind towards the non-conceptual understanding that the self is a dynamic process comprising the conjugation of aggregates (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness).

But it's important to understand what, exactly, is being denied, and I think there is a good deal of confusion over this, even amongst the highly educated. There are many passages in the texts describing the 'eternal unchanging self' that the Buddha rejects.

The self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, set firmly as a post. And though these beings rush around, circulate, pass away and re-arise, but this remains eternally. (DN1.1.32)

Here, the ‘this’ which 'remains eternally' is believed to be something enduring, within which ‘beings rush around, circulate and re-arise’. This arises from the Vedic principle of sat as being ‘what really exists’, distinguished from asat, illusory or unreal. Hence in this formulation, sat is what is ‘eternal, unchangeable, set firmly as a post’, and thus distinguishable from saṃsāra or maya.

In another verse, the Alagaddūpama Sutta criticizes those who think:

This is the self, this is the world; after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, not subject to change; I shall endure as long as eternity’ - this too he regards thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’.

This is designated as 'eternalism', one of the two 'extreme views' associated with death and re-birth. The other 'extreme view' is nihilism, that the body is a purely material phenomenon and that there are no consequences for actions after death.

But - this is the crucial point, not generally acknowledged in my view - in none of this is agency denied. How could it be, in a doctrine to which karma is central? There is a verse in which the Buddha explicitly denies the claim that there is no agent (self-doer or other-doer, i.e. self and other, see Attakārī Sutta.)

What is denied is the eternally-existing, unchangeable self posited by the Brahmins. And also that there is, anywhere, an unchanging element, thing or being - hence the designation of 'all dharmas' ('dharmas' here meaning 'experienced realities') as anatta, devoid of self (and also anicca, impermanent, and dukkha, unsatisfying.) In the Buddha's context, what I think he was rejecting was the religious view that through the right sacrificial practices, one could secure favourable re-births indefinitely or dwell in an eternal heaven. But he also rejects the view that physical death terminates the process that gives rise to individual existence in the first place. Getting insight into that process unties the Gordian knot of existence. And yes, that is hard to fathom! But none of it means, in bald terms, that ‘the self does not exist’, which is way it is usually interpreted.

I suppose another thing that should be added is that no-self is not a concept, but a state of being - specifically, the state of not being self-centred! The self-centred or selfish person has a very concrete idea of what constitutes me and mine and myself as something which as to be continually reinforced and defended. One who is not self-centred doesn’t behave this way or cling to that notion of me and mine. But that is more than a conceptual understanding, it is a way of being in the world.

This and climate change. Those two issues are so easy and so obvious that a child can understand them, and yet individuals who would otherwise fool you into believing they’re sharp thinkers simply cannot grasp them. — Mikie

Only one side in the American political scene is openly declaring the intention to suspend the Constitution, and running solely on the basis of vindictiveness and spite. Why this is not an outrage to any sane person is beyond me. As promised I will donate US$10.00 on the basis of losing the argument that Trump won’t be the Republican nominee. That charity will be Liz Cheney’s PAC. And bye for now.

Do you accept that a claim of ancient wisdom is largely dependent upon a description of what those old people were saying? — Paine

No. Different epochs (and that is what they are) are characterised by different ways of being. There were of course many aspects of ancient life which are rightly condemned by today’s standards but the insights preserved in the classical texts have been preserved for good reason. Also many of these texts are from the Axial Age, which has a special significance, and which deserves a thread in its own right, although I’m not going to post one as I’m taking a spell from forums for a while.

The subpoena to Garland was pure theatre and retribution, no basis in law or fact. We can expect many more frivolous and baseless lawsuits from Trump’s minions in Congress none with any basis in law or fact, but solely driven by spite and the desire to settle scores.

Ashli Babbitt was shot by law enforcement trying to force entry into a restricted area. If she hadn’t have been taking those actions, she wouldn’t have been shot.

I truly have no interest in debating J6. It was a protest that got out of hand. — fishfry

Not true. There were intruders holding signs saying that the Vice President should be hung and expressing the intent to find and murder the speaker of the house. They desecrated the House and destroyed private and government property and confidential records.

The difference with Holder is that Eric Holder was asked to testify and provide documents for a period of time in which he actually was part of the executive branch. In fact he did provide many documents and he claimed executive privilege for others. The court agreed but also required Holder to turn over non-privileged documents.

Steve Bannon was being requested to testify and provide document for a period of time in which he was not part of the executive branch. Bannon turned over nothing and refused to testify. It is fundamentally different than Eric Holder’s case.

[Trump] is not on trial for J6 — fishfry

That trial is pending.

Didn't they throw certain GOP members off the committee or deny them membership, flouting longstanding procedures? I also hear they destroyed all their records. — fishfry

No they did not deny GOP participation. The original proposal for a National Commission to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol Complex, known colloquially as the January 6 commission, was an unsuccessful effort to create a bi-partisan commission that would have investigated the January 6 United States Capitol attack. On February 15, 2021, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi announced that she planned to create a "9/11-type commission". The details were initially negotiated by Republican John Katko, and would have consisted of an equal number of Democrats and Republicans. A bill forming the commission passed the House of Representatives on May 19 with all Democrats and 35 Republicans voting in support of it. However, it was blocked by Senate Republicans on May 28, with 54 Senators voting in favor and 35 voting against, failing to clear the 60 votes needed to break a filibuster. After the bill establishing the commission failed, the House of Representatives created the United States House Select Committee on the January 6 Attack.

There was then negotiation to establish another form of bi-partisan inquiry but it was torpedoed by Kevin McCarthy and other Republicans, some of whom denied that the assault was an attempted insurrection at all. McCarthy meanwhile insisted on broadening the scope to include an inquiry into Black Lives Matter protests. Stymied in the Senate, Pelosi declared that the House would conduct the enquiry. The only two House Republicans to vote to establish the Committee were also the only two Republicans to serve on it: Liz Cheney and Adam Kinzinger.

As far as the ‘destruction of records’ is concerned, it’s another Trump/MAGA lie.

In any case Fishfry I respect your intelligence and have learned things from you about philosophy of math. This is what makes it disappointing - to see intelligent people rationalizing the despicable
actions of Trump and his flunkeys. It’s depressing.

the J6 committee was a total politicized fraud. — fishfry

By the way, I don't accept that. I watched a great deal of the telecast, I found it compelling and right on target. Trump should never be considered for public office again, in light of what he was shown to have done. But again, the supine GOP have fallen in behind him, two officers who were injured trying to defend the Capital were booed by Republicans when they appeared before Pennsylvania's House of Representatives. The rot has well and truly set in.

In other news, Steve Bannon has (finally!) been ordered to report to prison.

We have to tread carefully, however. The way I parse it is that mind does not exist as an object of knowledge in other than a figurative sense ('the object of the enquiry'.) If you designate it as a real object then you're reifying. Mind as the subject is that to whom experience occurs. But you can never step outside that or make an object of it. That's precisely what constitutes 'the problem of consciousness' for the objective sciences!

Given that we are indeed subjects of experience, and that we are part of a species, a language group, a culture, and so on, there is, of course, a vast domain of objective facts. I have no wish to deny that, or to say that these facts are a matter of individual predeliction. What I'm drawing attention to is that even the undeniably objective always occurs to a subject.

Take a look at that video, I also provide it as a footnote to the original essay.

I'm one of those totally anachronistic people who's never signed up to Tinder. Mainly, I guess, because at age 70, I was lucky enough to meet my life's partner 40 odd years ago at University, before apps were even a thing. So - I don't really have any recommendations. Although I do recall hearing a radio interview with a guy in his 40's who had made a huge amount of money in tech and didn't have to work. He was lonely, but then he got a dog. The dog itself, apart from being a companion, also allowed him to strike up conversations with other dog-owners at the park, and that's how he found some who went on to become his nearest friends. (I will add, like @T Clark above, my son too met his dear one on Tinder and they've been married 4 years. There's nothing the matter with that, but I imagine Tinder has, let's say, a poor noise-to-signal ratio.)

Perhaps what I truly need to face up to, is the fact that such a truth, if it exists and does not live up to human "reasoning" cannot be mutually pursued in a forum which necessarily prides itself in the mastery of human reason. — ENOAH

It’s called ‘the hard problem’ for a reason! You’re dealing with a question that is at the basis of a great many philosophical questions and there are no easy answers.

I take an idealist approach. I see philosophical materialism (physicalism, reductionism) as being part of the problem to which a properly-constituted idealist philosophy is the solution. And I will say there's support for this within cognitive science, or the type of cognitive science which stresses the sense in which the mind constructs our experienced reality. Take a look at my thread The Mind-Created World.

Also check this video out.

There is the real apple which I would have seen had my sensation not been mediated by mind's re-presentation of "apple" (fruit, shape, red, eat, doctor away, rotten at the core, not pear, not orange, not wax etc). — ENOAH

You're actually into a very tough problem here, which is the appearance and reality distinction. You're wanting to claim that 'the apple' (read: any object) has a 'real existence' (ultimate reality) which exists (is real) irrespective of and outside of our mediated experience of it.

The problem being, that if all experience and judgement of objects is mediated by our sensory and intellectual faculties (per Kant) then the apple (or object) as it is in itself, is not something we ever know.

So - how do you get outside that mediated experience to see things as they truly are? A natural answer might be that this is what science does, but when you get down to the fundamental constituents of physical reality, which are the objects of quantum physics, then the Observer Problem rears its head. And the philosophical import of that, is precisely that you cannot detect such entities as they are independently of any act of measurement (according to what is known as the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics).

It is of course true that science explores and explains a vast panorama of phenomena, but recall that phenomena means 'what appears', and 'what appears' always appears to a subject, who him or herself is never disclosed in the observation (but whose presence is implicated in the above-mentioned 'observer problem'.)

My two cents worth is that David Chalmer's original paper, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, is pointing to a philosophical issue, which is not a problem that can be addressed by scientific means as a matter of principle. And this is because of the ineradicably first person nature of conscious experience, which is not amenable to the third person methodology of the natural sciences.

Whereas his opponents claim that:

In Consciousness Explained, I described a method, heterophenomenology, which was explicitly designed to be 'the neutral path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological principles of science. — Daniel Dennett

(It's worth noting that the essay at the head of this OP was linked by Dennett in the first place, because Humphrey's theory is compatible with Dennett's, as they're both materialists.)

So Humphreys, Dennett, and the other advocates of 'naturalised epistemology' view the hard problem as something that can be solved. In that sense, they can fairly be accused of actually ignoring the root of the problem itself, which, according to David Chalmers and others, is not a problem to be solved, but a way of pointing out an unavoidable limitation of objectivity viz a viz the subjective nature of experience. Phenomenology and existentialism understands this in a way that the objective sciences cannot.

See Thomas Nagel's What Daniel Dennett Gets Wrong (Oct 2023) for an analysis of the in-principle shortcomings of materialism in philosophy of mind.

Also The Blind Spot of Science and the Neglect of Lived Experience (also in Aeon Magazine and now a book.)

A year later, what's the status of this potential solution to the hard problem? — RogueAI

If anyone cares to go back to the start of this thread, the article which is is about is in Aeon Magazine, How Blindsight Answers the Hard Problem of Consciousness, Nicholas Humphrey. That is the proposed solution in question. There's also an interesting book about the topic, The Ancient Origins of Consciousness (not related to Nicholas Humphrey but exploring similar themes), the abstract of which states 'Combining evolutionary, neurobiological, and philosophical approaches allows Feinberg and Mallatt to offer an original solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness.'

I think the orientation of his overall philosophy is clearly influenced by Protestantism. It wouldn't be accurate to say that he was Protestant, as he wouldn't even set foot in a church, but that his cultural and religious background establishes the parameters of the underlying assumptions of his ethical theory, as Maritain argues.

(By the way, John Calvin was Protestant, and Calvinism one of the main schools of Protestantism. I'm not sure where pietism fits into the scheme, though.)

I'm trying to configure where specifically, "Protestant" comes into view here.. — schopenhauer1

You can imagine that Kant would have no truck with Aquinas' 'five proofs' or any of the other argumentarium of Scholastic philosophy. They would all be subject to the kinds of critiques he had of other rationalist philosophers. He was famously dismissive of the ontological argument ('existence is not a predicate'). I think intellectually he was very much a product of the Reformation, even if he then went even further than the Reformers in questioning the very existence of the Church.

Aspect of Truth: A New Religious Metaphysics, Catherine Pickstock.
Thinking Being: An Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition, Eric D Perl.

I watched excerpts of Garland’s response to the Jordan inquisition. While I agree with everything Garland said, his persona and delivery are weak. I wish there were a more forceful, telegenic and eloquent speaker in that vital role.

More and more, I'm understanding how the 'Western mindset' has lost a vital perspective, and that the resulting worldview is like a two-dimensional depiction of a three-dimensional reality. (It is like the scenario that McIntyre describes at the beginning of After Virtue, with scattered fragments from a library lying about, that we no longer know how to connect.) That lost perspective *is* the qualitative dimension. But that claim is nearly always challenged on the basis that qualitative judgements are personal and subjective and that there is no scientific basis to them. I think this is what Awakening from the Meaning Crisis is addressing. But Vervaeke is - I would say first and foremost - a cognitive scientist, so he doesn't endorse any kind of sentimentality or romanticism. It's a factual issue, but it's also qualitative (in one of the last talks I listened to he rejects the 'fact-value' dichotomy).

Related to this - I have the sense that the One of Plotinus *is not* a concept. I think arriving at an understanding of it requires a kind of cognitive transformation although that too is very difficult to fathom. I recall from the IEP entry on Pierre Hadot: 'Hadot argues in Plotinus, or the Simplicity of Vision, that the famous Neoplatonic metaphysics of the One, the Ideas, and the world-psyche is not the abstract, purely theoretical, otherworldly construction it is often presented as being. Rather, Hadot claims, in Plotinus’ Enneads the language of metaphysics “is used to express an inner experience. All these levels of reality become levels of inner life, levels of the self” (PSV 27). For Hadot, Plotinus’ metaphysical discourse is animated by a “fundamental but inexpressible experience.” ' Later in the same article, Hadot distances himself from Plotinus' ascetic mysticism but nevertheless this is a recurring theme in his later studies of philosophy as a way of life. That also chimes with Vervaeke's continual stress on philosophy as a transformative understanding, albeit remaining fully conversant with and aware of natural science.

Physics is an abstraction. It is based on attending to physical phenomena while prescinding from the inseparable subjective phenomena. So, physics necessarily produces an incomplete picture of reality. — Dfpolis

:up: And how we got to 'physicalism' was by two steps: first, declare that 'the physical' and 'the mental' are two separate substances but exist basically side-by-side. Then, point out that there is no way to demonstrate the existence of a 'mental substance'. Voila.

It's a reasonable idea, but this kind of analysis barely falls under the general subject heading of philosophy. There is a very strong tendency to evoke evolutionary theory to account for all kinds of human traits but it often bears the risk of slipping into a 'just so' story.

I think a much more substantial figure with a somewhat similar idea is René Girard, who wrote extensively on the concepts of mimetic desire, mimetic rivalry, and sacrificial violence. His work explores how human desires are imitated from others, leading to rivalry and conflict, and how societies use sacrificial mechanisms to channel and resolve these conflicts. Some of his key works include "Violence and the Sacred" (1972) and "Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World" (1978).

Mimetic rivalry refers to the idea that human desires are not inherently original but are imitated (or "mimetic"). According to Girard, individuals often desire objects or goals not because of their intrinsic value, but because they see others desiring them. This imitation leads to rivalry and conflict, as multiple individuals or groups compete for the same objects or goals.

In Girard's view, mimetic rivalry is a fundamental aspect of human behavior and social dynamics. It can escalate to the point of violence, as individuals or groups struggle to assert their desires over others. Girard further argues that this rivalry can lead to social crises, which societies often manage through mechanisms such as scapegoating and sacrificial violence, redirecting the conflict onto a sacrificial victim to restore peace and order.

There are resonances with the 'Easterlin thesis' (which I acknowledge I hadn't heard of previously.)

I guess my challenges are meaningless in that context. — Paine

They're really not. I will always read the texts that are presented with interest. It's more that my interests are tangential to the topic and I'm ever mindful of derailing a discussion.

I think the matter belongs to a discussion of what Aristotle intended. Folding his efforts into an omlette of other ideas is what I am challenging. — Paine

And as I've said, I'm interested in Aristotle in the context of the history of ideas, which is the study of an omelette. It is nearer to what John Vervaeke is covering in his course materials.

I think it is clear that Vervaeke is a Platonist, but his relationship with naturalism seems a bit complicated. Maybe it would be better to say that he wishes to redirect naturalism away from its anti-Platonist history. It may all come down to the question of how Plato and Vervaeke understand God and transcendence. At the very least I would say that Vervaeke is opposed to the standard, reductionist tropes of naturalism, such as materialism. What do you think? — Leontiskos

Question from here.

The key idea is his 'levelling up' - rather a peculiar turn of phrase, but what it means is that there are different levels of description, and also reality, but that these all influence each other, upwards and downwards. He says that reductionism, which produces a 'flat ontology', wishes to account for everything in terms of its atomic or sub-atomic basis. Whereas in reality, top-down constraints are equally important in the actual processes of living beings. (This is the subject of Awakening from the Meaning Crisis>Episode 6>Aristotle Kant and Evolution.) He often mentions this book, Context Changes Everything, Alice Juarrero which also got a bit of attention here on the forum in years past.

(I also recently listened to a keynote lecture he gave on neoplatonism and levels of being. The problem with Vervaeke is there's so much of him! Awakening from the Meaning Crisis is, what, 52 hour-long lectures, and then there's numerous other interviews, guest appearances, panel discussions....life's too short....)

I've quoted your question in the Vervaeke thread so as not to divert this one.

there is a 'paradise lost' aspect to your versions of the history of ideas that I do not subscribe to. — Paine

It's not so much 'paradise lost' as 'forgotten wisdom'. That there was an 'sapiential wisdom teaching' that was original to Western culture, that has been occluded by scientistic technocracy and 'the instrumentalisation of reason'. But again, maybe better discussed in the other thread than this one.

Do you "buy" Mr. Maritain? — tim wood

Professor Maritain. It's not a matter of whether I "buy" the argument, @Moliere asked the question and I happened to know of that essay by him. I will say I've barely scratched the surface of Maritain, who was a monumental figure in 20th century Catholic philosophy, and not much more so of Kant, but I believe Maritain's analysis has merit.

I think most importantly to Kant is that he'd assert that being a religious man is not in conflict with being a rational, scientific man. It seems to me that's almost a "in a nutshell" explanation of Kant: How to believe in both science and religion without destroying either. — Moliere

My thoughts also.

///

Going back to the souce I quoted, there's a useful synopsis of Maritain's argument in footnotes 15-16, from which:

Kant tried to transpose revealed morality as the Judeo-Christian tradition presents it to us into the register of pure reason. He sought to retain the Judeo-Christian absolutization of morality in an ethics of Pure Reason, which rid itself of any properly supernatural or revealed element in order to replace it with the authority of a Reason not grounded on the real and on nature.

I am not familiar with Vervaeke. — Paine

You’ll find a thread that I’ve created about him here.

*

You have made much of the difference between ancient and modern ideas of the physical. — Paine

I’m very interested in history of ideas. That is not as vague a term as it sounds, it is an actual academic discipline, usually associated with comparative religion departments. The book which is said to have given rise to that discipline is The Great Chain of Being by Arthur Lovejoy (1936 - turns out to be rather a turgid read, but anyway…) I’m pursuing the theme of how physicalism became the ascendant philosophy in Western culture and what the changes were in ways of understanding that gave rise to that. Platonism and how it developed is obviously central to that.

For example - Werner Heisenberg’s adaption of Aristotle’s ‘potentia’ (as noted above). As it happens, Heisenberg was a lifelong student of philosophy, he was known for carrying around a copy of the Timeaus in his University days. His Physics and Philosophy and some of his other later writings are very philosophically insightful in my opinion.

I don’t want to expound on the minutiae of divergences between Aristotle and Plotinus, for example, as I’m not equipped to do so, and, as I said, I’m considering the issues at a high level. And I will generally defer on any close readings of the text, to those who have familiarity with them, although I might take issue with matters of interpretation from time to time.

And another

https://www.cbsnews.com/boston/news/covid-origin-wuhan-lab-leak-alina-chan-mit-harvard/

Previous review of the above author's claims, saying she has an ax to grind. The review in question is of a book she co-authored a couple of years ago. The reviewer calls into question some of Chan's key claims.

It's a highly technical subject. :fear:

(Incidentally I don't know why this topic has been relegated to the Lounge, it is really an interesting question in history of philosophy.)

It is impossible to understand Kant's ethical doctrine if one does not take into account the convictions and the fundamental inspiration he derived from his pietist upbringing. He prided himself on founding an autonomous morality; he took great pains to that end. But in fact his accomplishment was dependent on fundamental religious ideas and a religious inspiration he had received in advance. That is why, however we may regret not being able to keep the analysis within exclusively philosophical bounds, we are obliged, if we wish to grasp the real significance of the moral philosophy of Kant, to take note of all the points of reference to traditional Christian ethics in its essential structure. It is not with the idea of opposing the two systems to each other that we shall have recourse to this kind of confrontation. We would have preferred to avoid it. But it is forced upon us in spite of ourselves by the exigencies of the subject, and because without it the historian of ideas cannot form an accurate notion of what Kant's moral system really is.

The religious background of which we have just spoken is the source of what characterizes Kantian ethics from the outset, namely, its absolutism, the privilege it assigns to morality as revealer of the absolute to man, the seal of the absolute which it impresses upon morality, the saintliness with which it is clothed. The saintly and absolute value of moral obligation and of the ought; the inverse value -- sacrilegious and absolute -- of moral wrong; the saintly and absolute value of good will; the saintly and absolute value of purity of ethical intention: so many traits whose origin lies in the influence of revealed ethics, and which have been transposed therefrom. But since at the same time the whole universe of objective realities on which that revealed ethics depended in its own order and in the supra-rational perspective of faith had been eliminated, along with the universe of objective realities which metaphysics imagined itself to know, the saintly absolutism of morality required a complete reversal of the bases of moral philosophy and rational ethics. Moral philosophy became a-cosmic. The world of morality had to be constituted purely on the basis of the interior data of the conscience, while severing itself from the world of objects -- confined in sense experience -- which our knowledge attains, and especially from that search for the good, the object of our desires, which also belongs to the empirical order, and to which up to this point the fate of ethics had been tied. — Jacques Maritain, Christianity and Philosophy - The Ethics of Kant

('while severing itself from the world of objects' is a point that John Vervaeke stresses about Kant in various of his lectures. )

Each side suspecting the other of the same things — Fooloso4

But don't fall for the 'equivalence' fallacy. Only one side is based wholly on lies, even though the other side might also not always be truthful.