And all of these are physical things. "Hi" and "Olah" both mean a greeting with the physical difference of intonation and spelling. — Philosophim

But they're not. A sentence or a proposition is not a physical thing which is not meaningfully explicable in terms of physical laws. Language, for instance, is the subject of semiotics, linguistics, and other disciplines, but nothing within physics addresses any of that. Within those disciplines, some will be more inclined to a physicalist worldview, others less so. Noam Chomsky, for instance, says that physicalism is untenable because there is no coherent account of what constitutes a physical body.

When you read these words, you will interpret their meaning and compose a reaction (or not). That reaction has some physical elements - like the keys you depress to type, the appearance of letters on the screen - but the core is negotiating meanings, and that is not a physical process. But it can have physical effects - if I say something that others find deeply confronting or offensive, their pulse rate and blood pressure might increase, but that is not because I've physically influenced them via a medicine or substance, but because of their intepretation of what I'm saying.

With respect to the reality of fictional characters such as Sherlock Holmes, they are plainly cultural constructs, real by virtue of a common set of references in works of literature. To that extent they're real but fictional. But the elements of formal logic and mathematics are in a different category to that. They too are only perceptible by rational thought, so not physical as such, but real nonetheless. They exist in what Frege and Popper call a 'third realm'.

Thoughts are physical, and this is backed by studies of the brain. — Philosophim

However, physical studies of the brain invariably fail to capture the subjective dimension of existence. In other words, this claim entirely overlooks the original point of this thread. Likewise, thought-contents, such as the meaning of propositions, can be represented in many different languages, systems, configurations of ideas, all the while retaining their meaning, demonstrating that their meaning is independent of the physical forms they take (a form of the 'multiple realisability' argument - see this ChatGPT dialogue).

Just what is 'a physical thing'? And what is it about consciousness (or acts of thought) that can be described as physical? According to one source, what is physical is what resists our will - it resists being pushed or lifted, requiring physical energy to do so. But how can (for example) the relationship between ideas be described as physical? Say, an inductive argument - if A, then B. How could the cogency of any such argument be described in physical terms? (This is also discussed in the thread Physical Causation and Logical Necessity.) Did the law of the excluded middle come into being as a consequence of evolution? Surely not - what came into being was our capacity to recognise it. And a great deal of the basic 'furniture of reason' can be understood in those terms - they're not the products of biology, but can only be understood by a sufficiently sophisticated intelligence, which h. sapiens possesses. That's why I'm sceptical of biological reductionism with respect to reason (also the subject of Thomas Nagel's essay, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion.)

In my view, the impulse behind physicalism in respect of consciousness, is mainly cultural in origin, in that our culture has undermined or disposed of the alternatives to physicalism, mainly as a consequence of Descartes' construal of res cogitans as 'thinking thing', an oxymoronic term. Whereas a thinking being is something else altogether. Which is why various forms of Aristotelian hylomorphism are making a comeback.

Why physicalism?

Physicalism is paradigmatic for modern philosophy and culture because the generalised method of the application of precise measurement to the quantifiable attributes of physical bodies has been extraordinarily successful across an enormous range of phenomena, from subatomic to the cosmic scales. This method relies on reduction to those attributes which can be represented and measured numerically, pioneered by Newton, Galileo and Descartes. The whole ethos of Enlightenment science is that this method is truly universal in range and scope and that there is nothing that could fall outside it (or at least, nothing worthy of consideration.) This is where the problem of consciousness originates - because by definition consciousness is excluded from this paradigm.

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them.

Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp 35-36

Thomas Nagel, quoted above, was also referenced in Chalmer’s original essay and is a leading critic of philosophical reductionism. He adds:

The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory. — The Core of Mind and Cosmos

We can very clearly identify and even medically manipulate consciousness. We use anesthesa to put people unconscious. You can drink alcohol, get drunk, and alter your consciousness. Consciousness is clearly physical. — Philosophim

I don't think that there is as strong a correlation as you're claiming. Certainly all of those influences affect the brain, and the state of the brain then affects the nature of conscious experience. But that doesn't amount to proving that consciousness is physical, as it's still not clear what consciousness actually is, other than it is something that, for organisms such as ourselves, requires a functioning brain in order to interact with the sensory domain.

There are also many hugely anomalous cases of subjects with grossly abnormal brains who seem to be able to function (see Man with tiny brain shocks doctors).

There is the case of psycho-somatic medicine and the placebo effect, wherein subjects beliefs and emotional states have physical consequences. They can be regarded as being 'top-down causation', in that the effects of beliefs and mental states operate 'downward' on the physical brain. (There was a classic experiment years ago where subjects who were trained to imagine they were doing piano exercises showed very similar neural changes to subjects who trained with actual pianos. And that opens up the whole area of neuro-plasticity, which also has vast implications for the effect of intentional actions on neural structures.)

And finally the claim that 'consciousness is physical' is the very subject of the entire argument, and your claims in this regard still suggest, to me at least, that you're not seeing the point of the argument.

The bet you referred to, as I understood it, was about the Easy problem. — Philosophim

Not so. The byline of the article you cite says 'Christof Koch wagered David Chalmers 25 years ago that researchers would learn how the brain achieves consciousness by now.' The bet was lost.

the neuroscientist believed they would have a neuronal explanation of what causes consciousness. This is the easy problem. — Philosophim

No, it's not. That is just the problem that hasn't been solved. Again, look at the reference I provided upthread on the neural binding problem. The section of the article in question is only a few hundred words, but it spells out what it is about the subjective unity of experience for which neuroscience cannot find a physical cause, and even cites Chalmers' original essay.

For if we did know that it does or does not subjectively feel conscious apart from its behavior, then we would have an objective way of telling if something does or does not subjectively feel conscious. That is something we can never know be it rock, bug, animal, plant, or human. — Philosophim

However, the fact of my own consciousness is apodictic (beyond doubt) for each of us, is it not? That is the sense that Descartes' cogito is right on the mark, is it not?

And by the way, this is not to imply that there is something mystical going on here, or that consciousness is necessarily some sort of spiritual or immaterial substance. — Thales

Welcome to the Forum, Thales, and thanks for the mention!

I might add, another theme I explore in many threads, is the way in which Descartes' 'res cogitans' has been so often seen as a kind of 'spiritual or immaterial substance'. After all, 'res' in 'res cogitans' means 'thing', and so it is easily interpreted (or misinterpreted) as a kind of ghostly essence. Indeed, I think Gilbert Ryle's depiction of the 'ghost in the machine' is based on this interpretation of Descartes. It's very much embedded in modern culture.

(An alternative way of depicting it is to understand mind as the ability to perceive meaning or to see reason. That is nearer in meaning to the Aristotelian 'nous', although exploration of that topic would take us a long way from the OP.)

A rock does not show any behavior of being conscious, and we do not believe a rock can have the experience of a rock, but we cannot know that either. — Philosophim

I would have thought that the distinction between sentient beings and insentient objects is a fundamental not only in philosophy. I can't see any sense in the claim that rocks are subjects of experience. I suppose some forms of panpsychism might make such claims, but they're not credible as far as I'm concerned.

Besides, the problem is not only about not knowing what it is like to be another kind of being (the reference to Nagel is to his well-known article What is it Like to be a Bat). It's also about the fact that no objective description of brain-states can convey or capture the first-person nature of experience. The kind of detailed physiological understanding of pain that a pharmacologist or anaestheologist has, is not in itself pain. Knowing about pain is not the same as being in pain. It is also known as the 'explanatory gap'. Pain is something that is undergone by subjects of experience, not just a configuration of matter. It's that subjective dimension that is absent in any third-person description. That is the salient point.

Also note this paper 'The Neural Binding Problem(s)', Jerome S. Feldman, Cogn Neurodyn. 2013 Feb; 7(1): 1–11. Published online 2012 Sep 1. doi: 10.1007/s11571-012-9219-8

In the section on The Subjective Unity of Perception, the author mentions Chalmer's paper. The gist of that section is that although neuroscience has a pretty good grasp of all the individual systems that account for the perception of motion and the other elements of visual perception, the actual system that produces the unified subjective experience can't be identified: 'that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene . That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience.

The truly hard problem of consciousness is that we can never objectively test what it is like to be conscious from the subjects view point. Think of it like this, "What is it like to be a rock?" We understand the atomic make up and composition of the rock. But what it is it like to BE the rock AS the rock? — Philosophim

I think this demonstrates a failure to grasp the point at issue. In David Chalmers original paper, 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness', nothing whatsover is said about what it is like to be an inanimate object such as a rock, as the paper is about the nature of experience. I take it that neither Chalmers nor anyone here will claim that rocks are subjects of experience.

The salient passage in the Chalmer's paper is this:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

MODERATOR NOTE: the thread 'what would solve the hard problem of consciousness' was merged with this existing thread on the same topic.

This question was merged into Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?

It's a mystery to me — RussellA

That does not constitute an argument.

Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

And what would provide the basis for such ‘careful reflection’ in the absence of an innate grasp of the issue at hand?

Democratic socialism would be one answer. Which Americans tend to falsely denigrate as ‘communism’.

If TS Elliot is right about the world ending with a whimper and not a bang, there’s your whimper.

GOP do not consider Trump a "proven loser" — Relativist

The election results say otherwise. Republicans have under-performed in every election since Trump's initial win. Then everyone forgets about that in the meanwhile and Trump leads the media on a wild goose chase into conspiracy theories and grievances. And come the next actual election, the results for the Republicans, as distinct from the fevered fantasy of a Trump presidency, will be abysmal. The real shame of the matter is that there’s a whole lot of really important legislative work that needs doing, there are enormous economic, political, and environmental challenges to deal with, whilst MAGA are totally absorbed in what can charitably be designated a circle jerk.

//oh, and interesting artwork//

Bumping this topic, just going through my previous OPs and this one didn’t get much of a mention, but it really has a lot of extremely interesting and off-the-beaten track articles https://www.thecollector.com/

But exhausting the spirit trying to illuminate the unity of things without knowing that they are all the same is called “three in the morning.” What do I mean by “three in the morning”? When the monkey trainer was passing out nuts he said, “You get three in the morning and four at night.” The monkeys were all angry. “All right,” he said, “you get four in the morning and three at night.” The monkeys were all pleased. With no loss in name or substance, he made use of their joy and anger because he went along with them. So the sage harmonizes people with right and wrong and rests them on Heaven’s wheel. This is called walking two roads.

A few guesses about this passage. First, monkeys often represent egoic mind in Buddhist and Taoist lore (as in the famous Monkey television show, where the central character is a monkey on a pilgrimage in search of the Buddhist scriptures). The monkey trainer in this passage represents the aspirant who is attempting to tame 'monkey mind'. The passage about the division of the nuts represents 'skill in means' - by not being dogmatic, the 'trainer' (true nature) placates 'the monkeys' even though they really are no better off.

we have the rights and wrongs of the Confucians and the Mohists. Each calls right what the other calls wrong and each calls wrong what the other calls right. But if you want to right their wrongs and wrong their rights, it’s better to throw them open to the light. — Fooloso4

There's some polemics in that. Taoism was a kind of renunciate philosophy, practiced by wandering sages and ascetics who often appear as vagabonds or vagrants. The true 'man of the way' does not put on airs or attempt to appear superior or knowledgeable but 'though doing nothing, leaves nothing undone'. Confucious is often gently satirised in Taoist lore for being uptight and conventionally virtuous.

We are told that all things are one. We may even believe this. But is this something we know? If you think so, how or where do we know this? Is it known in the way Zhuangzi knows what fish like? Do you know things only as you know things yourself? That is, not as things themselves are but as you yourself are? Zhuangzi may dream that he is a butterfly but he has not been transformed into a butterfly. His perspective is not that of a fish or butterfly. It is not that of any other thing let alone all things. — Fooloso4

In respect of the passages quoted, I would think one would need a fair amount of knowledge of classical Chinese culture to offer a scholarly interpretation (something which I certainly don't possess). I have noticed, for example, that various translations of Tao Te Ching are usually highly divergent in English, indicating the difficulties of translating idiomatic Chinese into modern English.

That said, I am at least a bit familiar with some of the well-known Ch'an and Zen Buddhist literature that has made its way into English, and although it's different from Taoism, there are some areas in common. In respect of your question, the Zen Koan that comes to mind is one from Dogen, who was founder of the Sōtō Zen school. It goes like this:

Before one studies Zen, mountains are mountains and waters are waters; after a first glimpse into the truth of Zen, mountains are no longer mountains and waters are no longer waters; after enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and waters once again waters. — Dōgen

(This koan also became a popular 1960's song by Donovan Leitch).

The general interpretation of this koan is that it refers to different stages of the spiritual path. At the beginning, we just think mountains are mountains, waters are waters. Then realising the reality of dependent origination, we come to see that things are empty of own-being - 'mountains are no longer mountains'. But when enlightenment is attained, then we 'see truly' - we see mountains and rivers in their thusness (tathata). Of course much more could be said, but I take the key point to be the transformation of perception - something like a meta-cognitive skill, in today's terminology. But then, of course, satori or enlightenment or 'returning to the source' is also famously elusive and impossible to nail down. Hence the proliferation of poetic and artistic imagery, allusions, hints and (in platonic terms) aporia, which are intended to bring the process of discursive conceptualization to a complete halt so as to facilitate the transformation of cognition or bodhi/wisdom. (See this dialogue on Dharmawheel forum.)

Anyway - that Edward Feser blog post I referred to above can be read here in its entirety. Regardless of one's attitude towards Feser, this post is worth the read.

+1 :clap:

I studied Skinner's 'Beyond Freedom and Dignity' as a psychology undergrad. I hated that book and everything it stood for. Undergrad psych at the time (late 70's) wasn't what I expected, but it wasn't all bad - also included Albert Ellis and Carl Rogers. I read many of Sigmund Freud's humanist essays (as distinct from his scientific papers) which I also disagreed with in many ways but learned how deeply influential he has been in 20th c culture. (Oh, and one other benefit of my undergrad years was meeting my future wife, who's in the next room ;-) )

Years later I studied Transpersonal Psychology, which was kind of fringe, but pretty hip. I even edited the ATPA newsletter for a year or so. Abraham Maslow and other new agey kinds of subjects. I've forgotten most of it since, but liked it a lot at the time.

In that case, why would Kant had said that Hume woke him up from the dogmatic slumbers? — Corvus

My interpretation is because of the challenge Hume posed to the natural assumption that events are causally related. Hume cast doubt on that by saying that causal relationships are grounded in nothing more than repeated observations - that because we observe the relationship of A and B, we say that A causes B, when in reality we're simply observing a constant conjunction of occurences. We can't say we know that A causes B, because we can't actually observe the precise nature of such causation, and also because it's not an analytic relationship, that is to say that it is not true as a matter of logical necessity.

Kant's answer to Hume required rethinking the basis of human knowledge and understanding, which is the task of his critical philosophy. He argued that our minds play a fundamental role in shaping our experience of the world. According to Kant, certain concepts, like causation, are not derived from experience but are rather innate to the human mind (remember, Hume and the other empiricists denied innate capacities). These categories (adapted from Aristotle) provide the framework for the interpretation of experiences, making empirical knowledge and objective understanding possible.

In Kant's view, Hume was correct in asserting that knowledge of causation (and other concepts) cannot be derived from sensory experience alone. However, Kant argued that this kind of insight is instead a precondition of experience. For Kant, the mind actively organizes and synthesizes sensory data according to these categories, which include causality, time, and space. This synthesis allows us to perceive the world in a coherent, consistent manner. Kant thus showed that the empiricist idea of the mind as a 'blank slate' (tabula rasa) was self-contradictory - if it were truly thus, they would not be able to form coherent sentences! (That's me, not Kant :-) )

Thus, Kant's answer to Hume was to argue that while our knowledge is grounded against experience, the fundamental structure of knowledge relies on innate capacities of the mind.

What began quite nobely as an attempt to understand some of human psychology, by limiting itself to what could be observed - we cannot see into another person's mind - somehow morphed into the view that there is no mind or mental. — Manuel

Don’t you think behaviourism was reductionist from the outset? That it was basically a Procrustean bed - because the mind couldn’t be observed, and science built around observation, then it has to be excluded from consideration. (Dennett does say somewhere that his approach is basically behaviourist.)

As to how physics comes into consideration - isn’t it the case that modern mathematical physics is grounded in the quantisation of measurable attributes of bodies? And that this was then taken as paradigmatic for all manner of science, culminating in what René Guenon describes as ‘the reign of quantity’? Then only what is measurable is considered significant. And furthermore the paradigm assumes the separation of observer and observed - something which has been found to be untenable in quantum physics.

whose bright idea was it to get rid of ideas anyway? — Mww

Ideas, in the original sense of forms or principles, were abandoned in the late medieval period with the decline of realism about universals.

It would be nice to see these ideas brought to bear too, because I think a theory of pansemiosis needs to better clarify what is unique in life, and what is not so unique, but rather builds on the nature of non-living systems. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I recommend Charles Pinter’s Mind and the Cosmic Order. It’s mainly about cognitive science but has interesting philosophical implications.

Some time back we had a promising theory of everything that started with the premise all facts could be catalogued within a program. But when asked "how?", things began to fade. — jgill

That’s because somewhere along the line you have things you know without knowing how you know them. We can’t explain explaining. The epistemic buck has to stop somewhere.

But it seems, from my limited musings on the topic, that the attribute we named is of the universe's order, not of objects. But, serious question, does it ever make a difference? — Patterner

Well you have a computer to record that idea. That is a consequence of noticing attributes and making minute distinctions which were discoveries i.e. disclosing aspects of nature that were previously hidden.

God is just an idea that seems to function as a foundation but without objective reality. — JuanZu

God does not exist

anyway, logging out for Christmas to pay attention to family needs, many thanks and best wishes to all for the Festive Season. :halo: :pray: :ok:

What is absent is the conceptual space for 'the unconditioned'. Perception and perceptual objects are conditioned in two different ways - first because our grasp of them is conditioned by our own conceptual categories, second because they are arise as a consequence of conditioned factors. But the problem with that is that it easily falls into complete relativism and subjectivism - that things are only real 'for me'. What is sought is a grasp of 'what truly is the case'.

Here I will transpose the conversation to Buddhist philosophy, although there are alternatives. But in Buddhist philosophy, there is a term for 'seeing things as they truly are', which is one of the attributes of the Buddha. One of the canonical early texts says, 'there is, monks, an unborn, uncreated, unmade. Were there not an unborn, uncreated, unmade, there would be no release from the created, the born, the made' (i.e. 'the conditioned'). There are parallels in Christian mysticism, 'wisdom uncreate', in the writings of Meister Eckhardt and some other sources, drawing from Platonism.

But I think this domain of discourse is pretty well ring-fenced off in contemporary dialogue, because of its seemingly religious connotations. I think, maybe, Heidegger attempted to approach it, in his oblique way, although I'm not too conversant with it. But it is the one subject where the dialogue with non-dual philosophy (Zen and Advaita) at least provides a kind of vocabulary.

I would assume that Wayfarer wouldn’t deny existence outside of perspective — Joshs

I've been pretty careful about that point. The way I've put it is that any meaningful judgement about existence assumes a perspective, but that doesn't say that in the absence of perspective, nothing exists. Rather it is that both existence and non-existence are conceptual in nature. ON that particular point I appeal to Buddhist philosophy.

By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. — The Buddha

You've written a lot, and I may not be able to give sufficient time to respond to all of it, as Christmas is looming. But this is an incorrect analysis, for reasons I will go into below.

If observing mind holds a concept of objects and, moreover, holds capacity to perceive particular objects conceptually, and if, as you imply, there are no extant immaterial objects that can be perceived conceptually, then you negate, by implication, the objective world of immaterial objects as perceived by observing mind. — ucarr

This is a complex issue of epistemology, and there are various models that I consider and draw from. As I've said, I hope that my philosophy is compatible with Kant's 'copernican revolution', which is that 'things conform to thoughts, thoughts don't conform to things'. It is the representation that makes the object possible rather than the object that makes the representation possible. This introduces the human mind as an agent, an active originator of experience rather than just a passive recipient of perception. The world is the experience-of-the-world.

Where 'immaterial objects' come into the picture, is as cognitive and intellectual formations which comprise the basis on which judgements are made (similar to what @Gnomonsays in the post above). When I say that they don't exist as an object, I mean they don't exist as a sensible object, as phenomena ('what appears'). But formative ideas such as number are real nonetheless as constituents of reason. They are not the product of thought, but can only be apprehended by thought, and they are constitutive of the judgements we make about the objective world. That is made abundantly clear in science, is it not, which is grounded in quantitative analysis.

Your mind knows objectivity, so it also knows conceptually the objects that populate categorical objectivity. — ucarr

Well, again, consider number. Are numbers objects? You can point to a number, 7, but that is a symbol. The same number can be written in different languages and symbolic form, VII, seven, sieben, etc. What is denoted by the symbol is an intellectual act, the apprehension of a quantity. But they're not actually 'objects' so much as 'intellectual acts', but we use the term 'object' to facilitate discussion.

you position yourself as a Binary Existence Idealist: there is the phenomenal world of objects and, in a parallel world, there is the pure subjectivity of mind. — ucarr

It is precisely that conception of the world as separate from the self that I am calling into question. The subjective and objective are, as it were, co-arising and mutually conditioning - there is no self without world, and no world without self. Again I feel that is basically conformable with the Kantian model.

.

You claim we can never be outside of our subject-only mind — ucarr

What I mean by saying that, is that when you try and adopt the view of the world as if from no perspective - the world as it exists in itself, absent any perceiver, then you're trying to get outside your perceptual framework and see the world 'as it is in itself', as it would be with no observer. But we can't stand outside ourselves in that way. In scientific terms, we understand the cosmos is vast in space and time and that, as phenomena, h. sapiens are a mere blip or flash in space and time. But there is still an implicit perspective in that supposition, which is in the sense in which the mind provides the framework within which that judgement is meaningful. That is the limitation of naturalism - naturalism assumes a 'view from nowhere', as if its method of quantitative analysis shows us reality as it is with no observer. But the mistake is to interpret this stances as conveying some absolute truth, which it does not. See The Blind Spot .

I want you to respond to the specifics of my argument: cognition by the observing mind, which is tied to the physical processing of the brain, is both literal and physical. — ucarr

Plainly not. Mathematics, semiotics, many other elements of the mind, are not physical in nature. Cognition draws on all manner of influences and inputs, literal, symbolic, mythological, and many other factors. I think you're grasping at straws, because the denial of the primacy of the physical opens up too many difficult metaphysical questions, in a culture which has proclaimed that metaphysics is dead. We want it to be dead.

As for the mind's inability to grasp itself, the text I referred to is from Indian philosophy, the Upaniṣads, which are the central texts of Advaita Vedanta. The specific passage can be found here.

Thanks again for your comments and feedback but as mentioned Christmas is upon us and I'll be logging out for a few days. And, compliments of the season!

If non-physicals are showing up you should observe they always can be mapped to a physical brain in location and time. — Mark Nyquist

Not so. That is where the 'multiple realisability' argument comes into play. This concept, which emerged in the philosophy of mind, argues that a particular mental state, like pain, can be realized by many different kinds of physical states across varied organisms. In other words, different physical configurations can all give rise to the same mental experience.

The significance of this theory lies in its challenge to reductionist views, particularly those in the realm of mind-brain identity theory. This theory posited that each mental state is identical to a specific physical state of the brain. However, the multiple realizability argument suggests that this one-to-one correspondence is overly simplistic. Since different organisms with different physical makeups can all experience something like pain, it implies that a mental state cannot be directly and exclusively equated with a specific physical state.

But it can also be extended to the idea that propositional content can be correlated against brain states. The argument of brain-mind identity theorists, who posit that every thought or mental state is identical to a brain state, faces major difficulties when dealing with semantic content. The core challenge is this: while neuroscience can identify and map various brain activities and states, it struggles to find a direct and consistent correspondence with the semantic content of thoughts or propositions. This issue arises partly because thoughts and propositions are abstract, involving meaning, context, and interpretation, while brain states are physical, observable phenomena.

There are several reasons why mapping semantic content to brain states is challenging:

Variability Across Individuals: Different individuals may have different neural activations for the same thought or proposition. This variability makes it hard to pinpoint a universal brain state corresponding to a specific thought.

Context and Interpretation: The meaning of a proposition can change based on context, individual understanding, and interpretation. This subjective aspect of semantic content is difficult to capture in the objective framework of brain states. (This is the subject of the discipline of semiotics.)

Complexity of Language and Thought: Language and thought are highly complex and dynamic. The same proposition might involve different cognitive processes depending on factors like language proficiency, attention, or prior knowledge.

The Problem of Qualia: There's also the issue of subjective experience or qualia. How a person experiences understanding a proposition might not be directly translatable to a measurable brain state.

And to top it all off, it is recognised that the subjective unity of consciousness - the fact that we're aware of ourselves as unified subjects of experience - is not something that neuroscience has been able to account for. This is called the neural binding problem.

Which brings us back to the problem of consciousness.

Thanks for your kind words, and glad you found it helpful!

Are you perhaps getting your bearings twisted within the hall of mirrors? If the mind appears to us, then it's the object of our perception, is it not? — ucarr

But the mind does not appear to us! Sitting here in my study, all manner of things appear to me - obviously, a computer monitor and keyboard which I use to compose this reply, speakers, a piano keyboard, bookshelves and other iterms. Mind is nowhere apparent amongst this array of objects, rather it is that to which or to whom these objects appear. We can speak of the mind as object in a metaphorical sense, i.e. 'as an object of enquiry', but it is not an object of perception in the sense that objects are. There is no thing called 'mind'. I can think about my thinking, but the act of thought is not itself an object, for the stated reason, that a hand cannot grasp itself. And 'grasping' here is a pretty exact analogy - the mind 'grasps' ideas in an analogously similar way a hand grasps an object but ideas are not physical.

Is it because commentary would necessitate your acknowledgement doing cognition is not physical, — ucarr

I do acknowledge it. Pinter says:

In fact, what we regard as the physical world is “physical” to us precisely in the sense that it acts in opposition to our will and constrains our actions. The aspect of the universe that resists our push and demands muscular effort on our part is what we consider to be “physical”. On the other hand, since sensation and thought don’t require overcoming any physical resistance, we consider them to be outside of material reality. It is shown in the final chapter that this is an illusory dichotomy, and any complete account of the universe must allow for the existence of a nonmaterial component which accounts for its unity and complexity. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics (p. 6). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition

I sense in your analysis the inability to conceive of an 'immaterial thing or substance'. But note here I'm not claiming there is any such thing. The 'nonmaterial component' Pinter refers to is not something that exists objectively, rather it is in the operation of observing mind - which we ourselves can never be outside of, or apart from.

Notice that the realist objection to this argument is invariably along the lines that 'the world must exist anyway, regardless of any observing mind'. But say that this statement always includes an implicit perspective even while conceiving of a world in the absence of an observer. Without a perspective or scale, nothing meaningful can be said or thought about what exists.

Is it not the case the main reason you claim non-binary ideation for yourself is because you do, in fact, believe the phenomenal universe is a derivation and sub-set of immaterial mind? — ucarr

So, following on from the above, in a sense this may be true, but the mind is not to be conceived of as any kind of substance or thing (or reified) - which is the irresistible tendency as soon as it becomes the object of debate!

It's kind of a Zen thing.

Joshu began the study of Zen when he was sixty years old and continued until he was eighty, when he realized Zen.

He taught from the age of eighty until he was one hundred and twenty.

A student once asked him: "If I haven't anything in my mind, what shall I do?"

Joshu replied: "Throw it out."

"But if I haven't anything, how can I throw it out?" continued the questioner.

"Well," said Joshu, "then carry it out."

Note the specific charge against Trump, 'comforting an insurrection', which exactly parallels the expression in the 14th Amendment clause.

If you don't see, it's not because it isn't there, but because you have chosen to be willfully blind, like other members of the Trump cult. I don't know why anyone bothers responding to you, and I certainly no longer will.

The difference between seditious conspiracy and insurrection is unimportant to the case.

How many have been convicted of insurrection? — NOS4A2

The charges against the individuals involved in the January 6, 2021, uprising at the U.S. Capitol include obstruction of an official proceeding, assault, trespassing, disrupting Congress, theft or other property crimes, weapons offenses, making threats, and conspiracy, including seditious conspiracy. The District of Columbia’s attorney’s office has sentenced some 378 individuals to periods of incarceration over their involvement in the insurrection . The sentences range from home detention to longer prison terms for those who engaged in violence or threats . According to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, the median prison sentence for the Jan. 6 rioters is 60 days . However, some individuals have received longer prison terms, such as Stewart Rhodes, founder of Oath Keepers, who was sentenced to 18 years in prison on seditious conspiracy charges.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “sedition” is conduct or speech that incites individuals to violently rebel against the authority of the government. “Insurrection” includes the actual acts of violence and rebellion. In a constitutional democracy, sedition and insurrection refer to inciting or participating in rebellion against the constitutionally established government, its processes and institutions, or the rule of law.

While the two terms are related, they are not interchangeable. “Seditious conspiracy” is a federal crime that occurs when two or more people conspire to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof. “Insurrection” is generally understood to mean the actual violent acts of an uprising aimed at overthrowing the government.

However the fact that charges of insurrection were not brought, does not mean that the acts did not constitute an insurrection.

Donald Trump is facing charges related to the January 6th events. He has been indicted on four counts: conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding, conspiring against rights, and obstruction and attempt to obstruct an official proceeding. The ABC News reports that the charges against him include obstruction of an official proceeding, conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to make a false statement, and incite, assist or aid and comfort an Insurrection.

Nobody who reads the report of January 6th commission could be under any illusion that Trump did not act with seditious intent, namely, to prevent the transfer of power to Biden, He has said as much in public on numerous occasions.

removed Trump from the ballot for crimes no one has been convicted of. — NOS4A2

On the contrary. As of July 2023, there have been many hundreds of convictions arising from the January 6 2021 assault on the Houses of Congress

Pleas:

Approximately 594 individuals have pleaded guilty to a variety of federal charges, many of whom faced or will face incarceration at sentencing.

Approximately 160 have pleaded guilty to felonies. Another 434 have pleaded guilty to misdemeanors.
A total of 68 of those who have pleaded guilty to felonies have pleaded to federal charges of assaulting law enforcement officers.
Approximately 36 additional defendants have pleaded guilty to feloniously obstructing, impeding, or interfering with a law enforcement officer during a civil disorder.

Of these 104 defendants, 76 have now been sentenced to prison terms of up to 150 months.

Four of those who have pleaded guilty to felonies have pleaded guilty to the federal charge of seditious conspiracy. — DoJ

All at the instigation of Trump, indeed at least some of those convicted explicitly said they acted in accordance with Trump's wishes.

Again the basis of the decision is that due to his actions on that day which will live in infamy, he is not eligible to stand for public office.