Comments

  • Science as Metaphysics
    I wasn't referring to atomismL'éléphant

    Oh. I took that to be the meaning of the 'smallest unit', which is typically considered the atom.

    The ultimate reality -- what is the smallest unit they could reduce existence and still be true to the real.L'éléphant

    Parmenides who couldn't stay away from shaping the truth into something we mortals could grasp, even though he purportedly rejected the sensible world.L'éléphant

    Parmenides was a mystic. He had more in common with the Vedic sages than with moderns.
  • About algorithms and consciousness
    The only reason its controversial to think that physical combinations of matter and energy can have consciousness is because people think there is a soulPhilosophim

    Given that 'soul' is a translation from the Greek 'psyche', and that 'psyche' can also be translated as 'mind', do you think that people have minds?
  • The Naive Theory of Consciousness
    Here's a rather long extract by the author of What it is Like to be a Bat which makes a similar point:

    The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.

    We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

    However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

    So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory.
    Thomas Nagel, The Core of Mind and Cosmos
  • The Naive Theory of Consciousness
    This also accounts for why I cannot see from your perspective, which is the perspective of your particular and discrete biologyNOS4A2

    We are biologically identical, to all intents and purposes. Sure, science can tell our DNA apart but from a biological perspective, we're both members of the same species, and all our fundamental biological traits are identical.

    We do not need to stir in fictions like experience, consciousness, and mental properties, because all states of experience (as Chalmers called them) are states of the body.NOS4A2

    States only experienced by a conscious sentient being. Not an anaesthetized being, nor a corpse.
  • About algorithms and consciousness
    I've often thought that if it were true that AI became sentient, could it then be accorded rights, analogous to human rights? That it would deserve respect as a being, not simply an invention or a device. But again, I don't think this day will ever come, although I can see how it could be a source of huge controversy (with Blake LeMoine as poster-boy).
  • Atheist Dogma.
    Nature works. Just go out in the woods, or walk along a beach; gaze at stars or learn about coral reefs.Vera Mont

    Something not often commented, is that nature has a different meaning for moderns. In the past, nature was not only nurturing but also destructive, and it was widely understood that everything in nature is subject to death and decay as well as birth and life. The point of the idea of salvation whether in Semitic or Asiatic religions, was to transcend nature, to realise one's identity with what is beyond coming-and-going, birth-and-death. Whereas for our culture, having rejected any idea of the supernatural, nature herself now becomes the only real representation of purity, through the 'awe of nature' and the supposed innocence of the natural environment and first-nations peoples.

    In traditional theology and metaphysics, the natural was largely conceived as the evil, and the spiritual or supernatural as the good. In popular Darwinism, the good is the well-adapted, and the value of that to which the organism adapts itself is unquestioned or is measured only in terms of further adaptation. However, being well adapted to one’s surroundings is tantamount to being capable of coping successfully with them, of mastering the forces that beset one. Thus the theoretical denial of the spirit’s antagonism to nature – even as implied in the doctrine of interrelation between the various forms of organic life, including man – frequently amounts in practice to subscribing to the principle of man’s continuous and thoroughgoing domination of nature. Regarding reason as a natural organ does not divest it of the trend to domination or invest it with greater potentialities for reconciliation. On the contrary, the abdication of the spirit in popular Darwinism entails the rejection of any elements of the mind that transcend the function of adaptation and consequently are not instruments of self-preservation. Reason disavows its own primacy and professes to be a mere servant of natural selection. On the surface, this new empirical reason seems more humble toward nature than the reason of the metaphysical tradition. Actually, however, it is arrogant, practical mind riding roughshod over the ‘useless spiritual,’ and dismissing any view of nature in which the latter is taken to be more than a stimulus to human activity. The effects of this view are not confined to modern philosophy. — Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, P11
  • The Debt Ceiling Issue
    House passes Debt Ceiling legislation.

    71 Republicans, 46 Democrats voted no.

    09snkon2ndv8pn4o.png

    Telling that more Dems than Republicans voted Yes

    On to the senate, where a single no vote could still trigger default. :yikes:
  • About algorithms and consciousness
    Agree many think Penrose eccentric on that question but as I say, it does highlight the issue of whether consciousness really is understandable as an algorithm.

    I think what's really interesting about this question, is that there's no obvious empirical method to determine the answer to that question - especially now ChatGPT has blown the Turing Test out of the water. What that tells me is that the nature of consciousness is not necessarily determinable by empirical methods. Personally, I don't believe in sentient AI, but that there's no easy way to prove the case says something, I think.
  • The Naive Theory of Consciousness
    Chalmers was a big hit because he was "making it respectable to be a Cartesian dualist again". That was literally the gleeful response of the philosopher sat next to me when Chalmers gave the hard problem talk that made his name.apokrisis

    Chalmers proposes the concept of "naturalistic dualism" as an alternative to traditional Cartesian Dualism. According to this view, consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe, irreducible to physical processes, but it is still causally linked to the brain and the physical world. Chalmers suggests that consciousness may be a fundamental aspect of reality, akin to space, time, and matter, but which may not be fully explicable within physicalist scientific frameworks.

    I agree with him, although I know it's not very satisfactory from an engineering perspective.

    A sociological side-show in other words.apokrisis

    Yes, it's annoying that he's gone on to become a tenured academic at New York University, author/editor of half a dozen anthologies on philosophy of mind, and that rarest of things, a well-known philosopher. You'd think we could have expected something better from a Bronze Medallist at the International Mathematics Olympiad.

    What am I not grasping?NOS4A2

    The point of the paper you're quoting. This passage by Dashiell is very similar to Gilbert Ryle's criticism of Descartes' in his famous book, The Ghost in the Machine:

    “Consciousness, properly an abstract term which, like “happiness”, “graciousness”, or “thoroughness”, refers to some quality of the human being taken in abstracto. However, the hypostatizing tendency of human thinking has led to its use as if referring to something existential. Since a man may be conscious, it is easy to fall into the assumption that he may have consciousness, then that something like a consciousness exists.


    Here, I take it that the word 'existential' means 'existing'. So he's accusing Chalmer's of 'reifying consciousness', of making it out as some thing. But Chalmers doesn't do that.

    The problem is: when we look around for what it is Chalmers is talking about we come up empty-handed.NOS4A2

    That is because it is not visible to the objective sciences, which is not a shortcoming of Chalmer's theory, but the point, which you're not seeing.

    But upon an objective analysis we find there is only one state and it is wholly biological.NOS4A2

    Presumably, you would agree that there is a difference between a non-sentient organism, such as a tree, a simple sentient organism, such as a fish, complex sentient organisms such as elephants and primates, and complex, rational, sentient beings, such as humans. All can be understood through the perspective of biology, but biology does not necessarily extend to, or explain, the nature of what differentiates the complex-sentient and rational-complex-sentient beings from trees and comb jellies. They are subjects of experience - something which is not plausibly deniable. At issue is what it is that gives them this quality of subjective awareness.
  • About algorithms and consciousness
    Only when that method fails due to accidental circumstances our consciousness will take action to correct our actions.Ypan1944

    That's more a matter of attention than consciousness. In performing routine actions you're deploying what adult learning models describe as 'unconscious competence' i.e. doing something that doesn't require conscious effort because you know it so well. But you're still conscious, you're just not paying particular attention to what you're doing until something non-routine happens.

    Overall, I think the issue with your OP is that you're assuming that conscious actions can be reduced to or described in terms of algorithms. Is this a valid assumption? Algorithms are used by computer science for modelling all kinds of complex actions and situations, but does that mean that conscious activities actually are algorithms? A dissenting opinion is given by Roger Penrose, in Emperor's New Mind, who argues that human consciousness is a capability that goes beyond what can be captured by algorithms. He believes that human understanding and insight involve non-computable processes that are not reducible to simple algorithms and that cannot be derived by mechanical procedures. He bases his argument in part on Godel's theorem, saying that these demonstrate that within any formal system of logic, there will always be true statements that cannot be proven within the system itself, meaning that there are limits to what can be achieved through purely algorithmic or mechanical processes.

    Of course, many people disagree with Penrose, but at least the debate shows that the question of the algorithmic nature of consciousness is, well, debatable.
  • Atheist Dogma.
    It effectively is as you can find thousands of examples of that, even to this day. Religion was an old form of trying to understand the world but as time moved forward it became evident that it wasn’t as more scientific explanations proved better.Darkneos

    They're not equivalent. Science provides a wealth of quantitative data, better adaption to circumstances, and so on, but it is not concerned with existential truths.
  • Atheist Dogma.
    It would seem kinder to the author to assume he wasn't claiming that Jesus said "I am the truth, the truth and the truth" but drew a distinction between "the truth" and "the way" and "the life." Regardless, though, it's clear that Jesus is portrayed as claiming he alone is the way, the truth and the life.Ciceronianus

    I would prefer to believe that Christ was speaking from a universalist perspective, rather than proclaiming the requirements of a sectarian religious affiliation ("Yo! Christians! Form a queue to the right! Others - outer darkness!'). The question is, does the ‘I’ in Jesus’ statements about himself refer to that particular individual at a specific time and place? Recall the statement of God’s identity in Exodus,’I AM THAT I AM’ (Ex 3:14) and Jesus 'Before Abraham was, I AM’ (John 48). Advaita Vedanta would interpret those statements as affirmations that 'the Truth, Light and Way' just IS the Self (Ātman) which is the ground of being of every individual, to which it is the task of their religious discipline to awaken. (The fact that Christians might not concur is irrelevant from a philosophical perspective.)

    What do we mean by dogma?Moliere

    Dogma is not only religious. 'The central dogma of molecular biology is a theory stating that genetic information flows only in one direction, from DNA, to RNA, to protein, or RNA directly to protein.' Political orthodoxies have their dogmas, as do many other disciplines - Soviet Communism was notoriously dogmatic. Dogma is simply the regular form of an accepted principle or axiom. In itself it is not necessarily problematic, but becomes so when it is allied with authoritarianism, which is often is.

    it kind of depends on the kind of atheism one is listening to or supports.Manuel

    Listening to many of the voices on this forum, you'd be convinced that the history of religion is the history of evil and that all we can do is struggle to free ourselves from it. What that doesn't see is what calls forth the need for religion in the first place (because anthropology and history have shown that it is utterly ubiquitous in human culture). That is invariably depicted by atheism as a kind of sense of dependency which also needs to be thrown off. This is a quote from an analysis of the philosophy of religion of Josiah Royce which I think captures more of the original impetus towards spiritual belief:

    The religious person perceives our present life, or our natural life, as radically deficient, deficient from the root (radix) up, as fundamentally unsatisfactory; he feels it to be, not a mere condition, but a predicament; it strikes him as vain or empty if taken as an end in itself; he sees himself as homo viator, as a wayfarer or pilgrim treading a via dolorosa (path of sorrows) through a vale that cannot possibly be a final and fitting resting place; he senses or glimpses from time to time the possibility of a Higher Life; he feels himself in danger of missing out on this Higher Life of true happiness. If this doesn't strike a chord in you, then I suggest you do not have a religious disposition. Some people don't, and it cannot be helped. One cannot discuss religion with them, for it cannot be real to them. It is not, for them, what William James in "The Will to Believe" calls a "living option," let alone a "forced" or "momentous" one.
  • Science as Metaphysics
    Did you know what Parmenides and his contemporaries wanted to know? The ultimate reality -- what is the smallest unit they could reduce existence and still be true to the real.L'éléphant

    That was Democritus and Leucippus, the atomists. Parmenides was not an atomist.
  • Why Monism?
    People adopt them on account of what seems most plausible to them, but as I keep saying, that will depend on what one's own set of unargued premises or presuppositions are.Janus

    Not unargued. The argument is that logical necessity can't be accounted for in terms of physical causation as a matter of principle.
  • Why Monism?
    Oh, ok. Promissory materialism, then.
  • Why Monism?
    But the challenge is, how can any kind of 'either/or' thinking or logical argument, in general, be explained in terms of the kinds of physical causation that characterises brain states? What I was challenging was the assertion that:

    In the cause of physical brains, the brain state will be the configuration required to instantiate non-physical mental content.Mark Nyquist

    So, how to validate that statement is what is at issue. How do you think you could ascertain the empirical fact of that statement, on the basis of neuroscience.
  • Why Monism?
    One line of argument against that is a variation of what is known as 'the argument from reason'. This says that, whatever we understand 'brain states' to be, if we are arguing that they are physical in nature, then they're incommensurable with propositional content (incommensurable meaning not able to be judged by the same standards; having no common standard of measurement.) Why? Because propositional content is wholly dependent on the relationship of ideas and if-then statements - if this is the case, then that is so. Any arguments relying on rational inference or logical syllogisms make use of something like this, and are instances of logical necessity - that is [x] is the case, then it must also be that [y]. But physical causation is of a different order to logical necessity.Wayfarer
  • Why Monism?
    Do you think your intuitive preconceptions about how things must be are the last word on how things actually are?Janus

    I actually offered an argument, not an 'intuitive preconception'. If you would like to address the argument, then I might respond.
  • Why Monism?
    The wave particle duality may well be an heuristic device, but anyway, doesn’t have any bearing.
  • The Debt Ceiling Issue
    ‘House Rules Committee voted to clear the way for a debate on the plan on Wednesday,’ - NY Times. First hurdle cleared.
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    @Fooloso4 - you have said there are no immaterial minds - how would you even go about looking for such a mind (I hesitate to say 'phenomenon')? We have physical instruments that can detect electromagnetic and sub-atomic phenomena with exquisite accuracy, but how would you even go about investigating such a question?

    The point is that we know objects persistJanus

    Rather, we assume they do. If you read my posts more carefully, you would see that I am saying that both the posits of 'existing' or 'non-existing' are mental constructions or surmises.
  • The Debt Ceiling Issue
    The Freedom Caucus are vowing to torpedo it - have a listen to the video in this NYT article.

    “Not one Republican should vote for this bill,” Representative Chip Roy, a Texas Republican and influential member of the ultraconservative House Freedom Caucus, said at a news conference outside the Capitol. “We will continue to fight it today, tomorrow, and no matter what happens, there’s going to be a reckoning about what just occurred unless we stop this bill by tomorrow.”

    Another member of the group, Representative Dan Bishop of North Carolina, said he considered the deal grounds for ousting Mr. McCarthy from his post, something that any one lawmaker can attempt thanks to a rule Mr. McCarthy agreed to while he was grasping for the votes for his job.

    I knew there'd be calls for McCarthy's head.

    Hakeem Jeffries (House minority leader) is saying there needs to be 150 Republican votes. But

    Two of the Rules Committee’s arch-conservative members, Mr. Roy and Representative Ralph Norman of South Carolina, could vote against allowing it to move forward, in a sharp rebuke to the speaker. If they were joined by another Republican on the committee, they could sideline the agreement before it even reached the floor.

    Going to an exceedingly tense week in Washington.
  • Why Monism?
    In the cause of physical brains, the brain state will be the configuration required to instantiate non-physical mental content.Mark Nyquist

    Not what I had in mind. The philosophical question is, how could you account for propostional content in terms of brain-states. The brain-mind identity theorists hold that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. It's a complicated subject in philosophy of mind (Stanford article).

    One line of argument against that is a variation of what is known as 'the argument from reason'. This says that, whatever we understand 'brain states' to be, if we are arguing that they are physical in nature, then they're incommensurable with propositional content (incommensurable meaning not able to be judged by the same standards; having no common standard of measurement.) Why? Because propositional content is wholly dependent on the relationship of ideas and if-then statements - if this is the case, then that is so. Any arguments relying on rational inference or logical syllogisms make use of something like this, and are instances of logical necessity - that is [x] is the case, then it must also be that [y]. But physical causation is of a different order to logical necessity. This is the subject of this thread from about a year ago.

    Back on the topic of monism - I'm convinced that the original monist systems were derived from 'the unitive vision' in, for example, Plotinus. It is a fact that the word 'Cosmos' means 'ordered whole', and it was the conviction of many pre-modern cultures that the Universe functions as an ordered whole. Cosmology began as an attempt to conceive of the nature of that order. But the prospects of seeing the universe as an ordered whole in our day and age are very slight indeed, what with the multiverse conjecture and the realisation of the inconceivable vastness of the Universe. Maybe is beyond the intellectual powers of anyone to imagine the cosmos in those terms any more. 'All the kings horses and all the kings men, couldn't put Humpty together again.'
  • The Naive Theory of Consciousness
    Again, nothing has “arisen” from this state, forever discounting the claim that it “gives rise” to somethingNOS4A2

    What about the computer you're writing this on? The house you're sitting in while writing it? The products you use every moment of every day? How were they made? By unconscious automata? Did they spontaneously form from the aggregation of materials? Of course not. They were built by human designers and inventors.

    'Reification of consciousness' is definitely a problem, but it is not Chalmer's problem. The root of reification is 'reify' meaning 'to make a thing out of', from the Latin root Res, 'thing'. And it was Descartes that designated the mind as 'res cogitans', literally a 'thinking thing' (not even thinking being.) This has had many profound and deleterious consequences, crystallised in the depiction of the mind as 'the ghost in the machine'.

    I think what your OP demonstrates is the failure to grasp Chalmer's argument.
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    This is what supports Aristotle's definition of "man" as rational animal.Metaphysician Undercover

    Agree. I also think that rationality is often deprecated by modern philosophy, due to the animosity towards the idea of innate abilities on the part of empiricism, and also because it seems politically incorrect to say that humans are different to animals.

    In the ancient world sacred lore was indeed committed to memory, and the feats of memory that were accomplished seems amazing to us now. The entire corpus of the Vedas and all the early Buddhist texts were preserved orally for centuries before being committed to writing. (There is still a term in Islam, ‘hafiz’, for those who have memorised the entire Koran, which seems an astounding feat.)
  • Atheist Dogma.
    2. Establish the scientific method with truth as the only and unquestionable value.unenlightened

    I agree, with the caveat that ‘truth’ ought to be replaced with ‘objective fact’ or ‘measurable outcome’ as the sole arbiter of reality.

    However I also think a case can be made that religious authoritarianism and sectarian conflict is what gave rise to the reaction against religion that characterised the Enlightenment. The Articles of the Royal Society, the first true scientific society, specifically prohibited fellows from involvement in questions of metaphysic which were the province of the religious. In part this was because making pronouncements on such matters could result in serious consequences. But these are all very complicated historical matters.
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    Pretty darned close. I first learned about Kant in a 1955 book, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, T R V Murti, which draws many comparisons between Kant and the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) philosophy of Buddhism.
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    Yes, I do see the point. Kind of a placeholder for when nobody’s around, as the limerick says. But I don't think you need to introduce a spooky mind-at-large. I tried to articulate a neo-Buddhist approach to it like this.

    All of the vast amounts of data being nowadays collected about the universe by our incredibly powerful space telescopes and particle colliders is still synthesised and converted into conceptual information by scientists. And that conceptual activity remains conditioned by, and subject to, our sensory and intellectual capabilities — determined by the kinds of beings we are, and interpreted according to the attitudes and theories we hold. And we’re never outside of that web of conceptual activities — at least, not as long as we’re conscious beings. That is the sense in which the Universe exists ‘in the mind’ — not as a figment of someone’s imagination, but as a combination or synthesis of perception, conception and theory in the human mind (which is more than your mind or mine, although these are instances of it). That synthesis constitutes our experience-of-the-world. It is not an hallucination or figment of the imagination, but the mind constitutes the imaginative matrix within which all of this exists.

    What we need to grasp is that all we know of existence — whether of the rock, or the screen you're looking at, or the Universe at large — is a function of our world-making intelligence, the activity of the hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species. That’s what ‘empirical reality’ consists of. After all, the definition of ‘empirical’ is ‘based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience.’ So, asking of the Universe ‘How does it exist outside our observation or experience of it?’ is an unanswerable question (reflected by that quoted passage from Sime above).

    So there is no need to posit a ‘supermind’ to account for it, because there’s nothing to account for. Put another way: the Universe doesn’t exist outside consciousness, but neither does it not exist, so there is no need to posit any agency to explain its supposedly ‘continued’ existence.

    Hence the apparently paradoxical statement attributed to the Buddha - 'By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one.' 1 And that is because, in the Buddhist teaching, 'self-and-world' are co-arising, existing in dependent origination, due to the principles of conditioned origination.

    Whereas, the 'polarity of existence and non-existence' shines through almost everything said about it in this thread. (I will acknowledge that it is a very subtle point to grasp.)
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    Berkeley has the mind of God to hold everything in placeTom Storm

    Yes, well what ‘everything’ do you have in mind when you say that?
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    Probably only if you accept the somewhat outlandish idea that there is a mind-at-large which we are all 'offshoots' of.Tom Storm

    Such ideas are not remote in principle from various formulations of panentheism or the kinds of cosmo-psychism found in Advaita Vedanta and is also not too far removed from the idea of the Intellect (nous) in neoplatonic philosophy.

    Also interesting to note Erwin Schrodinger's interpretation of Indian philosophy, which appear in various of his philosophical essays and are summarized by Michel Bitbol in this essay. Some excerpts therefrom:

    He declares that the basic doctrine of the Upanishads, namely what he calls the doctrine of Identity, or the thesis that allegedly separated minds are identical with one another, and that our mind is identical with the absolute basis of the world as a whole, is the only credible solution to the apparent conflict between the experienced unity of consciousness and the belief that it is dispersed in many living bodies.

    “It is by observing and thinking this way that one may suddenly experience the truth of the fundamental idea of Vedânta. It is impossible that this unity of knowledge, of feeling and of choice that you consider as YOURS was born a few years ago from nothingness. Actually, this knowledge, this feeling and this choice are, in their essence, eternal, immutable and numerically ONE in all men and in all living beings (...). The life that you are living presently is not only a fragment of the whole existence; it is in a certain sense, the WHOLE” *

    From his reading of the Advaita Vedânta, and from the basic experience he associated with it, Schrödinger inferred that the basic illusion, in our naive and scientific view of the world, is that of multiplicity. Multiplicity of minds in the living bodies, and multiplicity of things in the material world. About the first type of multiplicity, Schrödinger wrote : “what seems to be a plurality is merely a series of aspects of one thing, produced by deception (the Indian Mâyâ)”. “The doctrine of identity can claim that it is clinched by the empirical fact that consciousness is never experienced in the plural, only in the singular. Not only has none of us even experienced more than one consciousness, but there is no trace of circumstantial evidence of this even happening anywhere in the world”
    — Michel Bitbol

    As I've explained, I don't find it necessary to posit a mind-at-large while still defending an idealist view. The risk with positing such an entity is the reification or objectification of it, but it never exists as an object, it is always only 'that which knows'.

    So, it seems impossible to think that objects don't persist, and some more than others, obviously. So, I don't follow Hume in thinking that we have no reason to believe that objects persist. What makes the case even stronger is observing the behavior of the animals most familiar to us that shows that they also see the same things in the same locations as we do.Janus

    We have quite a lot in common with animals, even if we may not know what it's like to be a bat. Also notice this observation from one of our learned contributors:

    Berkeley's subjective idealism was already "analytic" in the sense that he postulated that observation and conception is tautologically equivalent to existence. Many philosophers misunderstand this principle.

    For example, they take the principle to imply that unobserved items disappear from existence. But this doesn't follow from the principle, for according to the principle it isn't false that unobserved objects exist, but nonsensical.
    sime

    I think the stumbling block you're dealing with is the idea that unobserved ceases to exist, like what G E Moore said, when he asked if the train wheels ceased to exist when the passengers were boarded. That is not what Berkeley's idealism is claiming.
  • Why Monism?
    We have big brains that are very adaptive.Mark Nyquist

    The brain is undoubtedly the most complex phenomenon known to science - but that is not the point. The point is, there are philosophical objections to the claim that brain states equate to or are the same as the content of thought. There are also issues sorrounding how to understand or explain the causal relationship between the neurological and the semantic, and also the neurological and the experiential. But it's a highly complex area of science and philosophy so I won't try and pursue it, at least without doing a whole lot more research that I don't have the time to undertake.
  • Why Monism?
    I'm thinking the best approach is brain state, a singular definition, existence in the present moment only, and physically based on neurons holding specific content.Mark Nyquist

    But that is reductive physicalism, which I'm constitutionally averse to. The argument against it is that it somehow has to posit that these neuological states are at once physical and semantic, i.e. meaning-encoding. And as meaning can be encoded in so many completely diverse ways - like, different languages, different symbolic forms, different media - then I don't see how you could ever establish a 1:1 correspondence between meaning and a specific neural configuration or 'brain state'. Not to mention the ability of the brain to completely re-organize itself to compensate for trauma or to adapt to changing circumstances. which again suggests a kind of plasticity that is not found in case of physical objects.

    With respect to Wheeler, have a read of Does the Universe Exist if We're Not Looking?. There's also a speculative article of his, Law without Law, which is available in .pdf format from various websites.
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    I am claiming that there are no disembodied minds.Fooloso4

    However, the rational intellect is capable of grasping purely abstract ideas, and even using them to construct novel inventions, such as computers.
  • Why Monism?
    in the context of Monism, the question of information is very messy.Mark Nyquist

    I don't agree with others here that information can be thought of as the raw material of existence, because the word itself is polysemic - it has many meanings - and furthermore, that the term in itself has no meaning unless you specify what information you are talking about. The idea of 'generic information' is oxymoronic - information has to specify something, otherwise how does it constitute information?

    There is a famous and often-quoted statement from a book by Norbert Weiner, one of the creators of information science, to wit 'Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.' So, how does materialism respond? It adds 'information' to the list of fundamental furniture of the world. And then Claude Shannon came along with the ground-breaking theory of information which is another of the fundamental discoveries in information science. A lot of the speculation about information being fundamental is based on using Shannon's theory as an analogy (although it's often not clear as to what it is an analogy for.)

    That said, there is an interesting way in which information has been conceived as fundamental in biology, that being biosemiotics, about which one of the occasional posters here, Apokrisis, has provided much information. (See Marcello Barbieri A Short History of Biosemiotics if you're interested.)

    The Big Bang model posits nothing physical or otherwise before the first physical event.Janus

    There is a lot of documentation nowadays on the fundamental cosmological constraints that must be the case in order for a cosmos to form, and not simply dissipate into plasma or collapse into a mass of infinite density. These can't be explained in terms of consequences of the singularity as they must exist as causal constraints. I think they bear at least a suggestive similarity to a priori conditions of existence (see for example Just Six Numbers, Martin Rees.)
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    In fairness, I do not know whether or not he does.creativesoul

    The quote I provided summarises his view - which is why I provided it. I know it seems incredible, but there it is. It is the view that David Chalmer's 'hard problem' argument was set against.

    What’s that ol’ adage? If it was easy everybody’d be doing it?Mww

    Ain't that the truth :lol:
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    I reject the notion that Mary could know everything there is to know about color vision without seeing color.creativesoul

    That is the whole point of the thought-experiment. It's an argument against reductive physicalism. Compare it to this statement:

    In Consciousness Explained, I described a method, heterophenomenology, which was explicitly designed to be 'the neutral path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological principles of science.’ — Daniel Dennett, The Fantasy of First-Person Science

    So Dennett is arguing that it is possible, presumably, to know everything there is to know about the seeing of color, without the first-person experience. That is what the Mary's Room experiment is directed against.

    We have to recognise it as raw data to begin with, right?Tom Storm

    That distinction I made is from information science, not philosophy, although it has philosophical implications. Consider a probe gathering data about the atmosphere - the readings it collects are simply numerical values, represented as data-points - those data don't constitute information until they're aggregated into a data-set and arranged and displayed so as to convey information to the researcher or scientist. The data points are what is referred to as 'raw data'.

    Where this originated again was the role of the observer in providing perspective, and the fact that perspective, which is fundamental in establishing duration, ratio, distance and so on, is not in itself discernable in the data. The perspective is what the observer brings to bear on the objects of analysis in order to interpret it.

    I also wanted to call out this comment from a few pages back which makes an important point that I'm sure is being overlooked in this discussion:

    Berkeley's subjective idealism was already "analytic" in the sense that he postulated that observation and conception is tautologically equivalent to existence. Many philosophers misunderstand this principle.

    For example, they take the principle to imply that unobserved items disappear from existence. But this doesn't follow from the principle, for according to the principle it isn't false that unobserved objects exist, but nonsensical.
    sime
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    are you saying that the raw material is like noumena - there is something there but we don't see it as it is.Tom Storm

    There is a factual difference between 'data' and 'information'. 'Data is an individual unit that contains raw materials which do not carry any specific meaning. Information is a group of data that collectively carries a logical meaning.' In regards to the question of the role of the observer, the observer interprets the data in order to derive information. (There's a lot of discussion about 'information' as kind of the raw material of being nowadays, but in my view information does not exist as any kind of raw material, as it is always the product of interpretation.)

    We get into this deep enough, you may find your idealism was Kantian all alongMww

    Would that be so bad? Kastrup, who is the main advocate for analytical idealism, says of Schopenhauer 'I recognized in it [WWR] numerous echoes and prefigurations of ideas I had labored for a decade to bring into focus. The kinship between my own work and what I was now reading was remarkable, down to details and particulars. Here was a famous 19th century thinker who had already figured out and communicated, in a clear and cogent manner, much of the metaphysics I had been working on.'

    Generally speaking, I think Kantian idealism has almost no following on this forum, with yourself being a notable exception. So I wouldn't think exploration of the idea was a redundant exercise.

    It (i.e. Mary's room thought experiment) presupposes that it is possible to know everything there is to know about seeing color without ever having seen it. That is a false presupposition.creativesoul

    But the whole point of the thought-experiment is that you can know about color vision in a theoretical sense - rods, cones, optical nerves, wavelengths, absorption, and so on - without having seen colours. So it is trying to differentiate 'the experience of seeing color' from 'knowing what constitutes the experience of seeing color'. That's the point.
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    Data is not built, it is the raw material. What is built is interpretation, what the data means - that is the difference between data and information. And that too always implies an observer, which is what physicalism never sees. It's like someone looking for their glasses with their glasses on.

    Q: What did Heidegger mean by 'the forgetfulness of being'?

    ChatGPT: Martin Heidegger, a 20th-century German philosopher, used the term "the forgetfulness of being" (Seinsvergessenheit in German) to describe a fundamental problem in Western philosophy and culture. Heidegger believed that throughout history, there has been a tendency to overlook or forget the true nature of "being" and its significance for human existence.

    According to Heidegger, "being" refers to the basic mode of existence shared by all entities, including humans. It is not simply a passive attribute but encompasses the active process of existing and making meaning of the world (hence "being" is a verb). He argued that Western thought has traditionally focused on individual entities (things) and their characteristics, rather than investigating the broader question of being itself.

    In the philosophical tradition, Heidegger saw a shift in focus from the ancient Greeks' understanding of being as a fundamental concern to an objectively-oriented approach. This shift was was accentuated with the advent of modernity and the rise of scientific thinking. He believed that modern philosophy and science emphasized a calculative and instrumental view of reality, reducing entities to mere objects to be manipulated and controlled (and thereby forgetting the nature of being altogether. You listening, Dan?)

    Heidegger argued that this forgetfulness of being resulted in a loss of our authentic relationship to the world-and-self. Instead of recognizing our deep-rooted relatedness to the world, we treat it as a collection of resources to be exploited for our purposes. We become alienated from our own being and fail to appreciate the meaningfulness of existence. (We see everything from an ego-logical point of view.)

    Heidegger proposed a phenomenological approach that encourages engagement with the world and critical awareness of our own being-in-the-world, rather than treating everything as mere objects of study. By reflecting on existence and the way we relate to the world, we can strive to recover a more authentic and meaningful mode of being.

  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    the answer I was looking for was: you can’t find it, because it’s not there. The perspective is always outside.

    The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.

    Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe.

    So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'.
    — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271
  • A Case for Analytic Idealism
    Ah, and follow-up question - where, in the objective data, is ‘the perspective’?