More precisely, I expect my theories about my neurological processes to give an accurate account of my experience. If a theory doesn’t fit with the facts, it must be rejected or improved upon.So do you universally trust your experience to give you an accurate account of your neurological processes, — Isaac
There are fours arteries entering the brain, two carotides and two cervical, all connected inside the brain so they work with and even up one another.We have only one process for delivering oxygen to the brain, — Isaac
Initiation? You mean explaining mechanism? Because you also need a process of comparing preferences with one another.we need not impute any other factors than preference when looking to their initiation. — Isaac
Of course not. If this simple and mechanistic view of yourself suffice to account for your experience, you're more than welcome to hold on to it.I've no reason to commit to the idea of this process existing, have I? — Isaac
You're afraid to commit? To what? The idea of randomness?You have to now commit yourself to the existence of a mental mechanism for initiating random action, the alternative uses mechanisms we already know exist. — Isaac
We've seen that already with Buridan's ass: sometimes one cannot determine which option is nearest, it's impractical or impossible.Nearest to their hand is one option. — Isaac
Of course it's a preference, one that in the circumstances says something like: "I must not appear picky or distrustful by looking at all the plums closely or by hesitating. Given the circumstances, choosing at random is my best option."How is not wanting to appear impolite not a preference? — Isaac
Note that the explanation I offered for the odd success of malapropisms eliminated Davidson's notions of prior theory and passing theory. — creativesoul
Intuitively, I don't think one could ever present me with two options identical in every way, — Isaac
It's about what Davidson missed. — creativesoul
It's the circumstances you're placing it in that I'm claiming is impossible. — Isaac
How would you know a) that the options are exactly equivalent in every way, and b) that the donkey correctly perceives that they are? — Isaac
If our linguistic competence and/or ability were limited to those three aforementioned principles, we could not ever know what the speaker meant, as compared/contrasted to what they said [in malapropisms]... but we do.
Did I miss anything important with regard to the odd success of malapropisms? — creativesoul
( note to self: the Buridan’s ass paradox is only understandable by people who have some familiarity with actual donkeys and with how they behave, eg how strong-willed and earnest they can be)You must not have spent much time with donkeys in your life. — Olivier5
That's precisely the problem. — TheMadFool
bring me forth a continuous set of numbers that I might truly count the horrors in store for Man. — The Lord
Without asking Alice, the discussion is vacuous. — Gary M Washburn
I'm struggling to think of a behaviour to which no likes/dislikes could be attached, and so can't see the explanatory need for this additional factor other than that you'd prefer it to be there. — Isaac
Rhetoric is an embellishment, a decorative touch, added to written/spoken words in order to evoke a positive response by virtue of its aesthetic qualities. While the value of rhetoric can't be underestimated in debate, one should also be wary of its power of "empty persuasion" and by that I mean rhetoric can move hearts and change minds even when there's no real substance to what is being said or written. — TheMadFool
I don't know anyone called Hobson. Intersubjectivity is a very simple and useful concept, allowing to bridge subjectivity and objectivity somewhat. Which is what you are talking about.A Hobson's choice then. — TheMadFool
We shouldn't be expected (in philosophical terms) to "get out of them" in order to remake the will as we desire. — Luke
