Yikes. Dennett, in 2017: "I'm not saying that consciousness doesn't exist. I'm just saying it isn't what you think it is."

So, not what you evidently think. Read the Stanford article fdrake linked. Its good and informative, as per usual- the Stanford philosophy encyclopedia is an excellent resource. You might not be any more inclined to accept eliminativism, but at the very least you will hopefully become acquainted with what it does (and does not) claim, and on what basis it does so.. which probably would have been advisable before posting a silly strawman thread on the subject, but hey better late than never right?

Right, so like I said, "true for me" as a peculiar way of describing matters of taste or personal preference (i.e. whether chocolate is delicious). But then, why talk of truth when we mean opinion or taste? Or why talk of truth when we mean belief or perception (much less hopes or wishes)? And I certainly don't see why the prevalence of a confused usage should be a persuasive argument for adopting it in a philosophical context, if anything philosophy ought to be helping dispel linguistic and conceptual muddles not adopting/perpetuating them.

Sure but we don't have to oblige such abuses of language by adopting them ourselves, especially not when we're having philosophical discussions where clear and precise language is advisable and productive. That something is "true for me" is a misleading way of saying that you hope/want something to be true, that you are going to believe or behave as if it were true (i.e. regardless of whether it actually is)- or, I suppose, a peculiar way of characterizing a matter of taste or personal preference (i.e. that Coca-Cola is the best cola is "true for me"). But "relative" or "subjective" truth is not a thing, and so "objective" is not distinguishing anything here and so not doing any work (+ potentially opening up a separate can of worms in the bargain- like I said its not only redundant, but an unnecessary source of potential controversy or confusion).

Oh I'm not accepting it so much as I'm saying that its a battle not even worth fighting here. But I absolutely do think its a misguided and ultimately more or less worthless distinction (in really any context that I've ever encountered or can imagine). I'm definitely also sympathetic to the deflationary view of truth just in general.

If it was only redundant I don't think it would much of a problem, but its one that carries a good deal of baggage as well (i.e. all the Kantian nonsense) that is simply unnecessary in many contexts (including, so far as I can tell, this one).

I did, and that seems like quite the leap based on the short interaction we can see in the clip, and especially in light of all the other relevant context here (its no secret that plenty of actual, literal white supremacists are big fans of Donald Trump, or that a very non-negligible portion of his political rhetoric and governing history qualifies pretty uncontroversially/straightforwardly as white identity politics.. and that this was a not-insignificant factor in his election and his continued support from Republican voters)

Is it true that Person A thinks incest is immoral? Yes, can he claim that it is moral truth? Yes. The question remains on whether he thinks that Person A believes his moral truth is a fact or a viewpoint.

And so this is a perfect example of the confusion and redundancy I'm talking about, and which I don't think has adequately been supported. I think its relatively obvious the question does not remain- if someone thinks that their moral judgments express truths, then they are rejecting moral relativism and holding that- in your terminology here- there are something like moral facts (which we can express via moral judgments and propositions) and that morality is not merely a "viewpoint". So I don't see what is added, beyond unnecessary baggage/confusion/controversy, by introducing some peculiar (and I think illusory/untenable) distinction between various kinds of truth that differ in whether they are "objective" or not. "Objective" truth is a redundancy. To ask whether there are moral truths, is (more or less) just to ask whether there is some ("objective", subject-invariant, etc) fact of the matter in virtue of which certain moral judgments are true and others are not. Which is also the rejection of moral relativism (or anti-realism). And so the issue is (imo) more straightforwardly posed as a dilemma between relativism and moral truth, rather than different varieties of truth.

Sarcasm, that's really what you're going with? Lol oh dear. :grimace:

Running desperately short on excuses at this point, clearly. Guess that shouldn't be surprising.

Of course it is. Its a discussion of the value or worth of a particular genre or sub-discipline of the academic field of philosophy. And "dismissed" isn't the same as "addressed", but whatever floats your boat I suppose.

Trying to participate in a technical discussion without bothering to do even the slightest bit of work acquainting yourself with the relevant terminology would certainly qualify as a colossal (and entirely predictable) waste of ones time.

180 Proof's (quite spot on, imo) response uses, almost without exception, well-defined/understood technical terms in philosophy. And as this is quite literally "The Philosophy Forum"... I'd say any problem lies on the other end. Using relevant technical terminology is hardly a legitimate criticism in this context- if there's terms you aren't familiar with, ask for clarification (or just perform a simple Google search).

Or its effectively been severed from us altogether (thanks, Kant). A philosophic muddle if there ever was one.

I don't see where this is clarified. One straightforward way to pose the same question would be to ask whether there are moral truths. I've yet to see anyone lay out what exactly we'd be losing by removing all talk of "objective" here and just asking whether there are moral truths (if there are moral truths, then moral relativism is false).

Fair enough, but I expect that those of us that do are a rare breed and more exception than rule. Many people will get heated talking about politics or religion, but it takes a philosopher to get revved up about something so abstract (and philosophers certainly do get heated- just Google "Wittgenstein and Karl Popper").

I think your take on the OP's argument is correct (at least, its consistent with my own interpretation), but I would submit that it remains the same argument if you simply take out the word "objective". If something is "dependent upon the opinions of people" then you're talking about consensus (or popular opinion, or something like this), not truth.

I take the OP to be arguing that relativism in general is refuted by its implication of moral relativism (though its a bit ambiguous). I'm just agreeing with Banno that "relative/subjective truth" is essentially an oxymoron in this context and "objective truth" a redundancy, and so its better to just dispense with the objective vs. subjective/relative truth distinction and talk about truth. I really can't think of anything substantive that would be lost by doing so, and it would eliminate what is a common source of controversy/confusion.

:up:

But since there isn't any other sort of truth besides "objective" truth, this is not a useful distinction and only serves to muddy the water. Better to eliminate the redundant "objective" label and just talk about truth.

Sure, a pretty important distinction I should have mentioned. And Matt O'Dowd is awesome, btw.

True, but I'm not sure many people get especially riled up about e.g. the ontological status of universals. Nor is it quite so common for people to be casually interested in other, more abstract sub-disciplines of philosophy as they are the phil of religion.

He removed a redundancy. There is no use to any distinction between "objective" and any other sort of truth, since all you've done is distinguish truth from something else (i.e. not-truth).

Indeed, and the fact that its an area where people can (and often do) have intense and passionate views even when (or especially if?) they lack any particular familiarity with the subject matter (i.e. the philosophical study of religion) is no doubt part of the problem. Political philosophy is similar in this regard, and ethics/moral philosophy as well (although probably to a lesser extent).

Here's the official press release, and the actual paper, for anyone who is interested:

https://releases.jhu.edu/2019/08/08/dark-matter-may-be-older-than-the-big-bang-study-suggests/

https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.123.061302

(as Pfhorrest already noted, this is less of a shocking result than it may seem since the "Big Bang" in this context is the post-inflationary period in the inflationary model, not the hypothetical "t=0" spacetime singularity of non-inflationary big bang cosmology often referred to as "the big bang")

Yes, philosophy of religion probably gets something of a bad rap... But that's mostly due to the sheer volume of utterly incompetent discussions of philosophy of religion (especially online), mainly from fanatics and committed partisans, who are almost without fail completely unschooled in academic philosophy- and so its just sloppy and uninformed and amounts to little more than a personal confession.

I think most people can distinguish this, from the actual philosophy of religion, which is a perfectly respectable discipline and much of the time is every bit as rigorous as any other in philosophy (and so it comes down to ones personal interests). And of course most of the "Great Philosophers" dabbled in philosophy of religion to varying extents (Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Russell, etc). As always, its not philosophy itself that is the problem, just bad, sloppy, uninformed and ill-considered philosophy.

directly above.. but then you already knew that. You're playing games now, and I'm not interested so thanks for playing (and better luck next time).

I've pointed out your continued failure to derive a self-contradiction from, or provide a non-circular or question-begging argument against, an infinite sequence or eternal past. Which, given the nature of your argument, means the argument fails.

So not only a flaw, two fatal ones. But at this point it really doesn't look like you're familiar enough with this subject matter to be able to hold up your end of any serious discussion here. And I'm certainly not interested in playing games, which is what it appears this is devolving into.

Is this thread in the Lounge/Casual section I hope? Not any philosophy here, just the OP's personal confession.

Lol oh dear. So you're now just waving the white flag. Probably a good move.

This is really rather amusing, in a grotesque and sad sort of way. Even Thomas is rolling in his grave at this point; at least he paid lip service to basic logic and reasoning.

A contradiction- between your assertion (that nothing can be greater than "all finite numbers"), and the proposition in question (an infinite sequence). So, not a self-contradiction. So, no proof, no reductio, no logical impossibility. Show that an infinite past or infinite sequence contradicts itself, not that it contradicts your personal views on the matter.

Have you honestly never even taken a basic intro to logic? Not a contradiction with something you said (that there can be nothing greater than all finite numbers), but a self-contradiction. If X is logically impossible, that means X entails a contradiction: it is self-contradictory. But you have not even attempted to derive any self-contradiction from an infinite past, you've only contradicted it with your own assertion to the contrary.

And that last is the real fly in your pudding here- your premise is the same as the conclusion; infinite past cannot exist, because infinite sequences cannot exist. But whether infinite sequences or an eternal past can exist is the claim in question, so taking as a premise that it cannot (as an argument for why it cannot, no less) is viciously circular and question-begging: you aren't even providing a substantive argument at all, just a restatement of the conclusion, making this all amount to no more than a bit of personal trivia about your own personal articles of faith. And that's great... its just not philosophically interesting and so you're operating with the benefit of extreme forbearance of the moderators here.

I've already proved time has a start to you! Did you not read my reply? Once again:

- The past is either a finite number of days long, or greater than all finite number of days long
- Nothing can be greater than all finite numbers; they go on forever
- So time has a start

Did you not read my reply? This is not a proof, not a reductio, not a successful way to establish something as logically impossible, even in principle: you need to derive a contradiction. Not only do you not derive a contradiction, this argument is explicitly circular and question-begging: infinite sequences going on forever cannot be the premise for rejecting an infinite past (its your 2nd premise in the above) since whether the past can be infinite is precisely the claim that is in dispute.

So all you've done here is merely restate your faith in a finite past... a bit of personal trivia (Devans99 believes in a finite past), not an argument much less a proof and not especially philosophically interesting. This entire thread is like a bad parody of Thomas or William Lane Craig- and that's saying alot since their own apologetics/natural theology are rather comical in their own right.

I certainly wouldn't deny that popular discussions of science tend to be terrible all around. Sensationalized, partisan, overly simplistic. And certainly, these narratives crafted for the purposes of media consumption rather than education have left the public in a pretty sorry state wrt knowledge of some topics, including/especially cosmology where rife misconceptions and ignorance are the rule. But if we're talking about working scientists and serious scientific models, its important to point out that the role of fine-tuning is quite overblown and is more a creature of pop-science journalism than actual science.

And the Copernican principle isn't denying that human perception plays a privileged role for human observers: he's denying that our situation and location in the universe are unique and privileged, which is essentially just a repudiation of anthropomorphism: we are not the center of the universe, the universe does not exist purely for our benefit. Instead, we live on a typical planet orbiting a typical star in a typical spiral arm of a typical spiral galaxy in a typical local cluster (at least, so we assume until we encounter evidence to the contrary).

But regardless, say what you will about the Copernican principle (I think its quite solid as a methodological guideline), but the point is that is what the underlying concern is wrt fine-tuning, not any theological or creationist boogeyman. Not least of which because the theistic conclusion doesn't really follow from the premises of fine-tuning to begin with, so the true threat posed by fine-tuning is of a different nature than the theist flatters herself by assuming.

You keep making claims about logical impossibility, but then failing to derive or produce a contradiction from whatever is alleged to be logically impossible. It seems you're confused about what logical impossibility is and what it isn't: logical impossibility means entailing a contradiction. A and ~ A is logically impossible, because it is contradictory.

Logical impossibility does not mean "what you find conceptually difficult to imagine", which is evidently how you are using the phrase here. Supertasks or infinite sequences may strike you as conceptually difficult to imagine or grasp, but if they do not entail a contradiction, then they are not logically impossible. If you claim that something is logically impossible, stating why it is implausible or weird is not sufficient: show us where it involves a contradiction.

Time must have a start. The past is either a finite or infinite number of days long. If its infinite, then its longer than any finite number of days. But finite numbers go on forever, so that's impossible.

We know you believe time must have a start, that you want time to have had a start. The problem is of course that the evidence and logic of the matter doesn't tell us firmly either way: again, hence scientific models of both varieties remaining viable.

And so one can either live with this ignorance, or can opt for blind faith as you have done. I prefer the former, but different strokes and whatever floats your boat and all that.

It's not their main concern, but it is certainly a factor. It's routinely invoked as a counter to 'fine-tuning'-style arguments by pop-sci figures.

And therein lies the key- pop science figures and pop science journalism, which is always quick to sensationalize things or provide overly simplistic narratives. So far as I can tell, to the extent that multiverse models are motivated by fine-tuning at all, the motivation isn't to avoid the conclusion of an intelligent designer (which isn't really on the table anyways), its to avoid relinquishing the Copernican principle: the principle that we do not occupy a special or privileged place in the universe, that we assume everything about our position and situation to be as typical as is consistent with the available evidence.

This principle is motivated more by modesty and probability (after all, if you pick something from a collection at random, you are more likely to have chosen a typical member of that collection) than by any specific empirical evidence. And fine-tuning obviously runs directly counter to this principle, that we are not special and that our situation is typical. That is the threat, not the non-sequiturs about god/Gods that can be tacked on to the end of the supposed problem of fine-tuning: these aren't serious or credible arguments to begin with, so its good that scientists don't credit them overmuch or worry about blocking their conclusions. The Copernican principle, otoh, is something we want to hold on to if we can.

And in any case you do not appear to be serious about the discussion, as evidenced by your refusal to engage in any way with studies showing precisely what you claimed (without evidence) that there was no evidence for (an amusing irony, btw).

Actually it is how it works. The studies are rates of police violence by race/ethnicity, not totals. And yes, if you assert, as you did above, that the cited studies do not show what they claim to show, then you absolutely need to back that assertion up, in this case by showing why the data doesn't entail the conclusions the authors claim. Sort of how this whole thing works. If you're unable/unwilling to meet your burden of proof, that's your prerogative. But it means you've effectively retracted your claim.

and in any case you would have to actually show that the math works out as you claim (that the disparities disappear when accounting for rates rather than totals)- that's far too vague and non-specific a criticism to count as a meaningful rebuttal to serious academic studies of the topic, even if it were true (which it isn't). If you have any specific or substantive replies to these or similar studies, let me know, otherwise there's not much else to say here.

most of them are based on rates not totals, so that's a swing and a miss.