However, despite the fact that inanimate things do not display their own internal reasons, we can infer that living beings other than human beings have their own internal reasons for behaving as they do.

Clearly other mammals which have brains and think have their own reasons for their actions as well. Don't you think that trees and other plants have their own reasons for their actions as well? — Metaphysician Undercover

Starting with a definition of human life, I would find it difficult to extrapolate a definition of plant life and natural life using the term "awareness". Because I define human awareness in terms of human anatomy, physiology, and mental capacity (i.e., sensory stimulation/perception, interoception/sensation, and cognition). Also because my knowledge of plant (and other) biology is inadequate to the task.

A possible solution is to use the term "awareness" defined differently for each species, and avoid equivocation by stipulating types of awareness (e.g., plant awareness, animal awareness, bacteria awareness, etc.). Then use "awareness" in a definition of natural life without stipulating type.

Starting with a definition of human mind, I would find it easier to extrapolate a definition of plant life and natural life using the term "mind" instead of "awareness".

For example, abstracting "human mind" (the set of conditions experienced, and functions exercised, by a human being which produce its behaviour) to "mind" (the set of conditions experienced, and functions exercised, by an organism which produce its behaviour).

...think the only argument - disagreement - I have lies in what I take to be a reification of motive, purpose, telos, and now gestalt. As explanatory concepts - as ideas - they're all wonderful. But in my view they are not things. They can't be dissected with a scalpel or stored in a jar. — tim wood

Is your mind a thing, or immaterial, or both, or neither?

Not likely. That would defeat the purpose of ambiguity.
Thanks for proving my point.

Please provide a one or two sentence definition for each of the following terms as used in your post:
1) Matter
2) Symbol
3) Encode
4) Genetic Memory
5) Information
6) Purpose
7) Stable
8) Instability

Breath-taking equivocation. Makes for good fiction.

It always seems that life is hard to define with respect to minimal criteria. — tim wood

We've been through this before in the "What is life?" thread.

Life: The condition extending from cell division to death, characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients.

Artificial Life: The artificial condition extending from cell division to death, characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients.

Natural Life: The natural condition extending from cell division to death, characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients, respond to stimuli, mature, and adapt to the environment.

Human Life: The natural condition extending from fertilisation to death, characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients, sense and respond to stimuli, be aware, mature physically and mentally, reproduce, and adapt to the environment.

With reference to the causes of physical (inorganic and organic) and mental processes within a data-communication-information ontology, does the following seem reasonable?

1) Syntax (structural principles and/or data constraints) is formal cause.
2) Phenomena and/or noumena are material cause.
3) Entropy is the efficient cause of inorganic energy-mass transformation (inorganic message encoding/decoding).
4) Negentropy is the efficient cause of organic energy-mass transformation (organic message encoding/decoding).
5) Conscious (aware and responsive) agency is the efficient cause of symbol transformation (mental message encoding/decoding).
6) Message reaction is final cause.

Given:
1) Data (Form): asymmetries.
2) Communication: source production/encoding and/or transmission, conveyance, destination reception/decoding, or discovery of, and reaction to, data (Form).
3) Information: communicated data (Form).
4) Message: transmitted, conveyed, and received code.
5) Code: transformed, translated, or converted data (Form).

The fields of engineering and evolution provide further examples in which solutions always 'exceed' the problems from which they are born. Thus a wind turbine, a dam, and a coal powered fuel plant can be considered 'solutions' to the problem of generating energy...
Thinking about problems in this way has a few advantages. For one, it 'dynamizes' problems, keeping them 'open' such that problems are not static artefacts to be solved once and for all, but instead force creative and ongoing engagement. — StreetlightX

So, a problem is dynamic if it has more than one solution?

Engineering problems usually have multiple, if not many, solutions ranging from satisfactory (cost-effective) to optimal (expensive). And it is very important that these types of problems be "solved once for all" where public health and/or safety are at risk.

I am inclined to agree that "problems themselves have an ontological standing". For example, I would consider engineering and evolutionary problems to be types of empirical problems; and logical, aesthetic, and ethical problems to be types of pure problems.

I am also inclined to consider Science to be the appropriate tool for solving empirical problems, and Philosophy to be the appropriate tool for considering (if not solving) pure problems.

I have no goals. — TheMadFool

No surprise there.

Is it necessary to have a 'goal' in life? — krishnamurti

Only if action is a possibility (i.e., there are no goals in death).

From the introduction:
"The Master and his Emissary, 'the book that informs the following discussion, is about the profound significance of the fact that the left and right hemispheres of our brains have radically different ‘world views’."

So, another contribution to the field of Mereological Confusion.

We share many views in common. Best of luck with your endeavors. — javra

I've noticed, and cheers.

Still, to my mind, one could establish a dual aspect monistic ontology by interpreting all stuff, mental and physical, as information—here basically meaning, “that which endows form to”. Such a broad interpretation of information could thereby maybe be used to make the case that all information transfer is communication. — javra

Yes. This is roughly my intent. With types of data, communication, and information corresponding to types of ideas (ideals and abstractions) and objects (physical and/or mental).

Well, interpreting information as a dual-aspect monistic substance is an approach I take but, to be honest, there are some other components at work as I’ve so far made use of this understanding. Things like various causal influences or mechanisms by which information works. — javra

Yes. I think this is down to code (messages) being:
1) Common to (at one level of abstraction, or mutually understood by, at another) both transmitters (or senders) and receivers (or recipients), and
2) Syntactic (i.e., conforming to structural principles).

Also of information yet being other than core non-dualistic awareness even though information in-forms awareness—i.e., endows awareness with its form of first person selfhood, including that of its very being as an individual awareness within the universe...
To further clarify this last part, this in-forming of awareness certainly occurs in large part via the operations of the living, organic, physical substrata—such as brains for vertebrate life—as well as via this then formed awareness’s interaction with its environment by means of subjectivity. — javra

I currently view awareness as a dual aspect, mind-body condition; in its most general sense: an aware (perceptive, sensitive, and cognisant) condition. Perception being the mental experience of sensory stimulation, sensation being the mental experience of interoception, and cognisance being the mental experience of knowing.

Thanks for your input.

My focus is the domain of cognitive psychology which partly consists of mental functions (i.e., psychosemiosis with semantic, syntactic and pragmatic properties). Pragmatics addresses the relations between signs and agents (including intentions).

I currently consider data, communication, and information to be inter-related foundational concepts with regard to this psychosemiotic framework. Recognising that these terms are used differently in many areas of academic study and professional practice, I am keen to devise a description of communication which is as general as possible, so I can derive appropriate domain-related definitions.

Suggestions are welcome.

Thanks for your elaboration.

My own elaboration: given that communication is the process of encoding, transmitting, conveying, receiving, and decoding, data (form), to communicate ideas on this forum involves:

1) Encoding nonverbal thoughts to verbal thoughts.
2) Encoding verbal thoughts to written words.
3) Encoding written words to forms suitable for computer and/or telecommunication applications.
4) Transmitting (carrier signal modulation) computer/telecom code by energy propagation (electrical signals, radio waves).
5) Conveying telecom signals through internet media to a designated IP address.
6) Receiving (carrier signal demodulation) and decoding of computer/telecom code by The Philosophy Forum web site applications.
7) Receiving (reading) and decoding (understanding) written words by a forum member based on their association with semantic information (knowledge).
8) Recipient mental action (e.g., cogitation), followed by physical action (e.g., composing a reply).

So, I am inclined to say that semantic communication requires empirical (physical and/or mental object) communication.

Sure, there is a sense in which my computer is 'communicating' with your computer, but I want to put some scare quotes around such usage precisely because neither of our computers has any idea what they are doing. — unenlightened

So, would it be your position that communication is the process of encoding, transmitting, conveying, receiving, and decoding, only semantic data (form)?

I would be inclined to say that semantic communication requires empirical (physical and/or mental object) communication (again, given my general definition of communication).

Generally though, I too tend to limit “communication” to meanings intentionally transferred from one sentient being to other sentient beings. For example, bees communicate to each other, but saying that sun communicates location to the bees seems to me a bit off mark. — javra

And yet, to say that homoeostasis, gene expression, neural stimulation, endocrine signalling, and immunomodulation are types of biocommunication, doesn't seem so far-fetched to me.

So, should the notion of communication pertain only to organic objects? And if so, at what level(s) of abstraction (i.e., physiology and/or psychology)?

For those who would appropriately refer to the etymology of the word "communication" from the Latin "communico" (share, impart, make common), I would suggest that what the process of communication shares between informer (transmitter, sender) and informee (receiver, recipient) is code, given:

1) Communication: the process of encoding, transmitting, conveying, receiving, and decoding, data (form).
2) Code: transformed, translated, or converted data (form).
3) Information: communicated data (form).

We generalise the matter~mind divide so that it becomes a division between the naked materiality of quantum action and the pure form of mathematical structure. — apokrisis

This is an equivocation of "mind".

It is also equivocation to mention "the world of Platonic form", and then use "reality" to primarily refer to existence.

The "deep ontic structure of reality" and existence includes Pure Data (General Form) consisting of idea (transcendental or universal) asymmetries, and Empirical Data (Particular Form) consisting of object (physical and/or mental) asymmetries.

These asymmetries may be encoded by a conscious agent through mental representation as a set of variables having values, hence; meaning. So, the "deep ontic structure of reality" and existence also includes Semantic Data (Form) consisting of mental representations (such as Quantum Mechanics).

Selfishness is concern only for self interests, and egoism is its morality.

Only neural atypical human beings (e.g., psychopaths and high level narcissists) are selfish. Neural typical human beings are self-interested, but not exclusively, hence; they are not selfish.

For neural typical human beings, a morality construct develops through a functioning: theory of mind, empathy, ethical knowledge and conscience (in parallel with mental maturation consisting of personal experience and social influences).

In terms of social ethical instruction, if human beings were not self-interested, the Golden Rule wouldn't make sense.

It should be intuitively obvious that neural typical human behaviour ranges from self-interested to self-sacrificing. So, motives for altruistic action range from self serving (reciprocal altruism) to self sacrificing (empathy altruism).

Then, how do rocks reproduce themselves? — Galuchat

They don't, clearly. There is no mechanism of heritability among populations of rocks. All I've argued is that evolution can be applicable to non-organic populations, not that all non-organic populations undergo evolution. — StreetlightX

I have no problem with the notion of overarching concepts, viewing "data", "communication" and "information" to be such, applying to all types of objects, to wit:

1) Physical (Phenomena)
a) Inorganic
i) Natural (Geosphere)
ii) Artificial (Artefacta)
b) Organic (Biosphere)
2) Mental (Noumena)

If evolution is claimed to be substrate independent, it needs a general description which can be applied to all types of objects, otherwise the notion is category error.

And if the terms used in such a description (notably "reproduction") can only be (or are usually) understood with reference to the life sciences, they require redefinition (which is equivocation). To avoid equivocation, they need to be replaced or supplemented with other terms/concepts.

Funnily enough, category error and equivocation are the same problems I (and many biosemioticians) have with attempts to extend semiosis to physiosemiosis and pansemiosis. To be honest, I'm not even sure that semiosis should be extended to certain levels of biosemiosis.

If and only if there is heritable variation (changes in a developmental system [population + environment] that is passed down to another generation). — StreetlightX

Then, how do rocks reproduce themselves?

I'm not sure what you mean by an 'artificial population'; 'artificial' and 'natural' qualify mechanisms of selection, but not populations. — StreetlightX

By artificial population, I mean a population of artificial objects (e.g., French provincial tables).

First, natural selection happens to a population, and not single organisms...
Second, insofar as natural selection is something that happens to said population, it's not something that organisms 'engage in... — StreetlightX

Then:
1) Does natural selection also happen to populations of natural inorganic objects?
2) Is artificial selection something that happens to artificial populations (groups of individuals)?
3) If yes, how?

...one of the functions of language (perhaps the most elementary, although not only one) is to enable us to communicate things which are not experienced. — StreetlightX

I agree. Language is code as tool because it has functions.

'Design' is not really relevant though, insofar as all natural evolution takes place without any reference to design. — StreetlightX

Don't organisms design themselves by engaging in natural selection?

...the comparison between language and technology shouldn't be so far fetched to the degree that language is indeed nothing other than a natural technology in it's own right... — StreetlightX

I agree that language and technology evolve, and that a distinction between natural and artificial selection makes sense, understanding that natural selection is a metaphor, whereas; artificial (human) selection is not.

But my own concept of technology (applied science production) precludes equating it with language. How do you define "language" and "technology"? Instead, I view technology as a product of human language (a modelling system).

These are all just small examples from disparate fields, but I hope they begin to fill out a picture of how to understand evolution as not just an organic process, but an inorganic one as well. — StreetlightX

Human design (artifice) produces artificial inorganic objects (artefacta), but because human beings are organisms, the human design process is organic and evolves. Inorganic phenomena and artefacta do not design themselves or engage in selection (except in a metaphorical sense).

So, I wouldn't view evolution as substrate-independent.

Photoelasticity provides a means of visualising stress (internal force) resulting from the application of a load (external force) to a body in static equilibrium.

Ah, I see what you mean. I suppose what I 'don't like' about such diagrams is precisely that the[y] abstract away the time element, and correlatively, the body. — StreetlightX

The beams represented by shear and moment diagrams are actual bodies supporting actual loads (sustaining forces) in static equillibrium, hence; the time element is irrelevant. However, the space (geometry) element is not.

Thanks for the link.

The cited research is fascinating, but provides evidence of correlation between mental activity and neurophysiology, not of causation, hence; it is incorrect to say, "...particular physical states encode particular mental states" when the research makes no such claim.

In fact, what is being predicted are neural activation patterns produced by thought, not thought produced by neural activation patterns.

From the introduction:
"Given the semantic and thematic characterization of the component word concepts of a proposition, the model can predict the activation pattern the reading of the corresponding sentence will evoke."

And:
"This study thus has two main goals. The main goal was to develop a mapping between a semantic characterization of a sentence (based on the individual word concepts in the sentence and their thematic roles) and the resulting brain activation pattern that occurs when the sentence is read. The mapping can then be used to predict the activation pattern of an entirely new sentence containing new words, simply based on its semantic characterization."

P.S. Spare me the other examples.

Likewise, with a fine-grained enough brain scan, one could presumably "read off" the mental state of the perceiver from the physical state of his brain: particular physical states encode particular mental states, even if one can't "see" the mental states directly (indeed, this needn't even be taken to be a hypothetical fantasy relegated to a philosophical thought experiment: some very preliminary steps towards "mind-reading" ability using brain scanning technology have already been taken). — Arkady

I'll consider that to be hypothetical fantasy until you cite credible research.

Decisions regarding the use of military equipment are made by government officials and/or heads of state, not by engineering designers.

Has anyone been prosecuted for a war crime for designing military equipment? If not, and if legal codes are derived from moral codes, then military equipment design is not an activity which has ethical implications, except as follows:

1) In performing services, engineers are usually bound by a professional code of conduct which requires (among other things) a demonstration of scientific and technical competence.

2) Breaking an industrial non-disclosure agreement would invite civil litigation, and

3) The revelation of state secrets would generally be considered an act of treason.

Is designing military equipment, like jets and artillery, as an engineer morally just? — The scientific philosopher

It's the use of military equipment, not its design, which has ethical implications. In other words, military equipment may be used for moral or immoral purposes (cf., Just War Theory).

Thinking a little about this in terms of information, part of what it means to subscribe to reductionism is to say that context contains no information, or rather, cannot function informationally. — StreetlightX

That would appear to be the case. Thanks for the gene expression example. Mention of developmental factors brought gene switching to mind. Since I'm currently focused on cognitive psychology, I tend to be more annoyed by attempts to explain mind solely in terms of brain anatomy and/or neurophysiology.

And again, to be against reductionism here is just to be for science, not against it; at least, it is to hew closer to the discoveries of science than any extra-scientific metaphysics which is foisted onto it from the outside. — StreetlightX

I agree. The problem is not one of restricting empirical investigation to a single level of abstraction, but of reaching inappropriate conclusions and deriving incoherent concepts from the results of those investigations.

This obviously doesn't answer the symbol-grounding problem which you asked about, but it does imply thinking about 'symbols' differently: as not carriers of information in their own right, but as resources that need to be thought about in terms of wider, context-bearing processes. — StreetlightX

Hence, the difference between data and information.
I'm in the process of reading the Brender paper to see if there are any insights worth pursuing.

Hah, I've read that Floridi book - pamphlet, really - but unfortunately found it so painfully average that I think that connection would have escaped me entirely. — StreetlightX

Perhaps you could clarify/answer the symbol grounding problem Floridi raises (i.e., "how data can come to have an assigned meaning and function in a semiotic system like a natural language")?

I currently see the notion of data as foundational to scientific theories and the systems they explain, being inclined to view natural laws rather as natural syntax (i.e., encoding/decoding principles), and natural codes as transformed, translated, or converted natural data.

This agrees with:

1) Lower levels of description always underdetermine higher levels. Newell, A. (1990). Unified Theories of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, and

2) Data are not accessed and elaborated independently of a level of abstraction. Floridi, L. (2010). Information: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

I believe volition is a requirement of communication. I wondered what the opposing view might be. — frank

If communication is the process of transmitting, conveying, receiving, decoding, creating, and encoding data/information, does it necessarily have anything to do with volition?

I think that types of communication correspond to types of data/information, including: physical (natural, either organic or inorganic, or artificial), mental, and semantic.

Physical communication requires energy propagation (i.e., signals). Mental communication requires a mind. Semantic communication requires physical communication, mental communication, an intelligent author, a message, and an intelligent recipient.

If communication consists solely of physical data/information, then volition plays no part. For example:
1) Endocommunication provides physiological (e.g., metabolic, hormonal, neuronal, and immunological) regulation.
2) My general appearance may be the result of careful planning (providing evidence of volition), or it may not. With or without volition, it is a form of communication.
3) I utter spontaneous vocalisations without volition (e.g., when I hit my thumb with a hammer), and when I am heard, my pain has been communicated.

It's basic neuroscience.

The fact of neuroplasticity provides sufficient reason to reject epiphenomenalism.

So what is involved in understanding a proposition? — Banno

Language comprehension. The crow's behaviour provides criterial evidence of understanding (a mental faculty), not of verbal modelling.

No doubt Apo will be along soon to tell us... — Banno

All about dissipative structures, triadic relations, heat death, habit, blah, blah.

I wrote, "...it is unlikely that animals have beliefs." Here

But hang on - can't one believe something that is indeed true? — Banno

Yes.

So believing is something the mind does? — Banno

No, it is something human beings do.

I agree that belief is a propositional attitude, specifically; an attitude which accepts a proposition as true with insufficient evidence (i.e., having mind-to-world fit).

False beliefs contribute to bias, illusion, and error.

If "mind" is the set of conditions experienced, and functions exercised, by an organism which produce behaviour, then; belief is a mental function. Therefore, it doesn't make sense to ask,"Where is mind?", or "Where is belief?"

Criterial evidence in the form of observed behaviour suggests that animals have attitudes (e.g., prey having a negative evaluation of predator). But inasmuch as propositions presuppose language, it is unlikely that animals have beliefs.

But even if the (E) is the data of Gedanken experiments, is that not to some extent the result of abductive reasoning? If we define abductive reasoning as a form of logical inference which starts with an observation then seeks to find the simplest and most likely explanation, isn't that synonymous with the statement above which you proposed? — MonfortS26

I didn't propose a statement, I quoted Einstein. And in that quote, he is referring to the faculty of imagination, not reason, in arriving at (A).

The scientific method is the cycle of these three forms of reasoning according to Charles Sanders Peirce and it seems to me that is an accurate statement. My main question, is there an application of logic that falls outside this cycle? — MonfortS26

Yes.

In Einstein's epistemology..."the axiomatic structure (A) of a theory is built psychologically on the experiences (E) of the world of perceptions. Inductive logic cannot lead from the (E) to the (A). The (E) need not be restricted to experimental data, nor to perceptions; rather, the (E) may include the data of Gedanken experiments. Pure reason (i.e., mathematics) connects (A) to theorems (S). But pure reason can grasp neither the world of perceptions nor the ultimate physical reality because there is no procedure that can be reduced to the rules of logic to connect the (A) to the (E). Physical reality can be grasped not by pure reason (as Kant has asserted), but by pure thought."

Einstein, A. (1933). On the Method of Theoretical Physics. Lecture delivered on 10 June 1933 at Oxford University.

"Less certain is the connection between the (S) and the (E). If at least one correspondence cannot be made between the (A) and (S) and (E), then the scientific theory is only a mathematical exercise. Einstein referred to the demarcation between concepts or axioms and perceptions or data as the 'metaphysical original sin' (1949); and his defense of it was its usefulness."

Miller, A. (1984). Imagery in Scientific Thought. Birkhauser Boston, Inc.