There are games of coordination (the sort of thing that Lewis takes as the basis of convention) and games of competition, and a game can be purely one or the other or mixed, as in the prisoner's dilemma. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree.

I think most of the boys treat the game as mixed, both coordination and competition. What's curious is that the one who treats the game as pure competition changes the game for everyone. — Srap Tasmaner

I think each boy decides what type of game it is, and how they will play it, before the game even begins.

I wonder too if, in those games of tag I played as a kid, we didn't treat them as mixed rather than purely competitive, at least by avoiding the singling-out behavior in my example. I think my friends and I would have disapproved of someone going after the slowest kid in class every time he was "it". — Srap Tasmaner

I think any game which doesn't have rules that are enforced becomes a dominance conflict. Spoiler: psychopathy always wins a dominance conflict.

Is temperament correlated with motivation?

So it is with the RPI simulation of a social network's marketplace of ideas -- a small group that never adjusts gets its way.

I also found it suggestive that the specific mechanism in this case was one minority, not to put too fine a point on it, singling out a more vulnerable minority. The others respond by watching from the sidelines or trying to coach or coax the one changing the game to quit it. — Srap Tasmaner

Thanks for the clarification.
Inasmuch as the game of tag you described is a display of aggression (specifically, dominance) by an individual, the situation bears greater resemblance to an instance of the bystander effect than it does to the effect of a minority opinion. Others may be aware of more relevant research.

And this:
"The shift from Newtonian determinism to statistical science is what makes a
physics of society possible." - Philip Ball (Critical Mass, 2004). In this book, Ball reveals how human social group behaviour appears to be predictable to the extent that it conforms to power-law probability (Pareto) distributions.

It feels like there's a political analogy here -- something about how democratic or even market practices can fail to produce the expected or desired social result.. — Srap Tasmaner

It's social-ethical behaviour; so, analogous to many (if not most, or all) instances of social group dynamics (e.g., a philosophy forum). Or, consider it to be more generally applicable to game theory.

If you're genuinely interested, read the referenced book carefully. I don't have time to explain the same thing 10 different ways. Good luck!

I know that studying philosophy is no game even though it might seem so... — Abeills

It never seemed like a game to me; blood sport, yes.

Any tips about comprehending concepts and playing with them would help me! — Abeills

Neural atypicality seems to be an advantage.

I don't understand what you mean when you say mind is only a verbal construct. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Mind" is the name of a verbal concept which can be described as: the set of faculties exercised by a psychophysical being which produce natural and acculturated behaviour. When considered in relation to other verbal concepts (e.g., particular faculties), it becomes a verbal construct (i.e., mental model).

The set of faculties described in this conception of mind are real (i.e., they exist). However, "mind" (conceived of as an entity having these faculties) does not exist. So, use of the word "mind" only makes sense as a convenient way of referring to these faculties collectively, rather than by enumeration.

Inductive evidence in the form of physiological correlates, and criterial evidence in the form of observed behaviour, establish the existence of psychological functions and conditions.

If an experiment can be devised which resolves the question: "does the mind (as an entity) exist?", it is an empirical question, and the fact of its existence or non-existence can be established. For example, once it has been decided what constitutes the entity "mind", an experiment using PET, fMRI, MEG, or NIRS technology can determine whether or not it has neural correlates.

If there is no way to experimentally test the hypothesis, "the mind (as an entity) exists", then whether or not it exists is a conceptual question requiring logical investigation. For example, does it make sense to conceive of beings as composed of two parts (body and mind) or as an integrated whole?

If beings are composed of a body and mind, questions of interaction and mind location need to be resolved. Modern neuroscientists (and some philosophers) think this dualist problem is resolved by replacing mind with brain. But, this only transfers the attribution of psychological functions and conditions from mind to brain, when logically they are attributes of a being (a psychophysical unity).

Also, coherent concepts of psychological functions and conditions do not only take into consideration brain anatomy and physiology, but the anatomy and physiology of all the organic systems of a living being.

N.B. The foregoing is distilled from "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" by M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker (2003).

We aren't motivated when things are how we'd like it to be. We are content. — Harry Hindu

I agree. Generally, the cause of motivation is dissatisfaction. Specifically, dissatisfaction due to:
1) Negative affect produced by unpleasant sensations and/or feelings.
2) Unfulfilled human needs (i.e., requisites for good mental and corporeal health which facilitate human well-being).
3) Unfulfilled propositional attitudes (i.e., desires, hopes, opinions, beliefs, convictions).

How would "natural" be included in the explanation when "socially learned verbal constructs" usually falls under social and not instinctual, unless "natural" is used in a different way than a synonym for strict biologically determined behavior. — schopenhauer1

In my current conception:
1) The domain of Cognitive Psychology explains natural behaviour.
2) The domain of Social Psychology explains acculturated behaviour.
Both domains are socially learned verbal constructs (i.e., models).

If goals then are social constructs, is essentially everything we hold dear as humans in terms of our "supposed" desires, wants, hopes, motivations, etc. just a socially taught mechanism that has simply been one useful way for our species to survive?...
In other words, is the social construct just an exaptation- something that just so happened to arise but was not the reason for our unique evolution, or was it actually an adaptation- something that was specifically selected for? — schopenhauer1

Thanks for pointing out how ridiculous my revised answer to your first question is (obviously, I am testing developing concepts). Let me try a third time:

Psychological functions and conditions produce natural and acculturated behaviour which is described in terms of socially learned verbal constructs. In other words, I suspect that these functions are adaptations rather than exaptations.

Is a goal or imagination a phenomenon in one's mind or head which can be experienced and perceived? If so, by what is it experienced and perceived? What and where is one's mind (it's intuitively obvious that heads can be perceived, but can minds be perceived)? — Galuchat

I believe you have met a logical roadblock here. I don't think that a mind can be perceived... — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe you presuppose that I am looking for answers to these questions, when my actual intent is to elicit your opinions. I agree that a mind cannot be perceived, but because: like psychological functions, mind is not an entity which can be observed. It is a convenient term (schopenhauer1's "nominal label") for the set of psychological functions which a being is capable of exercising (a socially learned verbal construct). Therefore, attributing psychological predicates to a mind is nonsense, and attributing them to a brain (or anything "in one's head") is mereological confusion.

A goal may be identified, it may be analyzed, properties may be attributed to it, etc., just like any physical object. The difference is that the goal is an object understood to exist only in the mind, while a physical object is understood to exist outside the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that a particular goal (intention) may be identified, analysed, assigned attributes, etc., but only: by others when it is expressed to them (as in the first sentence of my previous paragraph), and by one's self when it is conceived of, or thought about. Inasmuch as it may exist in physical form when it is expressed, it does not "exist only in the mind". In fact, it never exists in a mind, because mind only exists as a verbal construct.

OK, so all you have done here is distinguished between two types of objects, objects which are entities and objects which are goals. You claim that only entities can be observed, thus restricting the use and meaning of "observe". — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct.

Also. it appears like you want to restrict the use of "experience", such that one experiences one's goals, but does not experience entities. Unless you adopt some dualist premises, I do not believe that such restrictions can be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct again. This is a misconception on my part.

What is observed is goal behaviour. And if we associate this behaviour with a premise, we can deduce that the person has a goal. But making the logical conclusion that the person has a goal is not the same thing as observing that the person has a goal. The goal is not observed. According to your restrictions, observations are of entities, not of goals. So no matter how well you observe the goal behaviour, you are not observing the goal (which can only be experienced according to your restrictions). Nor have you observed that the person has a goal, you have deduced this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct a third time. I have discovered my error: psychological functions are not experienced, they are performed.

Pursuant to the following two points:
1)

I think that a person's own goals may be apprehended with one's own mind, and the person may observe and follow one's own goals. — Metaphysician Undercover

2)

...all i mean by imagined is that it is something in one's head that is not in the world. — unenlightened

Is a goal or imagination a phenomenon in one's mind or head which can be experienced and perceived? If so, by what is it experienced and perceived? What and where is one's mind (it's intuitively obvious that heads can be perceived, but can minds be perceived)?

Is a goal or imagination something concrete which can be located in one's mind or head (i.e., either as a part of brain anatomy or neurophysiology)? Do anatomical and neurophysiological correlations (inductive evidence) of intent or imagination establish their location in one's mind or head?

Or are intent and imagination psychological functions (i.e., events or processes) or conditions which brain anatomy and neurophysiology facilitate? If so, how are they perceived by others and known to ourselves?

I think that others perceive one's goal and imagination behaviour (criterial evidence of one's intent and imagination), and that our psychological functions or conditions are known to ourselves in terms of verbal expressions which are socially learned. We perform psychological functions; they require no evidence to be known to ourselves. We do not experience them, but we may experience their cause(s) and effect(s).

So, to revise my answer to schopenhauer1's first question:

Are goals "real" in that they are a natural phenomena that are a part of certain animal biological/psychological make-up, or a nominal label for a very pervasive social convention/habit? — schopenhauer1

Psychological functions and conditions are socially learned verbal constructs which explain types of natural and acculturated behaviour.

Motivation is driven by your emotions, both being of the same root, and both referencing what moves you, both physically and emotionally. — Hanover

Affect produces moods and emotions; has dimensions of valence, arousal, and motivational intensity, and is correlated with motivational direction.

A plan is also an imagined act... — unenlightened

Review the RIBA Plan of Work 2013, and tell me that its required tasks are imaginary and not behaviour which can be observed. https://www.ribaplanofwork.com/PlanOfWork.aspx

As an engineer or architect, the preparation of design calculations and working drawings (i.e., planning acts) are concrete evidence of my intent (a psychological function/act) to build something.

It would be odd to say that I experience the goal, if the goal is to experience a cup of tea... — unenlightened

Then you can say that you experience intent which directs planning, informs volition, and results in action. Planning, volition and action being behaviour which is criterial evidence of intent.

A need produces desire. There are desires which arise from need, and desires which do not arise from need.

The problem, of course, is that calling something back into presence is not the only reason to 'call' — creativesoul

I agree.

Also, if language developed as a modelling system (as opposed to being derived from a communication system), it seems reasonable that the first task at hand would be conceptualisation (i.e., the process of forming a concept by abstraction and designation).

I think it is necessary to distinguish between intentions, or goals, and motivation which is the ambition that aids in successfully achieving ones goals. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree.

I don't see how a goal, or intention, could be observed by another...I think that we can only really observe our own goals, and this is an internal observation. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a logical dualist objection (i.e., the mind is hidden, accessible only to the person who owns it, etc.), and the subject of another current thread.

What is observed is goal behaviour, described by criteria, and constituting criterial evidence of another's goal experience.

A goal is not an entity, it is a psychological function of human beings. So, a person cannot even observe their own goal; they experience it.

Also, we can observe the actions of others, and using some premises, we can make some logical conclusion concerning the person's goal, but again this is not the same as observing the goal. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, but it is the same as observing that a person has a goal.

1) Are goals "real" in that they are a natural phenomena that are a part of certain animal biological/psychological make-up, or a nominal label for a very pervasive social convention/habit? — schopenhauer1

Inasmuch as "goal" is synonymous with "intention", it is a psychological expression of a subjective experience which can be observed by others, hence; a natural phenomenon. And inasmuch as people discuss "goals", "goal" is a nominal label.

2) Do the origins of goal-directed behavior come from evolutionary forces of biology/psychology or are they social conventions that ride on top of some more basic component? Related, If animals have goals are they different than human-directed goals? — schopenhauer1

Human behaviour is a product of human nature (the genetically predisposed capacity to develop and exercise human functions). That animals have goals is evident based on criteria of goal-directed behaviour. If the criteria for goal-directed behaviour are different for animals than they are for humans, their goals are different.

3) If goals are more on the nominal side of the spectrum, what does that mean in terms of ethical implications? If ethics aims at goals, and goals are nominal, does this invalidate certain ethical standards that are goal-directed? — schopenhauer1

It is because goals are "real" phenomena, with "real" effects, that we name them and decide that they are relevant to a theory of ethics.

4) Are some goals better than others? If so, how do justify a weighting to the goals such that one takes priority over the other? Are goals related to survival self-evident, for example? If goals of survival are superior than other goals, does this have implications for ethics? For example, can one say that since there is a de facto goal of not being hungry, humans must do X action to accomplish not going hungry? — schopenhauer1

Great questions, but off-topic. I would certainly enjoy discussing them in another thread.

Check here:
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/mental?s=t
And here:
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/stimulus?s=t
And combine them.

What is motivation? — Gotterdammerung

A mental stimulus correlated with affect which leads to problem-solving, decision-making, intention, planning, volition, and action.

When there is little consensus on the meaning of terms as they are used in areas of academic study or professional practise (in this case, Psychology), I use dictionaries. For the purposes of this discussion, I find the Psychology meanings in dictionary.com acceptable (which correspond with your definition). Whether or not elaborations are required depend on the course of discussion.

When you say that you suspect that few extroverts would be members of a philosophy forum, what makes you say this? Is it your idea of extroversion that makes you say it? Is it something about the nature of philosophy? — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Both. It is the psychological concept of introversion-extraversion and the primarily thoughtful nature of philosophy. Behaviour is criterial evidence of psychological predicates.

Pick and drag your mouse over the text you want to quote. It becomes highlighted, and a small box labelled "quote" appears near the highlighted text. Pick the box labelled "quote". The quoted text then appears in the input field at the bottom of the web page.
There are other ways, such as: copy and paste text into the "Quote" menu item above the input field. Hope this helps.

It's a difficult problem, not because it's unique to this type of forum, but because (in my experience) there is only one solution: site administration must "police" infringements of policy reported by site users. However, this is very time-consuming.

Online forums of every type attract large numbers of detractors wearing rings of Gyges. There is a scenario which is worse than losing members: a dog-eat-dog environment which reduces all members to the lowest common denominator in terms of behaviour.

In my opinion, given the nature of the problem, a public complaint thread would be counter-productive.

All replies to the OP thus far presuppose that language is derived from a communication system, whereas; Popper and Chomsky disagree. Semioticians Lotman and Sebeok think that language developed as a mental modelling system (an adaptation) in Homo habilis, and that speech is an exaptation derived from language (which emerged in Homo sapiens).

David Robinson suggests that differences in the natural frequencies and damping ratios of thalamocortical circuits define four neurological types which correspond to the four classical temperaments, to wit:

(1) Sanguine (pleasure-seeking and sociable)
(a) Low natural frequency and low damping ratio.

(2) Choleric (ambitious and leader-like)
(a) Low natural frequency and high damping ratio.

(3) Melancholic (analytical and quiet)
(a) High natural frequency and low damping ratio.

(4) Phlegmatic (relaxed and peaceful)
(a) High natural frequency and high damping ratio.

Robinson, D. L. (December 2008). Brain Function, Emotional Experience and Personality. Netherlands Journal of Psychology, Volume 64, Issue 4, pp.152–167).

So, whether you are generally introverted or extroverted may very well be a case of how you are "wired". I suspect that very few extroverts would be members of a philosophy forum.

As I understand it thus far, being consists of form (the genetically predisposed capacity for species-specific functions) and matter (a physical body); together, one substance (that of a type of being).

Also, mind does not exist; it is a convenient expression for a set of active and passive functions of intellect and will exercised by a being. Therefore, attributing psychological predicates to a mind is nonsense, and attributing them to a brain is mereological confusion.

Amongst other things, a meaningful correlation requires spatiotemporal distinction. I find no reason to think/believe that an unborn child has that capability. — creativesoul

You have made a ground-breaking discovery: wombs apparently exist outside the space-time continuum. Do they exist in some sort of parallel dimension perhaps? Please elaborate.
Also:
1) What kind of spatio-temporal distinction accompanies a feeling of hunger (which surely must have meaning to someone who experiences it)?
2) You will want to inform those conducting fetal learning research that they are in error concerning the ability of a fetus to assign meaning.

I would just point out that the aforementioned correlations are drawn by observers other than the unborn child. — creativesoul

If not by observation, how else should empirical investigation be conducted? Again, your insights could have ground-breaking implications for science, so please elaborate.

Language acquisition occurs between 12 and 36 months, but language development continues into middle childhood (11 years). — Galuchat

Ok. Relevance? — creativesoul

You're using terms inappropriately by attributing powers to language acquisition which belong to language use. Why not just say, "It is via language that we learn..."?

The position I'm putting forth doesn't rest it's laurels upon anything other than the fact that we all adopt(almost entirely) our initial worldview, and there is no ability to doubt the truthfulness of neither the teacher nor the teaching... — creativesoul

That may have been true for you, but it wasn't true for me. I repudiated my teachers' worldviews (in their presence and in the presence of my peers) as early as the age of eleven. Since that age falls within the time frame of your analysis, your assertion cannot be the case for every human being "regardless of individual, familial, cultural, and/or historical particulars." I recommend that you choose a more representative sample from your sampling frame ("we all"). In other words, don't indulge in selection bias.

And if by "the mechanics of thought/belief" you are referring to the development of an individual's thought/belief over time, in addition to language development, social and moral development need to be addressed. That being the case, I don't think it's possible to provide a coherent cross-cultural model of thought/belief development. — Galuchat

Why would you say that? I'm curious. — creativesoul

Because I have no idea what you mean by the phrase, "the mechanics of thought/belief". I thought I would be generous and suggest one possibility based on contextual clues. So, what do you mean by that phrase?

To be clear, what I'm calling thought/belief is any and all mental correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own state of mind. At conception there are none present. We are born having drawn very few - if any - of the aforementioned correlations... — creativesoul

This presupposes that little or no prenatal development occurs (which is obviously ridiculous, unless storks deliver babies). In fact, the tactile sense begins to develop during the embryonic stage (5-8 weeks). The visual and auditory senses begin to develop during the fetal stage (13-24 weeks). Movement and the primitive reflexes are also observed during the fetal stage. Human gestation is approximately 40 weeks. Correlations of sensory stimulation with mental states begins to occur approximately 15 weeks prior to birth.

It is via language acquisition that we learn what... — creativesoul

Language acquisition occurs between 12 and 36 months, but language development continues into middle childhood (11 years).

This is only to say that it is via language acquisition that we initially learn how to talk about ourselves and/or others, and thus by virtue of learning how to situate ourselves in the world by coming to terms with it and ourselves, we adopt - almost entirely - our initial worldview. This must be the case, for during this time we do not have what it takes to doubt what we're being taught. — creativesoul

If "during this time" refers to the period between two years of age and becoming a professor (say 25 years of age, for the sake of argument), adopting "our initial worldview" and not having "what it takes to doubt what we're being taught" cannot be the case for every human being "regardless of individual, familial, cultural, and/or historical particulars."

And if by "the mechanics of thought/belief" you are referring to the development of an individual's thought/belief over time, in addition to language development, social and moral development need to be addressed. That being the case, I don't think it's possible to provide a coherent cross-cultural model of thought/belief development.

It appears like either you didn't understand what you were saying (mistaken), or you were actively trying to deceive. — Metaphysician Undercover

That would be the modus operandi: if you can't dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with bullshit.

I agree. Lower levels of explanation (neurophysiology in this case) always underdetermine higher levels (cognitive psychology in this case).

It's funny to hear you bringing up semi consciousness again as if it is a term with any relevance here. But maybe you can explain what you mean in neuro terms rather than as some handwaving metaphor, like a volume button being turned down low or something. — Apokrisis

By empirical investigation, it is easy to establish the fact that conscious, semi-conscious, and non-conscious mind-body conditions exist: simply observe that people can be awake, asleep, or in a coma.

If, having a background in neuroscience, you wish to have PET, fMRI, MEG, NIRS, or some other type of data correlated with these conditions, that might be useful in classifying psychological functions such as attention (and intention), but how would it be relevant to the OP?

Inasmuch as attention has an intentional (voluntary, noticeable, controllable, conscious) aspect, and an unintentional (involuntary, unnoticeable, uncontrollable, semi-conscious) aspect, it is unsuitable even as a metaphor for consciousness. It could just as easily serve as a metaphor for semi-consciousness.

Also, does the OP ask about intransitive or transitive unconsciousness, or both? Probably both if condition determines function (especially if that function fluctuates between two conditions).

I think the unconscious is an unknown known, and one neurologist's woo is as flakey as his brother's. — unenlightened

I agree that the unconscious is an unknown known.

The remit of the scientist is to resolve empirical questions (i.e., to establish fact by means of empirical investigation) and provide reliable explanations. The remit of the philosopher is to resolve conceptual questions (i.e., to determine whether or not a concept makes sense by means of logical investigation) and provide coherent models. These are complementary tasks.

Cognitive Neuroscience is concerned with the neurophysiological processes which are associated with psychological functions. It is only through an integrative analysis of the explanations each domain generates that a complete explanation and coherent model of consciousness can be provided.

Why be such a dick? — Apokrisis

To demonstrate that you also do not explain neurophysiology, except by metaphor (which has no scientific or philosophical value). Similar to your pansemiosis monologues, it's reductionist pseudo-science-philosophy, colloquially known as woo, hand waving, fact free waffle, etc.

If you want to know what a good book on neuroscience is like, read Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, by Bennett and Hacker.

PMed. — Apokrisis

Your desire for anonymity will be respected.
Thanks for providing the title of a book which is actually sold by Amazon (presumably written by yourself).

Having read the reviews of this, and your other titles (as listed on Amazon), it is obvious that you are a well-read science writer, and that you are not a neuroscientist. In fact, Amazon describes you as a journalist and author.

None of these titles would be considered to be a textbook on neuroscience. I could spend £2.19 to purchase the title you recommended, but I suspect (and you know) that it doesn't contain an explanation of "attention" and "habit" written strictly in neurophysiological terms. Please ask one of your neuroscience contacts to write one for you. Thanks in advance.

I don't explain neurophysiology, but I would be interested in reading an explanation of "attention" and "habit" written in strictly neurophysiological terms. — Galuchat

There you go. It was fact free waffle. — Apokrisis

If you've written five books on neuroscience, it shouldn't be a difficult thing to provide the requested explanation. Or just give me the titles, I'll purchase them myself, and look for the answer (assuming your books have been published).

I don't explain neurophysiology, but I would be interested in reading an explanation of "attention" and "habit" written in strictly neurophysiological terms.

A better neuroscientific division than conscious vs unconscious is attentional vs habitual...
So what we are dealing with here is a natural dichotomy of brain activity towards either dealing with life in a rapid, learnt, unthinking way, or a more deliberative, attentive, and learning way. And this is a dynamical balancing act. We have to be doing both at once all the time. — Apokrisis

Neuroscience explains neurophysiology. Neurophysiology is correlated with, but insufficient to explain, psychological functions. Consciousness is a property of a whole human being (comprising body and mind), not of human brains.

Since the terms "conscious" and "unconscious" are familiar to, and used by, neuroscientists, philosophers, and psychologists, I see no reason to confuse the issue by replacing them with the terms "attention" and "habit" (which pertain to entirely different psychological phenomena). To make sense, that would be a metaphorical use of terms, hence; a category error.

Also, I have never liked the terms "subconscious" and "unconscious", finding them inadequate to the task of categorising psychological functions with respect to semantic information processing.
I would prefer to replace them with the terms "semi-conscious" and "non-conscious" (which are at least cognate). These, together with the term "conscious", seem to comprehend mind-body conditions which can be observed in the behaviour of others, and entail variations in awareness and responsiveness which can be measured.

The mind is variably aware, and the body is variably responsive, to wit:
1) Consciousness is a conscious condition, and to be conscious is to be fully aware and fully responsive.
2) Semi-Consciousness is a semi-conscious condition, and to be semi-conscious is to be partially aware and partially responsive.
3) Non-Consciousness is a non-conscious condition, and to be non-conscious is to be unaware and unresponsive.

Cognitive Psychology has long recognised the dual aspect of semantic information processing, whether it be termed:
1) Horizontal and Vertical
2) Controlled and Automatic
3) Slow and Fast
4) Serial and Parallel, or
5) Explicit and Implicit, etc.

Descriptions of consciousness and semi-consciousness correspond with descriptions of controlled and automatic processing, respectively. The nature and extent of the relations between types of consciousness and psychological functions remain to be fully discovered and explained.

Some, if not many, functions exhibit characteristics of both types of processing, sometimes switching seamlessly between them (e.g., problem solving). Attention is variously described as Global (Broad), Local (Narrow), Intentional (Active) Selection, and Automatic (Passive) Selection. There are other examples.

So, besides the two types of processing noted, could there be a third type which combines these two in serial (switched), or parallel (simultaneous), operation (otherwise known as ordinary fluctuations in consciousness)? Or even a fourth type which involves non-conscious processing (either independent of, or in combination with, conscious and semi-conscious processing)?

Is the unconscious a myth? — Mongrel

Only if other people are a myth, such as those:
1) suffering from certain forms of brain damage, epilepsy, akinetic mutism, delirium, traumatic experience, and psychosis.
2) who are in pharmacologically induced, minimally conscious, or persistent vegetative, states, or chronic coma.
3) who have been anaesthetised.

It would be more productive to ask: what types of semantic information do people in these conditions process?

Yes, just trying to 'Solve for Happy' (Mo Gawdat), without relying on a belief in grand purpose, or any sort of afterlife. It continues to amaze me that despite the astounding advances in technology, no one has figured out a sure-fire way to achieve lasting peace of mind. I've learned a lot of skills that have at least minimized the mental suffering, but I would pay almost every last cent I have to be rid of the last traces of depressed thinking and feeling. — CasKev

Then maybe what you need is a worldview instead of a bag of mind tricks.