What alternative(s) are there to explain life’s appearance given a time when life did not physically exist? — Javra

In the absence of evidence, explanations come from imagination, creativity, and propositional attitude.

...why should it be proscribed to refer to the underlying concepts I’ve so far addressed —which have been addressed in due context—as one possible type of intersubjective reality? — Javra

If it's the concept of noumenal objectivity you want to strengthen within the framework of your metaphysics, the only question I have is: on what basis, if not current science?

On a scientific (i.e., biological, psychological, and sociological) basis, I have no problem describing noumenal subjectivity, and intra-species intersubjectivity. But I'm not aware of any evidence to support inter-species intersubjectivity, much less noumenal objectivity.

However, that's not to say that it cannot be formulated on a different (i.e., unscientific) basis. For example, you could formulate noumenal objectivity on a spiritual, mystical, religious, theistic, or some other, basis.

As per wiktionary, it can also mean: (1) Involving or occurring between separate conscious minds. (2) Accessible to or capable of being established for two or more subjects. — Javra

In choosing to use a particular definition for a word (and words do have different meanings, depending on context), I prefer to use a definition which is sympathetic to the relevant field(s) of study, Wiktionary notwithstanding (as in deferring to biology for a definition of life). N.B. Wiktionary's first definition of life includes the word "reproduction".

Which relevant scientific discipline, or academic area of study would limit the meaning of intersubjectivity to those listed on Wiktionary? And if a scientific or academic definition is not listed on Wiktionary, is it invalid?

Wikipedia has a relevant article on intersubjectivity.

Even if one’s definition of “intersubjectivity” would have it so, there yet occurs overlap in umwelts between species. — Javra

Intersubjective: of, or pertaining to, the common interpretation of context which presupposes communication between individuals.

Intersubjectivity is a shared understanding based on a common sign system, not on a common environment. This is how science can be a global enterprise.

...physical life on this planet is predated by a time when no life occurred... — Javra

This may be true as far as the inferences of human science (an intersubjective enterprise) are concerned, but it says nothing regarding the cause of life (which is a different question altogether), and does not rise to the level of objectivity. In fact, it cannot even rise to the level of pan-species intersubjectivity, because the way each species interprets the world is limited by their own biologically-specific responsiveness/sentience/awareness. In other words, intersubjectivity only happens within species, not between species.

However, I am interested in concepts somewhat related to your noumenal objectivity, such as collective consciousness/unconsciousness (albeit types of human intersubjectivity).

Jakob von Uexkull's Umwelt refers to an individual's model of reality, which is constructed by species-specific sentience and awareness.

For human beings, that model consists of physical objects (phenomena) and mental objects (noumena). For other organisms, it may consist of other things. There may even be more than just physical and mental things (unless you think that homo sapiens is the apex of evolutionary development and that its mind will never comprehend things which are currently unknown).

I think it's presumptuous to say: life evolved from non-life, or noumena arise from phenomena, either vice versa, or that both arise from something else entirely. Peirce held that phenomena and noumena are two aspects of one substance. I don't know enough to say even that, preferring to maintain my species-specific common sense, and only say that physical things and mental things exist.

Von Uexkull and Peirce never knew of each other's work, but Umwelt explains why Peirce could say, "...the entire universe...is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs", and why Niels Bohr could say, "We are suspended in language in such a way that we cannot say what is up and what is down." Because for human beings, that is how we interpret the world: through signs, language being a sign system. For human beings, there is no other reality but that which human sentience and awareness impose upon us.

Pansemiotics, being the study of everything semiosis, should not be relevant only to physics, but also to all other sciences (including psychology and sociology), as well as to culture (the mindset and products of a social group).

Also, semiotics should not be interpreted, or elaborated upon, within, or communicated from, the context of any single scientific discipline, but rather serves to interpret and elaborate upon all scientific disciplines.

Since semiosis is sign processing (i.e., sign interpretation and modelling), I find it difficult to conceive of semiosis as anything other than an awareness process. Endosemiotics employs the signal aspect of signs to explain physiology. I think this may be a metaphorical application (i.e., a category error, as previously noted). And biosemiotics seems to rely on the premise that living matter is different from non-living matter to explain biology and zoology. This also may be a category error.

So why would I use the term "semiosis" in my definitions of life? Because "semiosis" is a term that's understood (if not universally accepted) and used within the field of biology (which is best suited among the sciences to define "life"), and is general enough to include endosemiosis, psychosemiosis and cultural semiosis.

I can only confidently place the functions of interpretation and modelling within an awareness context (i.e., one where perception, cognition and intuition occur), and so hold that semiotics applies exclusively to mental (not physical) things.That said, I would be interested in any functional explanations which connect thinking with non-thinking, and living with non-living, domains (much as chemistry provides a functional connection between other natural sciences).

Thanks very much for your follow-up thoughts. I think if I leave the definitions as they now stand, the phrase "through semiosis" (i.e., information processing, or with reference to organism reproduction, DNA replication) meets the need to convey species survival while the remainder serves to define individual instances.

Please don't hesitate to share any further insights you may have. My intent is that these definitions become formal domain ontology (information science) classes (fields in a relational database). Thanks again.

Worker bees serve as another example of life that does not reproduce. Less genetically predetermined but nevertheless real is the non-reproduction of most wild canids that are not themselves alpha mates. — Javra

Noted. Thanks very much; will drop "reproduce" from Natural Life definition.

But consider an organism that has never reproduced during the entirety of its lifespan; it would hold no biological fitness but would yet have been alive. — Javra

In view of the above, it seems prudent that I elaborate upon my definitions of life to include (N.B. the following examples of definition, not argument):

Life
1. The condition extending from cell division to death, characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients through semiosis.
2. The duration of an organism's existence.

Natural Life
1. The natural condition extending from cell division to death, characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients, respond to stimuli, mature, and adapt to the environment through semiosis.
2. The duration of an organism's natural existence.

Human Life
1. The natural condition extending from fertilisation to death, characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients, respond to stimuli, be aware, mature physically and mentally, reproduce, and adapt to the environment through human semiosis.
2. The duration of a person's existence.

Artificial Life
1. The artificial condition extending from cell division to death, characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients through semiosis.
2. The duration of an organism's artificial existence.

These are dependent upon the following definitions:

Artifice
Human design.

Nature
The universe unaffected by human beings.

Hence, I would be inclined to classify mules under artificial life, or life which exists by human design, or plan. As well as that condition which obtains when unresponsive human beings are placed on life support machines in hospital.

At this point, I part company at 'pan-semiosis', as I think that illegitimately takes aspects of Peirce's philosophy, which was overtly idealist, and then substitutes what he meant by 'mind' with the second law of thermodynamics. — Wayfarer

That's what comes from reading too much Pattee, and not enough Sebeok.

It's disingenuous to tout pansemiosis while ignoring psychosemiosis and disparaging aspects of cultural semiosis.

I also would be very much interested in an explanation of how informational constraint and material dynamic combine to form human value systems, not!

Can you give me a general definition of "mind" which is consistent with "how the physical world is itself a mind" and the human mind? Presumably, this definition would be consistent with current work in physiosemiotics and psychosemiotics. — Galuchat

Is it possible to extrapolate a definition of inorganic mind from what we know about organic minds using functional and/or semiotic terms without resorting to metaphor? — Galuchat

In science, talk about any quality ceases to be metaphor to the degree the quality can be measured or quantified. And my pansemiotic argument is... — Apokrisis

I'll take that as a "No".

Your explanatory metaphors may be compelling, but until they are translated into the specialist vocabulary of each particular science, and your concept of pansemiosis is accepted as an overarching principle, they are of no scientific value.

A definition of mind is required when it becomes necessary to differentiate between types of life. And different types of life have different types of mind. I think most biologists would agree that some types of life have no mind (e.g., plants).

The fields of ethology, comparative psychology, sociobiology and behavioural ecology are beginning to provide a common framework for understanding animal and human minds based on behaviour.

Apokrisis provides compelling explanatory metaphors to assert the existence of physical mind using semiotic terms based on physical behaviour.

Is it possible to extrapolate a definition of inorganic mind from what we know about organic minds using functional and/or semiotic terms without resorting to metaphor?

It is accepting formal and final cause as real at the cosmological level. Even if that is just the general desire for entropification served by the form of dissipative structure. And that does account for life and (actual) mind as biology is ultimately explained as dissipative structure.

So as I said about a tornado, it seems rather lifelike as it rages about a landscape. But it is being sustained by boundary conditions, not by any internal model that makes it a self with some degree of autonomy.


Any description of mind which uses psychological terms only as metaphor (e.g., accept, desire, rage, self, autonomy, as above) is inadequate, leading to confusion rather than clarity.

An accurate description of the human mind can be constructed using both physical and non-metaphorical psychological terms. I am not aware of any such description of an inorganic mind. Can you elaborate upon your general definition of mind to provide one?

"If we now want to answer scientific/metaphysical strength questions about natural kinds or essences - talk about the facts of the thing-in-itself, with no distorting human lens of self-interested speech - then we have to have a model of how the physical world is itself a mind doing semiosis."


There is disagreement within the semiotics community whether the field should include physiosemiotics and, by extension, pansemiotics (which would presumably include physiosemiotics and biosemiotics), or be limited to biosemiotics http://biosemiosis.blogspot.co.uk/2008/07/re-pan-and-bio.html

Can you give me a general definition of "mind" which is consistent with "how the physical world is itself a mind" and the human mind? Presumably, this definition would be consistent with current work in physiosemiotics and psychosemiotics.

What is life?

Life is different for each species, but generally, it is the condition extending from cell division to death, characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients, respond to stimuli, mature, reproduce, and adapt to the environment through semiosis.

For human beings, it is the condition extending from fertilisation to death, characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients, respond to stimuli, be aware, mature physically and mentally, reproduce, and adapt to the environment through human semiosis.

As previously mentioned, it can also mean the duration of something's *existence.