But it also applies to your contention of a causal connection between brain and mind, no less than any other causal relationship. — Wayfarer

Of course, the same applies for the causal link between brain activity and mental experiences as for any other causal relationship: no cause, no effect. Similarly, it is also true for this causal relation that it cannot be deduced by any logical conclusion of the world, but only by observation. A single observation of a thought without preceding brain activity is sufficient to say that mental experiences are not always caused by brain activity. However, as said, such a case has never been observed since brain scans have been available.

But you’re the one who keeps insisting on the absolute indubitability of the causal relationship between the brain and the mind. Why is this instance of an inductive causal relationship immune to Hume’s criticism which you’re so happy to apply to anything else? — Wayfarer

If I understand it correctly, Hume is not criticizing the postulation of causal relations per se, (such as friction and heat), rather he is commenting on the procedure by which these causal relations are derived: not by logical reasoning, but only by observation of multiple identical sequences of two successive events, which are then called cause and effect. What Hume claims is that from the observation of the cause alone, one cannot infer its effect; one can infer the effect only by observation and not by logical reasoning.

Hume is saying that causation is founded on reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

Amazing as I find it, I got the impression that Hume is saying that causation is NOT founded on reason. He says:

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. (EHU 4.9) — David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

In my understanding, "can never" is a negation and is equivalent to "can not". How you can interpret "can never" as an affirmation is a mystery to me

Sure, in humans and brainy animals. But that's not very interesting. — bert1

If it's not interesting, it's still quite controversial, especially among philosophers. :smile:

... consciousness in rocks only occurs when there is rock-activity — bert1

How can you prove your claim that consciousness occurs in rocks?

@bert1
It's less about conclusions and more about the repeated observation that brain activity always and invariably precedes mental experiences such as thoughts, decisions, or perceptions. The reverse order has not been observed a single time.

Hey guys, let's get back to the topic. Let's put aside Hume's opinion on causality and instead focus on mental experiences, or qualia. Although neuroscientists do not know how qualia arise from brain activity, they have observed that those qualia (perceptions, emotions and thoughts) are caused by brain activity and never the other way around. That means, they have observed that mental experiences always occur after the corresponding brain activities and never without such a lead-up.

You might be thinking like Jaegwon Kim, and for similar reasons (i.e. the causal closure of the physical + the causal exclusion argument + the supervenience of high-level entities and processes over the physical domain.) — Pierre-Normand

I don't know Jaegwon Kim, but if he holds that there are higher levels above the physical realm, then I certainly don't think like him.

So if we say X did such and such out of "Custom" or "Habit", we are really saying that we do not properly understand why X did that, — Metaphysician Undercover

This is exactly what Hume wants to say: that we do not properly understand why the same cause is always followed by the same effect.

Notice the inherent contradiction, or hypocrisy in Hume's words. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry to say that by speaking of "hypocrisy in Hume's words" you show that you have not understood his argument at all.

To say that custom or habit is the cause of something, is just to avoid the question of what is the the real cause of that thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hume does not say that custom or habit is the cause of something but rather he is saying that our knowledge of the relation between cause and effect is ...

... founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past. — David Hume (EHU 4.21)

But demonstrative reasoning (concerning relations of ideas) cannot establish the supposition in question,

... since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. — David Hume (EHU 4.18)

@Wayfarer

thoughts and feelings are seen as caused by brain activity. — Jacques

causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit — Jacques

These two statements do not contradict each other, as you may imply. The first one only says that thoughts are always preceded by a specific brain activity and that no thought has ever been observed that was not preceded by such a brain activity (provided of course that one observes the brain from which the thought originates by means of fMRI). This is consistent with Hume's statement about causality:

... our knowledge [about the relation of cause and effect] is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past. — David Hume (EHU 4.19)

If you continue to find a contradiction between my two statements, you are welcome to point it out.

A careful analysis of the two principle forms of causation reveals that the necessity of "because of physical law" is reducible to a form of the necessity of "because of reason". Simply put, the laws of physics are principles of reason, and the necessity which supports them is a logical necessity, inductive and deductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. I tend to follow Hume's view that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit (as stated in his "Enquiry on Human Understanding"):

And though [one] should be convinced, that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nonetheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle, which determines him to form such a conclusion. This principle is CUSTOM or HABIT. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding; we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. — David Hume EHU 5.4-5

It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. — David Hume EHU 7.28

Neuro-reductionism is the argument that the mind can be "reduced" (made equivalent) to the brain. This sees the brain as identical to its thoughts and feelings. In neuro-reductionism, as neuroscientists study the brain, they gain an understanding of the mind.

"Reduced" does not mean "made equivalent to" but rather "explained by" and it does not mean that the brain is seen as identical to its thoughts and feelings but rather that the thoughts and feelings are seen as caused by brain activity.

The tendency of reductionism is to conflate the two kinds of causation, physical and logical: which is what we do when we say that 'the brain' acts in a particular way, and so 'produces' thought, because of physical causation. The 'because' of reasons - the 'space of reasons', it has been called - can't be explained in those terms, because it belongs to a different level of explanation. — Wayfarer

I would not speak of a different level of explanation, but rather of a different kind of communication: a metaphorical one that should not be confused with reality.

There is a distinction made in Talbott's example between the because of reason and the because of physical causation. To equate the two kinds is to deny the efficacy of reason, as your argument is then already determined by the disposition of your neurons. — Wayfarer

I did not equate the two kinds of causation, because I do not attach any reality to the "causation by reasons". Causation by reasons belongs to a metaphorical way of speaking, which has nothing to do with reality. Indeed, we often give the wrong reasons for our decisions and actions because we are often mistaken about the real reasons.

To claim that our reasons are determined by the disposition of our neurons is not to deny the efficacy of reason - this would only be the case if neurons were not working efficiently.

You might be thinking like Jaegwon Kim, and for similar reasons (i.e. the causal closure of the physical + the causal exclusion argument + the supervenience of high-level entities and processes over the physical domain.) — Pierre-Normand

I don't think there are higher and lower levels of reality, instead I do believe there are only different perspectives on one and the same reality.

The idea of panpsychism seems rather strange to me, not to mention that the truth of this idea cannot be verified or falsified.

Our having reasons to do things causes things to happen in the world. Rational causation is a form of downward causation — Pierre-Normand

In my view there is only one real form of causation: physical causation. All other forms are metaphorical or attributional.

This touches upon a point I've been debating ever since joining forums - of reason understood as 'the relations of ideas'. The tendency of reductionism is to conflate the two kinds of causation, physical and logical: which is what we do when we say that 'the brain' acts in a particular way, and so 'produces' thought, because of physical causation. The 'because' of reasons - the 'space of reasons', it has been called - can't be explained in those terms, because it belongs to a different level of explanation. — Wayfarer

As we know from brain research, an idea is not caused by other ideas but by brain activities. These activities remain unknown to us for the majority, because only about ten percent of them are heaved into the consciousness. Let me explain: an idea cannot be a cause already because an idea is a representation, an imagination or a fiction. The sentence "I have an idea." is a symbolic narrative to which no real content corresponds. Neither is there an "I", nor can this "I" "possess" anything, such as an idea, all is just fiction.

This sentence is similar to another one, "I drag the file to the trash." Neither there is a recycle bin on the monitor, nor a file, nor is anything dragged, all just symbols. In reality, we operate the mouse and this triggers actions in the processor, on the hard disk and on the monitor. Similarly, if we say "The red knight has killed the black knight" in a computer game: it's all just symbols and representations.

Much of the linking of brains and consciousness seems to me to be assumed on the basis of alterations in brain function altering what we experience. But why can't the alterations in a rock's functioning alter the rock's experience? I'm not quite sure why it's considered reasonable to focus on brains particularly when looking for consciousness in nature. — bert1

Aha, you're a panpsychist, right? My assumption was a different one: That all functions of our brain would also be possible without any personal experience.

"That's all fab, but why can't that happen in the dark? Why does any of this constitute or necessitate subjective awareness. or consciousness, or the capacity to experience?" — bert1

I have often asked myself this question, albeit in a different variant: "Couldn't the human brain perform its functions even without consciousness?" and I said to myself: Orientation can also be done by an unconscious computer in an autonomous vehicle, memory, experience and learning can also be done by AI systems and a lot of other functions of the human brain like creativity, analysis, face recognition, predictions, language ... etc.

Thus, I had the idea that maybe all of the brain functions, even those which imply consciousness could be done without consciousness as well. I realize that this is a tentative and superficial conclusion that some would say is pure heresy, but this is what has been bothering me for decades.

Maybe it will be like the science of human origins. It draws from a variety of sciences to answer one question. — frank

A variety of sciences? I thought it was just biology alone.

... there is a great deal of interesting science around identifying the neural correlates of particular experiences, which is great, but that doesn't say much about how consciousness comes about in the first place. — bert1

More precisely, until now they are unable to say anything at all about how consciousness comes about.

Neuroscience has nothing to say about phenomenal consciousness. — bert1

I would like to confirm you by quoting the German neuroscientist Gerhard Roth, who said: "As about consciousness, it is a great mystery even for neuroscientists."

I learned that there is a moral system for any type of behavior. For the selfish there is Ayn Rand's "Objectivism", for the religious there is Christian morality, for Moslems the sharia, for atheists humanism, for animal lovers there is PETA ... a.s.o. Even the mafia has its moral rules.

Agree. In my opinion morality is the last big illusion of mankind, after the flat earth, the geocentric view, and freewill.