Mass confusion on this thread regarding morality. Let me repeat myself: Point of clarification: just because a group embraces, let's say, cannibalism, wouldn't mean that group was practicing a justified or intelligent morality, it would just mean it was the adopted morality of the group. Here's the real problem, when people in Papua New Guinea would eat people they had a religious belief that justified this action as somehow having significance. The question is whether or not we will let unconscious superstition dictate our morals or whether we will use knowledge to craft precepts that are intelligent? With superstition nothing is off the table, all the way to the horror of consuming other humans because it means they become part of your spirit. I vote for a morality based on knowledge, and what is interesting, so does every modern Christian, this is why they reject the archaic morality of their ancestors.

Society is obsessed with photos and mirrors. — Gregory

Things that fall under the heading of technology, at least photos. Interesting, technology allows us to worship ourselves, Christianity did the same, it just did it through proxy, that is, 'mankind is so great that God made everything for him, even killed himself for this golden species.' Tremendous egoism and narcissism disguised as humility.

Maybe this is the real culprit behind religion, how well it allows us to validate our own importance? If this is the case, no religion has even come close to technology in this sense.

It doesn't matter how one feels about a particular thinker, if a person makes valid points then they are speaking to the relevance of philosophy. I have seen too many emotive thinkers on here who don't engage positions merely because they have some emotional dislike of the person: this is not philosophy, this is bias and a crippled psychology. Mill knew that truth was not a respecter of persons, he also knew that mankind's default position, to be offended by those who refute us or challenge us, is backwards. Those who refute us do us a favor, they rescue us from error, thus taught Mill in the second chapter of his Essay on Liberty. To reject a thinker's ideas, because one dislikes their person or has been offended, is an ignorant repudiation of truth. It marks a kind of negative, intellectual boundary that is being dictated by a person's emotional state. We must be of the mindset as philosophers that we would accept the truth from our most hated enemies were they to speak it. This is what philosophical objectivity looks like. I merely say these things, because though I am not fond of this topic, the author here has not merely offered up some platitudes, but has taken the time to put forth arguments, to defend his position on egoism. This is commendable, and regardless of how one feels about egoism, or the author, one should engage the arguments. He is prepared to have a serious conversation on it, I speak in defense of the objectivity of thought against the emotivism which seeks to fallaciously evade it.

The true nature of reality is that we are not supposed to be here — Gregory

As usual, an interesting, original comment. Friend, I hope you just keep on being you.

The universe is certainly hostile to the life that we are, on such an overabundant level that it's hard to see how anyone could argue that this universe was made for the kind of life that we are. Most of this planet is not even habitable for our species.

No matter how good technology gets, it won't solve the core mysteries of existence: Why are we here? What's the point of this existence? What's the true nature of reality? As long as those questions remain unanswered, people will turn to religion. — RogueAI

Strange you say this, because people are only turning to organized religion in a superficial sense. Are you really suggesting that people will choose the comfort of the ideal of God over Netflix? Come on son, that world is dying. Further, religion does not answer the questions you posed, it merely pretends to answer them.

I didnt mean it as an argument my apologies. I simply wanted to get a clearer picture of what you were saying. — DoppyTheElv

It takes time to learn this about dialectics, but it also takes time to be able to put this into practice because one has to gain some knowledge in order to be able to discourse with knowledge. It's understandable that this approach would be contested, it's certainly counter-intuitive to rationality. I can't tell you exactly when I realized this in discourse, but I remember realizing that I should just try to reply to a response without going into the question of definition, I thought I had a basic idea of what the other person was saying, the surprise is that the discourse then begins to move. However, like I already mentioned, there are times when this is not possible. People are dishonest (as well as subconscious) and they try to smuggle in premises, this cannot be allowed, especially if much is at stake, if we are talking about Christian morality, for example. Christians are notorious for asking loaded questions, which means one cannot have advanced dialectical discourses with them, one seldom makes it past the point of arguments over definition. Demanding a definition for every term is the mark of a novice dialectician.

But surely one can be a novice dialectic when it comes to one particular subject and a well versed one when it comes to another. — DoppyTheElv

Yes. We are all in this predicament no matter how intelligent or well read we might be, the world of knowledge has surpassed the ability of the individual mind.

If a philosopher of mind and a philosopher of religion meet to have a discussion, would not one of them require some definitions to be able to continue discourse? — DoppyTheElv

Yes. But this begs that question, why would I attempt to have a conversation on the philosophy of mind (with a person who is learned in this area) without any prior knowledge?

What I said is quite accurate friend... even now you do not need a definition for every word I use, and what does this allow us to do? It allows us to communicate at a deeper level.

One thing I would try to clarify about this topic is that we need to be able to impart critical thinking skills to people. This helps to narrow the objective. The thing about this is that there are literally masterful texts written on this topic, which is good because it means we don't have to invent the wheel, it has already been done, all we need to do it make use of the material. Too many times we approach a topic with the assumption that we must start from scratch, in our modern world this is almost never the case.

You are incorrect. Logical thinking requires solid definitions. — Philosophim

Yes, it does require some definitions, but you fail to grasp my point. What you are talking about is the process of novice dialectics. This is proven quite easily, when two knowledgeable philosophers come together to discourse they do not define every term, because they are not coming to the conversation without any prior understanding. Further, if you reason this way you will not get very far in knowledge. I can easily play what I call, 'the narrowing game,' but I try not to do it because I am trying to get somewhere in the conversation, I am not merely trying to win. You are, in fact, already practicing what I say, unless I'm mistaken and you define every conjunction? Of course you don't and neither does the other person because you have a basic understanding of these symbols. It's the same way with more advanced dialectics, this act of presupposing, of shared meaning, is how knowledge unfolds through dialectic.

I usually do not discourse with novice dialecticians. I don't have time for it. They would be better served by seeking out someone like yourself. As I already said: 'I'm not saying this should never be done, sometimes it's forced by the context.'

But I think what makes something a religion is the structure of the belief system, and I don't see that similarity between the structure of the belief systems relating to God, and the structure of the belief systems relating to technology. — Metaphysician Undercover

While technology is free of a formalized, dogmatic structure humans do have beliefs regarding its value, but like I mentioned above, I think what warrants it to the category of a kind of modern religion is man's reverence for it.

So what I see in the human relationship with technology is a lack of religion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this is how an archaic religion would view the question, that is, that the new religion does not qualify as being a religion because it's lacking the attributes of the previous religion.

Its very obvious to define "technology" as religion, when every aspect fits the major "theories" of religion. — batsushi7

I think one of the main things for me is its status of reverence in the lives of individuals and cultures.

I was wondering if making predictions about global political events requires that one adopt neo-realism. — frank

Making predictions is an interesting topic. Who can do it infallibly? Nevertheless, I would argue that probable anticipation is a duty of philosophy. Does one need to predict to be able to act? In some sense I think we do, but here the object is not so much events per se, but the effectiveness of social action. I think one must be able to see contradiction arise from the being of things in order to gain skill in prediction. As always we must be cautious that our pursuit of theory is not, as it is for so many who call themselves philosophers, an excuse to evade reality or responsibility.

Will private message to keep thread on track. :smile:

One thing I think we can all agree on, is that part of our culture here, is we are all freely allowed to question the morals of other cultures. Would you agree with that? — MSC

I'm not so sure about this. I think on this forum it eventually comes down to how many people our questions offend, which is backward because the essence of philosophy is negation.

Would theists be open to the idea that God is entirely female? — Gregory

If they in any way use nature to form their conclusion I don't see how they could possibly get around it.

"Yes, it is an ideal we project, but that's exactly what the law of identity is, an ideal." -- Metaphysician Undercover

Even as an ideal the concept is not merely made up of a one-sided determination. In order to make sense of a 'part' one must make use of the concept 'whole.' What, after all, would the 'inner' be without the 'outer'? This is Hegel's reasoning when it comes to identity.    

I said: 'if you subtract the concretion of the chair and your senses, and leave only your mind, you would not arrive at an understanding of a chair.'

You said: "This claim is unsupported, and actually sort of absurd. You have no way of saying what type of form a mind with no senses could come up with." -- Metaphysician Undercover

My claim is that your concept of a chair presupposes, not only the existence of a chair independent of your mind, but also your senses. I would go even further and claim that this is self-evident, if you went deaf and blind tomorrow your ability to form concepts would immediately be restricted because it would be much harder to take in information. 

I said: 'The easy way to refute this is simply to re-ask the question, is identity different from itself? You obviously have to say no. We could try to say that identity is not saying this, but that would merely amount to a denial of its actual being.'

You replied: "We are not talking about whether identity is the same as itself, we are talking about whether a thing is the same as itself. So you just go off on an unintelligible tangent here, assuming that identity is a thing. But identity is not a thing, it is something that we say a thing has, a thing has identity. And, the law of identity states that the thing is the same as itself. We are not saying that the thing's identity is the same as the thing's identity, that would be redundant. We are saying that the thing's identity is such that the thing is the same as itself. The law of identity is something (a law) which is applied to things by human beings. To ask whether identity is the same as itself is to reify identity, making identity the thing rather than something the thing has." -- Metaphysician Undercover

In the first instance identity is a formal claim. It is a statement about an object. The problem with this statement is that it is very specific and very narrow; the problem is that it negates itself. You are claiming that a thing is not different from itself, which is just the negative side of the identity position. Hegel puts it this way: "It is thus the empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that identity and difference are different. They do not see that in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity is different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be different."

He is correct, the identity position is, and must say this, in order to protect itself from the difference it is saying it is not. When you say a thing is itself you are at the same time saying that it is not different from itself, this is Hegel's masterful point, the contradiction emerges from identity itself.

I said: 'The answer is that you have three different symbols combined together in order to construct the law of identity. This is not my opinion. This was not Hegel's opinion, this is an empirical fact regarding the symbolic structure of identity. Why this structure, why not another?'

You replied: "There is another structure. It's the proposition "A thing is the same as itself". There's more than three different symbols here. The fact that Hegel can represent this as A=A does not mean that A=A is the only way that the law of identity can be represented. I'm sure that other people can think of other ways to represent it. Suppose I say Z represents "a thing is the same as itself. Then I've represented the law of identity with one symbol, no different symbols with unity." -- Metaphysician Undercover  

This is where our exchange finally begins to narrow. Here you failed to comprehend the literalness of Hegel's argument. You, as a matter of fact, cannot bring the law of identity into being with the symbol of Z, this solitary symbol articulates nothing. In order to bring the law of identity into conceptual being you must make use of identity, difference and unity. In every occurrence of identity you must make use of... must identify... different symbols that are taken together in unity. This is a material fact regarding the existence of the concept of identity. Try to articulate the law of identity without making use of unity and difference, you will not be able to do it. I hope you will not kick against this my friend but join me in celebrating the genius of Hegel's discovery. What mind could go up against Aristotle in this sense? No one! He held his ground for two thousand years. But Hegel, how did he do it (!), comes along and breaks down Aristotle's thoughts into their finer dialectical components, not fallaciously, but on Aristotle's own terms. This is truly astounding and it marks a turning point in philosophical history!  

"What needs to be done is to address the meaning of the law, not the symbolization of it." -- Metaphysician Undercover

Of course, but its meaning is derived from its formation. The premise is not supposed to violate itself. Hegel proves that its determination inevitably casts it into negation.

"Actually, it's you and Hegel who went beyond the premise of the law, by bringing in negation." -- Metaphysician Undercover

Hegel is not bringing negation from the outside; he is demonstrating that it is already contained in the law. This is proven by the fact that the Aristotelian formation states that identity and difference are different, that is, a thing is not different from itself.

" Clearly observation shows us how one thing can be both the same as itself and different from itself, due to the nature of change and temporal extension." -- Metaphysician Undercover

As Hegel says: "...the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself."

I said: 'It doesn't matter what you try to say the law is doing or does, what matters is what it actually contains; what matters is whether you have to go beyond it in order to derive the value you need from it.'

You said: "Right, and this law contains nothing about difference or unity. Therefore your attempt to relate these concepts to that law, in a way which is inconsistent with the law, is nothing but an attempt to reject the law through the use of semantics."

The point I'm about to make is exceedingly important. It was my hunch that Aristotelians would reply to Hegel's position by claiming that it was 'just semantics.' But this doesn't work because the law of identity is itself semantical! There is no way around this, logic is perhaps the most vital part of semantics. One cannot state a semantical law and then complain when it is refuted by semantics. Hegel's genius on essence has yet to be discovered by our species, it's a beautiful, untapped area of philosophy that carries philosophy into the future.

As Hegel said about those who hold to the Aristotelian position on identity: "Thinking that keeps to external reflection and knows of no other thinking but external reflection, fails to attain to a grasp of identity in the form just expounded, or of essence, which is the same thing. Such thinking always has before it only abstract identity, and apart from and alongside it, difference. In its opinion, reason is nothing more than a loom on which it externally combines and interweaves the warp, of say, identity, and then the woof of difference; or, also, again proceeding analytically, it now extracts especially identity and then also again obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness and then also again a positing of unlikeness — likeness when abstraction is made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing of likeness. These assertions and opinions about what reason does must be completely set aside, since they are in a certain measure merely historical; the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself. The Notion of identity, that it is simple self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection but has come from being itself. Whereas, on the contrary, that identity that is aloof from difference, and difference that is aloof from identity, are products of external reflection and abstraction, which arbitrarily clings to this point of indifferent difference."

Equivocation? How so? — TheMadFool

The topic here is the question, 'Is Technology a New Religion,' you are talking about people deriving pleasure or satisfaction from religion.

I maybe completely off the mark on this one but I get the distinct feeling that parents love it when their kids are smart and simply go bonkers when they're smarter. — TheMadFool

Yes, your comment is an equivocation, though an innocent one. :smile:

That was so hard hitting I need to collect my teeth from the floor. Damn. :strong:

I don't see what you're getting at. If something becomes an indispensable part of a person's life, say a car, or a phone, why would you call that thing a religion, unless the person was worshipping it as an idol? — Metaphysician Undercover

For me the qualifier here is not idol worship, but the irrational role it comes to dominate in one's life. The above quote by Modrow is interesting because he points this out in a swift way: "Computers are an absolutely awesome creation. One would think the mere fact that humans could create such wonderful machines would be cause to celebrate the excellence of the human mind. But do we ever hear this? No, instead, the mere existence of computers is used to belittle the human mind."

When I speak of religion it's very important to keep in mind that it's from a sociological analysis. This perspective begins from the premise that religions are culturally formed belief systems. Maybe is correct and we have no choice but begin with a formal definition, however, in order to cover ground we must not get stuck here. I do think this topic is of value because our culture is immersed in technology. Further, religious people are more attached to technology than they are their own religions. This is most fascinating. Technology from the sociological perspective is not just technology, it has a cultural and psychological element to it.

all worship is idolatry because nothing is the summation of all good. — Gregory

Well, I never thought about this before. But I think my position would come something close to this. Can worship ever be a good thing? (Interesting question). Is worship the kind of thing that always implies an unconscious negativity? I'm not sure. Would the worship of thought be problematic? Is there anything we could worship that would increase our quality as humans?

I guess you might be wanting to discuss whether the worship of idols qualifies as a religion? — Metaphysician Undercover

Not this.

Or would you dispute that the worship of technology qualifies as idolatry? — Metaphysician Undercover

Not this as well.

What I'm getting at is man's embrace of technology, not in the sense that we formally consider it religion, this would not even occur to us. I'm referring to technology as a religion through a kind of historical, sociological analysis, only we are trying to preempt the history in our analysis. What makes it a religion? The answer is nothing conscious on our part, it is our practical embrace and use of technology, the role it has come to play in our lives.

As a courtesy Im letting you know I do not like you — DingoJones

Neither truth or quality can be dictated or restricted on the basis of offense, which is just one's emotive psychology thwarting more objective considerations. See John Stuart Mill, Essay on Liberty Chapter 2. It is a hard lesson but one that every serious thinker must eventually come to terms with.

There is no morally condemning act… They are cultural creations, etc. — bcccampello

There are many morally condemning acts, such as spanking children, we now know this is destructive to their development as healthy humans. (Good luck refuting this with religion!)

Further, all morality is cultural, even the morality which claims to be Divine! The only difference is whether we allow man's unconscious superstition to dictate morality, or whether we use knowledge, as mentioned above, to construct a morality of intelligence.

The old moral arguments are dead, and it was not the philosophers, but the psychologists who killed them! And so far from, "wiping away the horizon with a sponge," to use Nietzsche's terms, we have unshackled the species from its own stupidity.

Consensus morality is problematic, but that doesnt mean it doesnt have utility. — DingoJones

I already answered this, see above.

Don't we always assume that interpretation of facts is possible only in the setting of rules (for interpreting)? — frank

Forget this academic preponderance and just proceed to the act of interpreting information that's important. This is my approach, I suspect nearly everyone on this Forum will disagree with me, but what do you get at the end of the day after you have followed this preponderance into its most narrow abyss? I have already answered this question, there are enough important things for me to comprehend, I don't have time to get stuck on these kind of questions.

Yes but we have to connect the computer symbols with the screen technology. — Gregory

This is true, and I think, a good point. Literal symbolism is hyperized by technology, but instead of giving allegiance to a solitary symbolic structure, in technology the gadget gives one a kind of mastery or liberalism over symbolic structures in general. This would make technology a vastly superior religion to any religion that came before it.

Without defining what a religion is, I'm not sure we can come to any meaningful discussion comparing it to technology. — Philosophim

Religion is already operating and functioning in the world and has been for thousands of years. The formal definition is not needed. My approach to this question is to view it through the operational lens. The last thing I said is the most important: The hardest part here is the ability to think outside the context of technology and to analyze it from a sociological perspective. One must pretend they are looking back on the age of technology to observe 1) what it did to man and 2) how man embraced it.

What I have learned, having had many exchanges, is that the act of formally defining things is often the mark of a novice dialectician. (Imagine a young person reading Plato for the first time and then just asking for a definition of every word, this is insecure). I have learned that it's often a good way not to get anywhere in the domain of knowledge. My goal is to cover ground as swiftly as possible. I'm not saying this should never be done, sometimes it's forced by the context.

We don't see people worshipping cars — Gregory

I would argue we most certainly do, but here "worship" has changed from the older, organized, religious ritual, to one that we would not consciously call "worship." It has to do with man's reverence and love for the object. There are people, if you scratch their (metal object) car they will kill you.

Much fasnication with technology has to do with sexuality — Gregory

Friend, like I have already said, your contribution to this Forum is totally original. Technology and sexuality is another interesting topic. I think it could be a separate thread.

First, we would need to define what a religion is. — Philosophim

I have purposely bypassed this approach. This leads to a dead end.

They become bored. — Philosophim

Same as religion, it provided a constant narrative of excitement, good and evil, spirits, heaven, hell, through which life was framed and carried along in a kind of daze. Remove these from the psyche and many people struggle to cope. Freud's explanation is still the best one on religion, Becker expanded it.

Did you have a symbol in mind yourself to discuss? — Philosophim

No, I am not suggesting that technology is religious in the sense of literal symbols. I am literally talking about the gadgets themselves, this is why I said they are more like 'entities.' But we have to analyze them from the basis of a symbolic structure, I believe they fall into this category. And even if they don't, it would still be utterly fascinating to analyze them from this basis.

The hardest part here is the ability to think outside the context of technology and to analyze it from a sociological perspective. One must pretend they are looking back on the age of technology to observe 1) what it did to man and 2) how man embraced it.

This is a highly unpleasant paper to read. I am not an analytical philosopher for good reasons.

I think this is a terrible way to approach the topic of comprehension or communication.

"Here is a highly simplified and idealised proposal about what goes on. An interpreter has, at any moment of a speech transaction, what I persist in calling a theory... To put this differently: the theory we actually use to interpret an utterance is geared to the occasion. We may decide later we could have done better by the occasion, but this does not mean (necessarily) that we now have a better theory for the next occasion." Ibid. pg. 260

It seems to me this entire approach is shattered and eclipsed by cultural psychology. Further, Davidson is here speaking of actions divorced from their historical contexts, as if the premises he is arriving at have some kind of meaning apart from their cultural history.

"The speaker wants to be understood, so he intends to speak in such a way that he will be interpreted in a certain way." Ibid.

Does he now?

I find it exceedingly hard to subject myself to this:

"I have distinguished what I have been calling the prior theory from what I shall henceforth call the passing theory. For the hearer, the prior theory expresses how he is prepared in advance to interpret an utterance of the speaker, while the passing theory is how he does interpret the utterance. For the speaker, the prior theory is what he believes the interpreter’s prior theory to be, while his passing theory is the theory he intends the interpreter to use. I am now in a position to state a problem that arises if we accept the distinction between the prior and the passing theory and also accept the account of linguistic competence given by principles (1)–(2)." Ibid. pg.261

Maybe have a little fun to redeem the time it took to read it:

"The asymptote
of agreement and
understanding
is when passing theories coincide.

But the passing theory
cannot in general
correspond to an interpreter’s
linguistic competence.

Not only does it have its changing list
of proper names and
gerrymandered
vocabulary,
but it includes every successful--
correctly interpreted—
use of any other word or phrase,
no matter how far out of the ordinary."

How to know this?
Perhaps one just creates it?

"Every deviation from ordinary usage, as long as it is agreed on for the moment..."

Agreed on it? Agree on it? What's this, the hidden axiom of the interpreter?

"A passing theory is not a theory of what anyone (except perhaps a philosopher) would call an actual natural language." Ibid. pg.261

No one but a philosopher? Yes, indeed, this tells us a great deal about [analytical] philosophers!

But Mr. Davidson, at least the paper has some kind of value?

"Mastery’ of such a language would be useless, since knowing a passing theory is only knowing how to interpret a particular utterance on a particular occasion." Ibid.

What's this then we are discussing? Strange particulars?

"The answer is that when a word or phrase temporarily or locally takes over the role of some other word or phrase (as treated in a prior theory, perhaps), the entire burden of that role, with all its implications for logical relations to other words, phrases, and sentences, must be carried along by the passing theory." Ibid.

But "A passing theory is not a theory of what anyone (except perhaps a philosopher) would call an actual natural language." Ibid.

"In fact we always have the interpreter in mind; there is no such thing as how we expect, in the abstract, to be interpreted. We inhibit our higher vocabulary, or encourage it, depending on the most general considerations, and we cannot fail to have premonitions as to which of the proper names we know are apt to be correctly understood." Ibid. pg.261

I like this, language is not so logical after all.

"In any case, my point is this: most of the time prior theories will not be shared,and there is no reason why they should be. Certainly it is not a condition of successful communication that prior theories be shared..." Ibid.

"Neither the prior theory nor the passing theory describes what we would call the language a person knows..." Ibid.

Mr. Davidson, I am struggling to see why you even wrote this paper?

"Perhaps it will be said that what is essential to the mastery of a language is not knowledge of any particular vocabulary, or even detailed grammar, much less knowledge of what any speaker is apt to succeed in making his words and sentences mean. What is essential is a basic framework of categories and rules, a sense of the way English (or any) grammars may be constructed, plus a skeleton list of interpreted words for fitting into the basic framework." Ibid.

I can move in this direction. I see mastery as an important topic.

"This characterization of linguistic ability is so nearly circular that it cannot be wrong: it comes to saying that the ability to communicate by speech consists in the ability to make oneself understood, and to understand. It is only when we look at the structure of this ability that we realize how far we have drifted from standard ideas of language mastery. For we have discovered no learnable common core of consistent behaviour, no shared grammar or rules, no portable interpreting machine set to grind out the meaning of an arbitrary utterance. We may say that linguistic ability is the ability to converge on a passing theory from time to time—this is what I have suggested, and I have no better proposal. But if we do say this, then we should realize that we have abandoned not only the ordinary notion of a language, but we have erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally." Ibid. Pg.264-265

I'm not sure why the assumption of knowing a language should specifically be contained in its rules, like with everything else, it's the psychology that makes the rules.

"I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases..." Ibid.

Am I wrong or is this the conclusion of a loaded premise based on premises (1), (2) and (3)?

"(1) First meaning is systematic. A competent speaker or interpreter is able to interpret utterances, his own or those of others, on the basis of the semantic properties of the parts, or words, in the utterance, and the structure of the utterance. For this to be possible, there must be systematic relations between the meanings of utterances.

"(2) First meanings are shared. For speaker and interpreter to communicate successfully and regularly, they must share a method of interpretation of the sort described in (1).

"(3) First meanings are governed by learned conventions or regularities. The systematic knowledge or competence of the speaker or interpreter is learned in advance of occasions of interpretation and is conventional in character." Ibid. pg.254

There "is no such thing as a language" because we fail to quantify it with the analytical method? This is a bearing on analyticity as opposed to language.

Well thank you! I just got lucky though, I read his response three times before I noticed there was an assumption. — MSC

No, that's not luck. You read it multiple times in a critical fashion. Bravo. If only we could get more critical thinking into the world.

Quite sincere. :smile:

If that is all you're aware of, aren't you making the assumption that they are Antifa? If you don't know either way then mighten they not be a false flag? — MSC

What an excellent display of critical reasoning.

Antifa violence and fear thereof are simply not grounded in reality. — Benkei

So true. Literally just a scapegoat to distract, textbook fascism.

I will here simplify your position: the problem with your thinking is that you are not actually thinking about this word, "objective." How you define this word will determine everything else you are trying to achieve or comprehend. Further, and this is the point that really matters, any supposed "Objectivity" you think you are referencing in any Absolutist or Supernatural sense is an indefensible lie. This is very important and this is why: the place you believe meaning to exist, that place is and has always been the non-objective that merely called itself The Objective. This is very important because it proves the objectivity you desire and thought existed was merely the non-objective, what gave this domain power was your false belief regarding its nature. This does not leave us in a black hole. Christians think the Bible contains objective morals, it doesn't and never has, it has only ever contained cultural morals. So here's the point, one doesn't need to despair, just as Christian morals were created and had value, even as they replaced more primitive values, we can do the exact same thing and have already been doing it for a very long time. The question of "Objective Values," is a useless, abstract hypothetical that plays in the realm of a make believe ontology. It is actually a sophistical device used to create a false dichotomy in order to nihilistically condemn reality, thereby leveraging the student in the direction of the idealistic image.

I would like to see some of the thinkers on here comment on technology within the context of symbolism, specifically contrasting it with religious symbolism. Symbols play an emotional role in our lives and every religion has a symbolic structure. I think technology even transcends this medium in some sense because it's so interactive, further the symbols of technology are more like entities as opposed to symbols, which makes the analysis most interesting. I would argue that as a society we don't even think about technology we simply make use of it. In times past the writer of a so-called "holy book," could say he created an Epistle that came directly from God, this was a masterful form of rhetoric that worked on the human psyche for a very long time, tragically, it still does. But with technology the Epistle that comes from God comes from those who create technology: the new Epistle writer is the creator of technology. Technology, though unconsciously, has become the new revelatory medium. The traditional Epistle would go out into the world and interact with society, it had an impact, technology does the same thing though not necessarily in an ideological way, but it has a social impact, like the Epistle, it transforms society because it transforms the individual. In order to analyze technology in terms of religion one must understand religion in sociological terms, one must strive to view technology through this same sociological lens.