in the Aristotelian conception of "identity", change and therefore difference, is inherent within a thing's identity — Metaphysician Undercover
You mean these are the same? No difference needs to be drawn in order to make a distinction, which would indeed imply, as Hegel says, going beyond the principle of identity? How can you contain identity and difference in the same instance of identity? Further, how can you identify something as being the same which is itself beyond the "inert imagine" that identity strives to cast? Of course, you should have worked through all these questions and many more doing post-doctoral work on Hegel? Unless of course, you just focused on his aesthetics? Unless of course, you haven't actually done any post-doctoral work on Hegel? Your replies are a good indication that you've never even read him.
It's called the law of identity, stupid. "A thing is the same as itself". Do you not comprehend that a thing necessarily has temporal extension, and also that a thing changes as time passes? Therefore we can conclude that change and difference are inherent within the identity of the thing, as an aspect of its sameness. There is no contradiction here, just a feature of temporal existence being accounted for. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, that is part of Hegel's discovery, identity and difference are part of being, but Hegel did not stop there, but of course, you already know this, so I don't have to tell you. More importantly, you have refuted the very principle you claim to champion without even realizing it. Change is not the same as sameness, identity is not the same as difference. This means identity cannot contain difference in order to be equal to itself, must not presuppose it in order to make itself intelligible. If a thing is identical to itself, which I take to be the proper formation of the concept, then the "self" you point to at the moment of identification, vanishes in the next instance. You have, as a matter of fact, gone beyond the image you propagated, so boldly and mightily tried to assert was "itself," but now it is not. Quite accurately then, you are dishing out a tautology to thought, you are in the business of asserting "inert images" as reality, most of all, you do not even realize your own negation. Sorry my poor fellow, but you must choose, you cannot have it both ways, either take being as it goes beyond Aristotelian logic, or live your life in the error of a tautology. Do you start with being or do you start with identity? It seems to me the evidence is clear; for you identity is and must be secondary to being, very hard to see how this doesn't cause problems for your view of identity?
What is most striking is that you seem to think you can simply class identity with difference without going beyond the claim of identity itself. It is a mere assertion on your part, a loaded premise, hoping you don't get caught by a more careful thinker. This is ignorant and proves you don't comprehend the necessary literalness of the concept.
Now I know you will insist and demand that you have the right to pack being (with all its difference) into the concept of identity, or to interpret the concept through being, but the concept itself will not permit it, which is proven the very instance you make a distinction between identity and difference. Yours is merely an attempt to retain the abstraction of identity against the reality which negates it. The real question is how you can identify anything through the identity principle, once you admit that being supersedes it? (Notice, you are not qualifying being with identity, but as you must, you are qualifying the nature of identity through the authority of being. Your solution is merely to
assert and
pretend that this has no effect on the concept of identity).
I am not interested in playing these games with you merely to appease your wounded ego. Metaphysician Undercover, you need to go under the covers and brush up on your Hegel.