It’s a simple question: should she kill her offspring? Should she abort or not? Why or why not? Why can’t you guys answer this? — NOS4A2

She neither should nor she shouldn't. She just may if she wants. What is so difficult to understand?

What were you even asking when you asked "assuming that it is optional, the mother has every right, and no one would intervene, should she kill her offspring?"

Having both "optional" and "should" as part of the same question makes no sense, and you're just confusing matters.

It's not the case that she should and it's not the case that she shouldn't; it's the case that she may.

So the moral pivot point for right killing and wrong killing for you is “intelligence” of the body to be killed or protected?

Is that your position? — Fire Ologist

When "intelligence" is taken to be a general term covering such things as a sufficient degree of self-awareness/consciousness, yes. That's why it's acceptable to kill plants, zygotes, the brain dead, and flies, but not babies.

It's trickier when considering more complex non-human life like cows and dogs, and I'm not averse to vegetarianism being the morally superior position, and that I'm in the wrong in eating meat.

That’s it? You are sufficiently intelligent? — Fire Ologist

Yes. It would be wrong to kill sufficiently intelligent extra-terrestrial life, even though they are not human.

And the reason it would be wrong to kill them isn't because they're Kryptonian or Species X but because they are sufficiently intelligent and capable of suffering and the like.

because that organism is the recipient of your behavior — NOS4A2

That's true of every organism regardless of whether we call it "zygote", "human", or "cow". Labels have no moral relevance.

Are you serious? — Fire Ologist

Yes. "it is wrong to kill X if and only if X is a human" is not a tautology. For some X it might be wrong to kill it even if it isn't human and for some X it might be right to kill it even if it is human.

Separately, most people agree it is usually bad to intentionally kill human beings. — Fire Ologist

And this is where we need to distinguish been an intensional and an extensional reading.

It is not the case that it is wrong to kill me because I am human but that it is wrong to kill me and I am human. It is not the case that it is wrong to kill you because you are human but that it is wrong to kill you and you are human. It is not the case that it is wrong to kill humans because they are humans but that it is wrong to kill humans and they are humans.

It would be wrong to kill us even if we weren't human. It's wrong to kill us because we are sufficiently intelligent organisms capable of suffering and the like.

You can if you want. That's your choice, and it certainly has no moral relevance. An organism just is the physical stuff that it's made of, and that physical stuff is what it is regardless of what, if anything, we call it.

What do I label it if I want to know what kind of animal it is? — NOS4A2

If you want to know what kind of animal it is then look at it and put it under a microscope. Its physical nature has nothing to do with the conventions of the English language.

Are human zygotes human beings?

Unless that is the question you haven’t entered the abortion debate. — Fire Ologist

I've addressed it. The question makes no sense in context. The term "human being" isn't like the term "bachelor" with an explicit set of necessary and sufficient conditions; it's more like the word "game".

Either way, what does zygotes being or not being human have to do with whether or not it is wrong to kill zygotes?

You claimed that we derive moral principles from the question "what is actually good?". We don't, because we can't derive propositions from questions.

Not if you are a lawmaker making policy on when a woman can and cannot decide what to do with her own pregnancy.

Ridiculous argument.

According to you, there could never be a controversy surrounding any abortion. It’s just word games and platonic form manipulation easily avoided by playing other word games. — Fire Ologist

I haven't said that. These are two different questions:

1. Are zygotes human?
2. Is it wrong kill zygotes?

The two are not the same. It can be wrong to kill zygotes even if we don't label them "human" and it can be right to kill zygotes even if we do label them "human".

Exactly right. So what should we call this shape-shifting being? — NOS4A2

When it's a zygote call it a zygote. When it's an embryo call it an embryo. When it's a foetus call it a foetus. When it's a baby call it a baby.

The idea that there must be some label that names/describes it from the moment of conception to the moment of death, and that the existence of this label entails moral facts about, is mistaken.

You can't derive a proposition from a question.

It is problematic because it is circular logic: you are saying that moral judgment X is wrong because moral judgment X seems wrong to you. This kind of thinking, lands you in wishy-washy territory where you can justify anything to yourself so long as you have a strong intuition about it. It's nonsense. — Bob Ross

That is a fundamental problem with all moral claims.

I say that it is right to kill annoying children and you say that it is wrong to kill annoying children. Where do we go from there?

Is "it is right/wrong to kill annoying children" something that can be empirically verified or falsified? Is it something that can be deduced from necessarily true axioms?

Where in time and space does the human being pop into existence? — NOS4A2

You might as well ask when an embryo pops into existence. It doesn't. There's a single-celled organism which we label "zygote" that gradually develops into a simple multi-cellular organism which we label "embryo" that gradually develops into a more complex multi-cellular organism which we label "foetus" that gradually develops into an even more complex multi-cellular organism which we label "human" or "person".

Some might use the label "human" earlier in the development cycle than others, but that's a personal linguistic convention with no philosophical or moral relevance.

What is a new human being, is one of two essential questions at the heart of the discussion. — Fire Ologist

Some people might use the word "human" to mean any living organism with genetics like you and me, and so include zygotes. Some people might use the word "human" to mean any living organism with genetics like you and me and which are multi-cellular, and so exclude zygotes but include embryos. Some people might use the word "human" to mean any living organism with genetics like you and me and which are multi-cellular and which have grown a sufficiently developed body, and so exclude zygotes and embryos and early stage foetuses but include late stage foetuses.

The idea that one of these groups is correct in using the word "human" to mean what they mean and that the rest are incorrect is mistaken. You need to abandon this essentialist view of the world and language.

It is not the case that we all agree on what the word "human being" means and just disagree on whether or not zygotes satisfy the required criteria. Rather, we each use the word "human being" in different ways (albeit with a strong family resemblance), and for some of us the term also designates zygotes and for some of us it doesn't.

This is why most of the arguments made here are non sequiturs. Whether or not it is wrong to kill a zygote does not depend on how we use the word "human being". Either way, a woman's bodily autonomy has precedence over a zygote's life. Whether you call it a human or not, a zygote is still just a single-celled organism, and single-celled organisms regardless of their genetic composition are morally irrelevant.

Yes, one is the reason to conclude the other. If you believe the first the other ought to follow. Does that make sense? — NOS4A2

You have said that rights are not properties of objects; that all that can be said is that we either do or don't grant rights to something.

If whether or not it is wrong to kill something depends on whether or not it has a right to live, and if whether or not something has a right to live depends on whether or not we grant it the right to live, then whether or not it is wrong to kill something depends on whether or not we grant it the right to live.

So arguing over whether or not it is wrong to kill zygotes is arguing over whether or not we grant zygotes the right to live. You grant zygotes the right to live and I don't. So where do we go from there? By your own logic it is not the case that one of us is correct and the other incorrect.

I don’t kill flies because of their physical characteristics but because of what they do. I kill other organisms because I need to eat them, not because they have hooves or fins. But this conversation is about killing members of your own species. — NOS4A2

We're not talking about whether or not we do kill things; we're talking about whether or not it is wrong to kills things.

Why is it wrong to kill (innocent) humans but not wrong to kill (innocent) non-humans? They only differ in their physical characteristics, and according to you it is wrong to judge an organism based on its physical characteristics.

Many parents would disagree with you. So what is your reasoning? — NOS4A2

That single-celled organisms don't deserve anything, regardless of physical characteristics (e.g. genetics).

Any moment to claim a new human being first comes to be after conception (such as birth) is arbitrary, unless you want to pick the moment of self-consciousness or some higher function (in which case you are way after birth). Science has to go on the demonstrable and testable - which is, for a human body, the moment of conception. Conception is one demonstrable limitation in the life cycle of a human being - it is the limitation I call, it's starting point. I see no better moment or time period during which a new human being first comes to be. — Fire Ologist

Two zygotes can fuse into one, creating a chimera. One zygote can split into two, creating twins. The origin and persistence of a personal identity doesn't work in the neat and tidy way that you might want it to.

We can deal with exceptions to the rules later, as when the life of the mother and zygote compete with each other, or other reasons. — Fire Ologist

We are dealing with exceptions. If continued pregnancy will kill the mother then abortion is acceptable. If continued pregnancy will paralyse the mother then abortion is acceptable. If continued pregnancy is not what the mother wants then abortion is acceptable.

As soon as you accept that the zygote's right to live is not absolute – that sometimes abortion is acceptable – the claim "abortion is unacceptable because the zygote has a right to live" is accepted to be a non sequitur. There is always an explicit "unless there are good reasons to abort".

We just disagree on what constitutes good reasons. You might agree that if the mother is at risk of death or paralysis then the reasons to abort are good, but not agree that if the mother doesn't want to continue the pregnancy then the reason to abort is also good.

We are arguing whether it is right or wrong to kill a human being at this stage in his life. It’s an important question. — NOS4A2

You're not making any sense. You claim that moral worth (and rights) are not properties of objects but "a status we afford or ascribe to them" but then suggest that whether or not it is wrong to kill a human is independent of whether or not we afford or ascribe moral worth (and rights) to them.

Do "so-and-so has a right to live" and "it is wrong to kill so-and-so" mean different things to you?

I don’t understand where this is going. Do you mean something like believing black cats to bring misfortune? — NOS4A2

Both humans and flies are living organisms. You seem to be claiming that it is wrong to kill (innocent) humans but not wrong to kill (innocent) flies. You are judging the morality of killing a living organism based on its physical characteristics (specifically in this case the physical characteristics that determine its species).

So why is it wrong to judge that it is wrong to kill some humans (e.g. babies) but not others (e.g. zygotes) based on their physical characteristics but not wrong to judge that it is wrong to kill some living organisms (e.g. humans) but not others (e.g. flies) based on their physical characteristics?

True, I meant they deserve to live or do not deserve to live. So which is it? — NOS4A2

Zygotes don't deserve anything, and so neither deserve to live nor deserve to die.

I think this is the simplest explanation.

Yes, “moral worth”, like innocence, is not a property of any given object. It is more like a status we afford or ascribe to other things when we consider them morally, at least insofar as I understand the phrase. — NOS4A2

Then what is there to argue? Pro-lifers ascribe moral worth to zygotes and pro-choicers don't. There is no objective fact-of-the-matter that determines one group to be correct and the other incorrect.

Just to be clear, my assertion was that it is wrong (and stupid) to judge the moral worth of a human being based on their physical characteristics. — NOS4A2

But not wrong (and stupid) to judge the moral worth of an organism based on the physical characteristics that determine its species?

They either deserve to live or deserve to die. — NOS4A2

False dichotomy.

I mean it in its standard sense: science of purpose [behind things as opposed to the physical cause of things]. — Bob Ross

There is no purpose.

When you say it is “highly likely”, you are not noting what it was designed to become but, rather, the probability of, in reality, under the nuanced circumstances, of its environment allowing it to develop into what it was supposed to become. — Bob Ross

There is no design.

#3 is fundamentally different than #2 and #1 because it is the only example Michael has (in their thought experiment) where the zygotes are a means towards saving the baby. I am suspecting neither of you understand this, and this is the root of your confusion. — Bob Ross

I fail to see why this is morally relevant. In every case you are performing some action which kills the zygotes and saves the baby. That is all that matters.

I would say this would be immoral; because you are not noting the probability of weighing who might likely save but, rather, the probability of doing something immoral vs. permissible. This would be a sadistic game that I would encourage anyone to avoid playing.

If we were talking about probabilities of producing bad side effects then that would be a different story. — Bob Ross

Saving the baby is all that matters. It is morally impermissible to allow the baby to die because you are unsure whether or not the death of the zygotes is a means rather than an unfortunate consequence.

That’s because you don’t believe they have rights; and I do. If you thought they had the right to life, then you wouldn’t make this kind of claim. — Bob Ross

I'm not claiming that they don't have a right to life. I'm claiming that even if they have a right to life this right to life is not absolute. We see this in the case where we are willing to sacrifice (as an unfortunate consequence) five zygotes to save one baby. Some things are worth more than the life of a zygote (e.g. the life of a baby, or the life of the mother). We just disagree on which things are worth more than the life of a zygote. I think that the mother being able to walk is worth more, and so abortion is permissible if continued pregnancy would lead to the mother's paralysis. And I think that the mother's bodily autonomy is worth more, and so abortion is permissible if the mother does not wish to carry a child to term.

This is the comment in question. Even two pro-lifers accept that we ought kill the zygotes to save the baby (notice in particular that we kill five to save one).

To make this more applicable to abortion, let's assume that continuing the pregnancy will damage the mother's spine, leading to permanent paralysis. Ought we terminate the pregnancy (if that's what the mother wishes)? I say yes. Not only is a zygote's life worth less than the life of a baby, it's worth less than the mother's ability to walk.

So we accept that not only is a zygote's "right to life" not absolute but also that their lives are worth less than other things (even things other than something's life). We might disagree with how little/much a zygote's life is worth, but at the very least we must accept that "we ought not terminate a pregnancy because the zygote has an absolute/overriding right to life" is false.

Pro-choicers then claim that the zygote's life is worth less than the mother's bodily autonomy. Pro-lifers might disagree, but given the reasoning above at least one of their arguments against abortion has been refuted. It's not enough to say that the zygote is human and has a "right to life"; it must be argued that this "right to life" has moral precedence over other concerns.

↪Tom Storm I'm not at all keen on so-called "trolly" arguments. There are intractable moral situations. — Banno

That is precisely why I think the trolley problem I suggested works well; because it isn't intractable. It's self-evident what one should do. Even NOS4A2 and Bob Ross accept that we ought actively bring about a situation that kills multiple zygotes so as to save one baby, showing that even those who claim that zygotes are humans who deserve to live accept that their lives do not carry the same moral weight as born humans, and that there are situations in which allowing the zygotes to live is morally worse than causing them to die, proving that their "right to life" is not absolute. That presents the opportunity to explain that the life of a zygote has less moral weight than the woman's bodily autonomy.

I don’t think all humans deserve to live. — NOS4A2

The "innocent" was implicit there.

One, that they are morally worthless, and two, that they deserve to die. — NOS4A2

I didn't say that they deserve to die. I have only said that we ought kill zygotes if it saves babies and that it is acceptable to abort a zygote.

You judge the moral worth of a human being based on their physical characteristics, and not because who they are and what they’ve done. — NOS4A2

What is the distinction between who someone is and what something physically is, in particular with respect to zygotes? You're the one who often argues against anything like a soul or folk psychology and reduces everything to base biology.

But again, you haven't answered the question. Why is it wrong to judge the moral worth of a human but not the moral worth of a non-human? You're engaging in speciesism without even attempting to justify it.

so long as someone sees moral worth in them, the being is not morally worthless. — NOS4A2

Well now we might be getting somewhere. Are you suggesting that a living organism has moral worth if and only if someone sees moral worth in it?

That leads to problematic scenarios, such as what if I see moral worth in cows or the serial killer trying to kill you, or what if the pregnant woman doesn't see moral worth in the zygote growing inside her but some random kid half the world away does?

There is no such example: I pull the lever if the one is being sacrificed is substituted for any number of zygotes; and this is not incoherent with my position. Like I said, you don't understand it.

Pouring zygotes on a building to put out a fire (to save a child) is not analogous to pulling a lever to save five by sacrificing N-amount of zygotes, for the zygotes are directly intentionally killed in the former as a means towards the good end whereas they are indirectly intentionally killed in the latter not as a means but rather a bad side effect of using the means to bring about the good end (and, at this point, with my principle of double effect, saving the child is always going to significantly outweigh the bad side effect of killing the zygotes but this is only valid for analyzing side effects NOT means). — Bob Ross

This a strange distinction.

Let's say there are two tracks. On one there is a box containing one living baby and on another there's a box containing five living zygotes. If you don't pull the lever then only the baby is run over and if you do then only the zygotes are run over.

This is achieved in one of three different ways:

1. Pulling the lever changes which track the trolley travels down
2. Pulling the lever switches the boxes
3. Pulling the lever moves the box containing five zygotes onto the primary track, before the box containing one baby (stopping the trolley from travelling further).

These seem to be morally equivalent. If one ought pull the lever in the case of (1) then one ought pull the lever in the case of (2) and (3). (3) is equivalent to @RogueAI's example of using the zygotes to put out a fire.

But if you still insist that (1) and (3) are morally distinct, then what if you don't know which of (1), (2), and (3) is the manner in which the baby can be saved? Each is equally likely. Should you pull the lever or not?

In my mind the answer is clear; always do what you can to save the baby, irrespective of how or how many zygotes are killed in the process.

To clarify, this teleological account of rights IS NOT equivalent to grounding rights in potential persons; for "potentiality" is a very loose term that covers more than telos (e.g., perhaps a cow has the potential to be a person since we could give it a brain chip). — Bob Ross

It's not clear what you mean by teleology.

If you just mean that a zygote is highly likely to naturally develop a rational will whereas a cow developing a rational will would require artificial intervention then it needs to be explained why this distinction is morally relevant, and why being highly likely to (naturally or otherwise) develop a rational will entails having a right to life.

In that quote you explicitly say that things without a rational will are not persons.

In previous comments you said that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they're human and wrong to kill humans because they're persons. Combining these together you were saying that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they're persons.

So you're contradicting yourself.

At the very least you need to amend your original remarks and say that it is wrong to kill zygotes because they will be persons, and then I will deny this claim; it is only wrong to kill something if it currently is a person, and what it could be in the future (or was in the past) is irrelevant.

Traditionally, a rational will; i.e., a sufficiently free will. That is a serious and impactful difference between humans and other species: most, if not all, other species lack the capacity to go against their own nature and inclinations such that they are motivated by pure reason.

Traditionally, a being which has a Telos such that it will have, if not already has, a rational will are called persons (because their nature marks them out to be such); and their will must be respected.

More technically, a being which has a such a "rational Telos" is not necessarily a person but, rather, will be; and their nature marks them out as such; and this is what grounds their rights (and not whether or not they currently are a person). — Bob Ross

Well, zygotes don't have a rational will, therefore by your own logic they aren't persons.

Tell that to the vast majority of parents who have children, that the child they have created and are carrying is morally insignificant and it doesn’t deserve to live. — NOS4A2

That does not address my point. I'm not interested in sentiment (unless you want to argue that morality is sentiment).

You claim that all humans deserve to live, but then must also accept one of these:

1. No non-humans deserve to live
2. Some but not all non-humans deserve to live
3. All non-humans deserve to live

If you accept (1) or (2) then you accept that it is appropriate to weigh the moral worth of living organisms. I don't see why weighing the moral worth of individuals within a species is any less disgusting than weighing the moral worth of species within a genus (or higher up in the taxonomy).

And I'll add, you already accepted with the trolley problem that the lives of five zygotes are worth less than the life of one baby, so why the about-turn?

But weighing the moral worth of human beings in various stages of their development so as to decide who are morally permissible to kill is a disgusting business. We’ve left ethics entirely and have approached an exercise in excuse-making and dehumanization, in my opinion. — NOS4A2

It's no less disgusting business than weighing the moral worth of non-human organisms. Is it wrong to kill plants? Flies? Cows? Dogs? E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial?

Plant ethics. Sure. But we’re talking about the killing of a human being. — NOS4A2

As established by the trolley problem, the moral worth of a human-as-zygote is less than the moral worth of a human-as-baby (and in fact, the moral worth of five humans-as-zygotes is less than the moral worth of one human-as-baby).

The moral worth of a human-as-zygote is equivalent to the moral worth of a plant.

There is a “should” for the one committing the act the act of killing. Should I or should I not take this course of action? — NOS4A2

To the extent that one can ask "should I or should I not kill the weeds in my garden".

Assuming that no one is forcing the mother to carry the child, and everyone believes it is wrong to intervene, should she or should she not kill her child? — NOS4A2

She can do what she wants. There's no "should" either way.

But you think it’s right so long as the mother desires it, up until and including species extinction. — NOS4A2

I think it's not wrong, or at least negligibly wrong, or at least less wrong than forcing the mother to carry the child to term and birth it (much like it's less wrong than allowing a baby to die).

But no the future doesn’t exist in the past. — NOS4A2

Then abort away.

It doesn't follow that it is right to kill zygotes. — NOS4A2

I didn't say it's right. I said it's neutral. The moral worth of a zygote is negligible, as shown by the trolley problem.

It wouldn't kill you because you weren't born at that time. — NOS4A2

I misread and thought you were asking about me going back in time and then someone terminating my grandmother's pregnancy, and that it would be a Marty McFly in Back to the Future situation.

But as for the question as asked, that really depends on how time travel works. Does the future still exist in some sense but changes as the past is changed? That would change my answer. If the future doesn't exist then no, it wouldn't be wrong to terminate the pregnancy (but it may be wrong to have gone back in time as that would have erased what was the present and is now the future).

No, I think killing a human being in its zygote stage is wrong because he doesn't deserve it. — NOS4A2

And as shown by the trolley problem killing five zygotes is less wrong than allowing one baby to die. Killing ten million zygotes is less wrong than allowing one baby to die.

The moral worth of one zygote is so negligible that killing it is less wrong than forcing a woman to carry it to term and birth it against her wishes.

If you could take a time machine and go back to the time when a mother was an innocent zygote, would it be ok to kill her then? — NOS4A2

That depends on whether or not killing the zygote in my grandmother's womb would kill me, because killing me would be wrong.

Refusing to procreate doesn't involve the act of killing. — NOS4A2

So? You were suggesting that killing all zygotes is wrong because it would mean the end of the species. I am simply showing that "it is wrong because it would mean the end of the species" is a non sequitur.

But it would mean the end of the species. — NOS4A2

Yes, as would happen if everybody alive refused to procreate.