The imposition of gender-selective pronouns on a whole lot of people who don't make that part of their own self-identification process. — Pantagruel

What’s the problem? Maybe my legal name is Michael but I prefer to go by a different name. Asking you to call me by this other name isn’t asking for special treatment, and is hardly a burden on you.

The chaos of redesigning all public bathrooms to accommodate a plethora of gender-identities. — Pantagruel

Nothing needs to be redesigned.

The exposure of children to these issues in school at a very young age. — Pantagruel

In what way? Children have been “exposed” to the difference between cis men and cis women for all of human history, what does it matter if trans men and trans women are also recognised?

But the problem is when special recognition and treatment is demanded outside of the group, by other groups. Which is most certainly what is going on now. — Pantagruel

But given the course that the social movement has taken, I'm starting to develop a very negative attitude around the issue. — Pantagruel

Such as?

Why choose male-to-female when one could simply using “man-to-woman.” — Mikie

According to the SEP article on Feminist Perspectives on Trans Issues:

FTM and MTF are abbreviations of female-to-male and male-to-female. They were originally connected to transsexual (medical) discourse indicating individuals who transition to the 'opposite' sex." They are now used in ways that have broken from this medical discourse and may be used more generally to indicate folk who move away from being assigned male (or female) at birth to the “other” direction. They may also be used as primitive (undefined) terms. This means that they are not treated as abbreviations indicating transition from one sex to another. Instead, they are used to simply categorize individuals in a way analogous to the categories man and woman.

"We” do? — Mikie

I do. I assume you do to.

So male and female have also been redefined in some way?

This is an ambiguous question. In the context of the phrase "male-to-female", it means a transgender woman born with male genitalia/genetics/etc. In other contexts, e.g. when discussing biology, "female" typically means a human both with XX chromosomes, ovaries, a womb, etc.

The English language isn't some formal system where each symbol has just one meaning that applies in all contexts.

Goats eat everything; therefore there is something that eats everything. therefore It is possible that something eats everything.

So you have a proof of the Great Goat:

Either it is not possible that something eats everything or it is necessary that something eats everything.
It is possible that something eats everything.
Therefore it is necessary that something eats everything. — Banno

Well, it's not a proof, but it is a valid argument.

The OP mentions the 'Strawsonian definition", on which the Stanford article is based:
"To be morally responsible is to be the proper object of the “reactive attitudes,” such as respect, praise, forgiveness, blame, indignation, and the like"
The definition sort of implies the attitudes of peers, but does not explicitly call it out.

I admit that my argument hinges on this definition and the argument may not hold with differing definitions, but I like the definition since it makes no reference to controversial subjects like 'right and wrong', be those objective, relative, or nonexistent. — noAxioms

Then I'm not sure what you're trying to argue.

If determinism is true then either I do this or I do that, and then either you punish or reward me for it or you don't.

It certainly wouldn't make sense to argue that even if determinism is true we still should punish or reward people for their behaviour, as if our response to someone else's behaviour is a free choice.

I think many arguments in favour of God do this. The claim is that something like the God of Christianity exists, and when asked to prove it they only provide an argument from something like an intelligent designer.

I said it doesn't mean that one cannot be held responsible for choices made. — noAxioms

What does it mean to be held responsible for choices made?

But you can’t go from male to female, or vice versa, unless we radically redefine “male” and “female”. I think there’s a lot of resistance to that, and for good reason. — Mikie

We generally understand what MTF and FTM mean in the context of transgenderism so this seems like a pointless argument.

Let Gx mean "x is God" and Fx mean "x created the world" (or anything else).

∃xGx ↔ ∃x□Fx
◇∃x□Fx
∴ ∃xGx

Proof

But given that ◇∃x□Fx ↔ ∃x□Fx is valid, ◇∃x□Fx begs the question.

Also as a counterargument:

∃xGx ↔ ∃x□Fx
◇¬∃xFx
∴ ¬∃xGx

Proof

But given that ◇¬∃xFx → ¬∃x□Fx is valid, ◇¬∃xFx also begs the question.

So at least with respect to the modal ontological argument there is no reason to believe either that God exists or that God doesn’t.

The we are now a long way from Canterbury. — Banno

Yes, I've already argued with others that Anselm's argument is invalid. I'm now trying to find the strongest kind of ontological argument. It's a more worthy topic of discussion.

If the definition is "a something a greater than which cannot be conceived", I'm not convinced. There's the obvious comparison of "A number a larger than which cannot be conceived" - the idea is not coherent. — Banno

For the sake of argument I'm using the more simplistic definition "the demiurge of all possible worlds".

The question then is whether or not there is a satisfactory definition of God of which both ¬◇∃xGx ⊻ □∃xGx and ◇∃xGx are true.

The second premise is true if the definition doesn't contain a contradiction.

The first premise appears to be an application of the Buridan formula, ∃x□Dx → □∃xDx, where Gx is defined as □Dx, and Dx is defined as something like "x is the demiurge".

The full argument then is:

1. ∃x□Dx → □∃xDx
2. ◇∃x□Dx
3. ∴ ◇□∃xDx
4. ∴ □∃xDx

What's interesting is that according to that website 1-3 is valid, 3-4 is valid, but 1-4 is invalid. That strikes me as a contradiction.

The countermodel is:

Worlds: { w0 }
Individuals: { 0 }
@: w0
D: { }

A simpler reformulation of the previous.

Either it is not possible that God exists or it is necessary that God exists
It is possible that God exists
Therefore, it is necessary that God exists

¬◇∃xGx ⊻ □∃xGx
◇∃xGx
□∃xGx

But that's just an instance of ◇p→p, which is pretty clearly invalid. — Banno

◇□p → □p is valid.

p→□p. Invalid. — Banno

This is given as a premise, not an inference. It’s either true or false. If I gave this argument, would you reply by saying that 1) is invalid?

1. p→q
2. p
3. q

The counter model looks right. — Banno

I think it’s interpreting this as an inference rather than as a premise:

∃xGx → □∃xGx

◇∃xGx→∃xGx looks invalid. — Banno

Given the definition of “maximal greatness” as being necessarily “maximally excellent”, the argument is ◇□ ∃xGx→ □∃xGx.

It is possible that something is necessarily maximally excellent, therefore it necessary that something is maximally excellent.

I don’t know how accurate that website is at parsing modal logics, but my understanding is that modal ontological arguments are commonly accepted to be valid, and so opponents must challenge the premise(s).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/#PlaOntArg

The “victorious” modal ontological argument of Plantinga 1974 goes roughly as follows: Say that an entity possesses “maximal excellence” if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. Say, further, that an entity possesses “maximal greatness” if and only if it possesses maximal excellence in every possible world—that is, if and only if it is necessarily existent and necessarily maximally excellent. Then consider the following argument:

There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
(Hence) There is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.

Under suitable assumptions about the nature of accessibility relations between possible worlds, this argument is valid: from it is possible that it is necessary that p, one can infer that it is necessary that p. Setting aside the possibility that one might challenge this widely accepted modal principle, it seems that opponents of the argument are bound to challenge the acceptability of the premise.

It's a false analogy. Vampires aren't non-contingent entities. — Hallucinogen

The greatest conceivable vampire is.

A vampire that exists is greater than a vampire that doesn’t exist.

A vampire that necessarily exists is greater than a vampire that non-necessarily exists.

Therefore, the greatest conceivable vampire is one that necessarily exists.

Replacing the word “vampire” with “intelligence” or “entity” or “thing” doesn’t change the logic.

But I was assuming that by "If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC", you meant the same thing as "If some X is TTWNGCBC," in the arguments you gave when you were previously attacking it. — Hallucinogen

Yes, they mean the same thing.

3 is not an axiom, just a definitional fact. 2. isn't necessary, I just left it there because you put it there. — Hallucinogen

Then the argument is invalid. To make your argument more precise:

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. God is defined as TTWNGCBC
3. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists

It's still missing the premise that asserts that there exists something which is TTWNGCBC, which as you say is the very intent of the argument.

To make this clearer by analogy:

1. If there exists something which is the greatest conceivable vampire then this thing necessarily exists
2. Dracula is defined as the greatest conceivable vampire
3. Therefore, Dracula exists

The conclusion doesn't follow. I'd need as a premise that the greatest conceivable vampire exists.

I think the modal ontological argument is a much stronger target of discussion.

1. If God exists then it is necessary that God exists
2. It is possible that God exists
3. Therefore, it is possible that it is necessary that God exists
4. If it is possible that it is necessary that God exists then it is necessary that God exists
5. Therefore, it is necessary that God exists

In formal logic:

$\exists xGx\to\Box\exists xGx\\\Diamond\exists xGx\\\therefore\Diamond\Box\exists xGx\\\Diamond\Box\exists xGx\to\Box\exists xGx\\\therefore\Box\exists xGx$

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. TTWNGCBC is God (or vice versa).
4. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists. — Hallucinogen

How does 2 differ from 3?

How so? — Hallucinogen

Because the conclusion doesn't follow. You would need an additional premise such as:

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. There exists something which is TTWNGCBC
4. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists.

But 3) is an empirical claim that needs to be shown. It's not something that's true a priori.

The mistake the OP (and Anselm) makes is to derive 3) from 1), but that's a non sequitur.

3. in the above isn't in the original argument by the OP. They don't give the condition "if there exists God..." in the argument. It isn't necessary to include and I don't see a fallacy in the argument without it. All that is necessary is stating that God fits the definition of TTWNGCBC in some way, which the OP did in point 4. — Hallucinogen

Then the argument is:

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists

Which again is invalid.

You're misunderstanding the logic. Look at existential quantification.

I'll be more explicit with my terms to make this clearer:

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. If there exists something which is God then this thing necessarily exists
4. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists

This is the fallacious argument that the OP has given.

It could go:

If some X is TTWNGCBC, then X necessarily exists
God is an X.
Therefore, God (necessarily) exists.

Not a non sequitur. — Hallucinogen

Then this begs the question, as the second premise just asserts that God exists.

No, the argument is "If some X is TTWNGCBC, then X necessarily exists". — Hallucinogen

If some X is TTWNGCBC then X necessarily exists
If some X is TTWNGCBC then X is God
If some X is God then X necessarily exists

Therefore, God (necessarily) exists

This is what the argument amounts to. The conclusion is a non sequitur.

1), 2), 3) is simplified to:

a) If some X is TTWNGCBC then X necessarily exists

Given 4), replace "TTWNGCBC" with "God":

b) If some X is God then X necessarily exists

Or in other words:

1. If God exists then God necessarily exists

Hence why the argument is just:

1. If God exists then God necessarily exists
2. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists

Clearly a non sequitur.

Libertarian free will remains a possibility. What's your point? — Metaphysician Undercover

That needs to be demonstrated. Disproving determinism isn’t sufficient.

John claims that humans can run at 30mph.

Jane claims that humans cannot run at 30mph because the fastest a human can run is 25mph.

Joe demonstrates that humans can run at 27.5mph.

Has Joe demonstrated that humans can run at 30mph? No.

John claims that humans can make free choices.

Jane claims that humans cannot make free choices because all actions are the deterministic consequence of some prior state.

Joe demonstrates that some actions are the indeterminate consequence of some prior state.

Has Joe demonstrated that humans can make free choices? No.

It's not difficult to understand an apple that is not sweet, or an apple that is not red - but an apple that does not exist? What is it? — Banno

I don't quite get the issue. We seem to understand what we mean when we ask whether or not ghosts or aliens or tachyons exist.

That’s fine. The point is that showing that determinism is false isn’t showing that free will is possible. The libertarian needs to explain what free will requires (e.g. an immaterial soul in your example) and that these requirements are possible.

Are you able to help me to expose the difference between these two conceptions of "free will" which are both incompatible with determinism? — Metaphysician Undercover

If our actions are the consequence of quantum indeterminacy then they are the result of random chance, not free choice.

Senate Republicans (except Murkowski and Collins) blocked the Equal Rights Amendment.

The Amendment:

Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.

Then as an example, free will (according to the libertarian) is incompatible with both determinism and quantum indeterminacy. A demonstration that quantum indeterminacy is true is a demonstration that determinism is false, but not a demonstration that free will is possible. Free will requires that there is some third mechanism (e.g. agent-causation) for action, and the libertarian's task is to make sense of such a thing and show that such a thing is possible.

Why not? I think that if free will is inconsistent with determinism, then the demonstration that determinism is false is exactly what is required to demonstrate that free will is possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

It might be that free will is impossible if either determinism or some other X is true. A demonstration that determinism is false isn’t a demonstration that this other X is false, and so not a demonstration that free will is possible.

I would say that the Republican party has embraced a new vision of freedom that is defined overwhelmingly as negative freedom, i.e., freedom from constraint, particularly government constraint. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Unless it's drag shows or transgender health care or abortion or critical race theory.

1. That than which nothing greater can be conceived (TTWNGCBC) exists in thought.
2. It is greater to exist in thought and in actuality than to exist just in thought.
3. TTWNGCBC exists in actuality.
4. If TTWNGCBC exists in actuality, then God exists in actuality.
5. God exists in actuality — Epicero

One of these is true:

1. I conceive of [an entity which is all powerful and all knowing and exists] and this entity doesn't exist
2. I conceive of [an entity which is all powerful and all knowing and exists] and this entity exists

The thing conceived (as shown in brackets) is the same in both cases. Anselm's argument makes a fallacious reinterpretation of these as something like:

3. I conceive of [an entity which is all powerful and all knowing and exists and doesn't exist]
4. I conceive of [an entity which is all powerful and all knowing and exists and exists]

He then claims that because the thing conceived (as shown in brackets) in 4) is "greater" than in 3) then 2) must be true, which again is a fallacious reinterpretation.

1. If TTWNGCBC existed contingently, then there would be something greater than it (viz. a version of TTWNGCBC that existed necessarily).
2. Nothing is greater than TTWNGCBC.
3. Therefore, TTWNGCBC exists necessarily.
4. TTWNGCBC is God.
5. Therefore, God is necessarily existent. — Epicero

Your argument appears to be:

1. If God exists then God necessarily exists
2. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists

The conclusion doesn't follow.

Isn't this generally tautological? All unmarried men are bachelors is saying unmarried men are unmarried men. — Tom Storm

If "bachelor" means "unmarried man" then all bachelors are unmarried men.

"Bachelor" can mean "unmarried man", but it can also mean "man who has never been married" or "person with a first degree from a university" or "a young knight serving under another's banner".

The sentence "bachelors are unmarried men" doesn't specify which meaning of "bachelor" is being used, hence the need for the antecedent in the first sentence above.

Broadly, we may say that the doctrine of determinism entails that all the facts about the past together with the laws of nature uniquely determine the future. — Pierre-Normand

Does determinism allow for stochastic quantum mechanics?

In order to make sense of this, it is necessary to delve a little deeper into the arguments that make the contrary thesis seem compelling (and that Jaegwon Kim has formalized as a causal exclusion argument). And it is also necessary to elucidate with some care the notion of possibility that is at issue in Harry Frankfurt's principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). When both of those tasks have been accomplished, it becomes easier to see how an agent-causal libertarianism can be reconciled with merely physical determinism. As I said to SophistiCat, I intend to recruit GPT-4's assistance for rewriting my paper on this topic in order to improve its readability. — Pierre-Normand

I'll be interested in reading that when it's finished.

But until then, what do you make of unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain?

There has been a long controversy as to whether subjectively 'free' decisions are determined by brain activity ahead of time. We found that the outcome of a decision can be encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s before it enters awareness. This delay presumably reflects the operation of a network of high-level control areas that begin to prepare an upcoming decision long before it enters awareness.