We've been taking as a starting point "snow is white" is true iff p and then discussing p, whereas I think we should instead take as a starting point snow is white iff q and then discuss q.

Snow is white iff snow appears white, or
Snow is white iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light, or
Snow is white iff snow has a mind-independent sui generis property of whiteness

We can then bring this back to truth-predication by understanding that if "p" is true iff p and if p iff q then "p" is true iff q.

"Snow is white" is true iff snow appears white, or
"Snow is white" is true iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light, or
"Snow is white" is true iff snow has a mind-independent sui generis property of whiteness — Michael

I wonder if this helps us address the redundancy view.

1. "'Snow is white' is true" means "snow is white"
2. "Snow is white" means "snow reflects all wavelengths of light"¹
3. Therefore, "'snow is white' is true" means "snow reflects all wavelengths of light"¹

If (2) is true but (3) is false then (1) is false, and the redundancy view refuted.

Or perhaps (2) is false, and that even if snow is white iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light, "snow is white" doesn't mean "snow reflects all wavelengths of light", in which case there is still the issue of explaining what "is white" means. Although perhaps that's a topic for another discussion.

¹ Replace with whichever "snow is white" means "q" is correct

Tarski was certainly critical of modern correspondence formulations, but also said that "One speaks sometimes of the correspondence theory of truth as the theory based on the classical conception.": — Andrew M

He also says, preceding that, "Nonetheless, it is my feeling that the new formulations,
when analyzed more closely, prove to be less clear and unequivocal than the one put forward by Aristotle."

I guess this is why nobody can agree on whether he was a correspondence theorist or not. Ironically he's less clear and unequivocal than we'd like.

Right, so this is an issue of reification. Some people think of a set as being some abstract, Platonic entity that "exists" in some sense, distinct from its members? I'm not a mathematician but that just strikes me as nonsense.

But the cardinality of P(E) can only be greater than E's if there exists elements in P(E) that are not members of E. — Kuro

That's not true. The power set includes repeated members. Taken from the Wikipedia article:

If S is the set {x, y, z}, then all the subsets of S are

• {}
• {x}
• {y}
• {z}
• {x, y}
• {x, z}
• {y, z}
• {x, y, z}

and hence the power set of S is {{}, {x}, {y}, {z}, {x, y}, {x, z}, {y, z}, {x, y, z}}

x, y, and z are repeated.

Right, but q could become an endless string of proposals for the necessary conditions of "truth", as we're already experiencing in this thread anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well that's true of any "X is Y iff Z" so I don't understand that objection.

I just think saying something like "Snow is white" is true iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light is more meaningful than saying something like "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white and so might help us better understand the concept of truth.

Or maybe it will lead us to the redundancy view that truth-predication is vacuous, even if a grammatically useful tool (e.g. so that we can say such things as "what you say is true").

Sure, but if we remove "true" from the equation, then we are off topic of the thread, which is a discussion of truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Refresh the page, I’ve made an edit.

I don't think it makes a difference.

How isn't it just a more substantial account of p? — bongo fury

Because "p" is true iff p. Therefore a substantial account of p is a substantial account of "p" is true.

We've been taking as a starting point "snow is white" is true iff p and then discussing p, whereas I think we should instead take as a starting point snow is white iff q and then discuss q.

Snow is white iff snow appears white, or
Snow is white iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light, or
Snow is white iff snow has a mind-independent sui generis property of whiteness, etc.

We can then bring this back to truth-predication by understanding that if "p" is true iff p and if p iff q then "p" is true iff q.

"Snow is white" is true iff snow appears white, or
"Snow is white" is true iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light, or
"Snow is white" is true iff snow has a mind-independent sui generis property of whiteness, etc.

Yes, Tarski endorsed the correspondence theory of truth. — Andrew M

I believe there isn't much agreement amongst philosophers on that. Tarski himself says in The Semantic Conception of Truth:

We should like our definition to do justice to the intuitions which adhere to the classical Aristotelian conception of truth-intuitions which find their expression in the well-known words of Aristotle's Metaphysics:

To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true.

If we wished to adapt ourselves to modern philosophical terminology, we could perhaps express this conception by means of the familiar formula:

The truth of a sentence consists in its agreement with (or correspondence to) reality.

(For a theory of truth which is to be based upon the latter formulation the term "correspondence theory" has been suggested.)

If, on the other hand, we should decide to extend the popular usage of the term "designate" by applying it not only to names, but also to sentences, and if we agreed to speak of the designate of sentences as "states of affairs," we could possibly use for the same purpose the following phrase:

A sentence is true if it designates an existing state of affairs.

However, all these formulations can lead to various misunderstandings, for none of them is sufficiently precise and clear (though this applies much less to the original Aristotelian formulation than to either of the others); at any rate, none of them can be considered a satisfactory definition of truth. It is up to us to look for a more precise expression of our intuitions.

...

As far as my own opinion is concerned, I do not have any doubts that our formulation does conform to the intuitive content of that of Aristotle. I am less certain regarding the later formulations of the classical conception, for they are very vague indeed.

So it seems to me at least that he doesn't endorse the correspondence theory but does endorse the Aristotelian theory, which he thinks of as different.

You do know that nuclear codes change between administration. Might you at least clarify that they our outdated and useless nuclear codes? — NOS4A2

When have I ever said anything about nuclear codes?

All of it, it turns out, was misinformation and propaganda. — NOS4A2

I didn't realise you knew what was taken and what was missing.

You believed and tried to sell the idea Trump was selling nuclear codes to Saudi Arabia, perhaps without knowing they change the nuclear codes from administration to administration. — NOS4A2

No I didn't. I referenced a news article that said that the FBI was searching for classified material about nuclear weapons, a Congressional report that said that the Trump administration was trying to transfer sensitive nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, and then wondered what it would mean if the FBI failed to find what they were looking for, suggesting as a hypothetical that Trump could have sold the information to Saudi Arabia.

My actual quote being "Jesus. Imagine they don't find them. What if Trump sold them to Saudi Arabia."

Nowhere did I say that I believed that Trump tried to sell nuclear codes.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/728295

You employ propaganda in order to combat propaganda. — NOS4A2

I employ facts. But nice of you to admit that I am indeed combatting propaganda.

Now compare Biden's speech with Trump's recent rally:

... this election is a referendum on the corruption and extremism of Joe Biden and the radical Democrat party.

If you want to stop this destruction of America, you must vote Republican you gotta get out

...

He's an enemy of the state, you know that? The enemy of the state is him and the group that control him, which is circling around him, 'Do this. do that Joe, you're going to do this Joe."

...

The FBI and the Justice Department have become vicious monsters. controlled by radical left scoundrels lawyers and the media who tell them what to do—you people right there—and when to do it.


...

Before our very eyes, our beloved country is being taken over by the very people who turned democracies into dictatorships and into ultimately, ruination.

...

Think of this, think how bad they are, think how evil they are.

...

But this battle is not about me. This is a struggle for the very fate of our republic. Our movement is fighting against a corrupt group of unelected tyrants who believe they can wield absolute power over you, with the help of a willing and very corrupt media.

They think the deep state, not the citizens should be the true masters of this country.

...

We have to smash the grip of his vile and vindictive political class. We have to clean house in Washington, D.C. and we have to restore government for the people.

If we do not, our republic and, indeed, our country will be destroyed and we will never be able to do what is called a comeback. You won't be able to do it. It'll never come back again.

...

The 2020 election was rigged, and now our country is being destroyed by people who got into office through cheating and through fraud.

...

Under a Democrat, all the streets of our great cities are drenched in the blood of innocent victims.

...

The Radical Left Democrat Party is not, in my opinion, a 50 percent party within our country. They're against God, guns, oil, law enforcement, voter ID, tax cuts, regulation cuts, the Constitution and they're against our founding fathers. But other than that, actually, they're quite good. The way they win is to cheat in elections. I really believe that. How can you be against all of those things and for some of the things that therefore and be considered a 50/50 party? I don't believe it.

They cheat like hell on elections all over the country, and they're really good at it.

...

Together we are standing up against some of the most menacing forces, entrenched interests and vicious opponents our people have ever seen. Despite great outside dangers, our greatest threat remains the sick, sinister and evil people from within our own country. But no matter how big or powerful the corrupt radical left Democrats are—and they are corrupt and they are powerful. We have to make them much less powerful.

No anti-Trump analysis of Biden’s’ words is going to convince me otherwise. — NOS4A2

That much is clear. I don't respond to you to because I think I'll finally get through to you. I know you're a lost cause. I respond to you to for the sake of others, combatting your rhetoric/misinformation/propaganda.

There is some evidence Biden knew and even signed off on it.

https://nypost.com/2022/08/23/biden-called-in-fbi-to-look-at-classified-trump-documents/ — NOS4A2

You're referring to this?

The May 10 missive by Acting Archivist Debra Steidel Wall to Trump attorney Evan Corcoran — published late Monday by JustTheNews — confirms that the White House counsel’s office, “affirming a request from the Department of Justice supported by an FBI letterhead memorandum,” asked the National Archives on April 11 to “provide the FBI access to the 15 boxes for its review within seven days.”

The White House asking the National Archives in April to give access to the FBI to the boxes returned In January is evidence that Biden knew and signed off on the search warrant issued in August? You really are reaching.

I'm referring to the Facebook stuff and the whistleblower reports. — NOS4A2

FBI responds to Mark Zuckerberg's claims on Joe Rogan show about Hunter Biden's laptop

Zuckerberg said that while the FBI didn't specifically name the New York Post article about Hunter Biden, it "fit the pattern" of what the FBI warned about.

He defended the agency, calling it a "legitimate institution," which prompted him to take the warning seriously.

The story was allowed to remain on Facebook, but with limited exposure.

In a statement, the FBI said it routinely provides entities of potential threat information, but it "cannot ask, or direct, companies to take action on information received.

Meta responded via Twitter saying quote, "the FBI shared general warnings about foreign interference, nothing specific about Hunter Biden."

Now he is ramping up his rhetoric, treating his opponents like domestic terrorists. — NOS4A2

You sure like to engage in your own rhetoric. This is what he said:

Donald Trump and the MAGA Republicans represent an extremism that threatens the very foundations of our Republic.

Now, I want to be very clear, very clear up front. Not every Republican, not even the majority of Republicans, are MAGA Republicans. Not every Republican embraces their extreme ideology. I know, because I’ve been able to work with these mainstream Republicans.

...

And here, in my view, is what is true: MAGA Republicans do not respect the Constitution. They do not believe in the rule of law. They do not recognize the will of the people. They refuse to accept the results of a free election, and they’re working right now as I speak in state after state to give power to decide elections in America to partisans and cronies, empowering election deniers to undermine democracy itself.

MAGA forces are determined to take this country backwards, backwards to an America where there is no right to choose, no right to privacy, no right to contraception, no right to marry who you love. They promote authoritarian leaders, and they fanned the flames of political violence that are a threat to our personal rights, to the pursuit of justice, to the rule of law, to the very soul of this country.

So, no, he isn't treating his opponents like domestic terrorists. He's saying that a specific subset of his opponents are trying to undermine the principles of democracy and restrict personal rights.

He has already sent his goons to rifle through Trump’s documents, perhaps worried what sort of info Trump had on him. — NOS4A2

There is no evidence that he directed the search, and no evidence that he even knew about it beforehand. And they weren't there to search Trump's documents but to search for the Government's documents which Trump was illegally retaining. And you're inventing a motivation.

Since we now know the FBI was working to suppress info that would reflect badly on Biden — NOS4A2

If you're referring to the Facebook stuff, they just warned them to be on the lookout for Russian propaganda. It was Facebook that made the decision about which specific stories to suppress.

The part following "that" is a proposition. — Tate

I'm not sure about that. There is the fact that snow is white and there is the proposition that snow is white. Are these the same thing? I'm inclined to say that the proposition is the truth-bearer and the fact the truth-maker.

Why do you treat these differently?

1. Joe Biden
2. The kettle is boiling

(1) is a name and (2) is a sentence. (1) isn't Joe Biden and (2) isn't the fact that the kettle is boiling.

1. The kettle is boiling
2. "The kettle is boiling"

(1) is a sentence, (2) is a quote.

And similarly:

1. The kettle is boiling

(1) is a sentence and that the kettle is boiling is a fact.

What is so hard to understand about this?

1. Joe Biden

(1) is a name and Joe Biden is a man.

Use-mention. It's really simple.

We can explain Tarski's view as follows: There are two modes of speech, an objectual mode and a linguistic mode ('material' mode, in Medieval terminology). The correspondence idea can be expressed in both modes. It is expressed by:

'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white

as well as by:

' "Snow is white" is true' is equivalent to 'Snow is white.' — Andrew M

I don't know if Blackwell got this right. In Truth and Proof (1969) Tarski said this:

A radical solution of the problem which may readily occur to us would be simply to remove the word “true” from the English vocabulary or at least to abstain from using it in any serious discussion.

Those people to whom such an amputation of English seems highly unsatisfactory and illegitimate may be inclined to accept a somewhat more compromising solution, which consists in adopting what could be called (following the contemporary Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski) ´ “the nihilistic approach to the theory of truth”. According to this approach, the word “true” has no independent meaning but can be used as a component of the two meaningful expressions “it is true that” and “it is not true that”. These expressions are thus treated as if they were single words with no organic parts. The meaning ascribed to them is such that they can be immediately eliminated from any sentence in which they occur. For instance, instead of saying
it is true that all cats are black
we can simply say
all cats are black,
and instead of
it is not true that all cats are black
we can say
not all cats are black.

In other contexts the word “true” is meaningless. In particular, it cannot be used as a real predicate qualifying names of sentences. Employing the terminology of medieval logic, we can say that the word “true” can be used syncategorematically in some special situations, but it cannot ever be used categorematically.

To realize the implications of this approach, consider the sentence which was the starting point for the antinomy of the liar; that is, the sentence printed in red on page 65 in this magazine. From the “nihilistic” point of view it is not a meaningful sentence, and the antinomy simply vanishes. Unfortunately, many uses of the word “true”, which otherwise seem quite legitimate and reasonable, are similarly affected by this approach. Imagine, for instance, that a certain term occurring repeatedly in the works [[67]] of an ancient mathematician admits of several interpretations. A historian of science who studies the works arrives at the conclusion that under one of these interpretations all the theorems stated by the mathematician prove to be true; this leads him naturally to the conjecture that the same will apply to any work of this mathematician that is not known at present but may be discovered in the future. If, however, the historian of science shares the “nihilistic” approach to the notion of truth, he lacks the possibility of expressing his conjecture in words. One could say that truth-theoretical “nihilism” pays lip service to some popular forms of human speech, while actually removing the notion of truth from the conceptual stock of the human mind.

So he seems quite opposed to the redundancy view.

1. Joe Biden

(1) isn't the President. (1) is a name. Joe Biden is the President.

Again, this is the use-mention distinction.

Remember this?

1. The kettle is boiling
2. (1) is true

The correct translation of (2) is "the kettle is boiling" is true.

So:

1. The kettle is boiling
2. (1) is the fact that the kettle is boiling

The correct translation of (2) is "the kettle is boiling" is the fact that the kettle is boiling. This is false. Just as "Joe Biden" is the President is false.

That the kettle is boiling is the fact that the kettle is boiling.

So, what is the fact to which your sentence "The kettle is boiling" points? In your own words. Take your time. — Banno

The fact that the kettle is boiling.

On the contrary, that is exactly what I am pointing to. — Banno

And yet you are conflating them when you say that (1) is the fact that the kettle is boiling. It isn't. (1) is a sentence.

SO how can it be that: "(1) isn't the fact that the kettle is boiling". — Banno

Because (1) is a sentence and the fact that the kettle is boiling isn't a sentence. Therefore, (1) isn't the fact that the kettle is boiling.

You seem to be unable to separate use from mention. Here's another example that should make it clearer:

1. The kettle is boiling
2. (1) is true

The correct translation of (2) is "the kettle is boiling" is true. The incorrect translation of (2) is the kettle is boiling is true.

1. The kettle is boiling

(1) is an English sentence. You appear to have accepted this above. But the fact that the kettle is boiling isn't an English sentence. Therefore, (1) isn't the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) refers to the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) is about the fact that the kettle is boiling. (1) mentions the fact that the kettle is boiling. etc.

(1) says "The kettle is boiling" and (2) says "La bouilloire est en ébullition".

I don't understand the difficulty:

1. The kettle is boiling
2. La bouilloire est en ébullition

(1) is an English sentence and (2) is a French sentence.

1. Boiling the kettle is

Is (1) a grammatically incorrect fact or a grammatically incorrect sentence?

What sentence is it?

Why, it's (2)... — Banno

1. The kettle is boiling
2. "The kettle is boiling"

These are two different sentences.

Skip to 1:25.

And when you ask them what item 0 is, the answer is something like that it is the kettle boiling.

But that's item 1. — Banno

Is it?

1. The kettle is boiling

(1) is a sentence but a boiling kettle isn't a sentence.

For Jan. 6 rioters who believed Trump, storming the Capitol made sense

But the rioters themselves haven't been circumspect about what made them travel — in some cases hundreds of miles — to Washington for a rally that day and then march on the Capitol, which hundreds of them entered.

In interviews and court proceedings they've been clear: They believed Donald Trump when he told them the election had been stolen, and they believed it was their duty to try to help keep him in office, which in their eyes was essentially an effort to save the democracy.

...

Kenneth Rader, who pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge this month, admitted in court documents that he shared an image with 40 Facebook friends that read “Operation Occupy the Capitol, January 6, 2021” and wrote that Trump supporters were “going to remove the corrupt politions and take our country back... I will not stand by and let this go unanswered.”

...

Another woman was incredulous when asked by a reporter on Jan. 6 why she tried to storm the Capitol building, crying about being sprayed in the face with mace.

“We’re storming the Capitol!” she said in a video that was posted on Twitter, explaining why she tried to go inside. “It’s a revolution!”

...

Ryan Nichols, who was visible in the footage shown by the Jan. 6 committee on Thursday, pleaded not guilty and is being held in detention before his trial. A judge ruled Nichols was a threat based on evidence that included a “plethora” of videos, including some in which he appears to confess to fighting at the Capitol, filmed himself threatening violence on his way to the Capitol and then explained the reason he committed violence.

“So yes, today, Ryan Nichols, Ryan Nichols,” he says in the video, speaking in third person, adding that he grabbed his weapon “and he stormed the Capitol and he fought.” He goes on to say he fought for “freedom” and “election integrity.”

“I fought!”

In Harvard study of Jan. 6 rioters, top motivation is clear: Trump

A plurality of rioters cited either their support for Trump (20.6%) or Trump’s false belief that the election had been stolen (also 20.6%) as their primary motivation for their actions that led to charges on Jan. 6.

The third most frequently listed reason defendants gave to law enforcement for entering the Capitol was their belief that they were participating in “revolution, civil war, or secession.”

About the same number of defendants in the study claimed they were at the Capitol to “peacefully protest” (7%) as those who claimed they were there because of a “general interest in violence” (6.2%).

Anyone who isn't an idiot understands why they stormed the Capitol. They were trying to stop the Electoral College vote.

Trump compliments 'fierce' and 'smart' Putin and applauds Xi Jinping for ruling China with an 'iron fist'

He sure loves his dictators. Definitely wishes he had their power.

Classified folder on display at Trump Tower

What's the bet that Trump Tower gets searched next?

Judge unseals the list of items FBI seized from Trump in Mar-a-Lago search

Lots of empty folders with classified banners. What's he done with the contents?

You've also got the weirdness that comes from convention T working for factual, declarative language and using it to, generically, set out the meaning of non-factual, non-declarative language through how the sentence somehow 'pictures' the relevant state of affairs. EG, like you can elucidate the speech act of flipping someone off through ""fdrake flipped someone off" is true if and only if fdrake flipped someone off". — fdrake

Just a side note, but Convention T and the T schema are different things.

Convention T. A formally correct definition of the symbol 'Tr', formulated in the metalanguage, will be called an adequate definition of truth if it has the following consequences:

1. all sentences which are obtained from the expression 'x E Tr if and only if p' by substituting for the symbol 'x' a structural-descriptive name of any sentence of the language in question and for the symbol 'p' the expression which forms the translation of this sentence into the metalanguage;
2. the sentence 'for any x, if x E Tr then x E S'.

So Convention T is the claim that an adequate definition of "true" will entail the T-schema for all sentences.

And, as I've mention before, this highlights the fact that Tarski didn't offer the T-schema as a definition of truth, but as a consequence of a correct definition. As I mentioned here, we still need an actual definition of "true".

In On the Concept of Truth in Formal Languages he says:

In § 1 colloquial Ianguage is the object of our investigations. The results are entirely negative. With respect to this language not only does the definition of truth seem to be impossible, but even the consistent use of this concept in conformity with the laws of logic.

...

If these observations are correct, then the very possibility of a consistent use of the expression 'true sentence' which is in harmony with the laws of logic and the spirit of everyday language seems to be very questionable, and consequently the same doubt attaches to the possibility of constructing a correct definition of this expression.

...

For the reasons given in the preceding section I now abandon the attempt to solve our problem for the language of everyday life and restrict myself henceforth entirely to formalized languages.

The object language is a formalized language, specifically the calculus of classes in his example.