So for some statement about things that exist to be true, it must be apparent to some conscious mind, mustn't it? — Banno

Yes

Not sure what that means. — Banno

I’m saying that the truth of “if X had happened then Y would have happened” does not depend on the existence of a parallel world where X and then Y happened (or indeed on the existence of anything).

if idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist, then any truth about things that exist must be a truth about minds and mental phenomena. — Banno

Yes.

Try this: if idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist, then any truth about things that exist must be a truth about minds and mental phenomena.

Do you agree? — Banno

That a statement is about a mind isn’t that it’s truth depends on someone knowing it to be true. This is where there appears to be some equivocation. The truth of “tomorrow Michael will dream about going on holiday” is mind-dependent in the sense that it’s about someone’s mind but is mind-independent in the sense that it can be true even if nobody believes it. And that’s the case whether idealist or not.

I don't see how this can be maintained. If idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist, then idealism is the position that only statements concerning minds and mental phenomena can be true. — Banno

I don’t think that truth depends on the existence of some corresponding entity. Claims about the future can be true even if the future doesn’t exist. Counterfactuals can be true even if other possible worlds don’t exist.

Not at all. Isn't the idealist you mooted is committed to the future not existing, since everything that exists is perceived, and the future is not yet perceived? — Banno

Then assuming that Fitch’s paradox applies to idealism, can you give an example of something that isn’t known?

There could not be two distinct things without separation between them, otherwise they'd be only one thing. And, if there is separation between them, that separation must consist of something. If it's not something real, then we're back to there really being only one thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

This makes no sense at all. You’re saying that some third thing is required for the two apples to be separated. Then what separates the two apples from this third thing?

I think you misunderstand. It's obviously not "some C" which separates A from B. What is the case is that A is different from, or other than B. C could not make A other than B, because C is of the same type as both A and B, and this is why the infinite regress appears, you have not grasped the need for something of a different type.. What makes A different from B, must be something categorically distinct from both A and B, as well as C, D, E, F, or anything else of that category, because these are all of the same type, and cannot account for the difference within the type. Another thing of the same type cannot account for the differences between things of the same type.

This is why there is a need for dualism, rather than pure idealism, or solipsism. If A and B represent distinct minds, then there must be something which makes A other than, or different from B. This must be something categorically distinct, like "matter" is supposed to be distinct from mind, not another bit of the same substance, C. Or else we would have one continuity of mind, A, B, C, D... with nothing really separating one from the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're right, I don't understand. I think it's entirely possible (in principle) that two apples exist, and are the only things to exist. There doesn't need to be some third thing to "separate" them.

what you will do tomorrow does not (yet) exist. It is not either true nor false. — Banno

This is the case for every metaphysics (physicalist, dualist, other) that isn't eternalist, correct?

If idealism is true then we know everything. — Banno

Your extreme idealist must conclude that because it is not part of experience, what you will do tomorrow does not (yet) exist. It is not either true nor false. — Banno

This is where you appear to equivocate. In saying that "we know everything" it's implied that we know the future. But Fitch's paradox is only that every truth is known. If claims about the future have no truth value then the future isn't known. If the future isn't known then can we really be said to know everything? There appears to be a meaningful difference between "we know everything" and "we know every truth".

And as an aside, it should also be noted that Fitch's paradox concludes that "every truth is known", not that "I know every truth". These aren't the same thing, so be cautious not to assert the latter. Your wording is ambiguous here so I thought I'd point it out.

Yet idealism holds as a minimal position that reality is mind-dependent. Reality is of course what is said by true sentences. Hence idealism must hold that the truth of a sentence true is dependent on mind. — Banno

I think that’s an oversimplification. Does physicalism entail that mathematical truths are physics-dependant? Does dualism entail that mathematical truths are either physics- or mind-dependent? Must one be an eternalist to believe that claims about the future have a truth value? Must one believe in the existence of all possible worlds to believe that counterfactuals have a truth value?

I think it’s more appropriate to say that idealism is the position that only minds and mental phenomena exist. It is quiet on truth. Truth might not depend on the existence of some entity that makes it true (e.g in the case of mathematics, counterfactuals, and statements about the future).

Or perhaps you don't think that this is idealism "proper"? Then how would you name a position that argues that 1) there is no external material world, 2) every entity that exists is a mind or mental phenomena, and 3) logical/mathematical/counterfactual/future truths are mind-independent?

The problem with unenumerated rights is in deciding what they are — Hanover

I’m addressing your claim that one can believe that one ought allow for abortion and that the Constitution does not grant that right. If it is unreasonable to believe that the Constitution does not grant unenumerated rights, i.e rights that are “fundamental”, and if one believes that one ought be allowed to have an abortion, then it is unreasonable to believe that the Constitution does not grant the right to an abortion.

Unless by “one ought be allowed an abortion” you mean something other than “there is a fundamental right to abortion”?

There are two possibilities : either p exists before being experienced or p exists after (at the moment of) being experienced. If after (i.e., the experiencing mind must be present for existence), then solipsism. — Real Gone Cat

That doesn’t follow. If there are multiple minds then solipsism isn’t the case.

Yes, that is reasonable. The only way we arrive at these unspoken rules (like the right to have an abortion) is through a biblical sort of sensus plenior exegesis upon a fairly limited document. If 100 otherwise uninitiated interpreters were asked if abortion were protected under the US Constitution, I can't imagine anyone would write an opinion remotely close to Roe v. Wade, especially with regard to trimester framework described in it.

But even if I grant you that substantive due process is reasonable, that doesn't negate the reasonableness of those who reject it, but you're instead left with a reasonable disagreement, although few describe the dispute in that way. — Hanover

Well, the Ninth Amendment does say "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people" and was explicitly adopted because there was the concern that without it it would be interpreted that only enumerated rights were rights. So with that in mind it seems unreasonable to deny substantive due process, a view shared by Justice Goldberg:

While the Ninth Amendment – and indeed the entire Bill of Rights – originally concerned restrictions upon federal power, the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States as well from abridging fundamental personal liberties. And, the Ninth Amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the existence of other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as well as federal, infringement. In sum, the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the view that the "liberty" protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments. — Griswold v. Connecticut

If there is multiple minds, then isn't it necessary that there is something which separates one mind from another? — Metaphysician Undercover

For A and B to be separate there must be some C that makes them separate? Why? What then separates C from A and B? Some D? And so on ad infinitum. Seems an unreasonable requirement.

If it's silent on the point, all the more reason not to use it as a basis for literal interpretation, which is the error Anglo-Saxon lawyers keep making. — Benkei

I don't understand this. If the Constitution doesn't say that States cannot establish a law against smoking then it is correct for the Supreme Court to rule that the Constitution doesn't say that States cannot establish a law against smoking, and so allow any State law against smoking to go into effect.

It seems that mental phenomena belong to minds. If not my mind, then a Hive Mind.

If p comes into existence at the moment of being experienced, it is only part of the mind experiencing it. I.e.,solipsism. — Real Gone Cat

It's not solipsism because there are multiple minds, and it's not a hive mind because they're separate.

So the uber-mind is indistinguishable from the material world. — Real Gone Cat

Presumably the materialist doesn't claim that the material world is the experience of an uber-mind? They're clearly distinguishable.

Ah, the Hive Mind. — Real Gone Cat

No, that isn't implied at all.

The former is called solipsism. — Real Gone Cat

No it isn't. There can be multiple minds, each with individual experiences.

The latter is a form of materialism that just calls matter by another name. — Real Gone Cat

I could say that materialism is a form of idealism that just calls mental phenomena by another name.

Of course the future is unknowable. But that is the case for both the realist and the idealist. — Real Gone Cat

That’s the point. Banno is arguing that if idealism is the case then everything is known (even referring to us as being omniscient). I’m explaining that this isn’t the case. Even if idealism is true I still don’t know what tomorrow will bring.

If not, then I don't see how you avoid the charge of solipsism — Real Gone Cat

Idealism argues that only minds and mental phenomena exist. It doesn’t argue that only my mind and mental phenomena exist.

Does p come into being at the moment it is experienced? Or is it lurking in some uber-mind? — Real Gone Cat

That depends on the specific form of idealism. Some argue the former, others the latter.

An unfortunate reality:

1. Abortion ought be afforded to those women who choose it in certain circumstances.
2. The US Constitution doesn't speak to that right.

You can believe in 1 and 2 at the same time.

That you see the Constitution as a vehicle to justify a progressive morality, regardless of the the actual content of the text, is a political position. I'm not condemning the sentiment and an argument can be made that the harsh rule of law should be bent by those wise enough to see its injustice, but so too can an argument be made that the rule of law ought be followed and not be overturned upon subjective notions if fairness.

That is, the ruling was a reasonable result if one sincerely holds to the position that the Constitution doesn't say whatever we think it ought to say. — Hanover

Is it reasonable to believe that there is no substantive due process in the constitution?

At the end of the day, most people care more about the economy than ideological issues, especially one like abortion that doesn't really affect that many people — Paulm12

Yes, because abortion is just an "ideological" issue, and pregnancy is not something that actually affects the life and health and welfare of real people. :roll:

And as for not affecting "that many":

Population Group Abortion Rates and Lifetime Incidence of Abortion: United States, 2008-2014

If the 2014 age-specific abortion rates prevail, 24% of women aged 15 to 44 years in that year will have an abortion by age 45 years.

Idealism doesn't hold that some statement p is true only if it is believed or known to be true. Idealism holds that only minds and mental phenomena exist. It's a position regarding the substance-nature of the world, not about truth.

The non-existence of an external material world doesn't entail that all counterfactuals are knowable and that all mathematical theories are provable. Taking an extreme form of idealism as an example, even if only my mind and my experiences exist, I don't know what I'm going to experience tomorrow.

I sincerely hope American empire will implode in my life time of its politics and judiciary continues to be this regressive. — Benkei

I half agree, although I suspect it would have a knock-on effect on the price of my food which I wouldn't want.

For that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court's substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell. — Thomas

So how long before a State makes it illegal to wear a condom and have oral sex?

The irony of the above is that Alito's opinion says:

This is evident in the analogy that the dissent draws between the abortion right and the rights recognized in Griswold (contraception), Eisenstadt (same), Lawrence (sexual conduct with member of the same sex), and Obergefell (same-sex marriage). Perhaps this is designed to stoke unfounded fear that our decision will imperil those other rights... — Alito

Is it really unfounded if a concurring opinion explicitly says that those prior decisions should be reconsidered?

It's weird that people are celebrating this as State rights triumphing over federal law. They want the State to be able to take away individual rights? They don't want the constitution to guarantee them certain freedoms?

The article doesn't explain why idealism entails that there are no unknowable truths, it just asserts that it does.

Do you believe that there are unknowable mathematical truths? If so, why would this only be the case if there is an external material world? I don't see why the existence of mind-independent atoms determines the provability of Goldbach's conjecture, for example.

Or what about counterfactuals or claims about the future? They can be unknowable if there's an external material world but are necessarily knowable if there isn't? I don't see how that follows.

It's about Fitch's paradox. — Banno

Not sure how Fitch's paradox is relevant. Idealism doesn't entail that there are no unknown truths. There can be unknown mathematical or logical truths, for example, and these do not require an external material world.

Only some of what one might say actually works. There is a way in which reality does not care what you say about it. Believe what you will, you cannot walk through walls. — Banno

Idealism can allow for the mental stuff that exists to behave in a regulated way such that we can't will ourselves to experience whatever we want. We'll never experience ourselves walking through walls.

If it is true in an over-mind, it remains true in a mind. I don't see any accrued advantage in such speculation. — Banno

Then why bother with it? — Banno

I'm not sure of the relation between advantage and truth. It might very well be that there's no practical difference between idealism and materialism, but also that idealism is true.

And as for why one might think that idealism is more likely than materialism, perhaps it's something like an application of Occam's razor. Rather than there being both material and mental stuff, and the hard problem of consciousness, and with the existence of material stuff being inferred to explain the regularity of experience, there's just the mental stuff that is immediately apparent.

Yes. What's wrong with: brain activity is sensations? — bongo fury

Nothing. Whether you want to say that brain activity is sensations or that sensations are some emergent phenomena from brain activity, it is the case that sensations are not directly connected to external world objects, and that they are, in a sense, "representations" of external world objects, with the qualities of those sensations (e.g colour), not being properties of external world objects.

is the myth, the internal picture that doesn't happen. — bongo fury

Are you saying that we don't have qualitative experiences? That brain activity doesn't produce sensations?

For me, the object we experience and the cause of our sensations is the same thing. This can be observed. So I think it is you who needs to show that there are in fact two different objects, because it isn’t immediately apparent that this is so. — NOS4A2

To interject, imagine that you have tetrachromacy and 40/20 vision and I don't have tetrachromacy and have 20/40 vision. If you and I look at the same external world object (e.g. an apple) then in one sense you and I are seeing the same thing (the apple) but in another sense you and I aren't seeing the same thing (you see different colours and more detail for example). The what we see in the second sense is different to the external world object. It is this second sense of what we see that the indirect realist will say is a "representation" of the apple.

And regarding the epistemological problem that gave rise to the disagreement between the direct and indirect realists, does the what we see in the second sense show us the mind-independent nature of the external world? Does that apple have the colour we see it to have even when we don't see it? And if so, is it the colour that you see it to have or the colour that I see it to have, as we each see the colour differently?

Given that direct realists argued that external world objects are as we see them to be (in the second sense) if perception is "direct" (and that perception is "direct") then it follows that whatever they meant by "direct", if external world objects aren't as we see them to be (in the second sense) then perception isn't direct. And I think that the modern scientific understanding of the world and perception shows that external world objects aren't as we seem to be (in the second sense), and so direct realism fails, regardless of the grammar we use to describe the object of perception.

And what if I'm seeing the rock in a mirror because it's behind me?

So do you accept that the fundamental furniture of the Universe is material in nature? Whatever that turns out to be? — Wayfarer

The "whatever that turns out to be" makes the very question "is the Universe material in nature?" a meaningless question. See Hempel's dilemma.

You’ll need to figure out a better argument because you’re still viewing the TV screen directly. — NOS4A2

I'm not asking about the TV. I'm asking about the rock. When I see a rock on a TV screen, am I seeing the rock directly?

It does follow that we experience the world directly and that there is a connection between oneself and the object for the same reasons I stated earlier. Real, physical connections, for instance light touching the eyes, hands touching the object etc. occur in these interactions. — NOS4A2

That doesn't make it direct. There are real, physical connections when a rock is seen in the reflection of a mirror, but I'm not seeing the rock directly. There are real, physical connections when a rock is seen on TV, but I'm not seeing the rock directly.

My distinction between direct and indirect pertains to viewing the world. The TV screen, being in the world, is viewed directly, as is anything else in the periphery, like the TV stand. An indirect view would be representationalism, the assumption that we are viewing a representation of a TV. — NOS4A2

I'm asking if I'm seeing the rock directly if I see it through a TV screen, or if I see it in the reflection of a mirror, or if I see it through a telescope, or if I see it through a pair of glasses.

I don’t understand. The only direct connection I am speaking of is the viewing of the painting (along with everything else in the periphery), not that there is any connection between a painting of a woman and a woman. The connections and contacts are real, not figurative, for instance light hitting the eyes. — NOS4A2

I'm saying that it doesn't follow from "the painting is of a woman" that there is a direct connection between the painting and the woman, and similarly that it doesn't follow from "the experience is of an external world object" that there is a direct connection between the experience and the external world object.

You need to do more than just say "we experience external world objects" to make a case for direct realism. If I see a rock through a TV screen then I'm seeing a rock, but I'm seeing it indirectly. So it can be that we experience external world objects and that indirect realism is the case.

So, they experience this thing called shape differently. — Bylaw

So how is it different to colour? The structure of some external world object determines what colour we see when we look at it, but it also determines what shape we see when we look at it and what shape we feel when we touch it. Why do you project shape, but not colour, onto the external world object?

Can you explain how we can run through a field and no fall down despite the incredibly complicated surface say a cattle field presents? — Bylaw

There is a regularity in which experiences are elicited by external stimulation. Given how our brain and eyes work, we see the colour red when stimulated by light of a particular frequency, which in turn is reflected by a surface with a particular arrangement of electrons. And the same principle with shape. Through a combination of instinct and learning we are able to navigate the world using qualia as a guide.

None of which we experience indirectly. — NOS4A2

So if I see a rock in the next room through a TV screen and a camera feed then I am not seeing that rock indirectly? Then it's not entirely clear to me what you even mean by seeing something either directly or indirectly. Because that seems to me to be a prime example of seeing something indirectly.

All I know is we perceive external world objects. — NOS4A2

Yes, and we paint people and write about history. But it doesn't then follow that there is a direct connection between the painting and the woman or the writing and the war. So it doesn't follow from us perceiving external world objects that there is a direct connection between perception and those external world objects. The grammar of how we describe the intensional object of perception says nothing about the (meta)physics of perception.

Do we not experience mental phenomena then? Because to me it still sounds like you’re saying that instead of a painting you are experiencing mental phenomena, which is an experience. If you’re not experiencing an experience, then how is it you are able to view, observe, see, feel, sense mental phenomena? Upon what do mental phenomena appear and to whom do they appear to? — NOS4A2

I'm saying what I said above: that experience is a mental phenomena, that there is no direct connection between mental phenomena and external world objects, and that the qualities of mental phenomena are not properties of external world objects.

I am not sure what Molyneux's problem says about the external to the perceiver existence of shape. They've been blind and have not learned to see shapes, and then they learn. — Bylaw

That people who were born blind and recognise an object's shape by touch are not, after becoming able to see, immediately able to recognise an object's shape by sight. This shows that the feel of a sphere isn't like the look of a sphere. So which of the feel of a sphere and the look of a sphere, if either, is a property of the external world object and not just a quale?

Which is why it is better to use things like shape and volume for example. — Bylaw

Why? What's the relevant difference between shape and colour? And is that shape as seen or as felt, because they're very different things (see Molyneux's problem for example).

I don’t think we’re brains. So I don’t see how it is possible that an experience is in the head — NOS4A2

Then what do you think consciousness is? Some etherial entity that extends beyond the body and somehow "contains" or "touches" the external world object that is said to be the object of perception?

We are conscious of the world, not of consciousness. We experience the world, not experience. We perceive the world, not perception. — NOS4A2

This doesn't say anything of relevance. The painting is of a woman, not of paint, but the painting is still paint, not a woman. There's no "direct connection" between the paint and the woman. So even if the experience is of an external world object (and you still haven't explained what it even means for an external world object to be the object of perception) it doesn't then follow that there is a "direct connection" between the experience and the external world object.

Note that I'm not saying that we "experience an experience" or "perceive a perception" (anymore than I'd say that the painting is of paint); I'm saying that experience is a mental phenomena, that there is no direct connection between mental phenomena and external world objects, and that the qualities of mental phenomena are not properties of external world objects.

None of this entails the kind of red-herring grammar ("we experience an experience") that you're trying to argue against. After all, when I dream I don't dream about dreams; I dream about eating an apple - and it's all just mental phenomena with no direct connection to external world objects.

All evidence points to there being no such veil between the boundary of the self and the rest of the world. Where the body ends the rest of the world begins. There is nothing between them. The contact is direct. — NOS4A2

See my post here about glasses, microscopes, telescopes, mirrors, and camera feeds.

We experience the outer world directly rather than indirectly, like through some subjective Cartesian theater. We don’t experience “consciousness” or “subjective experience”; we experience independent things. If we pick up a rock, for example, there is nothing between us and the rock, and therefor nothing prohibiting us from confirming its independence. It seems to me the idealist has yet to prove what this prohibition is. — NOS4A2

Another thing: if I wear glasses then I quite literally have something between me and the rock. Am I seeing the rock directly or indirectly? Or what if I use a telescope to see something far away or a microscope to see something very small? Or what if I use a mirror to see something behind me? Or what if I use a TV screen and a feed from a camera in the next room?

Where's the line between direct and indirect? Even the naked eye is a middle-man between the external world object and the brain/mental experience, and even the air is a middle-man between the external world object and the ear.

We experience the outer world directly rather than indirectly, like through some subjective Cartesian theater. We don’t experience “consciousness” or “subjective experience”; we experience independent things. If we pick up a rock, for example, there is nothing between us and the rock, and therefor nothing prohibiting us from confirming its independence. It seems to me the idealist has yet to prove what this prohibition is. — NOS4A2

The prevalent understanding of consciousness is that it is either identical to or an emergent phenomenon of brain activity. We can perhaps accept that some external world object is in some sense responsible for the experience - and that among the many things in the causal chain it has some kind of primacy - but given that the external world object isn’t in my head, whereas the experience is, what does it even mean for the external world object be a (direct) object of the experience?

Moreover, the initial argument between direct and indirect realists was epistemological. Does experience provide us with information about the nature of the external world? Do external world objects have the red colour that I see things to have, or is a red colour a product of experience itself, a quality of mental phenomena only?

And if a red colour is a quality of mental phenomena, not a property of external world objects, and if the apples we see have a red colour, then the apples we see are mental phenomena, not external world objects.

The reading bit is about raising the point that perhaps distinctions such as direct, indirect, internal, external, subjective, objective, realist and idealist are inadequate to the task set in the OP. Perhaps they misdirect us. — Banno

I agree. When I look at a mirror I'm looking at a mirror and I'm also looking at my reflection and I'm also looking at myself. The painting might be of a woman but it's also just paint. We can describe things in a number of different ways, all of which can be correct. I think direct and indirect realists are just talking in different ways. There's not necessarily any conflict.