In this sense sound and ink have an active role in the creation of meaning, for they are direct causes. — JuanZu
That meaning that is invented by the listener may be in communion with our meaning, but then it is a case of coincidence in meanings. — JuanZu
For my part, I don't think its as easy as "leaving the intention behind" - this since it's the intention which is transmitted to another via the sound or ink or braille - but OK. We seem to at least agree in terms of the sounds, written letters, or braille patterns being intentionally caused by an agent, and this so as to transmit meaning from one agent to another. — javra
If there is ghost in the ink it means that the intention and the purpose are transmitted without any imperfection or defect. — JuanZu
So the listener or reader receives the intention, purpose and meaning completely, accurately and absolutely clear without any distortion. — JuanZu
End of discussion. — JuanZu
One: Its not a physical attribute of the ink. The intentions are what caused the ink to have the shapes that it does. And so it is inferred from the ink's shapes. It is as much in the ink as might be a spark in an exploding dynamite.
Secondly: How do you reason there would be no possibility of misunderstanding were this to be so (again, as just described)? — javra
In this case we are talking about the materiality of the signs, the sounds uttered, the ink, etc.... From a materialistic point of view, mine, there is no possibility that intentions travel through the air or are inside the ink. That is mentalism. — JuanZu
But misunderstandings are a fact of life. Which implies that if we accept the materialist thesis that denies that kind of mentalism we must assume that the medium, the sound, the ink, etc, has some independence with respect to purpose and intentionality, and an active role in the creation of meaning for a receiver (the hearer, the reader, etc). — JuanZu
I was working on the presumption that you do not interpret meaning and use to be different in any respect. Is this correct? — javra
"Intending to" make use of something is not the same as "making use of something". — javra
Use of X presupposes intentioning, but intentioning "that one use X" can occur without X ending up being used. — javra
In fact the purpose is absent in the note. I repeat, this is because if it were not absent we would be talking about something similar to the ghost in the machine, in this case the ghost in the ink. — JuanZu
Uttering words is very similar to leaving a note. Both can lead to misunderstandings. Why is that? — JuanZu
Precisely because there is an active part of the "medium", without this active part there would never be a possible misunderstanding. — JuanZu
Medium transparency is an illusion you have invented. The possibility of misunderstanding proves otherwise. But in fact there are misunderstandings, ergo I am right. There is an independence of the medium that is active. — JuanZu
Can you give any example of use that is devoid of any purpose and hence of any usefulness or benefit? — javra
Use entails intentioning which entails intent (with purpose equating to either intentioning or intent). They’re not the same thing though. Intentioning X is not the same as making use of X. The latter presupposes the former, but the former can occur without the latter. — javra
The purpose here is absent because the absent of the autor and is partly a cause for misunderstanding. — JuanZu
That is, you can interpret many things from the note. A person can say something to another person and still be misunderstood. Uttering words is like leaving a note on the refrigerator. — JuanZu
There is some independence of the "medium" from the message. But this independence is active as I have shown. — JuanZu
The medium in a certain sense can betray the message and the author's intention. — JuanZu
But the note as the words we utter imposes its conditions, there is no absolutely transparent medium, which means that there is an active role of the medium beyond the purpose and intention of the agent. — JuanZu
No human culture has ever come up with names for the colors in the ultraviolet spectrum that are visible to insects, but not to the human eye. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Wittgenstein gets at this vaguely with the notion of a "form of life," but I think we could certainly expand on that a great deal more, as a means of showing how human biology determines use and usefulness. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Second, I had forgot Grayling's full example. People can use "QED" and the like consistently, in the correct way, and not know their meaning. However, consider "kalb." It means dog in Arabic. You now know what kalb means. However, if you don't know Arabic, you don't know how to use it in a sentence. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But what determines use? Wouldn't the causes of use and usefulness play an important role in explaining language too? — Count Timothy von Icarus
You are doing nothing other than categorically denying what I state. But without argument. — JuanZu
That language we share is actively exposed in the note, but not by another person, because this one is absent. — JuanZu
But as I said the note acts in the absence of its author, it acts in us who read and understand it. — JuanZu
In part the note actively is its ordo cognoscendi, by its syntax, by the place in which it is found (a refrigerator), by its style, etc. — JuanZu
That is in fact false. Because the mental contents are not in the note as a ghost in the letters. The note is alone and it is exerting a constraint on our language. — JuanZu
I maintain that it is because there is an active role of the note in the refrigerator. — JuanZu
It is partly the reason why we understand what we understand. Partly because the subject also has an active role and both roles interact with each other. — JuanZu
That's why when you are asked why you interpret the way you interpret what the note says you actually have to show the note and say "the note says so". — JuanZu
You are ignoring that the use we think we can make of the note is delimited by the note itself. It is like a command that interacts with us. And above all it is the reason why we understand a specific use and not any other. This is an active role that transcends the subjectivity of the subject and its intentionality. That is why the notion of use falls short, because the use is anchored to a subject, or to a way of life. Today with artificial intelligence we see more clearly how non-subjective sign systems interact with us. — JuanZu
If we see a note on a refrigerator according to our use of words we can understand what it says. However it should be noted that the note has an active role in us shaping our language and selecting the use we are going to give it. But here "giving a use" is misleading, since it seems that the subject is the one who has the only active role. However, we cannot explain our choice of word use other than from the note on the refrigerator. That is, the note has an active role in shaping the use. The role of the note is so active that in my opinion the idea of use is very restrictive to the subject. That is why I prefer to speak of transcription and of active non-subjective sign systems that interact with us. — JuanZu
That's a lot of quotes! Well, the OP was short on content, I figured I'd add a bit! — Count Timothy von Icarus
First, it might sound simple (i.e., that you're reducing meaning to something simple) saying that use is meaning, but Wittgenstein spent quite a bit of time explaining it. It's not reductionist. — Sam26
If you understand that "what is irony" is a construction, as is everything which flows out of it, constructions of meaning; and that, the real "you" lies somewhere outside of that cave of shadows, in the feelings, sensations and drives of the body; while you will never escape pleasure and pain, you might escape attachment and suffering. — ENOAH
I don't like using up space with long unsolicited explanations, and the statement just made requires long explanations, so I guess I'm unclear. On the upside, I hope my unclear statements might trigger pursuit by others into tunnels they may not have considered, and I learn a lot about tunnels from their responses. — ENOAH
I meant both sincerely. Thanks for the interesting take. Sorry if I was frustratingly unclear. But for me, all good. How could I really know? So obviously I've grown a little from this. I'm ready to move on.
I don't think I've left you hanging, right? — ENOAH
I can't say what David Moore means. — Moliere
To cut to the chase, I/we can't help it. It's autonomous. — ENOAH
The exploration further, call it philosophy, is a desire to build meaning. That desire is rooted in a positive feeling. We may not perceive that root feeling on the surface, so overcrowded with layers of constructions, but at the root is an unnable positive feeling. That is what I said was the first movement in philosophy. — ENOAH
Of course it's [grown into] a system etc. But everything beyond whatever that positive feeling is--the feeling both our bodies are after by, for lack, "discovery"--is making-up meaning. — ENOAH
In the end some of us produce functional new paths, some don't, but we're all making meaning to attach to organic feelings. So ultimately we're confounding any path to that once real feeling, with making sense. — ENOAH
I don't take Quora seriously, to be honest. I participated a for a small time there in answering labor questions and saw how it's basically a social media game. — Moliere
I don't think irony is based on a lack of expectations, though if you're a dullard without any expectations I could see how irony is lost on a person. — Moliere
What does it mean to say "everything is ironic", or "relative?" We claim to be making sense of it, but, ironically we're
confounding it further. — ENOAH
We do not focus on the truth we already know. "Irony" like most things surfacing through minds as culture or history, is not a definite singular thing. It represents first an organic feeling best left not displaced by signifiers. But inevitably minds come up with "irony" [for the feeling triggered when facts reveal themselves to be fictions and vice versa]. And its definition is already impossible because it is not the unnamable feeling, but the construction for it in code. But because it is constructed we give to it also constructed meanings. If conventionally accepted within a range of functional applications of that signifier, then we settle upon that as "definition." Fair enough. A reasonably necessarily dialectic for "irony" to function as code. — ENOAH
But then philosophy (also first an unamable feeling, stretched by Mind into [a] near infinite structure of signifiers, requiring extra lengthy narratives to arrive at the feeling [akin to discovery]) comes along and takes the dialectic beyond the reasonable conventional one designed to give the Signifier some signifieds, the construction of meaning [out of feeling]; but to a place which is clearly more fictional, a game claiming to be uncovering the core of truth. — ENOAH
"The Logic of Mathematics and the Imaginative and Creative Process by which we Make Sense by Rendering the Continuous Discretely and Producing Continuity from the Discrete" — Darkneos
Everything isn't irony because most things don't end in aporia or comedy. — Moliere
They are simply words that remind us that there is no ultimate metalanguage that serves to describe language. It is the same with the word "metaphor". You define it in a non-metaphorical sense and there is a contradiction in what it is to speak metaphorically and to define metaphor, that is, you betray its meaning. This implies that there is no metalanguage of definitions valid for all cases. Moreover, when we believe we have a metalanguage we use it as any other way of speaking that you can also define in another metalanguage of a higher order; and so on ad infinitum. That is, there is no ultimate metalanguage from which to define all aspects (or being) of language. — JuanZu
Ironically, we might just end up confounding things. — ENOAH
Ironically, both are something only a human could say... or, does that negate the irony? — ENOAH
From the article ‘the most potent examples of irony emerge from scenarios in which objects and the expected meaning in their context appear perpendicular to the more immediate meaning of that context.’
It’s pretty close to what I said. — Wayfarer
No, I think you’re on the right track. It’s a little like humor or explaining a joke - if you have to explain why a joke is funny then it’s not funny. And there are those - this includes a particular type of American - on whom ‘irony is lost’, who can’t see the irony of something. In which cases it’s pointless to try and explain why it’s ironic.
I suppose that both irony and a humor (at least not slapstick humor) both rely on cognitive dissonance, a kind of double meaning, a mismatch between what was expected and what actually happened. — Wayfarer
Ironically, this David Moore doesn't know what irony is. — DifferentiatingEgg
I have many arguments in this forum as to whether humans are categorically different to other animals. Most say they’re not, but ironically that’s something only a human could say. — Wayfarer
Both are considered to be idealists, but I wouldn't say they are "interchangeable", unless you want to trivialize their work as proponents of woo-woo. The link below characterizes Berkeley as a "subjective idealist", and Whitehead as "more complex", perhaps combining subjective concepts and objective percepts. For example, matter is both a tangible percept (experience) and a philosophical concept, as in Materialism. — Gnomon
How Matter can also be Mind may sound like woo-woo to some skeptics. And if immaterial ideas are woo-woo (can't see'em or touch'em), then this forum of sharing ideas via spooky action-at-a-distance is also mystical mumbo jumbo — Gnomon
I have no issue seeing that.
You said energy is a concept. So then matter is energy and therefore matter is a concept.
So is Whitehead interchangeable with Berkeley? — Fire Ologist
