Sure. Good luck. Be safe and well.

:smile:

Truth... ...is a judgment... — Terrapin Station

Correspondence isn't.

It's what "being true" is--when you make a "positive" judgment about the relation (for example, judging that "yes, the proposition corresponds to this fact from my perspective," rather than "no, it does not," which would be the "negative" judgment--aka the proposition is false). "Being called true" occurs because one has made the positive judgment in question.

And again, no, I wouldn't call the judgment a belief. If a belief is strong enough, one makes a claim that so and so is the case, as in factually the case, where the claim can be wrong (but the subject believes that it's the case until convinced otherwise). That's not the sense in which I'm using "judgment" here. The judgment here is simply a personal assessment as to whether the meaning the subject has applied has the positive relation in question (such as correspondence, for example) to something else (such as facts from the subject's perspective, if we're talking about correspondence; if we were talking about coherence instead, for a different example, the positive judgment would be "yes, this coheres with the other propositions I have assigned "true" to). — Terrapin Station

Cool, I think. So belief does not require thinking about truth conditions/relations, whereas judgment does?

Judging that this or that is true results in belief, wouldn't you say?

What sort of things can be moved? How about all of the things that have a spatiotemporal location?
— creativesoul

Does information have a spatiotemporal location? — Marchesk

No, and that's precisely the problem with such talk.

We often say a file is moved from one computer to another. It might be uploaded, downloaded, synched to the cloud or what not.

Yup. People talk like that all the time... as if the file is equivalent to information and can be moved in it's entirety, like a cup, from the cupboard onto the table. It cannot. The file consists of marks/symbols/commands/coding/etc. It does not consist of information. The file is but one part of information.

We could say any instance of some piece of digital information, such as your banking number, is on a particular machine. But is it on the hard drive, in memory, inside the processor cache? Do the bytes that make up the file reside on one location, or in various ones that change as the operating system or whatever program moves bits around?

All good questions. The banking number is a piece of something more. That something more is information. Are the bytes equivalent to the information that they are a part of? Is the number?

No.

Information is meaningful.

What sort of things can be moved? How about all of the things that have a spatiotemporal location? — creativesoul

Surely the former is a subset of the latter. — StreetlightX

It would seem so.

What sort of things can be moved? How about all of the things that have a spatiotemporal location?

All reports/accounts, including but not limited to those of thought, are propositional.

Better?

:wink:

All reports/accounts of thought are propositional. That is, all thinking about thought is propositional. Not all thought is thinking about thought. There is a distinction to be drawn between reports/accounts of thought, and what's being reported upon and/or accounted for. There are remarkable differences concerning existential dependency and elemental constituency.

Yes. On a strictly individual - not shared - level. I forgot about that.

There's a difference between a proposition being true and a proposition being believed.

"p" is true only if p; the proposition "p" is made to fit the word, p

Believing implies that one will act in certain ways. The world it treated as if p were the case. The world is made to fit the proposition, "p"

The direction of fit for a truth is the reverse of the direction of fit for a belief.

This might be what Terrapin Station means, that belief requires a judgement.

And it may be what @leo is missing in musing that science does not tell us how things are. — Banno

Nothing I would object to there... the direction of fit bit isn't understood rightly by me, I suspect.

There's also a difference between a proposition and a belief. What makes a proposition true, depends upon several different possible meanings. What makes a belief(in propositional form) true depends upon one, and only one.

I was objecting to the notion of P's being true for me, or you, or someone else, and wanting to see how Terrapin deals with that. I suspect he's working from a notion of relative truth... in the sense that conflates truth and belief.

P's being true does not require any particular person to believe it.<------ in that sense, it(the truth of P) is objective. Although, I prefer a different framework.

Depression has a solution... one solution. It requires coming to different acceptable terms about what's happened and/or is happening. There are many ways to achieve it.

I wouldn't talk about hallucinogens had I not already had the experience of taking them. If it doesn't make sense or is not profoundly enlightening when you're sober, then it doesn't make sense when you're not... the writings, that is. The only reason it seems to make sense when under the influence is because you're under the influence.

A judgment about the relation between meaning and something else is the difference between P's being true and P's being called "true"?

This judgment(calling P "true") is not belief?

I'm not following here.

hen I had psychedelic experiences, which opened myself up to the idea that there is much more than what we usually call the universe. The best way I could describe these experiences, is that while I was having them I could understand things that I am not able to understand the rest of the time, I could see things that I do not have the ability to see or even to imagine the rest of the time. If 10 years ago someone had told me what I am saying now, I would have thought they were just hallucinating. But these experiences weren't hallucinations, they were much more profound than anything else. I remember telling myself that by the time the effect wears down I would stop understanding what I understood then. And indeed, there are things I wrote down during these experiences that have lost their meaning and depth, if I read them now they just sound cheesy, because I am not able to understand them anymore... — leo

Think on that for a minute...

Perhaps the writings you made while under the influence of hallucinatory substances do not make sense now because they did not make sense then. Altering your mind does not allow you to see things that you cannot see without the altering, or make sense of writings that you cannot make sense of any other way.

Rather, altering your mind(thought/belief) with hallucinatory substances makes it so that you are seeing things that are not there, and using language in a nonsensical manner.

Perhaps?

:brow:

This is reposting something I've posted here a number of times over the years, but here it is again:

‘P’ is true for S iff S judges ‘P’ to have relation R to either S’s phenomenal P, and/or S’s stock of previously adjudged true propositions, depending on the relation R. Relation R is whatever truth theory relation S feels is the appropriate one(s)—correspondence, coherence, consensus, pragmatic, etc.

So in other words, what it is for some proposition, 'P' (quotation marks denoting the proposition literally as a sentence), to be true to some individual, some S, is for the proposition to have the relation R to S's phenomenal P (their phenomenal perception etc. of some state of affairs) or their stock of previously adjudged true propositions, in S's judgment. — Terrapin Station

And what is the difference between P's being true and P's being called "true"?

Talk about "P is true for S" conflates truth and belief. It also looks like a conflation between propositions and belief, much along the same lines that gave Gettier a foothold.

Non linguistic thought/belief must consist of something that is evolutionarily amenable to propositions, assertions, and statements. It must be able to evolve and grow into the linguistic expressions we all know and use. Any and all accounts of thought/belief must be amenable to evolutionary terms. — creativesoul

Unless you are somehow personally vested in using the language that you do, what stops you from pursuing different frameworks? This is the place where we get to. Let's be a bit more professional about it and hash it out the rest of the way... together. If our thought/belief is the product of an evolutionary progression, we ought be able to set this out with a framework that is amenable to doing so.

Right?

Thus, thought/belief begins simply and grows in it's complexity. That must be the case if our thought/belief is a product of evolutionary progression.

I do not have this all figured out yet. You are and have been helping for some time now. We help each other, ya know? What you said early on here about our interactions helping to sharpen your thinking rings true here, on my side, as well. We can figure this stuff out...

Taking things personally and saying things personally will not help that to happen.

As above, for me the referent of "the believing" would be the process or act of believing. I don't feel comfortable with referring to believing in that context as "thought/ belief formation". It may not be problematic, but I think it could be misleading, and I think "believing" is a perfectly sufficient term in any case, and that using a different term when referring to pre-linguistic contexts may help to avoid anthropomorphization and any confusion that might ensue from that. In other words I don't see any advantage, and perhaps no inevitable disadvantage, but I do see possible disadvantages, to be had in referring to the act of believing as an act of "belief formation" when speaking about a pre-linguistic context. — Janus

The above is the warning against and the subsequent discarding of the terminology I put to to use for a purported fear of possibility of anthropomorphism.

We can know what pre-linguistic thought/belief consists of by virtue of knowing what linguistic thought/belief consists of and taking it from there. Are you seeing this for yourself yet?
— creativesoul

No, I don't see that. As I said a few posts ago, I think the most we can do is "gesture at it" which means to speculate more or less blindly or wildly. — Janus

The above is the fait accompli notion, as if it is not possible for us to acquire knowledge of what non and/or pre-linguistic thought/belief consists of.

Perhaps an example would help. I throw a ball for the dog onto the verandah, He obviously doesn't see whether it has gone over the edge because he runs all around the verandah searching for the ball. When he has looked all over and doesn't find it he immediately runs down the stares and into the garden and looks there for the ball.

Now if it were me I would look all over the verandah and when I saw the ball wasn't there would think "The ball must have gone over the edge of the verandah onto the garden, so I should look there for it". Now I know the dog cannot think that thought just as I have expressed it there, since he cannot exercise symbolic language.

But I can conjecture that he might have visualized the ball being on the verandah, and when he found it wasn't then visualized it in the garden beyond. — Janus

There is the anthropomorphism at work. "If it were me"... projecting into the mind of a dog... even though you've repeatedly said that we cannot get into the mind of a dog.

That is, since there is no determinate "content" of thought in the absence of language, and since the indeterminate cannot count as content, then it makes no sense to talk of content in that context. I say the most we can do is speculate about how the indeterminate process of non-symbolic thinking might be related to or analogous to the determinate content of symbolic thinkin — Janus

The above assumes precisely what needs argued for, and introduces a strawman and/or red herring. On my view, there is no such thing as non-symbolic thinking. I explained this already. That cannot be emphasized enough.

I am saying that I can see no way to know what non-linguistic creatures' thinking consists in. By contrast, we know that linguistic creatures' thinking consists in language, or at least that it is expressible in language and thus comes to have determinate content. But it is not as though we determine some "content" of what we think and then translate that "content" into language; the expression of thinking in language just is the determination of its content. Put another the way the content of thought is inseparable form its symbolic expression. — Janus

The above, once again, introduces yet another argument that I'm not making. In addition, it assumes exactly what needs argued for.

These are all good reason for me to question what you're doing here... I want to think/believe that you're arguing in good faith. I'm still hoping that that is the case.

Anthropomorphism.

You warned against it. Discarded my terminology out of the expressed possibility of being guilty of it. Then you began doing it.

No - creativesoul sounds like me. — Banno

That's quite right at times...

I am not comfortable with speaking about "content" of "pre-linguistic thought/ belief". I would instead speak about 'the process of pre-linguistic believing' or something along those lines.

Could you re-phrase this? What is the referent of "the believing"? The process of thought/belief formation? The 'act' of thought/belief formation?

We can definitely state what the content of pre-linguistic thought/belief is.

Do we still agree?
— creativesoul

As above, for me the referent of "the believing" would be the process or act of believing. I don't feel comfortable with referring to believing in that context as "thought/ belief formation". It may not be problematic, but I think it could be misleading, and I think "believing" is a perfectly sufficient term in any case, and that using a different term when referring to pre-linguistic contexts may help to avoid anthropomorphization and any confusion that might ensue from that. In other words I don't see any advantage, and perhaps no inevitable disadvantage, but I do see possible disadvantages, to be had in referring to the act of believing as an act of "belief formation" when speaking about a pre-linguistic context. — Janus

This where the first disagreement began. The expressed concern regarding anthropomorphism rings quite hollow now, given that it is the reason you offer for rejecting the framework I put to use(even though there is no such issue within my position), and yet the terms you're using in lieu of "content" are guilty of exactly that.

:brow:

Nada.

The issue is a conflation of proposition and belief borne of an inadequate notion/conception/definition of thought/belief that is hard at work behind the scenes. Those consequences run deep and in all different directions, so to speak.

You have not addressed that and you know it Janus...

1.Are we agreeing that the thinking/believing creature cannot state it's own thought/belief?

2.Are we agreeing that the thought/belief of a pre-linguistic creature cannot be in propositional form — Janus

Do we also agree that all creatures' thought/belief(thinking/believing) begin(s) simply within some reasonably determinable time frame - after biological conception - and grows in it's complexity?
— creativesoul

Yes, I agree to that. :grin: — Janus

There's the basic outline. This is a good start to acquiring knowledge regarding the content of pre-linguistic thought/belief. Thought/belief, including statements thereof, must begin simply and gain in complexity.

You've agreed to all of the above. Time for the next step...

Non linguistic thought/belief must consist of something that is evolutionarily amenable to propositions, assertions, and statements. It must be able to evolve and seamlessly grow in it's complexity from whatever it is prior to language into the common linguistic expressions we all know and use. Any and all accounts of thought/belief must be amenable to evolutionary terms.

Do we agree?

Blather. Rhetoric.

Care to address what I've written?

And if you want to impute "mistakes" to my thinking then the onus is on you to clearly identify them and explain just what it is you believe is mistaken and how and in relation to what you think it is mistaken. Vague generalization and gesturing will not suffice to convince me. — Janus

You cannot take adequate account of what pre-linguistic thought/belief is because the framework doesn't allow it. The terminology you're using tend towards anthropomorphism, and admittedly so. Your position is based upon language use that cannot bridge the gap between non-linguistic thought and our own.

You know this. Thus, you deny all ability to take proper account of non linguistic belief. The odd thing is that you then go on to argue in favor of exactly what you say cannot be done.

Is that clear enough?

Careful what you wish for. Do you want to know what all thought/belief consist in or not?

Firstly assuming that symbolic thought evolved from non-symbolic thought, says nothing about the determinability of the latter. — Janus

Care to address what I wrote?

:brow:

Yes, I do say that we cannot get into the minds of animals: do you actually disagree with that, and if so, on what grounds? — Janus

I'm saying that such talk is unacceptable. There are better ways to acquire knowledge of what all thought/belief consists of.

The sheer number of things I've written that have been sorely neglected is continually rising. Do you really want to know what pre-linguistic thought/belief consists of?

As a aside which I think is relevant; when people ask me why I write, I usually tell them "to find out how and what I think"... — Janus

Not all writing leads to such knowledge.

We're both aware of our own fallibility.

Cheers!

Regardless of how we got here, or how many times we've failed prior to, we are here!

1.Are we agreeing that the thinking/believing creature cannot state it's own thought/belief?

2.Are we agreeing that the thought/belief of a pre-linguistic creature cannot be in propositional form — Janus

Do we also agree that all creatures' thought/belief(thinking/believing) begin(s) simply within some reasonably determinable time frame - after biological conception - and grows in it's complexity?
— creativesoul

Yes, I agree to that. :grin: — Janus

There's the basic outline. This is a good start to acquiring knowledge regarding the content of pre-linguistic thought/belief. Thought/belief, including statements thereof, must begin simply and gain in complexity.

You've agreed to all of the above. Time for the next step...

Non linguistic thought/belief must consist of something that is evolutionarily amenable to propositions, assertions, and statements. It must be able to evolve and grow in it's complexity from whatever it is prior to into linguistic expressions we all know and use. Any and all accounts of thought/belief must be amenable to evolutionary terms.

Yours is not. It has all the earmarks of conventional mistakes. Don't take that personally. You trusted the wrong people. I think you already know this. I mean, you're continually qualifying your remarks by stating stuff like we cannot get into the minds of animals. The whole fait accompli aspect...

You know the account you've adopted is not quite right.

The earlier bit about visual thinking was an open admission of anthropomorphism. The dog's thought/belief included use of it's eyes. "Visual thinking" draws a false equivalency between the way you think when looking for a ball and the way the dog thinks when looking for a ball. That method is fraught. Toss it aside.

I am saying that I can see no way to know what non-linguistic creatures' thinking consists in. By contrast, we know that linguistic creatures' thinking consists in language, or at least that it is expressible in language and thus comes to have determinate content. But it is not as though we determine some "content" of what we think and then translate that "content" into language; the expression of thinking in language just is the determination of its content. Put another the way the content of thought is inseparable form its symbolic expression. — Janus

I'm just curious...

Could you be wrong about this?

I know what I think because I can represent it symbolically — Janus

What makes you think/believe that we cannot represent non linguistic thought/belief symbolically?

:brow:

Are you claiming that we cannot know what the content of non linguistic thought/belief is because those creatures do not have language?

To convince me that you can know how and what animals think you would need to outline how you think this can be done... — Janus

And when that begins but goes unnoticed?

I'm not claiming that pre-linguistic thought/belief is non-symbolic. Such a thought/belief would be meaningless to the creature, and being meaningful to the creature is a requirement that must be met in order to be rightfully called "thought" or "belief".

Do you have an argument for that? As it stands, it's a gratuitous assertion.

I've been setting out the content. It has already been determined.

We can take good account of thought/belief from it's earliest stages through it's most complex by virtue of taking account of it's content. All we need know is what our thought/belief consists in/of combined with a reasonable conception of what non and/or prelinguistic thought/belief must not consist in/of in order to be rightfully called non and/or pre-linguistic, along with what it must consist of to be sensibly, rightfully called "thought", "belief", "thinking", and/or "believing". — creativesoul

I want to see your response to the above.

As I already said, I don't favour talking about the "content" of thought in the absence of language — Janus

You've said many things my friend, including talking about the propositional content of belief statements.

Are you claiming that we cannot know what the content of non linguistic thought/belief is because those creatures do not have language?

We need not get into the mind of the dog any more that we need to get into our own minds. We cannot get into either. Such rhetoric adds nothing to our understanding of the evolutionary complexity of thought/belief. Rather, it stifles it and contradicts much better accounts of everyday events.
— creativesoul

I don't know what you are trying to say or imply here, To say what the dog is thinking just is an attempt to get into the mind of the dog. We are already "in" our own minds in a way that we are not "in" the mind of other humans, let alone dogs. This is not rhetoric. I know what I am thinking, but I don't know what you are thinking unless you tell me, and even then I cannot be absolutely sure that you are not deceiving me. It comes down to trust. I don't see how you could reasonably deny that. You gesture towards "much better accounts" but I have no idea what you are referring to. — Janus

I'm saying that such talk of "getting into the mind" of anything is misleading at best. There are better ways to talk about our thought/belief.

Make your position/argument in such a way that it pertains to and/or references the two Gettier cases. That may help. Not trying to be rude dude. You're all over the place though. Can we simplify what your saying?

You claim that the true aspect of justified true belief is redundant. You further claim that the justification aspect basically covers the true aspect. You go further and claim that we have no access to check for truth.

I'm denying all three of those claims, and I've provided arguments and/or prima facie examples which support that denial. I don't know what else to say here...

Some of the stuff you've said I agree with. I do not agree with what you do with that stuff.

It is not that a jtb not different from jb

It is that we don't have access to anything more than justification. — Coben

That's not true. We look and check for ourselves to see if the cup is on the table, and we do not look at the justification.

There is no god's eye view needed.