Oh, that's a shame, I thought you might be interesting.

I don't see that in the paper you refer to AP. They aren't talking about art or music appreciation, they are talking about "wakefulness" and the like, and where different functions are located in the brain. That seems entirely reasonable as subject matter for neuroscience.

Then in the second part of the paper they talk about GWT, IIT and quantum theories of consciousness, in a completely unscientific way (there isn't any evidence to support those theories).

Are you not prepared to defend your ideas about the soul or spirit?

I would agree with "let them be happy", only that Science pervades today the world --at least the Western one-- and is spreading a totally materialistic view of life and Man, at the expense of the spiritual part of the human beings, with disastrous effects for the human mind and soul, something I think we are all witnessing today. One has only to look at the growing statistics of violence, crime, suicide, etc. — Alkis Piskas

I believe the statistics show a general downward trend in violence, and a general improvement in the human condition over recent history brought about by reason, science and humanism.

I wonder if you could tell me what it is that your soul or spirit actually does?

Neuroscience --and Science in general-- tries to describe consciousness as if Otology were trying to describe music (art) in terms of sounds (vibrations). — Alkis Piskas

I'm not sure that's fair. I see neuroscience as attempting to describe the biological mechanisms that produce and govern aspects of consciousness.

I think you should be targeting philosophical materialists, cognitive scientists and computationalists.

Brains are not conscious, are not in a state of being conscious, and therefore do not produce consciousness. — NOS4A2

I do agree with your point that brains don't operate in isolation, but the brain is particularly significant where consciousness is concerned. Do you think, for the present discussion, it matters whether we talk about the brain producing consciousness (leaving out the mention of the rest of the body, the appropriate living environment, etc.)?

The brain doesn't work through "information" — Daemon


This assertion is going to need some support. — Garrett Travers


I've already provided that support, concisely: the brain works through such things as electro-chemical impulses. When you've described all those processes, there isn't anything left for "information" to do.

As a concrete example, take the optic nerve. "The optic nerve carries sensory nerve impulses from the more than one million ganglion cells of the retina toward the visual centres in the brain. The vast majority of optic nerve fibres convey information regarding central vision. Encyclopedia Britannica"

Now suppose you're a scientist looking at the optic nerve. You are able to identify those nerve impulses. But you can't identify "information" in addition to the impulses.

________________________________________________

So Garrett, you asked for support for my assertion that the brain doesn't work through "information", and I provided it. Dehaene, defending Global Workspace Theory, says that "consciousness is nothing but the flexible circulation of information within a dense switchboard of cortical neurons".

And as Cobb observes, Global Workspace Theory does not explain why flexible circulation of information causes consciousness to pop up.

Now me, I think it's stuff like electrochemical impulses and wavelike interactions between populations of neurons that cause and modify consciousness. And not "information". I don't think GWT explains anything.

Do you have any response?

I think the neuroscience field uses terms like "data," and "computes," to describe the process in ways that we can linguistically understand. — Garrett Travers

I think some in the neuroscience field use terms like data and computation because they mistakenly believe that's how the brain works. It's the same conceptual error as with the term "information".

Others are aware that the terms are being used metaphorically, heuristically.

So, no that's just not what's going on. I mean, you might have some scientists that say such things, but that's not what most scientists say at all about the subject. — Garrett Travers

Gosh! I recently read a fascinating book, The Idea of the Brain, The Past and Future of Neuroscience, by Matthew Cobb. The modern scientists Cobb discusses seemed to be talking about many different aspects of consciousness, not just the wakefulness and attention you are focused on.

I'm afraid Cobb isn't too impressed by Global Workspace Theory or Integrated Information Theory though. He says neither is widely accepted!

He quotes French neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene, who has followed on from the ideas of Bernard Baars in developing global neuronal workspace theory: "consciousness is nothing but the flexible circulation of information within a dense switchboard of cortical neurons."

As Cobb comments, '"nothing but" is doing a lot of work in that sentence, and the theory does not explain why flexible and dense circulation of information causes consciousness to pop up.'

On ITT Cobb says "Again, the link between consciousness and the chosen focus of the theory - in this case integration of information - is unclear.

Wakefulness and alertness are what fundamentally characterize basic conscious operation, according to modern science. — Garrett Travers

According to certain scientists working in certain fields, perhaps. Others would regard experience as the starting point of consciousness. Feeling something like heat or a pinprick, or seeing or hearing something.

Can you tell us what the Global Workspace Model has to say about that?

Something is only money, or a marriage, because we say so. Therefore there was no money or marriage before humans arrived on the scene. Money and marriage are observer-dependent.

Consciousness was there before humans arrived on the scene. Therefore it can't be dependent on human observations (and chimps, though conscious, lack the language and concepts to make such observations). That's the relevance.

Give it some thought. I'm off to play badminton, back in 4 hours or so.

I'm afraid I don't understand what you are saying or why.

Consciousness can't be produced by something that only exists because we say so. — Daemon


This assertion is going to need some support. — Garrett Travers

Other animals, such as chimpanzees, were conscious before there was anybody around capable of saying anything at all.

the brain doesn't work through "information" — Daemon


This assertion is going to need some support. — Garrett Travers

I've already provided that support, concisely: the brain works through such things as electro-chemical impulses. When you've described all those processes, there isn't anything left for "information" to do.

As a concrete example, take the optic nerve. "The optic nerve carries sensory nerve impulses from the more than one million ganglion cells of the retina toward the visual centres in the brain. The vast majority of optic nerve fibres convey information regarding central vision. Encyclopedia Britannica"

Now suppose you're a scientist looking at the optic nerve. You are able to identify those nerve impulses. But you can't identify "information" in addition to the impulses.

What do you want evidence for, from me?

Similarly, a brain works through electrochemical processes, and suchlike, and when you've described the brain in those terms, again, there isn't anything for "information" to do. — Daemon


Right, and that's really the direction they're going in now, especially in the branch of computational neuroscience, specifically. — Garrett Travers

I don't see how that can be. For the same reason the brain doesn't work through "information", it doesn't work through "computation" either. And neither does a computer.

That was my point about the observer-dependence of computation and the observer-independence of brain processes and consciousness.

Consciousness can't be produced by something that only exists because we say so.

Cognitive Neuroscience? And, it isn't demonstrably false, it's one of the leading theories. — Garrett Travers

Do you think that the leading theories can't be false?

So, from what I can gather, the actual theoretical description of how the conscious process works is, in fact, sound, and accepted as a genuine theory in the field. — Garrett Travers

Which field? And what does "accepted as a genuine theory" amount to? Is it still a "genuine theory" if it's demonstrably false?

Information processing is not something that is disputed by researchers. — Garrett Travers

That's one of the reasons the topic interests me: I think you're probably right, many researchers do believe that the brain works by doing information processing, and most people believe that computers work by doing information processing. But they are mistaken.

A PC for example works through electrical currents, and things like the microscopic bumps on a CD. When you've described the machine in terms of such things as electrical currents and microscopic bumps, you've said it all: there isn't anything left for "information" to do.

Similarly, a brain works through electrochemical processes, and suchlike, and when you've described the brain in those terms, again, there isn't anything for "information" to do.

Ion exchanges and that sort of thing are observer-independent, in the sense that mountains, metals and molecules are observer-independent. — Daemon


Yes, but it is the "observer" part that is important here. An observe has to have something to observe that can be computed in the mind in a manner that is both interpretable, as well as accurate in its representation. It wouldn't make sense to be seeing a mountain, when such is actually a table, right? — Garrett Travers

Your response here is not relevant to my point.

IIT is a functional theory, but is having some issues with falsification at the moment. Apart from that, it's very sound. — Garrett Travers

I read Christof Koch's book about IIT, and in my judgement it is a complete non-starter! Brains don't work by processing information, they work by ion exchanges at synapses and that sort of thing. Information is observer-dependent, in the sense that money and marriage are observer-dependent. Something is only money, marriage or information because we say so. Ion exchanges and that sort of thing are observer-independent, in the sense that mountains, metals and molecules are observer-independent.

Ah ok. I broadly agree with that.

Any time you can prove the brain alone generates consciousness, I'm more than ready. — theRiddler

I wouldn't say the brain alone generates consciousness, your whole body is involved, in particular your sense organs. And you need supplies like oxygen.

The brain is where it all comes together though. We could prove that by having your brain removed. Thank you for agreeing to take part in the project.

Brain function is just as illusory as mental function. — T Clark

I'd be interested to know what you mean. I would take "brain function" to include for example patterns of neurons firing, and "mental function" to include for example me thinking now about what I'm going to write.

Neither of those is illusory. But perhaps you meant something different.

This is an extract from the introduction to Searle's "Mind, A Brief Introduction":

"There is an overriding reason for my wanting to write a general introduction to the philosophy of mind. Almost all the works that I have read accept the same set of historically inherited categories for describing mental phenomena, especially consciousness, and with these categories a certain set of assumptions, about how consciousness and other mental phenomena relate to each other and to the rest of the world. It is this set of categories and the assumptions that the categories carry like heavy baggage, that is completely unchallenged and that keeps the discussion going. The different positions then are all taken within a set of mistaken assumptions. [...] I am thinking of dualism, materialism, physicalism, computationalism, functionalism, behaviourism, epiphenomenalism, cognitivism, eliminativism, panpsychism, dual-aspect theory and emergentism, as it is standardly conceived. To make the whole subject even more poignant, many of these theories, especially materialism and dualism, are trying to say something true."

I find the ideas in this book persuasive, and liberating.

I've written to the lead author of the paper asking if he can provide a simplified explanation of the role of the neurons in the set-up. Watch this space.

In that case the set-up has absolutely no connection with consciousness. Logic gates can be represented by a diverse range of items, for example some time ago Japanese researchers used crabs to act as logic gates. We interpret these items as logic gates, we ascribe that status to them.

The same is not true of the mechanisms of consciousness: their status, their function, is intrinsic to them, it doesn't depend on our say-so.

But I want to be fair to the Dishbrain people, so I am going to continue to plough through their paper and maybe ask them to explain it.

I'm afraid that doesn't explain the process.

I've found this description: The mass, which the researchers call a cyborg, was created by placing human stem cells on top of a micro-electric array, where they grew into brain cells. In their configuration, the cells can both stimulate other cells and read the activity of others around them. Electrical signals are sent to the array to tell them where the ball is located. If electrodes to the right of a cluster fire, for example, the brain cells know that the ball is to their left. The distance of the signal gives the cells information regarding frequency. As with real Pong, the paddle can only move left and right. And also like the real game, the goal is to move the paddle into the path of the ball.

The cyborg was taught to play the game in the same way as are humans—by playing the game repeatedly to learn how to move the paddle in ways that result in success. In this case, it was feedback in the form of electrical signals in the electrodes.

But I still don't know how it works. Too vague.

If you know already what Dishbrain actually does @RogueAI could you explain it like I'm five? Otherwise, we are going to have to read the paper I linked to above.

And therefore that is not a definition in any discursive sense. On the contrary, however, "consciousness" is defined both by philosophy (for example ↪180 Proof
) — 180 Proof

'Consciousness is secondary – much more veto than volo – and confabulatory', perhaps selected for as a beneficial social-coordination adaptation which functions as the 'phenomenal complement' to natural language usage. — 180 Proof

awareness of self-awareness = consciousness — 180 Proof

I don't think this is what we are asking about when we ask whether Dishbrain is conscious. I think we are asking if Dishbrain can feel anything. Whether it has experiences.

Lots more detail here: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.12.02.471005v2.full

You have what is called "ostensive definition", definition by pointing. You might point at a patch of green and say "that is green". You can define consciousness ostensively, that's what RogueAI was implying, I think.

There's surprisingly little detail in that article about the specific set up of the neuron/computer interface. My initial feeling is that the neurons aren't doing anything that a digital computer couldn't do, and that it has nothing to do with consciousness. But I'm going to read more about it.

I do see where you're going, I don't see any reason it necessarily has to be that way. We've already understood a great deal about how the brain works, by using our brains.

If the ethics committees and the court would only let me go ahead with my experiments I'm sure we would be a lot further forward. I'll just have to try again when I am released at the end of my sentence.

Mind cannot sustainably be 'attributed to' natural processes, in the sense of 'fully explained by' or 'reduced to' or even 'emerge from', in my view. The 'hard problem', which exists for emergentists, has yet to be solved, or dissolved. The difficulties are conceptual rather than empirical. — bert1

Those are interesting ideas. We are finding out empirical stuff about the mind at an accelerating rate. One example I like is our ability to plant false memories in the minds of mice by interfering with individual neurons. Is it not reasonable to say that mind can be attributed to natural processes like that?

We don't know all the details, we don't know which biological mechanisms are fundamental, but it seems to me that the Hard Problem could in principle be resolved empirically.

We want to know how we can feel stuff. One day soon somebody may discover the mechanism. Why not?

1. If objective physics exists as science discovered, then physics cannot continue to develop. — Howard

This isn't terribly clear. Can you explain?

Laozi said that, so I guess he doesn't know?

Most theories of consciousness, says Neuroscientist Michael Graziano, rely on magic. They point to a feature of the brain—vibrating neurons for instance—and claim that feature to be the source of consciousness. The story ends there. The magician points to his hat—vibrating neurons—and pulls out a rabbit—consciousness.

But how does the hat produce the rabbit? By what mechanism would neural vibrations lead a brain to become aware of itself?

EN: What do you think the conception of consciousness will be in 300 years?

MG: The kind of consciousness in the brain is, I think at this point, really clear. It’s part of the style of information processing. That general conception I don’t think is going to change. But there’s a lot of ways that you could build consciousness, and I’ll go out on a limb here. There are things that I think are coming if you look into the future. If consciousness is buildable, which I think it is, if the human brain is just giant, massive information processor, which I think it is, if the technology for scanning the brain improves, which it obviously will, you reach this kind of conclusion that at some point we will be scanning the pattern of functional connectivity in a brain and collecting the data and simulating it or duplicating it in other formats, artificial computer formats. — https://behavioralscientist.org/rethinking-consciousness-a-qa-with-michael-graziano/"

The brain doesn't work by processing information. It works through specific biological mechanisms including neurons. We don't yet know the critical mechanisms, but we find out more every day. We can point to specific neurons that are involved in orientation in space, and alter them to create false memories (in mice). This isn't "magic".

"Information" is not what does the work in the brain. It's not what does the work in a computer either. In a computer it's electrical circuitry. In the brain it's neuronal activity.

I think in 300 years, and hopefully sooner if we do pin down the biological mechanisms of consciousness before then, we will look back and laugh at the idea that you could build it with a computer program.

I read some of this interview with him, and I conclude that he is absolutely clueless!

https://behavioralscientist.org/rethinking-consciousness-a-qa-with-michael-graziano/

I decide to imagine a blue elephant. As I do so my brain goes through a series of states dictated by my decision and its content. It's not so much that the mind moves physical things, rather the mind is physical things. There's only one world.

Where's the tautology?

That wasn't a great response to javra's reasonable question.

So is this right:

If a mental event M is dependent upon on a physical event P, and P causes a further physical event P* on which a further mental event M* is dependent, serious doubt can be cast on the claim that M causes M*. The account at the physical level of how P causes P*, together with the dependency relations, is sufficient to account for the occurrence of M*. The M-to-M* doesn’t seem to be a genuine causal relation.

?

I'm glad you said this. I've always found "supervene" confusing.

I'm a bit thrown by the way you're using the term "intentionality". It's usually glossed as "aboutness". Our thoughts are about something, they have intentionality.

To say you are in a state that is (phenomenally) conscious is to say—on a certain understanding of these terms—that you have an experience, or a state there is something it’s like for you to be in. Feeling pain or dizziness, appearances of color or shape, and episodic thought are some widely accepted examples. Intentionality, on the other hand, has to do with the directedness, aboutness, or reference of mental states—the fact that, for example, you think of or about something. — Stanford Encyclopedia

I don't think it can possibly be an illusion that our thoughts are about something. So are you using intentionality in some other way?