Forcing people into obligations by procreating them is wrong As I've said in an earlier thread: Why do people need to be born into the world in order to redeem it? There is an underlying assumption here, or hope that more people put into the world "means" something. — schopenhauer1
I wouldn't agree that the world needs to be redeemed. However, I don't think that we as human should think on this level. If a couple wants to have children, why should one of their first concerns be that there will be ''more of us'' on this planet? Why is it relevant? The point in which I disagree with utilitarianism is that life is about
quality of life, not about
quantity, therefore the number of people on this planet is irrelevant to the meaning of life and to the ethical questions raised.
Also, the Camus' "hip" standing at the edge of existence by understanding the absurdity as we are living it out, is another candidate for many. — schopenhauer1
We've all experienced Camus' feeling of absurdity. In Myth of Sisyphus, Camus' immediately discards human reason and claims that the world is alien to us. Why? Just because of some feelings, or the lack of other feelings? It's as if I said that the one who understands God has finally understood the meaning of life. It might sound appealing to some, but I haven't proven that it's true with regards to its relation to reality. Neither did Camus prove that his feeling of the 'absurd' is something more than just a feeling.
So the desire for redeeming the world (charity, scientific advancement, enlightenment) is really instrumental in getting what seems to be the underlying case, the pure desire for more existence. Schopenhauer might call this the "will-to-live".. or simply Will when made into an abstract metaphysical concept. — schopenhauer1
Charity, scientific advancement etc. do not have to be a manifested desire for redeeming the world. If the ''Will'' is a metaphysical concept, is it also a part of the human nature? A part that is not futile (as it itself wants to exist) at all, and the rest, psychological feelings and experiences are the ones that make a person miserable? That would however mean that a person can only be miserable in a material sense, in his own body, so to speak, but not outside of it in a metaphysical sense.
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Also stated: Boredom is felt when one's attention is not focused on any particular task, or can originate from a lack of stimulating things to do. It is often described as a dullness or restlessness. It causes one to experience time passing, or rather "pressing" down on us. What makes boredom so significant compared to other emotions is that it is, arguably, the baseline emotional state of being. When the usual concerns and goals of daily life are exhausted, or temporarily unable to be pursued, boredom seems to seep through as the phenomenological default experience. If this is true, that boredom is a baseline experience for humans, then what does that say about the nature of being and existence itself? — schopenhauer1
In this sense there can be more default experiences. Why would an experience, regardless of the importance for the individual, be so telling when it comes to the nature of being and existence itself? How can it be defined by an experience?
If life was to be characterized by various forms of flux and stasis, and stress — schopenhauer1
I'm not sure if you view human just from a materialistic point of view when you're describing those forms.