You people have read more theology, and authors like Hegel and Tillich, than I have, but what's been said here, in the quotes and in the discussion, makes sense to me. It seems that nothing can be said about God, other than as the possessor of the universal benevolence, good intent, that is evident behind the world.

Likewise the notion of God not being subject to the distinction of "existing" or "not existing".. I've been wording that by saying that God isn't an element of metaphysics.

I use the word "Reality" broadly, to include God. As for the word "is", I think it's right to say that it makes sense to distinguish it from "exists", and to only apply "exists" to elements of metaphysics.

I avoid the word "create" because it seems anthropormorphic.

Michael Ossipoff

I emphasize that the reincarnation speculation isn't part of my metaphysics, though it's implied by it.

Michael Ossipoff

— schopenhauer1

1. Someone who was going to be born into a world like this would just be born into a different one, if everyone in this world refused to reproduce. I myself wouldn't want to have a role in bringing someone into this world, but I don't really believe it makes a difference, for the reason expressed in the sentence before this one.


2. A person is born because they want, need, or somehow merit birth. Not because someone reproduced.(In an infinity of possibility-worlds, someone will.)

— Michael Ossipoff


With what justification?


You mean how is it implied by my metaphysics?

According to that metaphysics, a person's life-experience possibility-story is a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then logical facts about hypotheticals. After all, all of the abstract logical facts are inevitably there anyway, and need no explanation. I mean, no one denies that there are those abstract logical facts. That's all that's needed.

(Even a "Nominalist" has to acknowledge them as things, by referring to them, when he says he doesn't believe in them.)

The protagonist of that story is its essential, central, primary component. ...because a possibility-story is a life-experience possibility-story only because it has a protagonist.

It seems reasonable to suggest that that protagonist must be someone who has some sort of involvement with life, in order for him/her to be the protagonist/experiencer of a life-experience story. If so, then a desire for, or need for, or at least some kind of subconscious involvement with life is something that goes with being the protagonist of a life-experience possibility-story.

So then, that's why I said that you were born because of some wish, need, or other subconscious emotional involvement toward life. Therefore, among the infinity of systems of inter-referring abstract facts, is one that is a life-experience possibility-story about you.

All of that seems reasonable with or without reincarnation. It's equally true of a first and only life, as much as for a new life-experience story that matches the remaining subconscious inclinations and feelings when someone is unconscious after death.

If all that sounds like a fantastic suggestion, I suggest that it there isn't a less fantastic alternative suggestion.

Michael Ossipoff

I would be inclined to say just one [inter-refer. Who decides on the subsets? — Jake Tarragon

Alright yes, I took another look at your post that I was referring to, and you said sets of inevitable abstract logical facts.

...whereas I was talking about systems of inter-referring abstract logical facts.

Most of the infinity of logical facts aren't in the same inter-referring system.

...but if it could be argued that they are, that would be an interesting surprise, because it would be different from what I've assumed.

But, as for sets of them, the fact that we can divide them into sets as we choose--Doesn't that mean that there are infinitely many sets of them, equal to the number of combinations that can be formed from those infinitely-many abstract logical facts?

...even though one of those combinations consists of all of them?

Michael Ossipoff

I've added this edit to my previous post:

And if they're more interested in studying English itself, then the English words that they learn would give them, with no extra study, the Angla-Esperanto words. Since many fewer words are needed (due to better derivation), and because of the much more logical and consistent grammar, anyone studying English (and that's a lot of people) would have Angla-Esperanto. it would just come with English.

...besides, making it easier for English native-speakers is a good thing, for propagating a language. After all, there are economic reasons why English is the nearest thing to an international language now. If the same people who speak English, had Esperanto particularly easy for them, by using an all-English vocabulary, and if that encouraged lots of them to study Angla-Esperanto, then that would propagate and popularize Angla-Esperanto, just as it has popularized and propagated English.

...but better, because it would be a lot easier.

Michael Ossipoff

I like Esperanto but English speakers shouldn't get it too easy. Besides it would clash with English itself - better to have a clean break if Esperanto were to be adopted. — Jake Tarragon

That's all true.

But i emphasize that, not only would Angla-Esperanto be easier for English native-speakers, but it would also be easier for people studying English. Lots of people want to learn English. What if, by studying Angla-Esperanto, they'd be learning all English words, helping their study of English?

And if they're more interested in studying English itself, then the English words that they learn would give them, with no extra study, the Angla-Esperanto words. Since many fewer words are needed (due to better derivation), and because of the much more logical and consistent grammar, anyone studying English (and that's a lot of people) would have Angla-Esperanto. it would just come with English.

I just felt that, because it's been over a century, and Eo (Esperanto) still only has maybe a million speakers. ...1/7000 of the world population...then there'd be nothing to lose, and maybe something to gain by trying another vocabulary.

Yes, the Eo traditionalists would reject it. But what percentage of the world population are they? What if a whole different new population of Eo-ists started, and it began to take off big?

Michael Ossipoff

Is science equal to technology?

No, it's greater.

Michael Ossipoff

So do we set ourselves up as some game show producers.. and apparently the newborns are the contestants that must play the game? — schopenhauer1

My metaphysics implies that:

1. Someone who was going to be born into a world like this would just be born into a different one, if everyone in this world refused to reproduce. I myself wouldn't want to have a role in bringing someone into this world, but I don't really believe it makes a difference, for the reason expressed in the sentence before this one.

2. A person is born because they want, need, or somehow merit birth. Not because someone reproduced.(In an infinity of possibility-worlds, someone will.)

Michael Ossipoff

How many sets of "inevitable abstract logical facts" are there? — Jake Tarragon

Infinitely-many.

That's why it's inevitable that there's one that has the same events and relations as our physical universe. ...and why there's no reason to believe that our universe is other than that.

...though one could make an unverifiable and unfalsifiable brute-fact assertion of an objectively-existent physical universe superfluously existing and operating in parallel with that complex logical system.

Michael Ossipoff

Well, of course facts are things too. But, from the usage in the Wittgenstein quote, we can take things, for the purpose of this thread, to mean "things other than facts", or maybe even "material things".

I suggest that the accepted meaning for "things" is: "Whatever can be referred to". But, in this thread, a more limited meaning is intended, as described in the paragraph before this one.

Michael Ossipoff

What is the ontology of 'facts'.

The early Wittgenstein postulated that the world is the totality of facts, not things. — Posty McPostface

And it's true. Or at least the Materialist's "things" or "stuff" would be superfluous if it exists. The proposition of objectively-existent universe, and its objectively-existent stuff and things is unverifiable, unfalsifiable, and would be a brute-fact if true.

Michael Faraday pointed that out in 1844.

What does he mean by asserting the existence of facts in logical space? Does he mean to say that the world is everything that is the case, which means that the world is what configuration objects have in the world between one another?

I don't suppose that any of us can answer for him, unless he answered that question somewhere in his writings.

But aren't the "objects" to which you refer, the the same as the "things" that Wittgenstein said aren't?

The "objects" themselves are just part of the system of facts, all deriving from abstract logical facts.

I have a hard time seeing these facts about the world as observer-independent

Observer-independence is a separate issue, without as clear an answer as is sometimes assumed.

Obviously, all we know about the physical world around us is via our own personal individual experience. For that reason, it makes sense to speak of our world as an individual life-experience possibility-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring inevitable abstract if-then logical facts about hypotheticals.

...an Anti-Realist view.

But, looking at it more generally and objectively, the logical facts that make up our life-experience possibility-stories aren't really different from all the other abstract logical facts. So, if ours are there, then the others are there too.



So I don't think absolute Anti-Realism can be right.

But we can speak of whatever logical facts systems we want to, and of course the one that makes the most sense is the one that's about your experience. Hence my preference for my emphasis on the individual experience point of view, when describing a metaphysics.

I agree with those who say that Reality beyond metaphysics is unknown, unknowable and indescribable. ...suggesting another reason to not say anything definite and all-encompassing about Realism vs Anti-Realism.

When we assume that facts exist, we are implicitly committing ourselves to a form of nominalism as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic.

"Exist" isn't metaphysically-defined. But certainly there are facts, including abstract logical facts. No one would deny that. As for what you call "real" or "existent", that's entirely your individual subjective choice.

As for Nominalism, it was being espoused by a Materialist here, and it was his way of expressing his Materialism. When I looked that word up, Nominalism sounded a lot like Materialism, a re-statement of it, or nearly-so.

Speaking about there being facts doesn't imply Materialism, or anything like it.

You said:

as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic.

Things? But the Wittgenstein quote said that there aren't things, only facts. (And I say he was right.)

When we assert the ontology of the universe as facts and not things, we seem to be saying that objects are nominalist, but, as opposed to what?

Aren't we saying that objects are only a name for a local aspect or part of the system of facts?

Are all of these facts observer dependent?

Strictly-speaking, no. ...for the reason stated above. ... but with the caveat stated with it.

Because otherwise, everything would consist of thing's and not facts if it weren't.

Not sure why that would follow, unless you think that facts have to be about (more fundamentally-existing) things.

Michael Ossipoff

The difference between Theism and Deism is a temporal one. In the larger, meta-metaphysical picture, are you sure that that distinction is meaningful?

Michael Ossipoff

Can I repeat my standard answer on this subject?:

P.T. Barnum said that there's a sucker born every minute.

W.C. Fields said, "Never give a sucker an even break."

Those two great social-scientists have explained why this societal world is the way it is and will always remain so.

You may have noticed how the sheep are perfectly suited and fitted for their masters, like the way a glove fits a hand. Maybe it isn't coincidence. The situation is eerily reminiscent of Huxley's Brave New World, except that there's nothing new about it, and that. where, in the novel it's done by drugging, in our world it's just the result of evolution.

Evidently, during a significant period in our prehistory, gullibility and complete obedience to perceived leaders was an attribute that was survival-adaptive, and selected for by natural selection.

Anyone who wants change for the better is up against a million years of evolution.

... we would never solve the worlds problems and mysteries if all that we did was meditate all day.

But otherwise we might? See above.

Everyone would speak the same language on the planet but in various dialects. This way there is diversity in unity

With the understanding that we're talking about unattainable ideals, that's an interesting one.

Of course, more and more, English is the nearest thing to an International language. But not many people who weren't born to it speak it well enough for it to be very useful to them. English isn't an easy language for non-native-speakers. So it isn't really an international language, and isn't well-suited to be one.

Esperanto is a constructed language, constructed for the purpose of making an international auxiliary language. Esperanto is incomparably easier than English, or any natural language. Esperanto is logical, minimal, regular and consistent, and easy, in comparison to English and other natural languages.

No one claims that Esperanto is perfect. Maybe its biggest criticism is that its vocabulary is Pan-European, instead of truly International. Latin, English, French, German, Italian, with some Greek and East-European.

But Esperanto has a start, with roughly a million or so speakers, worldwide. Unfortunately that isn't enough to guarantee that you can talk to everyone everywhere, but it's a start.

I've suggested that Esperanto would be more successful, and actually fairer, if it adopted an all-English vocabulary, because English is one of the most widely-spoken languages, and the nearest thing to an international language, and is the language that many people already want to learn, and have economic incentive to learn. But Esperanto would also be a big improvement, as-is.

Esperanto was designed by a Polish doctor, named Zamenhof, in 1887 (if I remember correctly). In those days, Pan-European was considered international. But in the slightly more than a century since its introduction, Esperanto has maybe roughly a million speakers, and a large literature.

Esperanto, like many other languages, uses grammatical endings. English has them too, though not as much as its ancestors. Our Indo-European languages are inflective. Each grammatical ending tells a complete meaning, a complete set of grammatical variable-values. So there has to be a separate ending for each possible combination of grammatical variable-values.

But Esperanto, like some other languages, is agglutinative instead of inflective. That means that a word has a series of endings, each of which tells about only one particular grammatical variable.

An agglutinative language is easier than an inflective language,because there are fewer endings, because they're used in combination.at the end of a word. ...instead of having a different ending for every possible combination of grammatical variable-values.

Esperanto dictionaries are much thinner than those of other language, because of Esperanto's derivation. ...the deriving of words from other words. Esperanto does that incomparably consistently and extensively, thereby allowing a much thinner dictionary.

Michael Ossipoff

There's a difference between god and gravity. The former is a belief (true/false) but the latter is a fact (true). — TheMadFool

Yes, religion isn't about anything physical, and isn't about provable facts, or anything to assert or debate..

...the atheistic insistence on existence being defined physically may be unjustifiably restrictive.

Materialism doesn't hold up under examination, and discussions of it result in the Materialist fleeing in a circle, like the Weasel in the nursery-rhyme.

Michael Ossipoff

I was just thinking about the God-debate. The atheism-theism divide that hasn't been, to me, adequately resolved.

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I’m going to be specific about the resolution regarding Atheism and Materialism, a few paragraphs farther down, after I reply to a few paragraphs of this post. I’ll discuss each resolution at what seems like the right place in this post that I’m replying to.
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Yes, it’s a lot of unnecessary, not-valid, inappropriate criticism, mostly from the one particular side, about a definitional matter.
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I suggest that, as definitional misunderstandings, the issues of Atheism and Materialism are resolvable in principle, but not in practice, because the hard-core, hardline adherents of those positions are psychologically dependent on the feeling of superiority that they derive from their beliefs.
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I don’t care what Atheists believe. They seem quite confused about what they believe or don’t believe:
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Invariably, New-Atheists claim Agnosticism (but call it “Atheism”). But then, in the next breath, they’ll espouse Positive-Atheism, usually in insulting attack-language.
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Anyway, it’s none of my business what they believe, and my only objection to Atheism is the manners of its True-Believers. I don’t feel a need to criticize others’ beliefs (including Fundamentalists, Biblical-Literalists, and Atheists). Maybe some Atheists need to ask themselves why they feel that need.
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But I suppose there’s some value in trying for that definitional resolution at this forum, because occasionally, in these forums, we hear from an aggressively-critical New-Atheist, who might ease-up with the attacks, given a better understanding of the definitional differences.
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One key parameter in the debate seems to be the meaning of existence.
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It seems to me that the meaning of existence differs depending on which side of the debate you're on.

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Yes, “exist”, “real”, and “is” aren’t metaphysically defined, and a lot of unnecessary argument is the result of different definitions of those words.
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…though that isn’t the only definitional difference on which these unnecessary disagreements are based.

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For atheists, existence means something physical - that which can be perceived through the senses and if you want to go the whole nine yards, something measurable.

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Yes, and the belief that what’s physical, measurable, is all of existence, all of Reality, is the usual definition of Materialism. As you said, it’s just a definitional issue.
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To try to discuss that with a Materialist is to play a never-ending game of definitional Whack-A-Mole, as the Materialist hops back and forth between meanings, as each is demonstrated to not support him.
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In contrast to the above, existence for theists goes beyond the physical - beyond our senses and instruments.

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I’ll just add that there’s another definitional issue that contributes to Atheists’ confusion: The matter of what they mean by “God”. After all, that’s what their criticism of Theism is about.
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When an Orthodox (Materialist) Atheist recites the standard Atheist Liturgy, he makes statements about God—the God that he believes in as the one to disbelieve in.
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That of course is the Fundamentalists’, Biblical-Literalists’ God
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…the One True God, for Fundamentalists, Biblical-Literalists, and Atheists.
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Reality isn’t describable by facts, and sometimes all one can say is to express an impression. Having looked at the posts here, I looked up negative theology, and found that someone in 9th century Europe was saying what amounts to that. Of course it was being said in India as early as 700 B.C. or so.
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Given that theology means knowledge about God, negative theology doesn’t seem to allow for much theology. I’ve always considered theology to be a presumptuous subject.
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I don’t usually use the word or name “God”. …usually only when replying to someone who has recently used that word or name.
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As I mentioned in previous posts, my metaphysics seems to suggest an impression or implication of openness, looseness and lightness. …and, maybe for that reason, an impression or implication that what-is, is distinctly good.
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In fact, that impression of the goodness of what is, seems to imply a good intent behind what is.
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That’s an impression, not an assertion. I don’t debate religion. But, though it’s an impression, it’s an impression that I don’t doubt. So maybe it could be called a factual belief. …but not the kind of logical verbal factual matter that one asserts, debates, tries to convince anyone about, or offers or discusses evidence for.
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And I’m not saying that metaphysics is necessarily all that leads to that conclusion, but of course this is a philosophy forum.
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Of course that intent or its possessor isn’t, itself, an element of metaphysics.
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I agree with those who say that Reality isn’t understandable or describable.
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Not only are certain words metaphysically-undefined, but I don’t even have my own definite definitions of “is” or “exist”. But, as I use it, “Reality” encompasses more than metaphysical reality, the understandable and discussable reality.
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Anyway, though more literalist, or doctrine-believing Theists believe differently from me, I think they also believe in the Benevolence that I’ve mentioned above, as the at least nearly known attribute of the God that they speak of. So I tend to perceive the differences as mere denominational, doctrinal differences, and so it seems reasonable to me, to call myself a Theist.
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To a more literalist or doctrine-believing Theist, I’d say that God isn’t an element of metaphysics, and is quite unknowable and un-discussable.
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(But I have to admit that when the aggressive door-to-door denominations knock at my door, I tell them that, after many bad experiences with them, I no longer talk to them.)
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To an Atheist, I’d say that he’s probably only expressing disbelief in the Fundamentalist’s, Biblical-Literalist’s, God. That’s all I discuss with him. If he means more, I’m not interested in the details, or in telling him that his opinions or impressions are wrong. It would be meaningless to get into an argument or debate about impressions. One might just hope that he can resist attacking those who don’t share his opinions.
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The atheist POV is reasonable because rationally speaking it's a mistake to go beyond the evidence.

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In physics, physical evidence is needed to support a physical theory. In metaphysics, of course claims need logical support. But the Atheist is someone who wants to apply physical (or sometimes logical) standards outside their area of applicability. The Atheist is the one making the mistake. …a mistake of confusing different topics, and applying standards outside their areas of applicability.
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Naturalism:
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On the subject of Atheism, I replied inline, making my main suggestions at what seemed the right point in the post that I’m replying to.
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About “Naturalism”, I’ll just make my comments without commenting inline:
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There are some funny things about “Naturalism”, and maybe the funniest is its name.
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We all know that the usual definition of Materialism is that matter is all of Reality.
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Metaphysical Physicalism is just a slight re-statement of Materialism that explicitly includes such non-matter things as forces and fields, along with matter.
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I still call that “Materialism”. I used to say “Physicalism”, until someone corrected me and told me that Physicalism is a science-of-mind position. Because, then, Physicalism has 2 meanings—a metaphysical position and a philosophy-of-mind position, I avoid the word “Physicalism”.
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“Naturalism” is a funny word, because it amounts to an attempt by a Materialist to establish, as a starting-premise, that the physical world is what’s natural and genuine, the fundamental, primary reality; and that all else is “the supernatural”, not-natural things consisting of violations of physical law, akin to such things as vampires, werewolves, and mummies that chase you.
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So I’ll use the less biased word “Materialism” instead.
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To discuss Materialism, it will be necessary to briefly refer to my own metaphysics, which agrees with what Michael Faraday said in 1844. Tippler and Tegmark have said similar things, but I feel that they’ve missed the mark a bit in various ways.
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One class of things that there definitely, inevitably are, are the abstract objects…the abstract logical facts in particular.
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The Materialist might try to say that they aren’t real. Fine, because “real” is a flexible undefined word. I don’t claim that abstract logical facts, or systems of them, are objectively real. Only that there are such things. Even a Materialist can’t really deny that. Is there a square root of the number 2? Is it a fact that, if the additive associative axiom of the real numbers is true, then 2 + 2 = 4? (…given the obvious and natural definitions of 1, 2, 3, & 4, based on the multiplicative identity of the real numbers, and addition.)
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In fact it couldn’t have been otherwise. Could there have not been abstract facts? No.
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Someone here pointed out that if there were no facts, then it would be a fact that there are no facts, and that would be a fact.
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Someone else here said that there could obtain a fact that there are no facts other than the fact that there are no facts other than itself.
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But that would be a special brute-fact, calling for justification.
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Anyway, an abstract logical fact, or a complex inter-referring system of them, doesn’t and needn’t have reality, existence or meaningfulness other than in its own inter-referring context. It needn’t be real in some larger or global context, and it needn’t have some medium in which to exist.
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In particular, it’s completely independent of any global context or permission. A global fact that disallows all other facts would be meaningless.
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I claim that, among the infinitely-many complex systems of inter-referring inevitable abstract logical facts, there’s one whose events and relations exactly matches those of our physical universe. There’s no reason to believe that our physical universe is other than that.
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I’ve already posted some details about how a set of physical-quantity variable-values, and a physical law consisting of a relation between them are parts of the “if “ premise of an if-then fact.
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…except that one of those variable-values can be taken as the “then” conclusion of that if-then fact.
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A mathematical theorem is an if-then fact whose “if “ premise includes, but isn’t limited to, a set of mathematical axioms (geometric or algebraic).
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But I don’t assert that it isn’t more than that. Maybe this universe superfluously has objective existence too—in addition to being identical in detail to a complex system of inter-referring inevitable abstract logical facts.
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A claim that that’s so would be unverifiable, unfalsifiable, and a brute-fact. But I don’t claim that it couldn’t be so.
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So: Is there anything about that that’s controversial? No. I haven’t said anything that someone would disagree with. It’s an uncontroversial metaphysics.
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In particular, there’s nothing about it that a Materialist would disagree with. But of course he’ll try.
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He can’t say that there aren’t those abstract logical facts, or a complex inter-referring system of them. He can say that they aren’t real. Fine. I don’t claim that they’re objectively real. Only real in their own inter-referring context.
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And I don’t deny the Materialist’s claim about his objectively-existent universe and matter. But, if his claim about that is true, it would a superfluous brute-fact. …the subject of an unverifiable and unfalsifiable proposition.
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If you want to observe some frantic hopping back and forth between meanings, then watch a Materialist trying to wiggle out of that.
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By the way, because whatever we know about the physical world is via our own individual experience, then I suggest that it’s most natural, and makes the most sense, to speak of a complex system of inter-referring abstract logical facts that is our individual life-experience possibility-story.

Because of that individual-experience emphasis, then my metaphysics doesn't emphasize mathematics as much as MUH does. Of course much or most of our experience isn't about mathematical physical laws.

If I tell you that there's a traffic roundabout at the intersection of 34th & Vine, that also means that if you go to 34th & Vine, you'll encounter a traffic roundabout.

Facts about our world are equivalent to if-then facts.

We're used to declarative grammar, because it's convenient. We've come to unduly believe our grammar. I suggest that conditional grammar better describes our world.

A world of "if", rather than a world of "is".

Instead of one world of "is", infinitely-many worlds of "if".

.Using already-existing metaphysical terms, that metaphysics could be called Eliminative Ontic Structural Anti-Realism (EOSAR).
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I wanted to call it Skepticism, because—forgive me—it seems to me that complete rejection and avoidance of assumptions is skeptical. …and that an ancient Greek epistemological position doesn’t have a monopoly on a common noun as a name.
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But I’d be willing to settle for Uncontroversy as a brief name for that metaphysics, because it’s entirely uncontroversial.
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So, here Iam, torn between being open to possibilities (theism) and being rational (shaping my world view with reason).

What should I do?

Atheism isn't rational. It's pseudo-rational.

Theism needn't mean dogmatic, or doctrinaire or Biblical Literalist Theism.

If you get the impression of good intent behind what is, then you're a Theist.

So this mysticism and gee-whiz-ism around AI's is what I'm objecting to.

And the word emergence is a symptom of that. — fishfry

Exactly. And that's all it is.

Michael Ossipoff

Does any reputable scientist claim that science will someday explain - what ever that means - everything?

"Probably a few, wouldn't you say?" — Michael Ossipoff


Reputable scientists? I think rather few or none. — tim wood

Well, listen to the scientists interviewed on Closer to Truth. They pretty much invariably give science as the answer to metaphysical questions.

And it's something that we regularly encounter elsewhere too. I'm not criticizing them--people in general have been taught that science has all the answers. With many or most people, Scientificism is now the official religion, and Materialism is the official metaphysics.

Every Materialist is a Scientificist, and vice-versa.

By the way, every Materialist is an Atheist, and every typical orthodox Atheist is a Materialist. (I'm not saying every Atheist here is a Materialist.)

Michael Ossipoff

Imagine two comets colliding with each other mid-space, not far from Earth. Would we hear it, or at least feel it? — Hachem

No. We'd neither hear nor feel it. ...unless a piece of it came our way and entered our atmosphere.

Michael Ossipoff

Part 2 (of 2) of this reply:
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Alright, I must admit that I’m not the same person that I was in elementary school, junior high school (pre-secondary school) or highschool (secondary school).
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…even though I’m the same body.
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I’d say that the Ship of Theseus is the same ship, even when many or all of its planks have been replaced, with continuity of being only a little different from immediately before. …even if it’s bigger than it initially was.
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I know pretty much what I was feeling at some times in those days, and what I thought should motivate me, but I don’t know why I couldn’t have, at some point, sat down and said, “Alright, what’s going on here? Whom am I living for anyway? What, whose wishes, should be my purpose and priority? How do I want to use this temporary life?”
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Of course that would have been quite impossible for me, for reasons beyond my control, that were either due to my age then, or cultural, familial, & school bullying, or maybe even my own intrinsic attributes for reasons other than just my age (After all, the same thing didn’t happen to everyone). …or some combination of those.
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I’d say that over the timescale of a lifetime, we aren’t necessarily the same person that we were.
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But you know that you’re the same person you were yesterday or last week.
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How is the term "you", when applied to that which is framed as "Uneducated Pleb", different than the term "you" applied to the framing of properties that is "Michael"?

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I just take “You” to have its usual grammatical meaning: The person to whom one is speaking. I prefer the better expressivity of “Thou”, “Thee”, “Ye” and “You”. But oh well.
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Example - How can your name also be "Michael" when there was someone who has already lived and died in the 1700's and their name was "Michael"?

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“Michael” is only part of the label. The “Ossipoff “ distinguishes me from most of the other Michaels.
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You are not the other Michael, but you share the same particular framing as it comes to the term/name of "Michael" - but that is as far as that contingent framing goes. The name is part of a singular concept of identity (social framing of a property) above and beyond the properties each contained within multiple individual "Michael's" throughout spacetime. So are you an "archetypal" Michael?

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No, Michaels need have nothing in common other than their first name.
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Or are you Michael Ossipoff? Are you the only Michael Ossipoff now, or in the past, or forever into the future?

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No, not even now. Not even now in the U.S.
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If not, then is your identity contiguous with theirs?

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Of course not.
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Yes, if we consider the name only as a reified concept, but for the entity which is addressing this page the answer would be no, you have different properties than others also termed/named Michael.

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Quite so.

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Language games - You are Michael, but is Michael...you?

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Not usually.
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Michael Ossipoff

Is it about science? Let's rather discuss science. Is science a superstition? — tim wood

Of course not. It's a valid study. In particular, physical science is a valid study and (best yet available) description of physical things and events in the physical universe.

Scientificism isn't science. It's pseudoscience.

Criticicizing Scientificism isn't criticizing science.

I call it "Scientificism" instead of "Scientism" because: What you call a believer in Scientism? A Scientist? No, that word already has a different meaning: A practitioner of science.

So I'd say that a Scientificist is a believer in Scientificism.

Does any reputable scientist claim that science will someday explain - what ever that means - everything?

Probably a few, wouldn't you say? The fact that someone is highly qualified in science doesn't necessarily mean that you should listen to him about philosophy. ...but it doesn't mean that you shouldn't. Michael Faraday, in 1844, was evidently the first Westerner to get it right about metaphysics.

But there might be some scientists who are Scientificists. Look at the scientists interviewed by Kuhn, on Closer to Truth. Many (most or all?) of them seem to think that science has the metaphysical answers.
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(And maybe someday it won't be a "superstition" but a fact!)

Scientificism? :D

Michael Ossipoff

I’m going to send this reply in two parts, in order that I can reply now instead of tomorrow. Part 2 will be along tomorrow.
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I do not believe in the reincarnation of a soul or essence, etc.

I don’t believe in a Soul, Mind, or Consciousness separate from the body.
I don’t suppose that reincarnation is provable, but it’s implied by my metaphysics

.I would hesitate to call myself a materialist but on many positions I do side with them and so have been accused of being one.

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Well, it’s understandable to agree with the Materialists on some things without being one. I think the Eliminative Physicalists come close to having it right, in philosophy-of-mind, until they take their position way too far.
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What is your metaphysical position? I ask that because, of course, metaphysics is at the basis of these matters.
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\Certainly what we’ve done, and what effect we’ve had on other living beings in this world after our demise, matters, but that isn’t reincarnation. …though it’s (reasonably) said to influence reincarnation. Near death experience (NDE) reports usually describe a “life-review”, in which the person is shown something resembling a movie of everything they’ve done that has affected others, and feels those effects, from the others’ points of view.
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Quick word about "my conditioning" as well - conditioning is that way or the aggregate states of being that is expressed currently through the results of past experiences, training, genetics, status, parental guidance, friendships, education (or lack thereof), environment, etc. Am I my conditioning?

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That’s a definitional issue, making it a flexibly-answered question. I say that each of us is the body, plain and simple. That disagrees with both Buddhism and Vedanta, though I call myself a Vedantist. That’s a matter on which I, too, agree with Materialists.
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(Though I call myself a Vedantist, my metaphysics differs from that of the 3 usual versions of Vedanta--but they differ greatly from eachother too. All three and mine agree on the basic conclusions and consequences.)
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I would also like to invite you to doubt your assertion that "for now, you’re you, just like you were yesterday.". I would like to list a few reasons why we can doubt that at certain levels -
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1. My cells are not all the same as they were yesterday at this time. Ones still operating are now older and riddled with the effects of getting older, others have died, others are brand new today but with some potential genetic difference due to errors or the environment.

The body is a system, not an object consisting of always the same component molecules and cells.
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2. I have since had more and different experiences from this time yesterday which, at the very least subconsciously, have changed the aggregate of how I think and act. Maybe it is subtle, but every experience changes us as there is information that has been added about, for, and to my existence.

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Of course. The purposefully responsive device that you are, like any purposefully-responsive device, is in different states, when different things have happened. That’s the nature of response. That’s what enables such a device to respond purposefully.
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But that doesn’t make you a different device. The operating-system of the computer you’re writing with is still the same operating system, even though some of its memory-variable values change during operation.
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You make a different decision, because things happened differently. That’s still the same you, responding to a different environment.
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3. If I burned all the tips of my fingers off - I would no longer have the same fingerprints, so am I still "me"?

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Yes. It would be you, with sore fingers, and no fingerprints. There’s be a clear continuity of experience from the time before you burned your fingertip-surfaces.
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Are my fingerprints me? My hair color? My biological age?

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Are they you? No. They’re attributes of you. You’ve changed your fingerprints attribute. Your biological age, and, with it, your hair color, change, but you’re still you, with continuity of experience from before.
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But of course it’s also true that, though there’s been continuity of experience, and it’s the same body, I must admit that I don’t know the person that I was when I was very young, or even in highschool…or why I let myself be so easily cowed from life in those days.
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So, it’s also true that there are some aspects in which there are different but equally valid meanings for what it means to be the same person or a different person. I use different meanings of it when talking about different aspects.
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4. What constitutes the "now" in the "for now, you're you"? Was it then? Is it now when I am writing this or then - when I wrote the first post?

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The “Now” that I was referring to is the Now when you receive the reply.
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5. If I was in an accident and suffered damage to my frontal cortex, or damage to my amygdala, or my hippocampus so that my behaviour was no longer typical of my previous days - am I no longer "me"?

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You aren’t your behavior as observed by friends, family, or a scientist with a clipboard. If there’s continuity of experience, from before the accident to after the accident then yes, it’s still the same you. A friend might say, “You aren’t yourself”, but it’s not up to him.
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Sure, there maybe could be an accident or condition that could make you completely forget all about who you were, without even any subconscious attributes or memories remaining. You have no idea who you are, or how you got where you are, and remember nothing from before. No continuity of experience. Then I wouldn’t say you’re the same you.
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And, in the passage that you quoted at the beginning of your post, I mentioned that, at the end of lives, there likely comes a time, before complete shutdown of perception and experience, when there’s no more identity, and no knowledge that there ever was or could be such a thing. Obviously, to the extent that that change has taken place, then you aren’t the “you” that you were. Because identity is no more, you aren’t any particular “you” at all.
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I would no longer be able to control behaviour, or regulate emotion to the same degree, or perhaps not even remember that there was a "yesterday". Are my memories "me"? My emotions? My plans to tackle a meeting or article? Are those ways of being or states of being "me"?

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I wouldn’t say that those things are you. You’re the body, and you’re the same person as long as there’s continuity of experience. After an accident that completely eliminates continuity of experience, you’re still the body, but not the same person.
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6. Who am I if I legally or informally changed my name? Am I my name?

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No. Your name is only a social label.
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"for now, you're you" is a construct of language that creates a reification of all the ways to frame sets of phenomena that is interpreted socially, culturally, digitally, biologically, etc. as an entity or being.

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It’s more than that. It’s a fact of continuity of experience.
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This concludes part 1 of this reply. Part 2, replying to the last 2 or 3 remaining paragraphs in your post, will be along tomorrow.
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Michael Ossipoff

I cannot seem to delete a post if I wish to. — Mayor of Simpleton

Though it would be good to be able to delete a post, you now could just edit it, changing its text to "Deleted by poster".

Michael Ossipoff

Why should there have to be meaning?

Life is for its own sake, because there are things that we like.

What more meaning should there be?

I don't mean to encourage you to act unethically. You probably don't want to interfere with or harm the lives of others. You know it's better if you don't, because they're living beings like you. But the things that you like are, at basis, what it's about.

Metaphysics doesn't contradict that, but your question didn't seem to call for bringing metaphysics into the topic.

Michael Ossipoff

Tegmark
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In the article that you linked to, Tegmark says:
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…consciousness is the way information feels when being processed in certain complex ways.

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There’s an astounding amount of confusion about consciousness. The Eliminative Physicalists almost have the right idea, but take it so much too far that it becomes just a different kind of nonsense. But there’s nothing wrong with Dennet saying that he and his experience don’t really exist, because “real “ and “exist” aren’t metaphysically defined, and anyone can and does use them to mean whatever he wants them to mean.
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Consciousness is nothing other than the property of being a purposefully-responsive device (and having complexity and similarity to the speaker that make the speaker feel like calling the device (usually an animal) “conscious”).
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The experience of a purposefully-responsive device is its surroundings and events, in the context of the purpose built into that purposefully-responsive device.
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To continue the quote of Tegmark:
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We don’t yet know what principles information processing needs to obey to be conscious, but concrete proposals have been made that neuroscientists are trying to test experimentally.

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Ah yes, maybe science is close to solving the Hard Problem of Consciousness! :D
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Buddhism:
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Enter the Buddha, who states in "The Path" of the Dhammapada the following:
All created things are impermanent.
All the elements of Being are Non-Self.
He relates his version of "folk psychology" in which he outlines the skandhas which are the shifting and impermanent bundle of elements whose aggregate is called a personality, or "Self". For the Buddha - the "self", or "I", does not exist as his enlightenment contained the revelation that we are naught but a constantly changing collection of body parts, thoughts, emotions, perceptions, and sensations in a certain place and at a certain time and each element as well as the ever-changing aggregate endure only for a limited time.

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It isn’t quite clear how or why (at least some) Buddhists take that to mean that they don’t exist. Not only do you have the same name and fingerprints that you had yesterday, but you identify as the same person, which you are, in a meaningful sense (not least because of your identification as the same person).
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Yes, at the end of lives (or at the end of this life, if you don’t believe in reincarnation), there will come a time when you won’t know that there ever was such a thing as identity, time, or events. But, for now, you’re you, just like you were yesterday. Sorry, Buddhists.
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With various persuasions, there are things on which I agree with them, as well as things on which I don’t agree with them:
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In Buddhist metaphysical philosophy, "Emptiness", or denial of the intrinsic reality or nature of things, is the same application of tearing apart all elements of a "thing" to search for its "thing-ness" and coming up empty, so to speak. Buddhist emptiness denies any essence, or nature, or intrinsic reality of things in the world. So, along with the "self", Buddhism denies true existence to just about anything and everything.

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When (at least some) Buddhists speak of “Emptiness”, which at least some Buddhists interpret as there not really being anything, I agree in a way, because it’s evident that what there metaphysically is consists of abstract logical facts, and complex inter-referring systems of them—such as your life-experience possibility-story.
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(Oh yes, do I misunderstand what Buddhists mean? Sure, I must admit that I don’t know what they mean. They seem to have many different, somewhat conflicting, versions of it, accusing eachother of not understanding Buddhism. )
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So, anyway, as Materialists mean “something”, there isn’t something, and there’s metaphysically only nothing (no objectively-existent physical world, “stuff “ or other objectively-existent things).
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But I don’t call that “nothing”. This life-experience possibility-story, and the possibility-world in which it’s set, are real for us, because it’s our life and its setting. …real in the context of our life. That’s enough for me to call it real.
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Therefore, I don’t share (at least some of) the Buddhists’ emphasis on Emptiness, or there being nothing. Sure, as the Materialist means “something”, there’s nothing, but I’m not a Materialist.
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Michael Ossipoff

I'm not comfortable with saying facts are out there in the world. — Marchesk

But you know that they are. Not everyone calls them "real" or "existent". (Those two words aren't metaphysically defined, and so people can have different opinions about what's real.)

I myself don't claim that abstract logical facts are objectively real, or that a universe consisting only of them is objectively real.

There is a close relationship with facts and states of affairs, but they're not the same thing in my view. Consider that the facts can be wrong.

No, then they aren't facts. A statement (utterance claiming a fact) can be wrong, false, but there aren't wrong facts. When we say that someone's facts are wrong, we really mean "facts", not facts.

States of affairs can't be wrong. But what we take to be the facts can be.

...when what we take to be facts aren't really facts.

This suggests that facts are observer-dependent to an extent.

I'm not saying that Anti-Realism is wrong. The undefinedness of "real" and "exist" means that Realism vs Anti-Realism isn't really an issue.

From our own point of view, in the context of our life-experience story, our experience is primary, but, in previous posts here, I told why there's good reason to say that facts in general aren't dependent on our experience of them. Facts not about our experience are independent of our life-experience story, just as it's independent of them.


.[/quote]

I don't think there is the ambiguity that Banno spoke of. A statement just plain isn't a fact. It's an utterance that tells about or claims a fact.

A statement is a thing, however.

But there's ambiguity about what's real, existent, or what is. ...because those words aren't metaphysically defined.

Yes, I don't think mathematics uses undefined terms, as ordinary speech.does . A finite dictionary can't define all of its words non-circularly.

I guess mathematics relies a bit on dictionary definitions, but the important terms evidently don't have an ambiguity problem. I guess it could be said that mathematics avoids ambiguous terms.

Michael Ossipoff

The error here is to think that fact has one meaning, one use, and our job is to fathom that. It ain't necessarily so.

So a fact can be what is the case, and also a statement of what is the case. p as opposed to "p", an ambiguous disquatation. — Banno

Incorrect. A statement isn't a fact. A statement is an utterance telling about a fact (or claiming one, whether truly or falsly).

Michael Ossipoff

"But surely facts are things," — Michael Ossipoff


A thing: a,b,c...

A predicate: F,G,H...

A fact: Fa, Ga, Hb

Facts are not things. — Banno

What does that prove? The fact that a fact can be about a thing doesn't mean that a fact, itself, isn't a thing too.

(That sentence, directly above states a fact about a fact.)

Or here's another:

"The fact that you got a job is the reason why I didn't evict you."

Michael Ossipoff

None of this addresses the issue. We have the statement "the grass is green" and we have the green grass. But then we also have the fact as something else. So what sort of thing is a fact, if neither an utterance nor a material object? — Michael

Let me state my definitions again, starting with "Thing", because some of the other definitions make use of that word:

Things are whatever can be referred to.

(I justify that broad definition by the all-inclusive meanings of "everything" and "anything".)

A fact is a state of affairs.

A state of affairs could also be defined as an aspect of the way things are.

A statement is an utterance that tells about a fact.

By those definitions, facts and statements are things too.

So yes, as you said, a fact is neither an utterance or a material object. So, what is it then? It's a state of affairs, or an aspect of how things are. That's what kind of thing a fact is.

So I've addressed and answered that question.

And if we put the original question in context, are facts observer-independent?

That's a whole separate issue, calling for a separate thread. I addressed that question too, in a longer post, just few postings back. It calls for longer and more involved discussion.

But, to make a long story short, yes facts in general are observer-independent, unless you're a strict Anti-Realist.

But, in the context of your life-experience possibility-story, that story is about your experience, and, in that context, you and your experience are primary, and the facts about the rest of your world (the part you aren't experiencing) are secondary, and only meaningful by implication. So you could say that, in the context of your life-experience possibility-story, it all depends on you and your experience.

But that's true only locally, in the context of your experience-story. Of course the facts in that story aren't different from all the other facts. All the many facts that aren't part of your experience story are independent of you and your experience-story, just as your experience-story is independent of facts that aren't about it.

But this issue, the Realism vs Anti-Realism issue, is a separate issue. There was a thread about it, last month. I recently wanted to post to it, but couldn't find it.

Maybes the Realism vs Anti-Realism thread should be re-started.

I don't think it's really an issue, because "real" isn't really metaphysically defined anyway. But, in the broad, general, objective context, yes facts are observer-independent.

I've justified that claim, above in this part of this post, and in a previous one.

But it seems to me that you're complicating this thread, when you combine two issues, adding-in the involved Realism vs Anti-Realism issue.
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We can accept that material objects are observer-independent

No, not to a strict Anti-Realist. And, in the context of your life-experience possibility-story, your experience is primary, and material objects that aren't in your experience, like a certain pebble on the ground in a field in Paris, France, which isn't in your experience, is relevant only if someone there picks it up and e-mails you about it, which brings it into your experience. But that observer-dependence is only in the experience-primary context of your life-experience possibility-story.

More generally, broadly and objectively, facts are observer-independent, for the reason I've spoken of.

, but given that facts aren't material objects, it doesn't then follow that facts are observer-independent.

True, the fact that facts aren't material object doesn't make them observer-independent. A strict Anti-Realist wouldn't say that they are.

But the complete unrelatedness of most facts to your life-experience story, and the fact that the facts of which your life-experience possibility-story is composed aren't really different from all the other facts, makes facts, in general, observer-independent.

To place experiencing beings at the center of all metaphysical existence would be chauvinistic. ...like that Giraffe that says it's entitled to all the jellybeans because it has the longest neck.

We can certainly say that facts are dependent on material objects

We certainly cannot say that.

"2 + 2 = 4" is true, if the additive associative axiom of the real numbers (and integers, and rational numbers) is true. ...by a natural and obvious definition of 1, 2, 3, and 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity of those number systems and addition.

So we have the following abstract if-then fact:

"if the additive associative axiom of the real numbers is true.then 2+2=4.(by a certain simple specified definition of 1, 2, 3 and 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity of the real numbers, and addiition."

That abstract if-then fact's truth doesn't depend on any material object. It's an inevitable abstract logical fact.

Material objects have nothing to do with what makes "2 + 2 = 4" true.

, but then they might also depend on something else (e.g. statements).

Abstract if-then logical facts don't depend on anything.

(...except their own internal logical validity.)

The if-then fact's "then" conclusionof course depends on its "if" premise being true. But the truth of the abstract if-then fact, itself, doesn't depend on anything.

And likewise for a complex system of inter-referring abstract logical if-then facts. ...an infinity of them.. ...including one whose events and relations matches those of our physical universe.

There's no reason to believe that our physical universe is other than that.

If this universe has objective existence (not just consisting of abstract facts),and if the "stuff",the "matter" of this universe is objectively and fundamentally existent, then it's also superfluous. It superfluously duplicates what is already there. A proposition about its objective existence is an unfalsifiable, unverifiable proposition.

Michael Ossipoff

A physical law is a mathematical relation that has been observed and confirmed, between some physical quantity values.

The fact that a physical law has always been known to obtain doesn't mean that it will continue to. For one thing, new physics could be discovered.

For example, Newtonian mechanics turned out to be incomplete, when relativity and quantum mechanics were found to give a better description of what happens physically.

There have been a number of instances in which known physical law seemed to be violated or events inconsistent with it. For example: The black-body-radiation's energy vs wavelength curve; the Michaelson-Morely experiment's result; the planet Mercury's seemingly anomalous rotation of apsides.

Those things were later consistently explained by new physics.

But of course there remain other unexplained events. No one has satisfactorily explained ball-lightning. The universe's expansion is evidently accelerating, contrary to expectation, and implying that there's physics that isn't known. Dark energy isn't explained.

Based on previous experience, it can reasonably be expected that our universe's physical laws are consistent, but not known, and that the events in the paragraph before this one might be explained by physics that isn't known yet.

Presumably it couldn't be proved that a physical world is inconsistent, because it could always be saids that new physics might consistently explain any observed inconsistency.

Why should a universe's physics be consistent? A self-contradictory universe would be impossible,

I just listened to an old podcast on The Partially Examined Life website about the Tractatus and Wittgenstein's view on science. Wittgenstein put forth a Humean view of causality in which A just happens to always be followed by B, even though both are contingent, such that our expectation that B will follow A in the future is merely one of past habit, which need not hold. C might follow A next time.

The example given is Hume's sunrise every day. The podcasters were gushing about Wittgenstein's view of necessity just being a series of contingent events where the sun always rises, even though it could not rise on any given day.

I find this view of causality to be extremely impoverished. Let's take a coin flip. We say it's 50/50 whether it will be heads or tails. Now if we came across a coin that had landed heads for hundreds of billions of days in a row (the sun rising), then we wouldn't think this was because of some incredibly low statistical event had occurred. We would think that the coin had been rigged to always land heads. As such, we would predict that the coin would continue to land heads because of the rigging. And this is how physicists treat the sun continuing to shine everyday.

They go on to discuss laws of nature as just being logical propositions related to empirical observations of particulars, and nothing further. So gravity is an equation derived from making a bunch of observations of falling objects.

Again, this is an extremely impoverished view of laws. General Relativity talks about gravity in terms of not just particulars, but spacetime itself being bent. And this applies generally across the entire universe, to the point of determining the eventual fate of the cosmos regarding further expansion or contraction.

If laws of nature are merely logical propositions regarding sets of particulars, then why would we expect them to have such far reaching consequences? When Newton arrived at his law of gravity, people were surprised and astonished that there would be a force that pulled the same on cannon balls, feathers, and heavenly bodies. That was not expected.

Furthermore, the relationships between different fundamental concepts in physics, such as acceleration, gravity, energy mass, space and time combines the cosmos into an extremely deep and astounding order that goes beyond noticing that you can apply an equation to some particulars.

The really big question for Humean causation is why would we expect the universe to be contingently ordered to such an astounding degree? Why would it stay ordered for billions of years when it can at any time be otherwise? The sun could blink out tomorrow, and gravity could become repulsive, and so on. Would you expect that kind of contingency to result in the universe we see around us? — Marchesk

I'll just add that of course, the only way that I could clarify the meaning of something that I said would be for someone to, first, specify a particular statement of mine whose meaning wasn't clear, and what wasn't clear about it.

You'd have to be specific.

Michael Ossipoff

Let me answer this in a briefer way:

Again, I have no idea what you're trying to say — Michael

I've been posting definitions of the terms whose definitions were being discussed. (Things, Statements,and Facts). ...and commenting on the relations between things, facts and statements.

, or how it relates to the issue-at-hand.

See above.

But I'll repeat here that, though I'm always willing to clarify what I meant by any statement that someone specifically refers to as unclear, I also realize that you aren't obligated to care what I say.

Michael Ossipoff

The reason why I spoke of impossible worlds, was because I don't know what kind of a world your simulation would simulate. So, to cover all possibilities, I wanted to say something about impossible worlds too.

A world, as one hypothetical story-setting abstract object among infinitely-many,abstract objects, could be completely inconsistent and nonsensical, like a cartoon. The AI could be like a cartoon character.

Your simulation could depict/duplicate such a world.

A world world without consistent physical laws might seem unable to be organized enough to produce a conscious being, but the inconsistent existence of such a being in such a world is alright, because anything goes.

Likewise, you might say a conscious being couldn't survive in a world without consistent physical laws, but that inconsistency, too, is permissible in an inconsistent world.

So your simulation could depict and duplicate (but not create) a world that is entirely inconsistent, except that it has one or more rational conscious AI beings, who can talk about the nature of their world, as we do.

Such a world is reminiscent of the movie "Who Framed Roger Rabbit", in which there are cartoon characters, cartoon events, and ordinary humans too.

And, then, it would be possible to meaningfully speak of what that AI might say, when discussing the nature of the world that it finds itself in.

It might say something like this (quoted from my previous post):

"Maybe, in this evidently-inconsistent 'physical' world there's physics that I just don't know about yet, that will consistently explain all this. In any case, even if this is a nonsense cartoon story, it's a nonsense cartoon story that was already timelessly there among the abstract objects. A computer simulation can't create something that's already timelessly there. So this world isn't created by a computer simulation" — Michael Ossipoff

By the way, I've often wondered why it would be necessary for this world to be self-consistent. It seems to turn out that way. The black-body radiation's energy vs wavelength curve, the Michaelson-Morely experiment result, and the planet Mercury's seemingly anomalous rotation of apsides all were explained with subsequent new physics.

Most likely that will always turn out to be so.

Of course there remain some unexplained physical things, and apparent inconsistencies. No one has really satisfactorily explained ball-lightning. The fact that the universe's expansion is accelerating is unexplained and seemingly inconsistent with current physics. Gravity isn't well-understood. ..and so on.

But the past success of subsequent new physics, in explaining previous apparent inconsistencies, suggests that our world is consistent, and would be shown to be so, if and when the necessary new physics is discovered.

But, anyway, i've wondered why a world has to be self-consistent. Well, it can be said that a physical world can't be proven inconsistent, because there could always be as-yet undiscovered physics that will consistently explain the apparent inconsistencies.

But that doesn't explain why a world must be self-consistent.

Well, among the broad category of abstract objects, aren't there infinitely many inconsistent worlds too, or worlds that don't have consistent physical laws?

I've always found it puzzling but intriguing when Hinduism and Buddhism refer to incarnation in nonphysical worlds. Could that be a reference to those worlds that aren't possibility-worlds, don't consist of logical facts, but are there as abstract objects anyway?

Anyway, getting back to your simulated AI in a simulated world. ...a rational conscious AI, in a world that might be physically self-consistent or physically inconsistent, or not maybe physical at all, in any of those cases, that AI, would, it seems to me, say that its world isn't created by a computer program (even though your computer simulation is depicting/duplicating it), because a computer's transistor-switchings can't create what already timelessly is.

Michael Ossipoff





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The question of observer-independence broadens the subject a lot, which is why my reply was so long, and got into another topic.

Again, I have no idea what you're trying to say, or how it relates to the issue-at-hand. — Michael

I was addressing the issues that had been raised. But it isn't always obvious what someone else means, in topics such as these.

I was saying what I meant, and of course I'm always willing to clarify or re-word things, when specific phrases are referred to as unclear.

But, as I said above, sometimes we just can't tell what the other person means, no matter how well they say what they mean. Communication isn't perfect or reliable, and that's just a fact. Sorry if what I said wasn't clear, and I'm always willing to clarify or reword any particular statement or sentence referred to as unclear. But I realize that that doesn't always succeed, because communication on these topics isn't reliably successful.

We're talking about meanings of words whose meanings are rarely examined, and of course it can be far from obvious what someone else means in such a discussion.

Though I'm willing to clarify upon request, I also realize that you aren't obligated to pursue someone else's meaning.

Michael Ossipoff

None of this addresses the issue. We have the statement "the grass is green" and we have the green grass. But then we also have the fact as something else. — Michael

A fact is a state of affairs. A statement is an utterance that tells about a state of affairs.

A thing is whatever can be referred to.

"The grass is green" is a statement telling about a fact. it's also a fact.

Statements and facts are things too,

The fact and the statement aren't the same thing, though the statement is our only way of denoting the fact, and so "The grass is green" is both the statement and the fact.

So what sort of thing is a fact, if not an utterance and if not a material object?

A fact is a state of affairs.

And if we put the original question in context, are facts observer-independent?

Yes, The facts that make up our life-experience possibility-story aren't different from all the other abstract facts. But our life-experience possibility-stories, complex systems of inter-referring facts, have their own reality completely independent of the other abstract facts, In the context of our ilfe-experience possibility-stories, nothing is observer-independent.

But that's just in the context of our life-experience possibility-stories. In the global context, of course all the other facts are there too, independent of us and our life-story, just as our life-experience possibility-story is independent of them.

We can accept that material objects are observer-independent

Not in the context of our life-experience stories.

Anyway, I don't think material objects have objective existence anyway. They're just part of a complex system of inter-referring abstract logical facts.

, but given that facts aren't material objects, it doesn't then follow that fact are observer-independent.

But aren't they anyway?

Surely the inter-referring logical facts of which someone's life-experience possibility-story is composed aren't really different from all the other abstract logical facts. Those other facts are independent of a person's life-experience story, just as it is independent of them.

Michael Ossipoff

A fact, an action, or a modifier is a thing too.

...which spoils my definition of a thing.

Maybe "thing" can't be defined, though we all know what it means. Whatever can be referred to?

Michael Ossipoff

Then you're just changing the question to "what is the difference between a state of affairs and an object?" — Michael

Yes, but not just.

A thing is whatever isn't a modifier or an action (distinct from the word for a modifier or an action, and except when the modifier or action is spoken of as a thing).

I think "object" is often used to mean "thing". Don't they have the same meaning, in such usages as "abstract object"?

A fact is a state of affairs.

I guess that's true even if no statement is made, to tell about it.

Even a fact is a thing.

Michael Ossipoff

A statement is an utterance that tells about a fact. An utterance could be other than a statement. It could be "Oh shit!", or "Hey!".

Michael Ossipoff

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. We have the statement "the grass is green" and we have the green grass. So where does the fact fit in here? Is it the statement "grass is green"? Is it the green grass? Or is it some third thing, neither the statement nor the object? — Michael

The fact is the state of affairs that the statement tells about.

It's neither the statement nor the object.

Michael Ossipoff

Doesn't a statement tell about and refer to both a fact and a thing?

Maybe a fact could be defined as a state of affairs that an utterance tells about, when an utterance tells about a state of affairs.

And what are states of affairs? Facts or objects? — Michael

I'

I'd say a state of affairs is a fact.

But even a fact is a thing when it's spoken of as one.

In "abstract object", doesn't "object" mean the same as "thing"?

Michael Ossipoff