Thanatos says:
.

I didn't name-call. I said you posted blather, which isn't calling you a name.

.
Instead of name-calling a post that you don’t like, pejoratively characterizing it, and thereby violating forum guidelines, it would be better to specify what you think is wrong with it. You did the former, but forgot to do the latter.
.
Typical standard behavior of a flamewarrior who can’t otherwise support his claims.
.

And you are the one who wasn't specific at all.

.
So you say, repeatedly, without pointing to a particular instance. I invited you to tell us specifically what error, mis-statement or vagueness you found in a post of mine. Instead, you’re still just repeating the same unsupported angry noises.
.

So, you're just being hypocritical. And you're particularly hypocritical here where you become the only one name-calling here, calling me two names.:
"Thanatos" 's wasn't discussing philosophy. His conduct in this instance is just that of the ordinary usual internet-abuser and flamewarrior, sadly ubiquitous on the Internet.”—Michael Ossipoff

.
To send in my complaint, it was necessary to tell what behaviors I was complaining about. I included that information in my post too, because, after flagging your post, I wanted there to be an explanation for that near the end of the posts in the topic.
.

And you're the one who was unable to name where I made mis-statements and errors and then show how.

.
I asked if you could specify which of my statements was/were “blather”, and tell why you think so.
.
You couldn’t.
.
Then there was nothing more to be said.
.

You accused me of having made a "brute-fact,"

I said that Physicalism has a brute-fact. You said you didn’t think so, and I pointed out that the independently-existent, objective, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world that you (or at least someone) believe in is a brute-fact, unless you can explain it or quote from someone who has.
.

and I asked you to show how and you continually failed to do so.

.
See above. In fact, I’ll re-copy it for you again:
.
…and I pointed out that the independently-existent, objective, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world that you (or at least someone) believe in is a brute-fact, unless you can explain it or quote from someone who has.
.
I have no idea about whether or not you’re a Physicalist, or just a typical troll. It doesn’t matter. That’s why I said “…that you (or at least someone) believe in.”
.
We can replace that with “…that Physicalists believe in.”
.
So yes, I did tell what Physicalism’s brute-fact is.
.
(I’d already stated it in numerous posts to various topics)
.

I never made a physicalist belief

.
I didn’t say that you were a Physicalist. I merely told about Physicalism’s brute-fact.
.
My wording that I quoted above, showed that I didn’t claim to know if you were a Physicalist.
.
I have no idea what you are. It’s irrelevant.
.

; I just correctly said our facts are our reflections of the material reality of the universe; I never said they weren't part of our reality as well.

.
Forgive me if I thought that that statement (quoted directly aboves) suggested a belief in the primacy of a “material reality”, of which facts are a reflection. :)
.

And the only big, blatant brute-fact is your statement calling my statement one

.
A “material reality” that is related to facts by their being a reflection of it, because it’s metaphysically prior to them, is a way of asserting Physicalism’s brute-fact.
.

, as my statements can and have been explained, and you don't explain or support yours at all.

.
I’m always willing to explain &/or support any particular statement that I’ve made. Directly above, I’ve explained some things that I’d said.
.
Your statements are explained? Oh really. Then, specifically, which earlier statement(s) was/were the “blather” that you were referring to? (…statements made before you expressed that characterization)
.
You joined a conversation in which I’d spoken of Physicalism’s brute-fact. You tried to deny that Physicalism has a brute-fact, because you were confused about the difference between an explanation and a verification.
.

And then you again failed to support your claim, as I requested, that my statement was a "brute-fact," instead providing a tautology not backing your claim at all.

.
If you’re saying it’s a tautology, you’re also saying that it’s true. No, we needn’t debate whether it’s a tautology.
.
I’d said:

A primary, fundamentally-existent material reality is a brute-fact.

.
…because a thing posited but not explained is a brute-fact.
.
So yes, it’s a brute-fact unless you (or someone) can explain it.
.
Shall we wait for your explanation?
.
And no, a verification isn’t an explanation.
.
Thanatos quotes me:
.

Physicalism and "Naturalism" need to posit that brute-fact. That's what makes it unparsimonious...not the fact that someone assumes that Physicalism is correct.

.
…and says:
.

And I made specifically clear, as you wrongly claimed I didn't, how that was wrong:
A primary, fundamentally existent material reality is not a "brute-fact," as a brute-fact is something that cannot be explained, and a primary, fundamentally existent material reality can be explained.

.
Then I invite Thanatos’s to explain it..
.
Michael Ossipoff

I have to admit that I wouldn't be able to explain or account for such a thing.

If this physical universe is what its simplest, neatest, most parsimonious explanation suggests, then there must be infinitely-many more like it, with none being more real than the others (except as seen by their inhabitants).

Michael Ossipoff

I pretty much agree with everything you're saying. So, when the abstractionist says that w1 obtains but the others don't, what do you take that to mean, Michael? You might be a concretist and reject it, but do you know what the abstractionist is meaning? — Brayarb

I don't know for certain. It sounds as if he's saying what most people believe, and that, like most people, he's taking this physical world's local actual-ness (for us), to mean that it's all that there is.
...to mean that this world has something that none of the others have, because we can stub our toe in it. Isn't that special-ness illusory?

Admittedly the other possibility-worlds don't look very real from our standpoint here.

But why should this possibility be believed to obtain more than the infinitely-many other Possibility-worlds do? Why should it be intrinsically any more real, existent or actual? Aren't they all equally actual for their own inhabitants (...the ones that have inhabitants)?

I like the saying that "the actual world" means "this world".

(Sorry about all the accidental italics at the end of my previous post. I must either carefully check the tags, or else use the Preview option.)

Michael Ossipoff

I don't understand. You said:

Nothing about/in w1 necessitated that S1 obtained. — Brayarb

But w1 is just a word for the world in which obtains S1. And S1 is just a word for how it is in w1.

They're the same thing.

It just so happened that S1 obtained there instead of S2 — Brayarb

Isn't it by definition that S1 obtains in w1? Not by chance, but by definition. That's what w1 is.

..., even though, after S1 obtained, so to speak, we identify that world as w1

But of course each possibility-world has always timelesslly been there, as a hypothetical system, each with its special attributes and distinctions, different physical laws and constants, etc.

What is a possibiity-world if not its state of affairs? It's not as if a possibiity-world were some special "space" that could have these or those hypothetical facts.

The system's inter-referring hypothetical logical facts, including various if-thens, don't need to exist in any "medium" or space, or at any place. ...just as they don't need to "be" in any context other than that of eachother, to which they refer.

There are infinitely-many systems like that, and we call them possibility-worlds. Such a system doesn't exist in a possibility-world. It is a possibility-world.

(Maybe systems of inter-referring hypothetical or logical facts that don't include physical laws should still be called "possibility-worlds", as maybe could physical possibility-worlds whose physical laws don't allow for inhabitants. Of course that's just a naming-issue, not a factual issue.)

It seems to me that a (at-first seemingly) harder question is, "Why am I in this[/u] possibility-world?"

I'd say, "Because you and your world are defined in terms of eachother. You're part of this possibility-world. A life-experience story needs a Protagonist, and you must be someone about whom there can be a life-experience possibility-story, and, in particular, someone consistent with the story's other components..

There are some obvious causal relations between your attributes and those of your world. Obviously you're likely to be somewhat like your ancestors, and therefore somewhat like the rest of your species.

If someone knew something about one, he could guess something about the other.

Of course we were all born in the Land of the Lost.

Michael Ossipoff

Maybe try this: take the world that we're at (or any one of the possible worlds, for that matter). Let's say that a certain state of affairs S1 obtains contingently in that world. Now, for the sake of simplicity, let's say that if S1 had failed to obtain, then, necessarily, S2 would've obtained (which means there is a close possible world where S2 did obtain). That is to say that one or the other necessarily obtained in the particular world, but which obtained was contingent. Essentially I'm asking in the OP and here: what settled the matter that S1 obtained in this particular world instead of S2 when S2 was a state of affairs that this world could've included (was compatible with up until S1 obtained), alternatively? — Brayarb

That's just what makes that possibilitty-world the possibility-world that it is.

So what settled the matter in the way that necessity settles that S3 obtains? My contention was that it must be chance as far as I can tell, which, as I mentioned to SophistiCat, just means that it just settled this way instead of that and there's nothing to point to that could account for why. — Brayarb

But the fact that those two possibility-worlds have different states of affairs--isn't that what defines them, and makes them two different possibility-worlds?

The possibility-world to which you refer couldn't have a different state-of-affairs, because, if it did, then it wouldn't be that possibility-world. It would be a different one. Both exist. Infinitely-many exist.

Among the infinity of possibility-worlds, of course there's one with any self-consistent state of affairs.

So I don't find a question there.

Michael Ossipoff

"Yes, you could explicitly define "the actual world" as "this particular possibility-world." In fact, how I mean "actual" when I say that this world is actual to us because we're in it. And so that is a tautology when I say it." — Michael Ossipoff

So if it is a tautology, then there's nothing to explain, and that means that OP's question is confused. — Fafner

My answer to the question was certainly a tautology, in view of what "actual" means to me.

But of course the asking of a question implies saying, "I don't understand this--Does someone understand it and can someone explain it?" Sure the question was the result of confusiion about the matter--and a request for someone to sort that confusion out.

When you consider our educational system and our media system, etc. it's very understandable that a lot of people haven't heard any introduction to these matters.

For me, it was hearing about Vedanta that led me to my conclusions about these matters. Then I found out that Michael Faraday, Frank Tippler, and Max Tegmark had spoken of the physical world consisting only of structure, inter-relation among hypothetical mathematical and logical facts.. (Then people here mentioned a few modern Western academic philosophers who (if I understood the posts correctly) likewise suggested that metaphysical reality consists of logical facts--a brief summary of what I've been suggesting..)

Anyway, for me, Vedanta was the introduction to the answer to the metaphysical confusion that is so widespread, due to routine mis-education in schools and media..

One Internet article referred to Tegmark's Mathematical universe Hypothesis (MUH) as Ontic Structural Realism. That would make it different from my proposal, because I disagree with Realism. What I'd read by Tegmark seemed to not share my emphasis on an individual story, of a particular Protagonist, with that Protagonist as central and primary to that story...its necessary component..

Also, the existence of those hypothetical facts, logical facts, isn't a "hypothesis". They're there, and couldn't have not been. What's unprovable and un-test-able is the matter of whether that's all there is. A more elaborate metaphysics, with the assumption of an additional unnecessary metaphyisical substance, is possible, and probably not disprovable.

Though what I first read by Tippler sounded much like the basis for my metaphysics, I disagree with Tippler where he said that a computer-simulation could create a world. His statement about that indicates a very different metaphysics from the one that I propose.

Michael Ossipoff
.

Banno's "spitball" analogy suggests that he's confused about the difference between verification and explanation.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd said:

Then explain why there is the metaphysically-primary, fundamentally existent material reality that you (or at least some people) believe in. — Michael Ossipoff

What would an explanation look like in this case? More words.

Translation: "I can't explain why there is the metaphysically-promary, fundamentally-existent material reality that I believe in."

Yes, explanations typically use words.

So yes, Physicalism has a brute-fact. ...is based on and dependent on a brute-fact.

Skepticism makes no assumptions and doesn't posit a brute-fact.

I could throw spit balls at you until you agree that there are indeed spitballs.

Would that help?

It would certainly support your claim about as well as you're supporting it now.

Michael Ossipoff

Michael Ossipoff
But there is a sense in which a sentence such as "this world is the actual world" expresses a tautology, since you would be saying something true by that sentence no matter what world you are in. — Fafner

,.

Yes, you could explicitly define "the actual world" as "this particular possibility-world." In fact, how I mean "actual" when I say that this world is actual to us because we're in it. And so that is a tautology when I say it.

But though that's maybe the most useful metaphysical definition of "actual" maybe it's misleading, because doesn't it, by the sound of it, encourage people to believe that this possibility-world is inherently, intrinsically the different from, and special from, all the others--the only real one?

I expect that most people, including all the Physicalists ("Naturalists") believe that this physical world is the only "actual" world, by some meaning of "actual"that they don't clarify very well.. Well, Physicalism is sometimes defined as the belief that reality consists only of this physical universe. I've noticed that Physicalists tend to use Reality to mean "this physical universe".

By the way, what is an Abstractionist? Looking it up, in dictionaries and online, the only definition that I could find was "Someone who produces abstract art".

Well, one Internet source said that "Abstractionist" can mean "Idealist". Is "Abstractionist" another word for "metaphysical Idealist"? If so, wouldn't it be better to just use the more familiar and widely used word, "Idealist"?

Anyway, as I was saying before, any suggestion that this possibility world is intrinsically, inherently, more "actual", real, or existent than all the infinitely-many other ones, would be pre-Copernican.

I don't argue with people who say that their desk and chair are "actual", and the other possibility-worlds aren't--because I take "actual (to us) world" to mean "this world". But obviously the other possibility worlds are "actual" too, for their inhabitants. (referring to the ones that have inhabitants).

Michael Ossipoff

↪Brayarb
Because (to paraphrase Sidney Morgenbesser), even if our world weren't the actual world, you'd still be complaining.

(what I mean is that the question doesn't make sense) — Fafner

Question: Why is there something instead of nothing?

Answer: If there were nothing, you'd still be complaining.

Of course that isn't an answer, and the question isn't nonsense.

(But it's been answered here.)

But it's a good joke. Thanks for sharing it.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd said:

You could additionally ask:

"But why am I in this possibility-world? In fact, why am I me, this particular person? Is that by chance?" — Michael Ossipoff

You asked:

It's like asking why number two is number two and not number three.

Yes.

You're referring to the 2nd part of the question. Someone had, in fact, asked that same question, in bot of its parts, in one of these topic recently.

You quoted the 2nd question, but not my answer. My answer was really saying the same thing as your answer.

What would it even mean?

It would mean that the asker regarded himself as other than the person and the body.

Michael Ossipoff

This is why it is such an elegant solution to the cosmological argument, which outside religious answer, argues something on the lines of: "Why is there something instead of nothing". The question presumes there is objectively something. — noAxioms

Yes. As the Physicalist means "something", there isn't something; there's nothing.

But I don't think it would make sense to call the life-experience possibility-stories, or their possibility-worlds "nothing".

So I'd say that there's something.

And I've told why I claim that there couldn't have not been those life-experience possibility-stories.

But life might be temporary, and the maybe temporary duration of life would then be small compared to the approach, and maybe arrival at, the timelessness that, at least in some ways, sounds a lot like Nothing..

So I suggest that, if so, that timelessness, "Nothing", is the most natural state of affairs (Apologies to "Naturalists")

...natural, right, and good, if and when it's time for it.

(...natural in the dictionary sense of "ordinary or usual".)

Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:
.

Any reasonably well-written proposable metaphysics is an unfalsifiable proposition, because no metaphysics can be proven. — Michael Ossipoff

.
You reply:
.

Presumably the whole point of metaphysics is that it is thinking largely detached from scientific analysis - or at least from scientific falsification.

.
Yes, though I guess someone could propose a metaphysics that conflicts with physical observations.
.,

I don't think complete detachment is necessary - even your Skepticism is based on Occam's Razor, for example, which is, arguably, a scientific principle.

.
Though it seems to me that Occam was speaking of physics, the Principle of Parsimony seems independently relevant to metaphysics. In fact, isn’t it more even compelling in metaphysics than in physics?
.
...to the point where only the more parsimonious metaphysics should even be considered?
.
That’s my feeling.
.
That’s why the suggestion of all possible metaphysicses—including unparsimonious ones--obtaining, in various domains of infinite-Possibility doesn’t seem convincing to me, because wouldn’t the Principle of Parsimony apply to discussion about infinite-Possibility itself? So wouldn’t we expect it to not have an additional unnecessary metaphysical substance, anywhere?
.

Also, there must be some metaphysics that are potentially falsifiable…

.
Sure, it seems like someone could propose a metaphysics that contradicts observations.
.

…(or realizable ) in the future through discovery - either of knowledge of new scientific concepts, or through new knowledge of a general sort. For example, a fifth dimension could be discovered that confirms a certain metaphysics

.
One thing like that that stands out for me was the book by a physicist who is a recognized academic authority on quantum mechanics (Its title was “Quantum _________”, where I don’t remember what was in the blank. I don’t remember his name either. It was a long time ago that I saw the book. He said that quantum-mechanics lays to rest the notion of an independently-existent objective physical world.
.
That seemed like physics saying something about metaphysics, something that I hadn’t thought possible.
.

, or Alpha Centauri could be reached and shown not to have the planet Zog orbiting it, and controlling a huge simulation containing ourselves as proposed by the Zoggist metaphysics.

,
Well, the theories about our universe being a simulation say that the simulation is being run in a different universe.
.
(I don’t believe that a simulation could create a universe, because possibility-worlds are “there” already, and don’t need a simulation to create them. The only thing a simulation could create would be an opportunity for the operators of the simulation to observe a possibility-world.)
.

Solipsism is presumably a metaphysics - but one that is completely detached from scientific thinking, and also unlikely ever to be falsifiable ever

.
Each person is the center of their life-experience possibility-story. Obviously your experience-story must be set in a possibility world in which there are other members of your species. And, among the infinity of life-experience possibility-stories, of course there’s one for each of the other beings in that possibility-world (…and all the other ones, of course).
.
It seems to me that that fits some, but not all, definitions of Solipsism. But someone can’t discredit a metaphysics by applying a name to it.
.

So where am I going with all this? I think I'm trying to generate classes of metaphysics, based on 1) amount of scientific content - some or none;

.
Even if there are exceptions in which science can say something about metaphysics, I don’t know if science could be part of a metaphysics. Isn’t physics and its findings, for the most part, just a [consequence of a metaphysics?
.

2) potential for being declared falsifiable/realizable or not now or in the future - if not why not - logical or through knowledge

.
I don’t think there could be anything during life that can distinguish Physicalism from some Idealisms. …from Skepticism in particular.
.
Pairs of metaphysicses could have different predictions, conclusions or consequences for what will be experienced at the end of a life. …Physicalism and Skepticism in particular.
.
But, coming to the rescue of indistinguishableness, most likely when the body has shut down sufficiently for there to be a difference, the person no longer knows that there was ever such a thing as metaphysics. So one can’t expect to find out, at that time, which metaphysics is better confirmed.
.

BTW, is it valid to speak of a metaphysics as being potentially realizable (declared "true")...?

.
That question has occurred to me too. Can it be said that one of the metaphysicses is true, but just can’t be proved?
.
So important and conclusive does parsimony seem, to me, that I’d say “Yes” to that.
.
Michael Ossipoff

Perhaps because if everything is possible then it must exist. — Jake Tarragon

↪Jake Tarragon
.
I noticed your other posting, at a another topic. I don’t know which was posted first, but this was the first one that I saw, and so I’ll reply to this one now, at least partly, and then reply to the other one tomorrow (Friday, July 14) morning.
.
I’d asked:
.

"Why is there this multiverse?" — Michael Ossipoff

.
You replied:
.

Perhaps because if everything is possible then it must exist.

.
That answer isn’t so easy to answer.
.
My first try is:

That posits an additional metaphysical substance--matter, and the rest of what makes up an independently existing, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world, such that it's what reality consists of.

One convincing interpretation of Ockham's Principle of Parsimony is that the metaphysics that posits fewer metaphysical substances is the winner of a comparison between two metaphysicses.

And in each of those domains of Possibility where Physicalism (or some other metaphysics having various several metaphysical substances) obtains, those other metaphysicses need assumptions and posit brute-facts. The idea of everything possible being somwhere in Possibility--would that mean
unparsimony in much of Possibility?

Wouldn't it be unparsimonious, even for infinite Possibility, itself, for it to include more metaphysical substances than necessary? .
-------------------------------------------------
My 2nd try is these other suggestions:

(It's late, so this might not be as well-organized as it could be)
.
So you’re suggesting that all of the not-self-contradictory metaphysicses obtain, in different domains of Possibility. But, if Physicalism and Skepticism are indistinguishable to us, and if therefore no metaphysics can be proved, then which one would we say it is, in any possibility-world? The one that needs an additional metaphysical substance—matter, and the rest of the fundamentally existent, metaphyisically-primary physical world, such that reality consists of it? …or the one that only needs hypothetical abstract facts, and doesn’t need any assumptions or brute-facts.
.
So wouldn’t Skepticism trump Physicalism in any and every possibility-world? Especially since they’re indistinguishable, and it’s just a matter of comparing their merits?
.
I don’t know about the suggestion of all of the not-self-contradictory metaphysicses each obtaining in some subset of Possibility.
.
If there are some in which there’s the additional metaphysical substance of “stuff”, then is there one with phlogiston, and one with ectoplasm? …one in which Harry Potter magic occurs?
.
Having, in some domain of Possibility, possibility-worlds in which there’s an additional metaphysical substance, seems to open the door to all sorts of other metaphysical substances in worlds throughout Possibility.
.
Those are my first answers about that.
.
I’ll reply to your other post, in the other topic tomorrow (Friday, July 14) morning
.
Michael Ossipoff

"Why is there this multiverse?" — Michael Ossipoff


Perhaps because if everything is possible then it must exist. Once its apparent existential arbitrariness has been thus removed, it is a simple step to accept that someone might inhabit it. — Jake Tarragon

...along with everything else that could conceivably exixt. So Reality doesn't consist of this multiverse, if it's just one of infinitely-many possibility-worlds..

There could be various multiverses, as different possibility-worlds. But some claim that there might be just one infinite, eternal multiverse that includes every conceivable universe as a subuniverse. So, according to that hypothesis, there'd be only one possibility-world, that infinite, eternal multiverse.. I've answered that latter suggestion by saying that that would be something for physics to someday determine or decide, if it's possible for physics to ever do so.I've suggested that it's pointless to propose the possibility until such time as physics gives some support to it.

In any case, it wouldn't importantly matter. It would just be a matter of whether there's one, or infinitely-many, possibility-worlds.Nothing would be different other than that number.

Your suggestion might be consistent with, and not substantively in disagreement with Skepticism, the metaphysics that I've proposed here. I don't know.

The "possibility" of one or many material multiverses seems to call for a bit of explanation.

I'm suggesting that the possibility-worlds exist because hypothetical abstract facts, and separate self-contained inter-referring systems of them, undeniably exist.

Obvious and undeniable.

The material multiverse or multiverses that are there because there could be matter--That seems to be asking for a bit more from possibility, making possibility a bit more complicated, extending it unnecessarily to more arbitrary possibilities.

You'd be asking infinite possibility for the possibility of a different metaphysical substance, as opposed to just if-then relations among abstract hypothetical facts.

Sure, if everything is possible. But what if it isn't necessary to suppose that different metaphysical substance (matter)?

So, if your theory differs from Skepticism, doesn't it seem more, and unnecessarily, complicated?

Michael Osspoff

Why is there this multiverse?

Michael Osspoff

You could additionally ask:

"But why am I in this possibility-world? In fact, why am I me, this particular person? Is that by chance?"

A life-experience possibility-story has a Protagonist. Otherwise it wouldn't be a life-experience story. There are, of course, infinitely-many life-experience possibility-stories, and this particular story has you as its Protagonist.

Asking why you're that particular person implies an assumption that you're also something other than just the person, the body. But there's no evidence to support such an assumption. So, because you're nothing other than your body, then of course you're the person that you are, because that's the only "you" that there is.

Why should any of this be so at all? Because (as I've been saying in other topics), it couldn't have been otherwise, because the systems (of which our possibility-world is one) of inter-referring hypothetical facts, including physical-laws, which are hypothetical facts about hypothetical quantity-values (which can be regarded as part of those facs), and various if-then facts regarding those values, laws, and their consequences, and various other abstract hypothetical facts, such as mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts such as syllogisms and truth-tables, etc.

There couldn't have not been those things, for the reason that i've been saying in other topics: Their relevance and meaning is, and need be, only among eachother, in reference to eachother. I don't claim that any of this exists, or is real in any other context, nor need it be.

It's real in the context of your life, and that's good enough.

Michael Ossipoff

What accounts for this possible world being actual instead of one of the others? That is, why is this particular possible world concrete, as opposed to one of the other possible worlds? Is it just by chance? — Brayarb

There's a good reason why this, our own, possibility-world is the one that is actual for usl, and why the others are not actual for us.:

It's because we're part of this possility-world. This possibility-world is the setting for our hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories. That's why this possibility world is actual, for us.

There's intrinsically, inherently, no reason for our possibility-world to be more actual, real, or existent than the other ones. Any claim otherwise would be pre-Copernican.

But, for us, ours is actual because it's the one that we're part of. ...because it's the setting for our life-experience possibility-stories.

Michael Ossipoff

Thanatos:

You said:

You just supported its existence by writing on it and successfully communicating on it to me. Thanks

1. So, if someone says that there are purple unicorns in Cleveland, Ohio, and I ask them for verification of that claim, then the fact that I thereby "wrote on it" and "successfully communicated about it", i have thereby supported the claim that there are purple unicorns in Cleveland Ohio? :D

2. Thanatos has shown himself to be long on assertions and short on justification of them. In this instance, he isn't being very clear with us about what he's trying to say.

Shall I guess what he means? Alight, I'll guess that he's saying that the mere fact that I request that explanation proves that there's a physical world--because if there weren't a physical world, than there wouldn't be any people to have that conversation.

2a) I never said that there isn't a physical world. In fact, I've repeatedly said that it's reasonable to agree that the physical world is "actual", because it's real in the context of our llives. Metaphysicses disagree on the origin and behind-the-scenes nature of the physical world.

2b). I didn't ask you to verify anything. I asked you toexplain why there is an independently-existing, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world. ...or why reality consists of this physical world.

So:

Is it that we're confused about the difference between "explain" and "verify",

...or is it that we're trying to evade, in order to avoid admitting that we can't explain why there's an independtly-existing, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world, or why reality consists of a this physical world?

Michael Ossipoff

Terrapin:

Or, if it would be more helpful, I'll put it this way:

First, let me abbreviate "our lives, the physical world, or the observations and experimental-results of physicists" as "the physical observations".

Skepticism doesn't depend on the nonexistence of "stuff" or the falsity of Physicalism to explain the physical observations.

There could be "stuff", and Physicalism could be true, and consistent with the physical observations.

So the nonexistence of stuff isn't needed to explain the physical observations, and therefore, Skepticism doesn't need or use it to explain the physical observations. That's why Skepticism doesn't mention "stuff" at all.

Likewise, Skepticism doesn't need an assumption about the nonexistence of a stawberry-jam core in the center of the planet Jupiter, to explain the physical observations. That's why Skepticism doesn't mention that either.

But Physicalism's explanation of the physical observations posits a brute-fact: An independently-existent, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world. ...Often expressed as the brute-fact that reality consists of the physical world.

Michael Ossipoff

Terrapin:

Actually, what you said was:

That there's no "stuff" isn't any better-supported, haha

No, and I've made no claim to prove that there isn't "stuff", or that Physicalism isn't true. As I've often repeated, I doubt that any metaphysics can be proved.

It's just that I don't assume that there are such things a phlogiston or "stuff", and Skepticism needs no such assumption.

It's a question of whether a metaphysics depends on an assumption.

And no, neither do I advocate an assumption that thereisn't stuff.

The point is, that Skepticism doens't need to assume anything. Skepticism doesn't need any assumption, to explain our lives, the physical world, and the results of physics experiments and observations.

Physicalism posits an independently-existing, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world.

I've asked you to explain why there is one.

Michael Ossipoff

In other words, Physicalism's unsupported assumption is an assumption within Physicalism, rather than an external assumption about Physicalism, like an assumption that Physicalism is correct.

Skepticism doesn't share that un-parsimony,,,doesn't make an internal unsupported assumption.. — Michael Ossipoff


What in the world do "internal" and "external" refer to there exactly? — Terrapin Station

It's really not difficult, Terrapin:

There can be an assumption that one metaphysics true instead of another one.

Let's call that an assumption about metaphysicses--in particular, about which metaphysics is the correct one. It's an assumption that's external to the particular metaphysicses.

There could be an an assumption that a metaphysics depends on. Such an assumption could be said to be internal to that metaphysics. It's part of that metaphysics.

These are two entirely different kinds of assumptions.

Physicalism assumes that there's a physical world that isindependely existent, metaphysically-primary, and is the funamental-existent.

That's an assumption. Here's a homework problem: Which of those two kinds of assumption is it?

Alright, i'll give you the answer:

It's an assumption that's internal to a metaphysics, part of a metaphysics. It's an assumption that a metaphysics depends on.

Now, you've said that I assume that the metaphysics that i call Skepticism is true.

Actuallly, i don't ask any one to assume that.

In any case, it's an assumption that's external to the metaphysicses. ..an assumption that one metaphysics is correct instead of another.

I'm not saying that you should assume that metaphysics is correct.

I'm merely pointing out that Skepticism doesn't need, depend on, or make any assumptions.

If someone wants go assume that Skepticism is true, that's something else. I'm not suggesting that you assume that Skepticism is true.

But I suggest that a metaphysics that depends on an assumption, a metaphysics that posits a brute-fact, thereby incurs a distinct demerit, for the purpose of comparing it with a metaphysics that doesn't need, depend on or make any assumptions, or posit any brute facts.

Oh, and how about you explain why there's an independently-existent, fundamentally-exixtent, metaphysicall-primary physical world.

Michael Ossipoff

I personally don't believe there are facts for one fundamental reason, that is a fact represents some immobility in a universe which I believe is in a constant state of flux. In other words duration annihilates facts. I could imagine this as a piece of clay that when molded changes everywhere at once. — Rich

It's well established that the physical world has facts. The physical constants are either constant, or very nearly so. The laws of physics don't seem to be changing either (...and no, the ongoing discovery in physics doesn't mean that the laws are changeng, as physicists find out more about them).

Though changes of various kinds are happening in the universe, there are some constant facts.

In any case, the facts that I was referring to, systems of inter-referring hypothetical facts can't not be.

Some particular, familiar, and quite undeniable physical facts are mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts, such as some of our obvious syllogisms, and truth-tables, etc.

Those are facts, and they're well established to be facts. And the Pythagorean theorem hasn't changed much lately, unless I just haven't heard about it. :)

Those are examples, but possibility-worlds additionally consist of other facts about hypotheticals. ...and facts that, themselves, are hypothetical. ."If there were these physical laws (hypothetical relational facts between hypothetical physical quantities, and if certain quantities had these values, then..."

As I said, the "things" that the facts refer to can be regarded as part of the facts, instead of being separated as separate "things".

As I've been saying, all these mutually inter-referring hypothetical facts referring to hypothetical things don't, and needn't exist in any context other than there reference to eachother.

When you claim they don't exist, you're making an implausible claim that needs explanation and justification.

Anyway, mathematical theorems, and the abstract logical facts that I mentioned are enough to establish that there are abstract facts.

Michael Ossipoff

A primary, fundamentally existent material reality Is not a "brute-fact," as a brute-fact is something that cannot be explained and a primary, fundamentally existent material reality can be explained. Michael doesnt' know what "brute-fact" means. — Thanatos Sand

Then explain why there is the metaphysically-primary, fundamentally existent material reality that you (or at least some people) believe in.
.
Michael Ossipoff

I'm not sure why this "Skepticism" is anything more than saying about existence "it is what it is...".. — Jake Tarragon

That claim of equivalence would need some justification. ...which you haven't supplied.

But yes, the observations of Physics don't require or establish that the physical world consists of any more than the system of inter-referring hypotheticals that I described. That was first pointed out by Michael Faraday in 1844.

Such a system, referring to nothing outside itself, doesn't need any external explanation, and couldn't not be (because no one's saying that it "is", in any context other than its own). ... for the reason that I've explained earlier in this topic.

Is that an "unfalsifiable proposition"? Sure. But it's one that doesn't make any assumptions or posit any brute-facts.

Any reasonably well-written proposable metaphysics is an unfalsifiable proposition, because no metaphysics can be proven.

Michael Ossipoff

"Fine, if you're comfortable with an unsupported brute-fact". — Michael Ossipoff

That there's no "stuff" isn't any better-supported, haha — Terrapin Station

You're confusing two different kinds/levels/orders of assumptions:

Have I proven that my metaphysics is correct, and that yours (whatever it may be) isn't?

For example, specificallyl, have I proven that there's no "stuff"?

Of course not, I've repeatedly suggested that no metaphysics is provable.

So, when we're checking for unsupported assumptions that a metaphysics needs, it doesn't make any sense to say,. "Your metaphysics depends on the unsupported assumption that it's correct and mine isn't."

I don't advocate an assumption that Skepticism is correct. So much for that "assumption."

Sorry, no. That isn't the kind of unsupported assumptions by which we're comparing metaphysics's parsimony.

A primary, fundamentally-existent material reality is a brute-fact. Physicalism and "Naturalism" need to posit that brute-fact. That's what makes it unparsimonious...not the fact that someone assumes that Physicalism is correct.

In other words, Physicalism's unsupported assumption is an assumption within Physicalism, rather than an external assumption about Physicalism, like an assumption that Physicalism is correct.

Skepticism doesn't share that un-parsimony,,,doesn't make an internal unsupported assumption..

Skepticism make no assumptions and posits no brute-facts.

It explains our physical world in terms of a system of inter-referring hypothetical facts.

"If this and this and this, then that."

I've told why that doesn't need an external explanation, because the components of that system refer only to eachother, and undeniably "exist" in terms of and in reference to eachother.

This isn't just my claim. We've named several physicists and a Western philosopher who have likewise said that a system of inter-referring hypothetical facts can explain the observations of physics, and our physical world.

Michael Ossipoff.

You continue to repeat your claim that I haven't supported my metaphysical proposal or its explanaion and justification.

But you missed one line of my previous post:

I said, "Be specific".

Apparently you're unable to.

I've been patient with you. When I asked you to be specific, I was giving you one more chance to show that you actually have a specific substantial objection. You've shown that you don't.

It wouldn't be productive for me to waste any more time replying to you.

As always, at this point, I emphasize that when I don't reply to Thanatos Sand, it doesn't mean that he's said something irrefutable. It's just that I've finally given up on asking for him to be more specific and less vague in his objections.

Michael Ossipoff

That was a bunch of blather that again misrepresented my views and didn't address them at all. And your referring to a "topic" you wrote doesn't constitute presenting the erroneous arguments within that topic, so you still fail to support your argument in any way.

I suggest you tighten up your thoughts and address my arguments in concise paragraph form instead of writing a ramble of semi-coherent sentences, your final doozy being a prime example of that semi-coherence. — Thanatos Sand

You’d said:
.

[Ontology of the universe as facts is a problem since facts are our views of the material reality of the universe, not the truths of the Universe itself.
— Thanatos Sand

.

That's an unsupported belief.

Your statement is a statement of the Physicalist belief that reality is material. ...that the material world is primary, is what's fundamentally real and existent.

Your primary, fundamentally real and existent material world is a big, blatant brute-fact.

There's no need for brute-facts. A metaphysics based on inter-referring hypothetical facts needs no brute-facts or assumptions. ...as I describe in my topic "A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics."

In my other reply to this topic, I told some reasons for that.

Michael Ossipoff

.
You reply:
.

Nothing you say in your "counter" to my quote above it counters or even effectively addresses what I said at all. I never made a physicalist belief; I just correctly said our facts are our reflections of the material reality of the universe; I never said they weren't part of our reality as well.

.
Well, let’s look at what you said:
.

Ontology of the universe as facts is a problem since facts are our views of the material reality of the universe, not the truths of the Universe itself.
— Thanatos Sand

.
You clearly said that facts are our views of the material reality. So the material is the Reality, and the facts are just “views” of that Reality. …and that facts aren’t the “truths of the universe”. Then what is the “truth of the universe”? Why, the material Reality, of course, of which the facts are merely a “view” and not the truths of the universe.
.
Yes, you said that. And, in the post that I’m replying to, you re-affirm that what you said is “correct”.
.

And the only big, blatant brute-fact is your statement calling my statement one

.
Well, the material reality that is primary, the fundamental-existent, the “reality” as opposed to just a “view” that isn’t a “truth of the universe” is a blatant brute-fact.
.
Why is there that material reality? There just is, right? That’s a brute-fact.
.

, as my statements can and have been explained

.
You repeated them, but that doesn’t change them.
.
“Explain” them? Alright, explain why there’s the material reality that you refer to that is the primary fundamental existent, instead of facts, which you say are merely “views” of your material reality, rather than “truths of the universe”.
.
If the facts are merely views of the material reality, and aren’t the “truths of the universe”, then explain what is the truth of the universe.
.
And, if material reality is the “truth of the universe”, explain why there’s that “truth of the universe”.
.
But I’ve already asked you to explain why there is that material reality that you referred to.
.

, and you don't explain or support yours at all.

.
I’ve explained that a system of mutually inter-related and inter-referring hypothetical facts, including “physical laws” which are facts about relations between hypothetical quantities; and including such abstract facts as mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts
.
As I said before, the “things” that facts are about can be regarded as and spoken of as part of those facts.
.
Why do such systems “exist”?
.
How could they not? Such a system’s components have meaning in reference to eachother. They “exist” in reference to eachother. That’s their only “existence”. What more existence do they need?
.
Your life-experience possibility-story is such a system. Part of it consists of the hypothetical possibility-world in which your life-experience possibility-story is set.
.
I’ve explained this at various topics, at various forums at this website.
.
But you said that I haven’t explained or supported it, and so I’ve supplied the above brief summary.
.
Ever since Michael Faraday, in 1844, some physicists have been pointing out that there’s nothing about physics’s observations to imply that our physical world is other than a system such as I described above, consisting of mathematical and logical relation. …and no fundamentally-existent, primary “stuff”.
.

And your referring to your outside in-supported topic

.
I’m going to guess that you meant to say “unsupported topic”.
.
I’ve supported my “A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics” topic (…including its title). I’ve repeated, here in this post, a summary of that justification of it.
.

…with the interesting name does not suffice or stand as explanation or support.

.
I didn’t explain or support it by merely referring to it. But I explained and supported my initial post to “A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics”, when I posted it, and many times since. …and I’ve provided a brief summary of that support and justification, above, in this post.
.
If you want to say that I haven’t explained and justified my claims, or the metaphysics that I propose, and offer justification of, then you’d need to specify particular not-valid statements in that justification, or ways in which my metaphysical proposal, its explanation or its justification is lacking.
.
But be specific.

.
Michael Ossipoff

You asked:
.

I'm asking if something outside your causal influences (a distant object) is real (part of the context of the universe).
. — noAxioms

.
I answered:
.

It is.

If the people whom I trust to know about such things say that it’s almost surely there , then I accept that it is almost surely real and existent, because I regard the physical universe and its contents to be real and existent, because they’re real and existent in the context of my life.
.
Those distant planets become part of my experience when the physicists &/or astronomers tell us about them almost surely being there. — Michael Ossipoff

.

The definition of exists is one of choice, and physicists often switch between a subjective and a more holistic inclusion of all the parts of the universe.

.
We’ve already agreed that “exists” can mean what anyone wants it to mean, as long as s/he specifies what s/he means by it.
.
But, as Litewave pointed out, “exist” has a broad default meaning that includes every valid non-inconsistent fact, including abstract facts and hypothetical facts about hypothetical things, and inter-referring systems of such elements.
.
(The “things” can be regarded as part of the facts.)
.
So I don’t think that there’s any point in quibbling about what “exists”.

.

To illustrate, a live T-rex exists on earth (is part of the universe)

.
No it doesn’t. You’ve used a present-tense verb, and live T-Rex no longer exists on Earth.
.
You could say that it “exists” in spacetime. But the meaning of a present-.tense verb implies this time, unless there’s an understanding
otherwise. You can make a mess by mixing mutually-contradictory definitions.
.

, but does not exist now (an arbitrarily defined slice of the universe that goes through a reference point, typically the point of the statement being made.

.
Yes.
.

In the same way, the distant planets exist, so you seem to take that more holistic view. The distance place is not a different universe, just another part of this one

.
I agree with calling something physically “actual” (a stronger word than “existent”) if it physically exists in the context of your life.
.
This physical universe, and everything in it, exists in the context of your life. No, you don’t directly sense-perceive the more distant parts of it, but you experience scientists of various kinds telling you about their observations and conclusions about it.
.
If you’re driving, and there’s an obstruction that prevents you from directly perceiving a car coming, on the boulevard that you’re about to drive across, then you slow down and proceed cautiously, because, though you don’t directly perceive that possible car, you know that there nevertheless might be one. What you don’t directly sense-perceive can still be actual, as you might find out if you don’t slow down in that intersection.
.

like the Jurassic is part of Earth.

.
T-Rex lived in the Cretaceous period, not the Jurassic. …Jurassic-Park notwithstanding.
.
I guess “Cretaceous Park” wouldn’t have as good a sound to it.

.

But it doesn't exist now

.
What doesn’t? The live T-Rex, or the distant planet.
The live T-Rex doesn’t. The distant planet does.
.

since if it did it would be receding faster than light.

.
I assume you’re referring to the distant planet, not the T-Rex.
.
First you say that science predicts planets billions of lightyears away, then you say that they don’t exist unless they’re receding super-lumnally?
.
Nothing that distant from us exists? That’s a novel minority position.
.
I don’t know how you determined that a planet a billion lightyears from here would be receding faster than light if it existed. But please, we needn’t go into that.
.
Obviously our telescope observations of very distant objects are showing those objects as they were when the light now received by our telescopes was leaving those objects. But that doesn’t mean that they don’t still exist now. Things very distant exist right now, even though it will be a long time before we receive the light that they emit. …and even though we have little information about them.
.

It doesn't exist in our reference frame

.
It doesn’t share the same motion as our solar system, if that’s what you mean. But distant things nevertheless exist, and are actual.
.

, and never will. No violation of light speed since only two things in the same frame are confined to sub-light speed. But these places do exist, I agree.

.
Yes. I must have misunderstood you, above, when I thought that you said that they didn’t exist unless they’re moving super-luminally.
.

If find it offensive to describe it as a multiverse, which is like calling the USA multi-country because the map is a book with a page for each state.

.
Unfortunately, “multiverse” implies that it consists of some separate universes. I personally don’t call something a “universe” if it’s physically-related to something outside it.
.
So, if our big-bang “universe” is part of a multiverse, then it’s that multiverse that’s really our universe, and our big-bang “universe” is really a sub-universe.
.
But “multiverse” could reasonably refer to a universe consisting of sub-universes.
.

In the subjective view, the universe is only some max size (about 27bly across)

.
A Scientific American article about 14 years ago said that it wasn’t known whether our big-bang universe (BBU) is finite or infinite.
.
But the article said that evidence is beginning to pile up in favor of the BBU being infinite.
.
Of course new information could have been discovered since then. Maybe, during the last 14 years, it has been determined that the BBU is finite, and is about 27bly across.
.
Not very likely though. Surely that major discovery would have been in headlines of all sorts of publications, and would have been mentioned a lot on radio, etc. too.
.
Are you sure that you aren’t referring to the observable universe?
.
…the part of the universe whose recession-speed from us isn’t red-shifting its radiation to unobservably low energies?

.

because it has not yet had time to expand beyond that. It still has infinite mass, meaning almost all of it is bunched up at the edge.

.
Of course there’d really be no edge, even if the BBU is finite. …any more than the surface of a globe has an edge.
.
But yes, from any point on a globe, or in a finite but unbounded BBU, there’s a most distant place.
.
But if the universe is finite in size, wouldn’t one expect only sub-luminal speeds of recession from us? …and only finite mass?
.
What source would one consult, to find the fact that a finite BBU has infinite mass? Or that the BBU is finite, and about 27 bly across?

The subjective view is also often 'what I see' and not 'what is now'. So the article read that the merging of two black holes was about to occur and they were going to measure the gravity waves. That statement said that we were about to observe it, and ignored the fact that it happened over a billion years ago. It would not be of any interest if it were happening now.

.
If they’re distant, then it wouldn’t be visible if it were happening now.
.
But there are still very distant things that exist and are real and actual right now, even though we can’t observe them, and have little information about them.
.
How did this topic turn into a physics topic? The metaphysical discussion doesn’t need physics argument.
.
Michael Ossipoff

" "Stuff" is the Physicalist's (Naturalist's) phlogiston+ — Michael Ossipoff


The error there isn't with positing "stuff," it's with being uncomfortable just in case we can't prove that there's stuff. — Terrapin Station

Fine, if you're comfortable with an unsupported brute-fact.

Michael Ossipoff

Ontology of the universe as facts is a problem since facts are our views of the material reality of the universe, not the truths of the Universe itself. — Thanatos Sand

That's an unsupported belief.

Your statement is a statement of the Physicalist belief that reality is material. ...that the material world is primary, is what's fundamentally real and existent.

Your primary, fundamentally real and existent material world is a big, blatant brute-fact.

There's no need for brute-facts. A metaphysics based on inter-referring hypothetical facts needs no brute-facts or assumptions. ...as I describe in my topic "A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics."

In my other reply to this topic, I told some reasons for that.

Michael Ossipoff

What is the ontology of 'facts'.

The early Wittgenstein postulated that the world is the totality of facts, not things. — Question

Then he was right.

And we have similar statements from physicists Michael Faraday, Frank Tippler, and Max Tegmark.

...from Faraday as early as 1844. So far as I'm aware, Faraday was the first Westerner to suggest that logical/mathematical facts, and their inter-relation, are enough to explain observations, without believing in fundamentally-existent, primary, "stuff".

"Stuff" is the Physicalist's (Naturalist's) phlogiston.

But maybe there were a few millennia of philosophers in India who already knew that and said it.

And the "things" that the facts are about can be regarded as part of the facts.

What does he mean by asserting the existence of facts in logical space?

Does that really need any asserting? As I've mentioned elsewhere here, an inter-referring system of hypothetical facts have meaning in terms of and in reference to eachother. What other existence do they need?

I have a hard time seeing these facts about the world as observer-independent

They needn't have anything to do with an observer, because, as I said above, their relevance and meaning are in reference to eachother.

But you're also right to emphasize the observer--but for a different reason:

Those facts without an observer, including infinitely-many possibility-worlds with no inhabitants, aren't part of anyone's life, and don't mean anything to anyone. We're understandably self-centered, and if it doesn't relate to, or mean something, to us (or at least to someone), then it feels as if it has less reality-status..

You, as Protagonist, are the center of your hypothetical life-experience possibility-story. You're that story's essential component.

So the facts of your own life-experience story are the ones that seem most real to you.

I always agree that what's in the context of a person's life is what's particularly "real" to that person. ...like your desk and chair.

But I have to agree with Lightwave's statement that even abstract facts exist, because I speak of them as "are 'there' ", or in similar terms.(...even though I said that word isn't metaphysically-defined).

(A typing-error that I just made suggests asking if non-vegetarian metaphysics would be meataphysics

Lightwave says that contradictory or inconsistent propositions don't exist, and I'd agree that they differ from consistent ones, by not being valid. ...and that that's a big difference that might disqualify them from the broad category of "existent". I don't know. That hadn't occurred to me before.

So, I guess "exist" has a very broad unavoidable default meaning, even if there are more exclusive definitions of it.

Maybe "real" is more subject to individual people's limiting definitions. I ran across, on the Internet, a suggested hierarchy of real-ness, intended to roughly describe actual usage, and it seems to me that "actual" was at the top of that hierarchy, as the strongest real-ness. So maybe "actual" is a good word for things that are "physically" real in the context of someone's life..

When we assume that facts exist, we are implicitly committing ourselves to a form of nominalism as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic.

...but your world, your possibility-world, and your life-experience possibility-story that takes place in it, are indeed dependent on you, as that story's Protagonist. It's a life-experience story only because it has a Protagonist--you, in this instance.

Are all of these facts observer dependant?

Your life-experience story is dependent on you, the observer/protagonist, being part of it. In general, though, facts aren't dependent on an observer, as I spoke of above, near the top of this post.

Michael Ossipoff

"Everyone is a body, and nothing more". — Michael Ossipoff


What about a conscious electronic AI? — Jake Tarragon

Sure, that too. Change "body" to "chassis"? No problem.

Better, just call it "the physical AI", to avoid philosophy-of-mind issues.

...just as you could call the body "the physical organism", when referring to the body of a biological organism. The reason for saying "body", or "physical organism (or physical person) is to emphasize that we aren't playing the philosophy-of-mind game...to distinguish what we're talking about, from some other metaphysical substance hypothesized in the philosophy-of-mind.

This apparent need to even speak of someone's body (as opposed to what??) in these discussions, is symptomatic of the fact that we're dealing with fall-out or spill-over from the philosophy of mind.

Michael Osspoff

I've mentioned this elsewhere:

I don't usually get into this issue, because it isn't a matter of argument, provability, or convincing anyone. I've argued for a metaphysics, but I don't argue about religion.

But I'll reply (maybe indirectly) to the initial-post's comments:

Metaphysics is the topic of what is. I know, that's called Ontology too, and hopefully we needn't get into an issue about the definitions and difference.

It has been pointed out that what is, is very good. Some say indescribably good. No, we needn't argue that. It's their impression, and maybe it isn't yours, and you have a right to your opinion.

Those people are expressing an impression. It isn't a metaphysical matter. You could say it's a supra-metaphycical impression.

Because it isn't metaphysical, it isn't about what exists ("exist" is a word that I avoid in definite statements anyway).

People have expressed gratitude for how good what is, is.

Some people, including some philosophers, have spoken of an impression of a Principle of Good.

An impression, remember,. not an assertion, or a claim about what you should believe.

As an example, the Byrds sang:

"I opened my heart to the whole universe, and found it was loving."

(No doubt they weren't referring to this physical universe, but rather to what is, in general.)

Anyway, I just wanted to add these comments, in indirect reply to the initial-post's commenst.

Michael Ossipoff

How does this make sense? If science is functioning as a religion or system of meaning why would it's adherents, and our nihilist friend daldai, be suffering from a lack of meaning? — praxis

I don't know if Scientificism (the religion of Science-Worship) is a system of meaning. For many it's a system of no-meaning.

But, either way, it can be said that different Scientificists worship their religion in different ways...that iit has "denominations", if you like.

Evidently, at face-value, daldai's Science-Worship is causing him great angst.

But, when someone's belief is presumably making him unhappy, but he adamantly advocates an unusually extreme, doctrinaire and dogmatic version of it,, and isn't considering letting go of it, will anyone be able to help him?

With all issues, be skeptical.

Michael Ossipoff

In my previous reply, I gave the terrapin the benefit of the doubt, after his previous violation of conduct-guideliines. ...meaning that I granted to him the respect of replying as if he were making a sincere statement.

I try to reply respectfully to everyone, but, in this instance, that respect was undeserved.

Alright, then, there will be no more replies from me to the terrapin, who has demonstrated an inability to abide by conduct-guidelines.

As I always say at this point, when I don't reply to some reply from terrapin (and I won't reply to any), it doesn't mean that he's said something irrefutable. It's just that, as I said, I don't reply to flamewarriors.

Michael Ossipoff

You really should consider fleshing out your replies a bit more. — Terrapin Station

Well, maybe you need to flesh-out that statement more. It's easy to make vague criticisms, without giving an example of what you're talking about.

Feel free to specify a particular reply of mine that didn't adequately answer the comment to which I was replying, or was incomplete or not sufficiently detailed

But do so politely, calmly,objectively, and within this forum's behavioral rules. I don't reply to flamewarriors.

(It seems necessary to say that, due to your first reply to me.)

Michael Ossipoff

Point is, all the models of the universe that work imply their existence, but such planets cannot have relevance to me personally. — noAxioms

.

NPR news and tv have no relevance to me, but I don’t call them nonexistent. — Michael Ossipoff

.

Your're evading the question and also disproving your own statement by posting about something you say has no relevance.

.
Surely mentioning something that’s existent but irrelevant to me needn’t contradict a statement of mine, unless I’ve said that there’s no such thing. When the relation between relevance and existence came up, I mentioned NPR and tv, as examples of something existent but irrelevant.
.
But I didn’t mean to evade the question. I replied that if physicists and astronomers, the people who’d know about that matter, say that there are almost surely planets that are billions of lightyears from us, then I’d say that almost surely they exist.
.
…because, though I try not to use “exist” and “real” in a definite statement, I feel that it’s perfectly reasonable to say that our physical universe and its contents “exist”. …because they exist in the context of our lives.
.
So those very distant planets exist. Or, more accurately, they almost surely exist if physicists and astronomers say that they’re almost surely there.
.

I'm asking if something outside your causal influences (a distant object) is real (part of the context of the universe).

.
It is.
.
If the people whom I trust to know about such things say that it’s almost surely there , then I accept that it is almost surely real and existent, because I regard the physical universe and its contents to be real and existent, because they’re real and existent in the context of my life.
.
Those distant planets become part of my experience when the physicists &/or astronomers tell us about them almost surely being there.
.
Likewise subatomic particles, etc.
.
I’d said:
.

We’re biological organisms. …animals, to be more specific. Animals have evolved—been designed--, by natural selection, to respond to their surroundings so as to maximize the probability of their survival, reproduction, and successful rearing of offspring. We can be regarded as purposeful devices.

.
You replied:
.

Pretty much my answer as well. The 'me' that everybody seems so bewildered by is actually an illusory carrot on a stick leading you to behave in a fit manner.

.
“Me” isn’t illusory (unless you say the physical world is illusory). “Me” is a physical human, a physical biological organism.
.
But yes, what’s illusory is a “Me” that consists of a separate metaphysical substance.
.
But that’s probably just a wording-difference, rather than a disagreement.
.

Not recognizing it as such seems to lead to that hard problem. At least that's how I see it.

.
Yes, the Hard Problem is a made-up problem based on a belief held by the people who express that “problem”.
.
I’d said:
.

By the way, regarding the word “conscious”, of course it isn’t obvious or clear where “consciousness” starts, in the hierarchy of life, from viruses up to humans. At what point can an organism be said to be conscious. Surely mice are. Insects too, right? — Michael Ossipoff

.
You replied:
.

I've been torn apart by others when I express my opinion on that. I put it on a scale from zero on up. Insects are more conscious than a mousetrap, but less than the mouse. It is arrogant to presume that there cannot be something more conscious than us.
So it isn't something that is a line crossed, a thing that you have or don't. The dualists invented the binary consciousness since it means you have the mind thingy or you don't. But they're largely in charge of the vocabulary, so the question becomes "is a bug conscious?" and not "how conscious is a bug?".

.
Yes of course there isn’t really a definite line, for what’s conscious.
.
We just take different wording-approaches:
.
I call everything from mousetrap to human “purposefully-responsive”, in order to avoid the controversy and flak that you’ve drawn.
.
And then I say that what we call “conscious” is an arbitrary individual choice, an arbitrary line that I place just below insects.
.
But, strictly-speaking, you’re right: a demarcation-lined doesn’t really make sense, and it would make sense to say “conscious” where I (uncourageously) say “purposefully-responsive”.
.
I’d said:
.

I don’t squash insects when they enter my apartment. I put them out. If an ant is on the counter or table, I brush it onto the floor instead of squashing it. If any insect, including an ant, is drowning in water, I fish it out with tissue, and leave it on the tissue, to give it the opportunity to dry and recover.
.
.
I do squash spiders, because, for one thing, each spider you squash means lots of insects that won’t die in a particularly unpleasant manner. …so it more than balances out. Also, of course some spiders dangerously bite us humans.

.
You replied:

.

Funny. I kill most bugs indoors, but leave the spiders, only putting out the scariest looking ones.

.
Then it averages out, and you cancel-out my effect on the arthropod-population.
.
I used to leave the spiders, partly because the “Daddy-Longlegs” (Long-Bodied Cellar Spiders) weave webs from which long single strands can be easily gotten (I didn’t take it till the web was dis-used). Those strands are fascinatingly-useful for detecting and roughly-measuring the smallest air-currents.
.
For example, in the morning, when one external wall of my apartment had just begun to receive sunlight, measurement with a web-strand revealed a brisk wind blowing in at the bottom of a door to the rest of the apartment, and out at the top of that door. …a convection current that registered as a powerful convection current, with the web-strand flapping in the breeze.
.
Likewise, a web-strand will be “flapping in the breeze” when held close to one’s body, due to the body-heat convection current, which the web-strand registers as a powerful convection current.

In fact, those sensitive air-current measurements with the web-strands can sometimes have practical value, for judging how well a room or apartment is ventilated.
.
But then there was a big proliferation of winged termites, which swarmed into the apartment. Everywhere around the apartment, the spiders were eating the termites, in a distinctly inhumane manner. So I squashed all the spiders, except probably for some that were unnoticeable somewhere.
.
You ask:
.

Are you vegan, that you consider it inhumane to kill even bugs?

,
No. I don’t live alone, and I can’t unilaterally choose our diet. I will say that we don’t eat animals every day. Maybe about every 3 days Yes, ideally I should be vegan, and I admit that I’m unethical by not being vegan, or even always vegetarian. But I feel that it would also be unkind to pressure my girlfriend about all-the-time vegetarianism.
.
Am I hypocritical to spare insects while eating vertebrates, which of course are practically our cousins in my opinion? No, but eating vertebrate animals, our cousins, admittedly feels like cannibalism. Maybe we can try vegetarianism.
.
But there’s no household social mandate to make me kill insects, and so I don’t kill them.
.
Michael Ossipoff

With regard to the question "What is an explanation", let me briefly re-cap how this discussion started, and then suggest an answer to that question, in keeping with the initial purpose of the discussion:

When we began discussing explanations, we were talking about physical explanations. Will physicists continue with open-ended discovery, where each explanation that they find needs more explanation, which, when found, will raise more questions with things to be explained?

Or will they find a brute-fact?

I'd suggested a 3rd possibility. They; might find a state of affairs that is self-explanatory or inevitable.

That would avoid the need for an infinite chain of explanation, without a brute-fact. It wouldn't be a brute-fact, because its inevitability or self-evident-ness would be its complete explanation.

So, what is an explanation, in the context of physics?

Well, wouldn't it be that set B (of observations and theories consistent with those observations) explains set A (of observations, successful theories and accepted evident facts), if B implies A, or if A is a subset of B?

That sounds like what would count as an explanation in physics.

Michael Ossipoff

From Michael Ossipoff:

Regarding the post of mine to this discussion-thread, just before this one:

It was, of course, posted as an answer to the question asked by the initial poster.

However, before posting it here, I accidentally posted it to a different discussion-thread, the one titled "A cure for Nihilism". I believe that that thread is at the All Discussions forum at this website, and at the Philosophy of Mind forum at this website.

Anyway, my post here, just before this one, is intended for this discussion-thread, in answer to the original poster's question.

But it was only by accident that I posted it to "A cure for Nihilism". I mention that because it might be impermissible to post the same posting to two threads. If so, then I ask that that posting be deleted from the "A cure for Nihilism" thread, and allowed to remain at this thread, because this thread is the one at which it was intended, and answers a question.

Michael Ossipoff