What aspects of reality do you think are not discussable and describable(ineffable?)?

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How broad a range of things do you think that words accurately and completely describe? To me, it seems that the burden of proof is on the person who claims that words accurately and completely describe all of Reality.
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You’re basically saying, discuss what you think is un-discussable :D
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Anyway, in a passage at the end of your post, you answer your own question. I’ll quote it here:
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For my money, more primordial than any of these logics I listed is a simple change of sense. Think of it as a gestalt shift. You know, when a cloud can look like a cat one minute and a horse the next. That's a change of sense. A gestalt shift isnt causative in any formal sense. The cloud-as-cat didnt 'cause' the cloud-as-horse. There is no necessary relation of any sort being claimed between the two.

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That passage hints about something that isn’t discussable or describable. …that words don’t describe or apply to. So, do you really believe that words can be a complete description of Reality?

Anyway, I hear-tell that there were some of them Classical-Greek fellers who also didn’t think that everything was describable and discussable.
So, I must decline credit for inventing that idea.
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I don’t think that's the way you understand if-then. You want to lock in a formal logic causation.

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If-then is about logic. There are aspects of our world that are consistent with and described by logic.
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The if-thens in my metaphysics are about one proposition demonstrably inevitably following from another. That can be called causation. And there’s a domain of Reality that is described by logic.
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As an adherent of modern scientific metaphysics, that would be not surprising.

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I’m the one who said that metaphysics, logic, science and words don’t describe all of Reality. You’re the one who thinks that words cover and describe all.
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But yes, while admitting that metaphysics doesn’t and can’t describe all of Reality, I nevertheless say that metaphysics needs to be approached scientifically. Metaphysics has a lot in common with science. …similar requirements. Avoid mutual-contradiction. Statements need to be supported. There are uncontroversial things can be said. Brute-facts, assumptions, and unverifiable, unfalsifiable propositions are rightly suspect.
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I don’t claim to know much about the unknowable. :D
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I can’t prove that something is un-discussable by not discussing it. But you can show that something is discussable by discussing it. So then, do so. Discuss something that you think some people might not consider discussable. …without asking me for the impossibility of discussion about what’s undiscussable.
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Can anything be said about matters that are un-discussable, indescribable, ineffable? You’re asking me for information about un-discussable things.
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Without rigorous proof either way, which of the following is the reasonable presumption?:
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That all of Reality is discussable and describable, or that it isn’t? Or that it might or might not be? If the latter, then any statement purporting to be about all of Reality is questionable.
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Yes, I said that if all of Reality even might not be discussable, then any statement purporting to be about all of Reality is questionable.
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I limit my assertions to uncontroversial ones.
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Materialists claim that the physical world is all of Reality. That’s a broad and big claim, assertion, and assumption.
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Materialists believe in their fundamentally, objectively, concretely existent world as a brute-fact. What else can you call it?
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Are you referring to a spiritual dimension?

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I don’t say that, but it could be taken as referring to meta-metaphysics—undiscussable, un-describable matters.
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That’s probably what someone means when saying that phrase.
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To me what is of interest is not what supposedly exists in itself out there somewhere that we cannot see.

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Yes, O seer of all!
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1. “Exists”: As I said, there’s some agreement that “exists” applies only to elements of metaphysics. …and, in fact, only to elements of metaphysics that come into and go out of existence…that exist temporally. Maybe only physical things. With those limitations, I guess it could be said that “exists” means “is” (when “is” is used at the end of a clause, without a predicate-nominative—saying something about one thing, rather than equating two things).
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2. “..out there somewhere…”
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Out where? So you think that if there’s anything un-discussable, then it must be distantly spatially located “somewhere out there?”
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3.“supposedly”? It sounds if you’re supposing things that I didn’t say.
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Anyway, what’s more unreasonably and vainly “supposed” is your belief that words can describe all of Reality.
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4. “…that we cannot see.” Alright, are we clarifying that we’re a Materialist, who believes that the physical world comprises all of Reality?
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I avoid the word “exist”.
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As for what you’re interested in, of course no one can tell someone else what they should be interested in.
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But let me quote, again, your own assertion about the limitations of logic and words:
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For my money, more primordial than any of these logics I listed is a simple change of sense. Think of it as a gestalt shift. You know, when a cloud can look like a cat one minute and a horse the next. That's a change of sense. A gestalt shift isnt causative in any formal sense. The cloud-as-cat didnt 'cause' the cloud-as-horse. There is no necessary relation of any sort being claimed between the two.

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In any case, yes I suggested that not all of Reality is discussable or describable. When I said that, I thought that it was uncontroversial and universally agreed. But I’m not interested in debating it. I prefer to confine my discussion to something that is known to be discussable: Metaphysics.
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So I’d rather just discuss metaphysics. I’m not interested in convincing anyone about the limits of discussability.
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You said:
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, but how our constructions of meaning change. In that sense, what is indescribable now is simply that understanding which lies in our future.

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So you’re saying that you’re convinced that all or Reality will eventually be known by humans? (…as soon as science become sufficiently advanced)?—Are you a Materialist? …a Science-Worshipper?
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To me talking about what is not now describable is like talking about what range of behaviors an organism isn't capable of now but may be in a differently evolved state.

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See directly above.
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Remember, I said a postmodern science would presumably treat implicitly the most primordial questions that philosophy would discuss explicitly. That means that many, but not all, aspects of aesthetic and ethical domains will be amenable to a self-reflexive postmodern science.

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You just have a different definition of science. There’s nothing wrong with different definitions, as long as they’re carefully specified, and consistently-used.
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What you mean by “science” sounds like a brand of philosophy. It would be difficult to comment on it without knowing more about it.
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I’ve read that relativism about everything is a strong component of Post-Modernism.
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Keep in mind all of the categories of contemporary empirical psychological inquiry that at one time were branches of philosophy(cognition, will, memory, perception).

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So that’s the kind of a science that postmodern science is or will be?

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I’d said:
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Metaphysics is part of philosophy. Are you saying that science can describe, cover and apply to all that metaphysics describes, covers and applies to?"

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You replied:
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Metaphysics used to be the crowning achievement of philosophy. Newer philosophical approaches don't believe in metaphysics any more.

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Metaphysics isn’t, or shouldn’t be, about believing. As I said, uncontroversial things can be said about metaphysics. If you don’t “believe in” them, then you’d be invited to tell why.
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A person can believe in a metaphysics that they can’t defend. A person can express disbelief in a metaphysics with which they can’t find fault.
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Obviously, people can and do believe whatever they’ve already chosen to believe.
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In fact, they don't exactly consider that it's possible to do philosophy any more in the strict sense( metaphysics as a beyond which organizes the physis, the objects of the world). By the same token, a postmodern science doesn't consider its role a strictly describing objective entities, having rejected the separation of subject and object which guided modem science.

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As I said, you have a different definition of what “science” means, and it’s something that, for you, replaces philosophy, including metaphysics. But someone could ask, “But if it replaces metaphysics and philosophy, answers their questions, then isn’t it philosophy? Philosophy and an improved replacement for physical-science, all rolled into one?

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"It's now agreed by all that, by the modern meaning of "science", science is about the relations and interactions among the things of this physical universe. In its purest form, that's physics."

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Yes, but postmodern science, which at this point only includes a subset of the cognitive science community, rejects this definition. My expectation is that, in order for what are now called the physical sciences to advance beyond a certain point, they will eventually have to reorient themselves as postmodern also by moving past this Cartesian dualism.
[/quote]
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Is that a quote from Post-Modernists?
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Cartesian Dualism, like Dualism in general, is a metaphysics. Science (including physics) doesn’t subscribe to a metaphysics at all. Science-Worshippers want to make science into a metaphysics (Materialism) and a religion (Sciece-Worship). But, really, science has nothing to do with metaphysics, and shouldn’t be worshipped as a religion.
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Science can’t “move past” Cartesian Dualism, because science isn’t in Cartesian Dualism. Cartesian Dualism, or any Dualism is a metaphysics. Science has nothing to do with metaphysics.
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…though a respected university physics professor and established specialist on quantum-mechanics has said that quantum mechanics lays to rest the notion of an objectively-existent physical world. …a (uniquely?) rare instance of science saying something about metaphysics.
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I’d said:
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"So science can describe, cover and apply to abstract if-then facts?"

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You replied
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Let's talk about abstract if-then facts.
What is an if-then relation? I suppose the 'if' part introduces a starting fact

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The “if-then” fact’s “if “ premise isn’t necessarily a fact. It’s only a hypothetical proposition. I make no claim that the premises or conclusions of the “if-then” facts that I refer to are true. If a proposition isn’t true, then it isn’t a fact. But there are abstract timeless hypothetical if-then facts that are demonstrably inevitably true. …regardless of whether or not their premises are true.
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I’m talking about worlds of “if “, as opposed to worlds of “is”.
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, maybe in the form of a proposition?

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Yes.
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Is this fact then a concept?

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“Fact”:
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I’m not saying that the premises of the if-then facts that I refer to are true. If a premise isn’t true, then it isn’t a fact.
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“Concept”:
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The premise is a hypothetical proposition. I guess you could call it a “concept”, except that I like to keep what I say uncontroversial, and keep it plain. The word “concept” might imply more than I mean. I prefer to just call the premise a hypothetical proposition.
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What are we assuming…

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You’re asking me what you and I are assuming. How would I know what you’re assuming? Only you know what you’re assuming. Why ask me?
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…about the history of this starting 'if' , this concept, in the individual's experience?

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What “starting if”? By that, do you just mean the “if “ premise of any particular if-then fact?
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Its history is that timelessly is, as a hypothetical proposition that’s (at least part of) the “if “ premise of an abstract timeless if-then fact.
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But no assumption is involved, required, or used.
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Do I assume that the timeless abstract if-then fact, or its premise(s) or its conclusion “exist” or are “real”? No.
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No assumptions. No brute-facts.
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Are we assuming…

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You’re asking me what you and I are assuming. How would I know what you’re assuming? Only you know what you’re assuming. Why ask me?
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…that all concepts are mutually defined by reference to other concepts, like the word definitions in a dictionary?

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No. I’m not talking about concepts. I’m talking about timeless abstract if-then facts, and their hypothetical premises and conclusions. I try to avoid using unnecessary terms that might have different meaning than I intend. I don’t use the word “concept” when describing my metaphysics.
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But yes, a proposition, such as a hypothetical physical-quantity-value, can be (at least part of) the premise of one abstract if-then fact, and can also be the conclusion of another abstract if-then fact.
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And no, that isn’t an assumption.
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Dictionaries are finite. Experience is open-ended, and therefore so is the system of inter-referring timeless abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals that comprises a life-experience possibility-story. For example, of course there remains much physics yet to be discovered. Current explanations themselves call for explanations of them. And no one knows the physics that will explain the acceleration of the recession-rates of the more distant galaxies—though I don’t think anyone doubts that, at least potentially, in principle, physics will find an explanation that’s consistent with other physical observed facts.
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In the past, there were seeming inconsistencies: Black-body radiation’s energy/wavelength curve; the result of the Michaelson-Morely experiment; the unexpected large direction-change of particles directed into a piece of metal-foil by Ernest Rutherford; The planet Mercury’s seemingly anomalous rotation of apsides; Olber’s paradox. …etc.
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Those seeming inconsistencies were later consistently explained in terms of new physics or new theories and explanations that were well-confirmed.
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If so, then can we assume that everyone has their own mental dictionary, so that my 'if' concept may mean something slightly different to me than it does to you?

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Your life-experience possibility-story is yours only, though all of our stories take place in the same possibility-world. That’s really no surprise: For your story to explain or account for you, there must be a species that you belong to, and it must have other members in your world.
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There are infinitely many life-experience possibility-stories, and so of course there’s one about every being in your world. You experience only your own experiences. The experiences, and experience-story of other beings is theirs only, just as yours is yours only.
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Because we live in the same world, we experience many of the same facts about that world. For instance, we both know that, in the measurement-systems used by humans on this planet, there are 12 inches in a foot, and 100 centimeters in a meter.
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Also, if the starting ' if'…

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I don’t know what you mean by “starting “if “. A person’s experience is open-ended, and therefore so is the complex system of inter-referring abstract timeless if-then facts that constitutes a story about that experience.
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I’ll assume that, by “starting ‘if’ “, you just mean the “if “ premise of an if-then fact.
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…concept

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I don’t use the term “concept” in my description of my metaphysics.
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…of an if-then relation presupposes a prior history or context that defines its meaning, isn't this starting 'if' already a 'then' to a prior 'if'?

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It certainly can be, and (at least) often is.
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I don’t use the word “concept” in my description of my metaphysics. I speak of hypothetical propositions, and of if-then facts.
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Sure, a proposition can be (at least part of) the premise of one if-then fact, while also being the conclusion of another if-then fact.
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After all, the starting 'if' doesn't come from nowhere, it emerges out of a background of my ongoing interest, concerns, activities.

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Exactly.
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It is already framed in relation to this background.

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Yes. It’s part of the complex system of inter-referring abstract timeless if-then facts about hypotheticals that is your life-experience possibility-story.
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Now, when we think of all the ways that meanings can be related to each other, all the different types of causative logics(material, efficient, formal, final) ,I wonder what are the most primordial observations we can make about an if-then statement.

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The most basic requirement for your life-experience possibility-story is that it be self-consistent, without contradictions. It’s based on if-then facts, and there’s no such thing as mutually-inconsistent facts.
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But, as for an if-then fact itself, there’s nothing more primordial about it than itself. Such a fact, and a complex system of inter-referring abstract timeless if-then facts about hypotheticals, doesn’t need a context, or a medium in which to be…like some kind of potting-soil.
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It’s premise needn’t be true. In fact it’s irrelevant and meaningless to even speak of the “reality” or “existence” of such a system of inter-referring abstract timeless if-then facts.
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For my money, more primordial than any of these logics I listed is a simple change of sense. Think of it as a gestalt shift. You know, when a cloud can look like a cat one minute and a horse the next. That's a change of sense. A gestalt shift isnt causative in any formal sense. The cloud-as-cat didnt 'cause' the cloud-as-horse. There is no necessary relation of any sort being claimed between the two.

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Yes. I’ve twice quoted that passage above, because it shows you agreeing that words and logic don’t cover and describe everything.
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I dont think that's the way you understand if-then. You want to lock in a formal logic causation.
As an adherent of modern scientific metaphysics, that would be not surprising.

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As I answered above (when quoting that same passage), I’m not the one claiming that words and logic describe all of Reality.
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Above in this reply, I explained that metaphysics has much in common with science…has some of the same requirements that science has. …and is valid in its domain, as science is.
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Michael Ossipoff

I had errands today, and it's a long post, but I'll have my reply finished and posted tomorrow morning. (Tuesday 2/20/18).

Michael Ossipoff

Right, so the 75% of philosophers who accept scientific Realism are not just mistaken, they're actually writing jibberish because such a view is not even defensible? — Pseudonym

Yes.

What, jibberish from professional academic philosophers? The emperor is unclothed?

Well, maybe it results from the "Publish or Perish" imperative.

That's quite a claim.

Sure.

I'm always willing to support my claims. I've been supporting that one in various posts. i'll do so again here in this thread, as one of my next postings.

Michael Ossipoff

My point isn't that these words lack meaning, or that they're "metaphysically undefined." My point is that they're like other words that tend to be vague, and as a result they don't lend themselves to precise definitions. — Sam26

Sure, all language is a bit vague. No finite dictionary can non-circularly define any of is words. it really always must come down to "You know what i mean", or demonstration-by-gesture.

But "Exist", "Real" and even "Is" are qualitatively more un-defined than other words. Though I refer to Reality, to mean "All", and use "Is" with the broadest interpretation, I don't use "real" for comparison of metaphysical things, and I don't use "exist".

I think there's lots of unnecessary debate in philosophy about what is or isn't "real" or "existent".

If one is using the term exists to refer to something completely subjective, then that's problematic

Of course.

And I claim that our metaphysical world is purely subjective, in the sense that we're primary and central to our life-experience possibility-story. It's entirely about our experience. In that sense, it's completely subjective. The physical world around you is secondary, as the setting for your life-experience possibility-story.

It's there because you're in it, and you're in it because of your predisposition.

As I was saying, it's meaningless to say that NDEs aren't "real".

They're followed by one of two things:

The peaceful rest and sleep at the end of lives.

OR

A next life.

I suggest that, for nearly everyone (including everyone in these forums) it will be the latter.

Michael Ossipoff

If I say that conscious awareness is a property of neural activity and you think it isn't, I am not "confused" I have a different but equally defensible belief about the world. — Pseudonym

Of course, in the physical story, all animals, including humans, are physical. The self-consistent-ness of your life-experience possibility-story requires a physical origin and body for humans.

But where you're confused is if you think that the physical world is metaphysically fundamental and primary.

(...but I don't claim that you're alone in that position)

This notion that all metaphysical positions are "equally defensible" beliefs just isn't correct. Materialism isn't defensible.

Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:
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Real", "existent" and "is" are metaphysically undefined.

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You replied:
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Distinguishing 'reality', 'being', and 'existence' is practically impossible in the current English philosophical lexicon, because they are usually considered synonyms. But there are fundamental differences between these words.

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That’s part of the problem, but even when they’re distinguished from eachother, it can sometimes still be problematic they mean metaphysically.
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'Exist' is derived as follows: 'ex-' to be apart, apart from, outside (as in external, exile), and '-ist', to stand or to be. So to 'exist' is to be 'this as distinct from that', to have an identity. In my heuristic, the 'domain of existents' is basically the realm of phenomena. 'What exists' are all the billions of compound objects that are composed of parts and have a beginning and end in time. Also, existence refers to the living of life considered longitudinally through time, 'our life', and all of the forms of phenomena that exist within that frame.

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That’s what I’ve read too. I often say that “exist” is about elements of metaphysics. But you’re saying, maybe with good justification, that the meaning of “exist” is meaning is more limited, and doesn’t include timeless abstract if-then facts. That’s fair and reasonable. So not all elements of metaphysics “exist”.
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That’s fine with me, because I’ve never said that the timeless abstract if-then facts, or complex systems of inter-referring timeless abstract if-then facts, that I refer to “exist”. …even if there’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than such a system.
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What is 'real' is another matter. I understand this to denote real numbers, logical, scientific and natural laws and principles, and so on. So in this heuristic, numbers are real, because they're the same for anyone who can count, but they're not existent, because they don't come into and go out of existence.

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Yes, it makes sense to not call those things “existent”.
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I just use “Reality” or “All of Reality” to mean “All”, in its broadest sense. I don’t think anyone can establish or demonstrate that that isn’t more than those discussable and describable metaphysical things that you listed. I don’t think all of Reality is subject to demonstration, argument, description or discussion. I don’t think it would even make sense to speak of a demonstration otherwise.
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I don’t think it’s necessary to argue which metaphysical things are “real”, and which aren’t, in some metaphysical sense for comparing metaphysical things, whatever comparison that would be, whatever that would mean. It seems like an arbitrary label and an unnecessary, unmeaningful distinction.
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But I’d say that, among the timeless abstract objects, there’s something special about timeless abstract facts, such as timeless abstract if-then facts, because, whether or not someone wants to call them “real”, they have positive truth-value, and, real or not, in an inter-referring system of them, they have relation to eachother. …relation that couldn’t care less if they’re designated “real”.
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Possibility-stories and possibility-worlds must be self-consistent, because they consist of abstract facts, and there’s no such thing as mutually-inconsistent facts.
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…an inconsistent story would be an impossibility-story, and an inconsistent world would be an impossibility-world.
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(And prime numbers, in particular, are not composed of parts.)

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Prime numbers other than 1 can be said to be composed of parts, because they can be gotten by adding smaller numbers. In fact, isn’t addition closer than multiplication to what we usually mean by combining parts?
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The meaning of 'Being' is another matter again. Note that in ordinary speech the term 'Being' usually denotes 'human being', and for good reason.

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Surely you don’t mean that the other animals aren’t beings too.
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This is because in a Being, the domain of existents and the domain of reals is synthesised into the 'meaning-world' in which we live.

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Come again?
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At first it seemed that you meant, by “a being”, a conscious, experiencing entity such as a human or other animals.
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But, below, you’re referring to an attribute or basis of such beings.
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But another crucial point about being is that being is never an object of consciousness, because we're never apart from or outside of it. Being is 'that which knows', never 'the object of knowledge' (a fundamental insight of non-dualism. But this is why it can be said that we 'forget what being is' even though it's always 'nearer' than anything else.)

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That doesn’t sound inconsistent with my definition of Consciousness as the property of being a purposefully-responsive device.
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…except that it seems to make or posit something confusing, complicated or difficult to explain—and not necessary for an explanation or description of us.
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Of course the property of being a purposefully-responsive device is something that all of us animals have in common, and so it’s sometimes argued that we’re all the same at center. Sure, that can be said, but it doesn’t mean that we’re all the same, just because we have that in common. We could be called different kinds of the same thing, but that doesn’t make all of us the same.
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During life, we’re each obviously a separate different individual. At the end of lives, during shutdown, we’re increasingly similar, as sleep deepens, and there’s no longer such a thing as individuality, or (eventually) even an awareness that there ever was or could be such a thing as individuality, identity, worldly life, time or events.
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Of course arguably, and I don’t deny it, this temporary (over one or many finite temporary lives) existence as an individual being doesn’t match the significance, at the end-of-lives, of the eventual and timeless absence of identity, in the final deep sleep.
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So it could be said that, eventually and timelessly, where it counts the most, we aren’t individuals with identity.
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And so I’ve argued that, though we’ve been in life for so long that it’s what we’re used to, that final and timeless part of our lives, at the end-of-lives, is the more usual and normal state, because timeless beats temporary; and final rest beats intermediate striving.
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One definition of “natural” is “usual and normal”, and so I suggest that the timeless rest at the end of lives is our natural state.
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But don’t be too sure that it will be at the end of this life. Probably not, in my opinion.
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Anyway, at the end-of-lives we approach the Nothing that’s the quiescent background behind the timeless abstract if-thens that constitute our experience-stories. That Nothing is arguably what’s most natural and fundamental.
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The 'be' of 'be-ing' is a completely different matter to the nature of the existence of objects. This is the distinction basic to ontology.

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Yes, although, for each of us, we and our surroundings are the two halves of the complementary pair that is our life-experience possibility-story--In that story we’re what’s essential, central and primary. It’s from our point of view, and obviously that makes us special. …as the experiencer in whose point-of-view the story is.
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The possibility-world in which we live is just the setting for our experience, which is primary.
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That’s why I say that you and your predispositions, making you the protagonist of a life-experience possibility-story, are the reason why you’re in a life. Briefly, you’re in a life, a particular one, because of who you are.
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Sometimes it’s tempting to say, “I didn’t ask to be born!”, but I don’t think that holds up under examination. Our own role in why we were born is something to own-up to.
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But why in a societal-world like this one? Probably explainable if we were sufficiently awful in the previous life (though I say that previous lives are indeterminate, not just unknowable).
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Typically, in our extroverted and objectively-oriented culture, we accept that what is real is what is 'out there'; as Sagan said, that 'cosmos is all there is'.

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Sure, Science-Worship.
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But Being is prior to the Cosmos, in the sense that if we were not beings, the cosmos would be nothing to us

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There’s no such thing as “if we were not beings”, because then there wouldn’t be any “We”.
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, we would simply react to stimuli, as animals do.

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1. We’re animals.
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2. All animals, including us, react to stimuli--as purposefully-responsive devices.
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3. But I don’t deny that human-ness has a special unique potential.
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It is our insight into principles, laws, logic, and so on, that enables the grasp of the 'logos' of things. Although now this has become very confused, because so-called 'empiricism' doesn't understand these distinctions.

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Yes.
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Michael Ossipoff

Must quit for the evening.

Replying tomorrow.

Michael Ossipoff

I must quit for the evening.

Will reply tomorrow.

Michael Ossipoff

I should add that, of course, Materialists believe that this physical universe is all of reality. So, of course, for them, science does describe, cover, and apply to all of reality.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd said:

Many people, known as Science-Worshippers, want to apply science outside that valid area of applicability, and have a belief that science describes, covers, applies to, all of Reality".

IF you believe that philosophy can describe , cover, and apply to all of reality,... — Joshs

I don't.

Metaphysics can describe, cover and apply to the matter of what is that is discussable and describable. That isn't all of Reality.

(I realize that "metaphysics" is a broader term. But it's often used with a meaning similar to "ontology", which I take to mean "metaphysics" as I described it in the paragraph before this one. If anyone says that "ontology" is also about un-discussable, un-desribable Reality, that isn't the meaning that I take "ontology" to have. The "-ology" suffix implies knowability, describabity, disussability.).

... then I would suggest that so can science for the most part.

So you're saying that science can describe, cover and apply to all that philosophy can?

Ethics and Aesthetics are parts of philosophy. Are you saying that science can describe, cover and apply to all issues, topics and questions of Ethics and Aesthetics?

Metaphysics is part of philosophy. Are you saying that science can describe, cover and apply to all that metaphysics describes, covers and applies to? Of course that would have to include Idealist metaphysicses too--all of them.

So science can describe, cover and apply to abstract if-then facts? Which branch of science would that be? Physics?

Not science as it has been conceived over the past 400 years by those working within the natural sciences.

Not just by them. It's now agreed by all that, by the modern meaning of "science", science is about the relations and interactions among the things of this physical universe. In its purest form, that's physics.

Chemistry is about a subset of physics, though its techniques are necessarily somewhat different for that subset. (it's been said that quantum-computing will make more of chemistry calcuable, predictable, by the methods of physics.)

Biology is, at least in principle, derivable from chemistry.

Science, as it has been conceived since it stopped being considered a branch of philosophy, didn't concern itself with its origins or grounding, but simply took for granted as its starting point certain presuppositions about subject and object.

Yes, now "science" conveniently refers only to the study and discussion of the relations and interactions among the physical things of this physical universe.

'these are things philosophy can investigate with greater depth and rigor than science'.

It's a lexicographic matter. Conveniently we now distinguish science from metaphysics. Anything other than the relations and interactions among the things of this physical universe can't be investigated at all by science, because that's all that science is about. (as defined now).

You can discuss how science used to be defined, and that might be of great historical interest, to those who want to pursue the study of history.

Michael Ossipoff

Having volume doesn't mean being dividable Something could occupy volume, but be impossible to divide. ...though there might be insufficient information to know whether it's really indivisible--as atoms were initially expected to be.

Michael Ossipoff

...so Atheists are right when they say that many Atheists need to be closeted, such as politicians trying to appeal to a demographic.

scientific constructions of reality become more predictively useful over time. — Joshs

...for the physical relations among physical things.

But many people, known as Science-Worshippers, want to apply science outside that valid area of applicability, and have a belief that science describes, covers, applies to, all of Reality.

The religion of Science-Worship is rivaled only by doctrinaire, dogmatic, Literalist, anthropomorphic, interpretations of Theism, as the official religion in our society.

(Not all Theism is dogmatic, doctrinaire, Literalist, or anthropomorphic.)

But many people posing as dogmatic Literalist Theists are really closet Atheist, Materialist, Science-Worshippers.

Michael Ossipoff

For example, it's meaningless and silly to quibble about whether NDEs are real. NDEs undeniably are, and what more does anyone expect to say about them?

Michael Ossipoff

Yes, the assumption that "real" and "existent" (and even "is") mean something is the cause of much philosophical confusion.

"Real", "existent" and "is" are metaphysically undefined.

I use "Reality" (capitalized) to mean "All", or "All that is", where "is" is just as broadly defined. I don't use "real" metaphysically, because, as I said, it isn't metaphysically-defined. I avoid "exist" too, for the same reason.

Ii use "is" with the broadest, unlimited, meaning.

I take "exist" to refer only to elements of metaphysics, but I avoid using "exist".

But yes, much of philosophical discussion and debate seems to be unnecessary and pointless quibbling about what exists or is real.

Michael Ossipoff

A familiar difference between definitions in logic and human language, is the meaning of "or".

As you may know, in logic, "A OR B" means "A", "B" or "A and B". If you just want one of them, you must use exclusive OR, abbreviated xOR.

In human language it's the opposite. If the carnival game operator tells you that you've won a stuffed bear or a parasol, and you take both, you're obviously in the wrong.

If you want inclusive OR, you have to say "A or B or both". Or, more briefly, A &/or B".

No one is claiming that words always mean the same in logic and in human language.

Michael Ossipoff

My argument is that [the clerk] isn't a logician — Harry Hindu

The clerk's interpretation that an implication-proposition is true if its premise is false is unanimously agreed on by the academic sources i found, for 2- valued truth-functional implication.

What I'm saying is that implication-propositions don't translate to logical "IF-THEN" statements that are used by people and computers via their programming. — Harry Hindu

As for people:

That was the whole point of the story, ...to illustrate that the standard truth table for such implications can give results that differ from what people ordinarily expect.

And no, i''m not "moving the goalpost". It's something that I've been saying from the start.

As for computer programs:

Of course. So what?

A computer program doesn't interpret an "IF...THEN" statement as a logical proposition that a conclusion follows from a premise.

It takes it as an instruction to do something if a certain proposition t is true.

Loosely said, it often takes it as an instruction to make a variable take a certain value if a certain equality, inequality, or proposition is true. ... when the action called for is the execution of an assignment-statement.

...but it can also just specify an action, such as "IF x = a, THEN PRINT(x)"

In general, it's an instruction, like saying, "If he tries to get in, call the police".

Michael Ossipoff.

I’d said:
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My objection to the predicate logic language was only that it seemed an unnecessary complication. If we're having a conversation, and you insist on speaking Latin, that doesn't mean that you're wrong, it just makes it more difficult for me. That was my complaint about predicate logic language.

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You replied:
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Again you miss the point.

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I just keep missing that darn point!
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It's not about speaking different languages

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That was what my objection was about.
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, it's about using the correct terms in ANY langauge to translate to the correct terms of another language. When your logical system ends up being inconsistent with other logical systems, then something is wrong. They should all be integrated into a consistent whole.

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There are different truth-tables for implication.

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You keep claiming that the clerk is a logician. If so, then the clerk would know that there other logical interpretations of the sign and that all logical interpretations should be consistent.

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He was using the standard truth-table for 2-valued truth-functional implication.
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I’d said:
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...but that could depend on the company that's using the computer.

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You replied:
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You obviously don't know much about computer programming. ALL computer languages mean the same thing with IF-THEN statements.

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I didn’t say that different programming languages mean different things by IF-THEN. You said something about honesty, and that’s what I was replying to. There aren’t dishonest programming languages, but there are dishonest companies. And no doubt phishers and malware-writers use perfectly honest programming languages.
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I’d said:
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The truth value of the implication-proposition is function of the truth-values of the premise and the conclusion.

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You replied:
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No. It only depends on the truth value of the conclusion. Just look at the table.

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Incorrect.
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If the conclusion is false, then the truth of the implication depends on whether or not the premise is true, by the truth-table that I’ve been referring to, the standard 2-valued truth-functional truth-table.
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I’d said:
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But of course, by the standard implication truth-table, if the conclusion is true, the implication-proposition is true regardless of whether or not the premise is true.

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You replied:
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Exactly. Now you've just contradicted your statement above.

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No, I didn’t. If the conclusion is false, then the implication proposition is false if its premise is true, and true if its premise is false.
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You continued:
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See how illogical this is?

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You got that right.
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I’d said:
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But, as a practical matter, in the story, it doesn't matter. The customer can't prove that he paid [a problematic claim], and so the scam worked. The clerk (who is also the store owner and a logician) can assure himself that he didn't lie when he scammed the customer, because his truth-table is the standard one.

Admittedly he'd have to lie to the police about whether the payment was made, and admittedly the implication-proposition in his sign was false (a lie) when he refused to give the diamond.

But he didn't lie to the customer when he said that the sign's implication proposition was true before the payment was made.

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You replied:
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You just keep moving the goal posts.

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Incorrect. That’s what I’ve been saying from the start.
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This conversation is no longer meaningful.

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It never was.
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Michael Ossipoff

You're missing the point. The point is that the customer's interpretation of the sign is just as legitimate as the clerk's. The problem is that they both contradict each other, which means that at least one of the interpretations is wrong.They can't both be right at the same time. — Harry Hindu

The clerk's interpretation is correct, by the 2-valued truth-functional truth table and definition of implication that several academic sources were unanimous about.

There are other truth-tables for implication. I wouldn't say that some are more "legitimate" than others.

But the clerk's truth-table is the more widely-quoted one, the more standard one.

I'd said:

Obviously the clerk's scam would be illegal. But, as I said, the customer has no proof that he paid for the diamond.

You replied:

Of course he does. The diamond and the sign would attract attention. No other customers or clerks saw the customer give the clerk the money?

There was only one clerk in the store. But, as i said, he could have had an accomplice, to remove the money from the store before police arrived. There weren't other customers in the store.

There aren't cameras in the jewelry store?

I acknowledged that the security-camera would be a problem, maybe a prohibitive one.

I said, "Don't try this at home."

All these other behaviors you tell us the clerk engages to cover up the fact that the customer gave them the money in is dishonest. The clerk is a liar simply by his behavior.

Of course. He's a liar, because, even though he didn't lie to the customer, he lies to the police about whether the payment was made. So he doesn't really live up to the title of the thread.

And,even though he didn't lie to the customer, of course he defrauded and intentionally deceived the customer. His sign was false (a lie) when the clerk didn't honor it by keeping its promise. So, in that sense, too, the clerk lied (because he'd written and displayed the sign that proved false), even though his earlier assurance was true.

The scam couldn't be repeated. And, after the notoriety of the first time, the store wouldn't get any business. The scam wouldn't be very feasible, if do-able at all. And even if were feasible, it wouldn't be practical.

If he has a 20 million dollar diamond, why does he bother scamming for $5000?

But the clerk didn't lie to the customer when he said the sign's implication-proposition was true, because that statement was correct,when made, by the standard truth-table for 2-valued truth-functional implication.

Michael Ossipoff

The OP never said the clerk wrote the sign. As a matter of fact, the store owner (which isn't a logician) most likely wrote the sign because he is the one that actually owns the diamond. — Harry Hindu

I said, in the title of the thread, that the store is owned by a logician. I said in my post that the clerk is the owner and logician.

Michael Ossipoff

Also, it occurs to me that the clerk/logician, who never tells a lie, would have to lie to the police about whether the payment was made. So much for never lying.

Maybe he just prides himself on never lying to a customer.

Michael Ossipoff

A jewelry shop would need a security camera, especially if the 20 million dollar diamond is real.

Authorities could ask to look at the security-camera record for the time in question.

Maybe there's a well-concealed security-camera and it's possible to say, "We don't have one yet." (Not necessarily feasible).

Or maybe there's a pre-set-up way that the accomplice could code a signal to an unconcealed security-camera, to delete its record for that day, in a way that successfully mimics a natural failure. That would only work once, before the coincidence became too improbable. And, even once, it might justify a close examination of the camera-system. (So, not necessarily feasible).

So the scam would be problematic.

Michael Ossipoff

The clerk could have an accomplice, who'd take the money off the premises, to somewhere else, before the police arrive.

Michael Ossipoff

Ok, you're right. It looks as if the clerk's scam would be very difficult, if not.impossible, to succeed with.

I should have demanded a register-count when I was shortchanged when paying with the 50..

Michael Ossipoff

But the clerk has plenty of opportunity to transfer the $5000 to the cash-register when the customer starts to call the police. When the police arrive, the money will be in the cash-register, untraceable to the customer unless finger-prints can be gotten from a currency-bill.

Michael Ossipoff

The customer was too trusting.

Yes, the clerk made a mistake when he just put the money in his pocket, instead of in the cash-register. By that mistake, he could be caught.

I didn't know that finger-prints could be gotten from a currency-bill.

I've been short-changed by being given change for 20 when I'd paid with a 50, or being given change for a 10 when I'd paid with a 20.

In the case of the 10 and the 20, I was later reimbursed by the manager.

In the case of the 20 and the 50, I wasn't reimbursed.

Ideally, when paying with a 20, a 50, or a 100, one should have recorded the serial-numbers of the 20s, 50s and 100s that one is carrying.

Then, the clerk would have a hard time explaining how the customer knows the serial number of that 50, if he only paid with a 20.

It might sound like a lot of trouble, but it wouldn't be so laborious to write down the serial numbers of ones 20s, 50s, and any possible one or more 100s that one might (temporarily, I hope) be carrying.

Ii must admit that I've never recorded serial numbers. That's why I lost $30, when I paid with that 50.

Michael Ossipoff

Exactly. If the customer flips a coin to decide when to pay, the time of his payment is still a constant with respect to the implication-proposition. — Michael Ossipoff

Exactly. That makes andrewk right. — Benkei

If he said that, then he's certainly right about it.

But he has represented some times mentioned in the implication-proposition as universally-quantified variables.

That representation is incorrect, because, as I've been saying, the time-of-payment is a constant with respect to the implication-proposition.

Michael Ossipoff

That makes no difference I'm afraid. If it's random it becomes constant at the time of payment as well. — Benkei

Exactly. If the customer flips a coin to decide when to pay, the time of his payment is still a constant with respect to the implication-proposition.

Michael Ossipoff

In any case, as I said, the sign-wording is the important thing, because the sign, and not the predicate logic wording, is in the story. — Michael Ossipoff

Then I was right when I said that you used an improper logical system in translating the logical meaning of the sign.

The sign's implication-proposition can be expressed in the language of propositional or predicate logic.

Neither is wrong.

My objection to the predicate logic language was only that it seemed an unnecessary complication. If we're having a conversation, and you insist on speaking Latin, that doesn't mean that you're wrong, it just makes it more difficult for me. That was my complaint about predicate logic language.

What I was saying in the passage you quotes was only that the sign itself is the important thing, because that's what my story was about. But if predicate logic language can express the message even more unambiguously, then of course the sign could have been written in that language.

But any of the various ways of saying it are equally proper.

So I certainly didn't and don't mean that predicate logic is improper for translating the sign into logic language.
— Harry Hindu

In "If-THEN" statements, the THEN statement is necessarily dependent upon the truth value of the IF statement.

So far, so good.
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This is the way it works in the English language and computer programming (and I would add that a computer is more logical than a logician because a computer doesn't have greed clouding it's interpretation of the symbols on the sign).

...but that could depend on the company that's using the computer.

If the truth value of the implication-proposition is only dependent upon the truth value of the conclusion, then the truth value of the premise is irrelevant to the truth value of the proposition.

The truth value of the implication-proposition is function of the truth-values of the premise and the conclusion.

But of course, by the standard implication truth-table, if the conclusion is true, the implication-proposition is true regardless of whether or not the premise is true.

If the material conditional only states that q is true when (but not necessarily only when) p is true, and makes no claim that p causes q, then what exactly is the relationship between p and q?

The relationship is only that expressed by implication proposition's truth-table. As you said, nothing is said or meant about causation.

The only observation of p and q truth-values that could establish something about whether p always implies q would be an observation of p true and q false.

The metaphysics that I propose is based on abstract if-then facts for which the conclusion demonstrably follows from the premise. Of course there are lots of such abstract if-then facts. A proved mathematical theorem is such a fact.

The standard 2-valued truth-functional implication truth-table was the basis of my story about the diamond sales scam.

A material conditional is more like simply writing two completely separate statements. Translating to English, it's more like saying,

"Give me $5000."

"I give you the diamond.",

where each part isn't dependent upon each other to be true.

I don't know what you mean by that. The sign's implication proposition said that, at any time, if you've given me the $5000, then at any time more than a minute after you gave it to me, I'll have given you the diamond.

The sign is an IF-THEN statement and that is the logical system that should be used in determining the logical meaning of the sign.

Of course. It was.

The "truth" table produces invalid results precisely because you're using a logical system that doesn't translate to the actual meaning of the sign.

The truth-table's results are ordinarily useful, but their deceptiveness in the story situation is the point of the story. The customer was intentionally deceived. The truth-table made it possible for the clerk to deceive and scam the customer without lying.

But yes, there are some interpretations, some alternative truth-tables, that say that the truth of the implication-proposition is indeterminate when its premise is false. The 2-valued interpretation doesn't allow that.

And the 2-valued truth-functional truth-table is the more standard one.

But, as a practical matter, in the story, it doesn't matter. The customer can't prove that he paid, and so the scam worked. The clerk (who is also the store owner and a logician) can assure himself that he didn't lie when he scammed the customer, because his truth-table is the standard one.

Personally, speaking for myself, the if-then proposition that seems most relevant to mathematics and metaphysics is one in which the conclusion demonstrably follows from the premise.

Michael Ossipoff

The time of payment is decided by the customer. It can only have one value, the one chosen by the customer. For the purposes of the implication, the time-of-payment isn't universally-quantified. It's a constant that has been chosen by the customer. — Michael Ossipoff

That's a bit silly. Yes it's chosen by the customer but he can choose any time. — Benkei

...and when he has done so, by paying, his time of payment becomes a constant. For the purpose of the implication-proposition, the customer's payment-time is a constant.

It isn't a universally-quantified variable, or a variable at all, in the implication-proposition.

I'm not sure what the purpose is of this thread. Is it to show that the truth table for material condition isn't an adequate reflection of how we actually speak? — Benkei

It was intended to illustrate how the, otherwise-useful, 2-valued truth-functional definition and truth-table for implication could have a meaning that most people wouldn't expect.

Michael Ossipoff

Because you're forgetting something important - the interpretation of the customer, which contradicts the clerk's interpretation. — Harry Hindu

Of course. That's why clerk's scam worked.

Yes the customer was intentionally deceived.

Which interpretation is the correct one?

By the definitions that I found in those academic articles, the clerk's interpretation is correct for the 2-valued truth-functional definition and truth-table for implications.

Obviously the clerk's scam would be illegal. But, as I said, the customer has no proof that he paid for the diamond.

Michael Ossipoff

We observe that the money is paid at 10:01:30 (ie 1001.5).
So both antecedents are true, so the consequent must be true, ie:

OwnsDiamond(C,1002.5)

But observation shows this is false. The customer does not own the diamond at 10:02:30. So the original statement must be false. — andrewk

Yes, as i mentioned earlier, of course the implication-proposition becomes false a minute after the money has been paid, because the clerk hasn't given the diamond.

But that doesn't make the implication false before the payment has been made. Before the payment has been made, the implication's premise is false, making the implication true.

Therefore the clerk wasn't lying when he said (before the payment was made) that the implication-proposition was true at that time. It was true at that time.

----------------------------------

But my sign-wording that you've quoted (and my predicate language too) had other problems.

I've fixed those problems in my post before this one.

Michael Ossipoff

Oops! I mis-worded the sign. And my inequality doesn't help.

First the sign. Here's what it should say, and what i'm changing it to:

if you've given $5000 to the clerk, then at any time more than 60 seconds after you gave him that money, he'll have given you this diamond

I hereby change the sign-wording to what the above paragraph says..

The inequality:

I'm getting rid of the inequality, and wording the predicate expression in a different way that says what the sign says:

---------------------------------------

So here's how I'd write the predicate expression (though the sign-wording, by itself, is sufficient).

HasPaid(C, $5000) --> HasBeenGivenDiamond(C, at all times at least 1 minute after paying the $5000)

(I don't say he owns it, because he might sell it, or he might be 500 years deceased)

No, I didn't word it algebraically. Does predicate logic format require that?

*************************************************************************************************************

In any case, as I said, the sign-wording is the important thing, because the sign, and not the predicate logic wording, is in the story.

**************************************************************************************************************

------------------

The time of payment is decided by the customer. It can only have one value, the one chosen by the customer. For the purposes of the implication, the time-of-payment isn't universally-quantified. It's a constant that has been chosen by the customer.

There's no need to name or label, the "any time". It isn't, and needn't be, mentioned in the implication-proposition.

Michael Ossipoff

We observe that the money is paid at 10:01:30 (ie 1001.5).
So both antecedents are true, so the consequent must be true, ie:

OwnsDiamond(C,1002.5)

But observation shows this is false. The customer does not own the diamond at 10:02:30. So the original statement must be false. — andrewk

Of course the implication-proposition becomes false at 10:02:30.

The inquiry, and its answer, were made before the payment, which was made at 10:01:30..

At the time of the Clerk's answer to the initial inquiry, the implication proposition was true, because its premise was false, because the payment hadn't yet been made.

The truth of the implication-proposition when the clerk said it was true, is all that's needed for the clerk to not be lying.

The implication-proposition becomes false at 10:02:30, because the clerk hasn't given the diamond within 1 minute after the payment.

So yes, after 10:02:30, the implication-proposition is false.

But it was true when the clerk said it was, before 10:01:30, because its premise was false, because the payment hadn't been made.

Michael Ossipoff

Instead of T2>T1, I'd say:

T1+1 > T2 > T1

Michael Ossipoff

Obviously, instead of just saying, "If you've given $5000 to the sales-clerk...", I should say:

"If you've given $5000 to the sales clerk within the most recent 59 seconds..."

Otherwise the implication's conclusion could automatically already be false at the "any particular time".--something that I didn't intend.

I hereby modify the story as described above.

I don't know if that affects your argument.

1. You're saying that the times referred to in the implication can have any value. That's contrary to my story.

Maybe the story would be clearer if I worded the sign like this:

"At any particular time, if you've given $5000 to the sales-clerk within the most recent 59 seconds...."

...thereby getting the "any particular time" out of the "if" clause.

I now hereby make that modification to the story too.

You (or the customer) can choose any time. Given that fixed time that you or he have chosen, the implication is about that fixed time.

The free choice of time is over, as soon as you decide when to make the payment. The implication refers to that fixed time.

2. I'd change "GetsDiamond" to "HasReceivedDiamond".

That would be more consistent with the sign's promise in my story.

I'll post these changes and comments now, and resume soon.

Michael Osspoff

I interpret it to mean that you can't jail him or put him on probation on your own authority, or order and require him to register as a sex-offender, etc.

But not being a court doesn't mean that you don't have freedom-of-speech, or that you're required to keep his sex-with-children secret.

Michael Ossipoff

Of course the friends, with a 14-year-old daughter, have a right to a warning about your brother.

Even if it wouldn't be legally culpable to withhold that information from them, you know that they have a right and a need to know about that

As for protecting other young girls from him, in ways such as you discussed, yes it would be justified and called-for. It's his own doing, and the situation isn't your fault. His history and tendency is consistent and persistent enough to constitute a danger that's the business of his potential victims and their parents.

The imperative isn't as strong as it is for the warning of the friends, but, as you said, why shouldn't other girls and their parents deserve warning too?

Michael Ossipoff

For one thing, you said that t2 equals or is greater than t1. But I'd said "...if, at that time, you have given $5000 to the sales-clerk..."

The sign explicitly specified a time after the payment was made.

Then you assign the same time value to t1 and t2.

That's just a first comment, from a look at the beginning of your argument.

For your argument to make enough sense to evaluate it, you'd have to change those parts of it. Only then would there be any point examining the rest of it.

In other words, if you can make those corrections, and still have an argument that seems right to you, then you'd need to do so, in order for your argument to be worthy of further examination.

Michael Ossipoff

It can take a long time to wade through a crackpot argument, to explain each of its errors.

First of all, my justification of my story had nothing to do with FOPL. It was only in terms of propositional logic, using a definition and truth-table that was unanimous among the academic sources that I'd found.

But, instead of evaluating and criticizing my justification, in the terms in which I'd justified it, you change the terms to FOPL, which has nothing to do with my justification of the story...thereby also making the subject too complicated for yourself, and confusing yourself, as described in my paragraph that I quoted.

So, instead of saying what's wrong with my justification, in terms of how I justified it (a propositional logic implication definition about which academic sources were unanimous), you re-write the topic in other terms, and then say that I should say what's wrong with your argument in different terms..

That's an easy and common crackpot technique:

"They won't say what's wrong with my design-proposal for a perpetual-motion machine!" [...maybe because they don't have time to wade through it.]

Michael Ossipoff