I suppose I could ask you the same question. Heads and tails being throw are each as likely, so how does knowing that you'll wake up twice if it's tails change that? — Michael

You get to guess more when tails are thrown, so if you're guessing it's likelier tails were thrown.

There are two wins with every tails — Michael

With each tails thrown, not with each tails guessed. The guesses are separate. You get to guess more times with tails, so naturally it makes sense to guess tails was thrown.

With the common sense, how does that sound rational to you? Heads and tails being thrown are each as likely, so how does the knowledge that it's Monday change that?

No, your calculations with Kolmogorov's definition give an answer that contradicts mine. They do not directly address or disprove that 75/225=1/3.

As for the calculations themselves, they show the odds throwing heads and it being Monday happening, not the odds of it being the current situation at the moment the question is asked. There's also 1/2 chances of throwing tails, then it being Monday, and then it being Tuesday, happening.

Basically the thing I question on them is the usage of the term "heads" and claiming its odds to be 1/2. Do you mean the odds of throwing heads or the odds of them having been thrown when the question is asked? The former leads to what I described above; right answer to the wrong question. The latter is circular reasoning.

If the test is repeated 150 times, in 75 out of 225 questions the correct answer is heads. That's 1/3. What definition of probability makes the chances 1/2?

All you're saying is:

If 100 people asked then it was tails [the rule of the game]
100 winners [the outcome]
Therefore, it was tails

But that's obvious, and not relevant. — Michael

I nowhere said the last two parts.

Same thing. It's the likelier choice because I asked more people.

For any given person there's a 50% chance that they're right, so it doesn't matter if they pick heads or tails. It's just that if it's tails and they pick heads then there's a greater number of losers and if it's tails and they picks tails then there's a greater number of winners. — Michael

Of course that's true if they choose randomly whether to guess heads or tails. If they make the sensible choice of tails there're more winners because it's the likelier choice to be the correct one.

But you don't say that if there's more winners under tails then tails is more likely. That's a non sequitur. — Michael

It doesn't make tails more likely to be the result of my throw, but it makes it likelier for the correct answer to be tails. That's not non sequitur, that's a textbook example of what probability means.

There aren't more winners because it's more likely but because you asked more people. — Michael

It's more likely because I asked more people.

Because of the amnesia different people can be used to compare. Heads, I randomly choose a person from the street to ask the question from. Tails, I choose a hundred. Should they guess I threw tails or heads?

Or if the amount of people doesn't matter, why not wake up the Sleeping Beauty 0 times with heads.

She's given it twice: once on Monday and once on Tuesday. — Michael

Shouldn't matter if their odds are 25%. Then the expected value would be (1/4)*1+(1/4)*1+(1/2)*(-1)=0.

If I offer you one free lottery ticket if you correctly guess heads and two free lottery tickets if you correctly guess tails then tails is the better bet even though equally likely. — Michael

But she's only given 1€ with tails. The reason she wins by guessing tails is because she's likelier to be in a situation where tails has been thrown.

You're conflating "more likely to win if tails" and "more likely that tails". — Michael

I'm not conflating, I'm drawing a conclusion. She's likelier to win with tails because tails is the likelier outcome of the bet.

Let's imagine the situation repeated 150 times. 75 occurrences of each situation means the chances are 1/3. There's no reason to assume the probabilities are different.

There's 1/2 chance of heads and Monday happening, but that doesn't mean the chances of the Sleeping Beauty being in that situation are 1/2.

Thinking of the sailor variant, for any outsider the chances of heads or tails are 1/2, but if you're then told the sailor is your father, the chances of tails double because then he's had two children which means the odds of you being his child are higher.

If the odds were 1/2 and the Sleeping Beauty got to bet 1€ each time she was woken up, she should break even no matter what, but we notice that betting tails wins her 2€ with tails and loses her 1€ with heads.

A rejection of God entails a rejection of existence. — Marcus de Brun

How so?

Being more clear isn't the same as dumbing it down.

An example would help because this is a highly circumstantial topic. Depending on the context you maybe should or maybe shouldn't dumb it down.

The analogy is a valid one. In informal language "a is b" can mean "a=b" but also "a∈b". Hesperus is Venus but Venus isn't always Hesperus, and therefore the meaning of "is" in the context is closer to the latter one.

Hesperus is a Venus in a specific state, and these states of existence are not specific objects but classes.

The claim that "Hesperus = Venus" is as invalid as "BlueBanana = a banana".

Hesperus = Venus
Venus = Phosphorus
Therefore Hesperus = Phosphorus — MetaphysicsNow

BlueBanana = banana
The banana Belter ate = banana
Therefore I am the banana Belter ate, and therefore I am dead.

The issue is Hesperus is not Phosphorus. They are both Venus but that's like saying I'm a banana, Belter has eaten a banana, therefore I'm dead because I was eaten by Belter.

Art is simply a social trait that enables one to acquire resources, mates and friends - which is why we do most of the weird social things we do. — Harry Hindu

If it is so, why does art play that role? Why is art the way it is?

The context is a part of the action. Actions don't exist in a vacuum. That stealing is wrong is a generalization; if you steal to feed a homeless family the action is not just stealing but stealing to feed a homeless family, which may be interpreted to be morally right.

with a conditional: movement could be possible if the space was discrete.

Not when

Disregarding the numbers between — BlueBanana

Or, in the case of locations, the locations between the two points, i.e. teleportation.

So, to clarify, if I count the natural numbers from 1 to 2 and say "one, two," that takes time, but if I move from point A to point B, without moving through the locations between, it takes no time, assuming I don't stay at the locations.

Then the first number would be 0, was it included. There's no need for the first number with instantaneous counting between two numbers.

The difference between time taken is relevant again. If one number takes a time to count, in that time you'll have to have counted one number, and that number should be the first one. With locations, in any given time, you'll have moved that distance and all the distances between that point and the starting point, and there's no need for the existence of the first point. The first point would only be needed if it took time to travel to it.

Why does there need to be the first point?

@Michael There's a fundamental difference between the number line example and movement. Disregarding the numbers between, it takes time to count any amount of numbers, but doing the same with distances the movement between two points would be instantaneous. Thus, if you don't stay at any location, the movement between two locations does not take infinite time.

As to the lamp, its speed of switching would be infinite which could be interpreted to mean multiple things. Thomson had the premise that at any given moment the lamp is either on or off that he never questioned. Is the lamp on or off the moment it's switched? That's the answer to whether it's on or off at two minutes.

What if one stands by the subjectivity? The argument being subjective is not subjective.

Not in this context. — Jeremiah

That's up to interpretation.

When figuring probability repeated values are very important, if you remove them then you will misrepresent the distribution. Repetition is not a valid reason to remove a datum. — Jeremiah

It is in some contexts.

Having memory means you have a mind. — Harry Hindu

Let's interpret a footstep as a memory of something stepping there. What entity has this memory? Ground? The Earth? Some even larger system? Can any of these be said to have a mind?

What is a mind if not memory that stores and processes sensory data? — Harry Hindu

Sentience to begin with. Conscious experiences.

Many people on this thread are being inconsistent and attributing minds to humans but not to computers. Why? How do we know that humans have minds but computers don't? — Harry Hindu

They don't express any attributes that would imply them having a mind, and neither does their physical structure.

Yeah, I did think of that too, but even they aren't (mostly) killing themselves. It's all about perspective, sucks from our point of view to be sure.

Speaking of perspective, I was reminded of that one old thread on antinatalism. Both in that topic and this one I think what one considers to be the norm or the basic state of existence and what generalizations one draws out of existence is the major difference. I believe the people who have more suffering than happiness in their life are in minority and the average quality of life is above that.

Don't get me wrong, I totally agree that self-awareness (or I'd maybe rather say sentience) causes suffering, but it's just worth it.

Like I said, p-zombies cannot be programmed. They are dead inside. Humans are more like robots, where p-zombies are more like a mechanical contraption without any capacity for programming. Humans are programmable. P-zombies are not. — Harry Hindu

If they have memory, they can learn, and therefore they can be in a sense programmed through conditioning. So, do they have memory? Is memory a property of only mind, only brain or both? I'm not an expert but afaik the existence of memories in brain has been scientifically confirmed.

Either way, the reflexes of p-zombies should work normally so at least classical conditioning should work on them.

You're missing the reality that the Robot would most definitely need the concept of cupness to operate in the general world of things. Knowing the color of the handle of one particular cup might help with that cup. In the real world the Robot would need to understand cupness in order to find a cup in the first place. Then when it finds a cup it can determine what color it is. — SteveKlinko

It would need the information the concept of cupness holds - or, some of that information. It doesn't need to compose all this knowledge into this abstract construction that also holds much unnecessary data. Cupness is much more than what a cup is and what counts as a cup, or even all the knowledge concerning cups there is. Cupness is like a generalized form of a thought (or dare I even say feeling) of a cup, something only a conscious and sentient being can grasp. That simultaneously compressed but also overly complex thought is something I don't believe would be necessary.

From a Buddhist perspective the ego/self is the ultimate cause of suffering. — TheMadFool

Maybe so, but it's also the cause of joy and well-being, the positive feelings, which also with the negative feelings cause and allow the existence of each other. And all that is so goddamn worth it for the cheap price of the existence of suffering.

In addition, from a moral perspective, altruism (the highest good) is to put others before you. So, people see value in diminishing the role of the self/ego in ethics. — TheMadFool

Why is it that when looking at the existence of self and consciousness and their consequences, the focus is entirely on suffering, but in ethics, it's on the positive feelings? An altruistic person would also choose suffering on themselves over other people, something which requires highlighting the role of ego and the self.

Nirvana is literally the realization that there's no self (anatta); this realization is considered a liberation from samsara (cycle of rebirth and suffering). — TheMadFool

If there's no self, the realization of whom is it that who doesn't exist? :wink:

Just kidding. On a more serious note, though, it's a cycle of happiness as well.

Buddhism, while deep, just comes across as a tad pessimistic. I, for one, enjoy my time here.

Oh, relevant: existentialcomics.com/comic/231

But Humans don't work like Robots. — SteveKlinko

Is the converse true? I think a robot works, although in a simplified way, like a human, making it possible for it to replicate the actions of conscious beings.

The Conscious Visual experience contains an enormous amount of information that is all packed up into a single thing. The Neural Activity is not enough. — SteveKlinko

I think the opposite is the case. A conscious experience, whatever its benefits are, cannot be efficient. While containing all of the visual data provided by eyes, it also contains the experience of that data, which is such a rich experience we ourselves can't even begin to comprehend how it is created. The brain also unconsciously organizes and edits that data to a huge extent, filling gaps, causing us to perceive illusions, basically expanding our visual experience beyond what information is provided by the senses. For example,

When I reach out to pick up my coffee cup I see my Hand in the Conscious Visual experience. If my hand is off track I adjust my hand movement until I can touch the handle and pick up the coffee cup. — SteveKlinko

a robot would only need to find a specific kind of group of pixels with a color matching the color of the cup. Conscious mind, for some reason, in a way wastes energy forming an idea of "cupness", equating that cup with other cup and connecting it to its intended usage as well as all the memories (unconscious or conscious) an individual has relating to cups. All that information could be broken down to individual points and be had access to by a robot, but instead human mind makes something so complex and incomprehensible.

The existence of that idea also allows me to, while seeing a simple cup, appreciate my conscious perception of that cup. I still can't see the evolutionary value of that appreciation, though.

I wonder how Descartes would react to Siri :D anyway, I don't think the Turing test is a good method for detecting thinking process. A robot, or a zombie, could be programmed to answer questions about their feelings as if they had any.

I can't see how it could maintain the pretence of being, well, 'a being', for very long, as all it can do is regurgitate, or combine, various responses and information that has been uploaded into it (how, by the way? Is it a computer? If so, could it pass the Turing Test?) — Wayfarer

Isn't that what humans do as well? We are fed information through our senses in infancy and childhood that we over the course of years learn how to react to.

Take for example Determinism and the freedom of the will. The question has been sufficiently answered by Schopenhauer (one cannot will to will. All events in nature are caused, human actions are events in nature, ergo, human actions are caused/determined). — Marcus de Brun

It's your opinion that answer is sufficient.

So why isn't self-awareness needed for joy then? I'm eating, I'm relaxed, I'm in the company of my loved ones are all expressions of self-awareness just as much as

I'm hurting, I'm dying, I'm losing, etc. — TheMadFool

I don't, however, think of the part of self-awareness as relevant. Sentience is what is needed for feeling any emotions or feelings, and self-awareness happens to be many of the properties that almost by default rise from it. "I feel" is a description of what one is feeling, for feeling of which the understanding of I is not needed.

What certainly is not needed for any emotion is the amount of self-awareness that humans have. What you called "lower animals" are almost all capable of feeling pain and many even the more complicated negative emotions.

Yes, it’s a vague definition, because our use of the word “Consciousness” is imprecise. Really, “purposeful-responsiveness” is a better, more uniformly-used term. — Michael Ossipoff

It's also incorrect as it does not describe what the term "consciousness" refers to. As I stated, purposeful-responsiveness doesn't imply consciousness, but strictly speaking consciousness doesn't imply purposeful-responsiveness either. In contrast,

some Spiritualist notion of a separate entity, separate and different from the body. — Michael Ossipoff

is what the word means and refers to.

All conscious beings that exist are purposefully-responsive because they are a part of our universe, a property of which causality is, making actually everything purposefully-responsive from some points of view. Being a part of the universe isn't a good definition for conscious beings either.

Any device that can do what a person or other animal can do has "Consciousness". That's how it does those things, you know. — Michael Ossipoff

No, it does those things through causality causing it to do those things. Doing those things does not imply consciousness being involved.

Consciousness is the property of being a purposefully-responsive device. — Michael Ossipoff

Where is the consciousness in a mousetrap? How does it rise from its physical nature?