It needn't be self-referential but it may be. Close at hand includes self. I can non-self-referentially point at a pot and say 'this pot needs a scrub', or I can point at myself and say 'this Australian understands how lucky he is to live in a country in which most people don't carry guns'.

Also, 'This sentence consists of exactly seven words' is self-referential but not viciously circular like the liar sentence. Can you see why?

Here is what the sentence actually means:

((((((((((...) is false) is false) is false) is false) is false) is false) is false) is false) is false) is false

Only I haven't quite finished writing it yet.

To make it completely clear, explicit and unambiguous, we just need to replace that ellipsis '...' by what it means, which is '(...) is false'. We need to keep doing that until there are nor more ellipsis's left.

Could you do it for me please, as I got a bit tired doing the above.

Let me know when you're done.

If you are scared of speaking out against an evil autocratic government then don't. Giving up you right to free speech is precisely what they want so I will not, and I hope other people also won't, stop talking and discussing this issue — René Descartes

I agree that people who are lucky enough to have a right of free speech should not give it up, but posting opinions on an internet forum under a pseudonym is not exercising free speech. People can do that in totalitarian regimes too.

Free speech is being able to publicly, non-anonymously, stand behind your opinion and not be legally persecuted for it.

AndrewK - the question I have for you is, is ‘the real table’ the cause of ‘the perception of the table’? If that is so, how do you distinguish them? How can you demonstrate what ‘the real table’ is, as distinct from the perception of the table which you and I have, when we look at it? — Wayfarer

I think I would distinguish the table from my perception of it, but I don't think I would necessarily distinguish it from all perceptions of it. Maybe references to the table are to the set of all perceptions that ever occur of it, past, present and future, by anybody that ever perceives it.

I don't think one can sensibly talk about anything that is not mental, since the mental is all we can know, and all we can refer to. I don't go all the way with Berkeley in his proclamation that there is nothing non-mental, because to even state that proclamation requires that the notion of something mental mean something and I cannot see a way of making it mean something, whether to affirm it or deny it.

I like the idea that the table is a player in God's dreams. In most dreams it does not appear. In some dreams it is a bit player that is constructed, sat at and eaten upon, and finally broken up for firewood. But in one of the dreams it is the lead role - the first person experiencer.

You are assuming the veil of perception in these remarks. When the table is in front of me, it is given to my conscious awareness, or more plainly, I see it. I don't merely assume it to be so. Assuming that sense perception is reliable, I can reliably tell that it is there. My point in the OP is that, even assuming that all of our usual methods are reliable, there is still no way to tell that anything exists unperceived. So that's the difference. — PossibleAaran

I am not assuming anything. I'm asking whether you regard seeing something as perceiving it, but do not regard hearing something as perceiving it. That seems to be implied by your statement (at the top of this post: ) that we do not perceive a motor that we hear, but that we do perceive a table that we see.

If that is your position, do you think it stands up to scrutiny? I wonder what a blind person would think about the suggestion that they don't perceive anything.

If that is not your position then which side would you alter? Would you agree that we do perceive things that we hear, or that we don't perceive things that we see. I can see no other way out of the difficulty, than one of those two options, although I am open to suggestions.

This view, that "everything is connected" blatantly assumes that things exist unperceived. Take the drone of an electric motor example. When I hear the noise, if I come to believe that anything more than the noise exists at that time I will have to assume that the cause of the noise exists unperceived, since the noise and the motor are not the same thing. By what argument can I move from the noise to the motor? — PossibleAaran

How is that any different from saying that when you see a table in front of you, you 'blatantly' assume that the table exists - that you assume that there is a cause of the visual sensation that you have of a certain shape, because the visual sensation and the table are not the same thing? By what argument can you move from the visual sensation to the table?

Taking that approach, one has to conclude that every non-mental thing is unperceived, because we only ever perceive the phenomenon, not the noumenon 'behind' it.

But what is the significance of this for our topic? — PossibleAaran

That everything is connected to everything else, so all the examples given here of things that are unperceived, followed by the question 'do they then exist?' are not unperceived. They are perceived, so the question is moot.

The idealist can make this move, but there is also the possibility that experience just ceases. Other people will infer that the falling piano or oncoming car killed you. The examiner might say poor sap didn't even feel it. — Marchesk

This really weird thought occurs to me often, and seems completely divorced from any philosophical discussion of materialism vs idealism.

When I was first told about the forgetting drug Midazolam, which is used in uncomfortable but not super-painful procedures like endoscopies, I tied my brain in knots trying to 'understand' it. Apparently you are conscious, though drowsy, during the procedure, but have absolutely no memory of it, so after the event it's absolutely indistinguishable from it never having happened - you feel the same as if you'd had a general anaesthetic (but without the nausea). I still can't quite get the idea of it straight in my head.

Sometimes when I'm in a dangerous situation that could kill me, I think: If I were to be killed, there would be no more consciousness, so any brain activity shortly before the death will be as if it never happened (we could say that for all my brain activity ever, but leave that aside for now - I'm just describing my train of thought). But here I am alert and conscious of what's happening, so it seems as though that means that I won't end up dead in the next minute or so.

I'm just saying that one doesn't need philosophy and theories like idealism and materialism to get tied up in absurd-seeming but inescapable knots, over the notion of consciousness.

But this feeling that the diver has is one which he has as a result of falling. — PossibleAaran

That is the common belief, but it is a misconception. It is actually the feeling of the absence of gravity. The diver's accelerated motion - in the reference frame of the diving board - exactly cancels out the impact of gravity. What a diver feels the instant after leaving the platform is exactly what is felt by a person in what is considered a 'gravity-free' environment such as a space station, or even just a 'motionless' space ship in deep space.

The point is that we feel gravity all the time, in our innards as well as on the soles of our feet. We are so used to it that it feels normal, and it feels weird and scary when gravity disappears.

The more general point is that there are many things that we continuously perceive without realising it, by which I mean that we would notice and pay attention if they were to suddenly cease. Other examples are a faint drone of an electric motor, which we only notice when it suddenly stops. Or one of the many instruments in a thick 'wall of sound' musical arrangement of a song, which one doesn't notice until the instrument stops, and thereby subtly alters the texture of the music.

But this answer assumes that gravity continues to operate while unperceived does it not? — PossibleAaran

This is a subject dear to my heart, because of my perplexity over whether I will ever do a bungee jump (and whether I 'should'). (I suspect I won't, my excuse being the risk of detaching a retina).

You know that terrible feeling you get in your stomach when you jump off the diving board? I find it terrifying, yet I seek it out, jumping off (low) bridges into water, doing vertiginous waterslides, roller coasters etc.

That feeling is exactly what 'not perceiving gravity' is. It feels like there's a force, but actually it's an absence of force. So astronauts in the International Space Station feel like that all the time. I suppose they must get used to it, so that it no longer feels terrifying.

Forgive the long diversion. There is a relevance to the topic, which is that a sudden disappearance of gravity would be obvious and traumatic, filling people with terror. So it would not be a good topic for contemplation of the unperceived.

I'm trying to think of an example. Perhaps this. Imagine the train is travelling across a bridge. All the windows are tightly shuttered so the occupants cannot see outside. The bridge is supported only at either end by bolts that can be simultaneously withdrawn at the press of a button. When the train is in the middle of the bridge, Lex Luthor presses the button and, without a sound (initially. After about a second the wind noise will become significant), the train, track and bridge goes into free fall, Under Einstein's principle of equivalence (crudely: acceleration is equivalent to gravity) gravity disappears for the occupants of the train.

Although there are no immediate visual or audible cues as to gravity's disappearance, the occupants will nevertheless be instantly filled with alarm, as they are suddenly struck by that stomach-in-throat, I just jumped off the diving platform, feeling. They will perceive the disappearance viscerally.

Fortunately, Superman turns up just in time and, supporting it from underneath, brings the bridge, track and train to a gradual, safe halt before transferring it to a nice stretch of flat land to let out the terrified passengers.

No humans were harmed in the conduction of this thought experiment.

How do I know that this piece of paper still exists when I put it away in my desk and leave the room? — PossibleAaran

You probably won't know, because of the crudity of human sensory organs, but in theory you could, in the same way as we know about a black hole: by its interaction with other things. A paper sheet in another room interacts with the desk drawer containing it, which interacts with the desk, which interacts with the floor and air, which interact with the walls of the closed room, which interact with the air outside the room, which interacts with you,

There would be tiny differences in the patterns of air movement around you if that piece of paper were not in that closed desk in the closed room. Your naked senses may not be enough to measure that but, at least in theory, if you had sensitive enough measuring equipment, you could detect the difference.

This is writ large in Wayfarer's / Russell's / GE Moore's example here (). If the train wheels ceased to exist once nobody was looking at them, the passengers would hear and feel an almighty jolt as the carriages they were in suddenly dropped onto their axles.

This response may not work for astronomical objects outside the observable universe, because of the expansion of the universe. But that's a somewhat different discussion.

What on earth would it mean to say that "a thing is identical with itself"? Is that an informative statement? — gurugeorge

It could perhaps be referring to the proposition 'x=x' where x is a variable symbol. Some axiomatisations of first-order predicate logic contain an axiom schema which is of that form.

What the schema does really is specify a key property of the '=' symbol, specifically the property named 'reflexivity'. The other schema that's needed to complete the specification of the meaning of '=' is the axiom schema of substitution:

(a=b) -> (F -> F')

where F is a proposition and F' is a proposition obtained from F by replacing one or more of the occurrences of a in F by b. Essentially it says that any property that is true of a is also true of b.

A better definition is that identity is a reflexive, transitive and symmetric relation. — MindForged

That is a necessary but not sufficient condition for identity, assuming that identity means the same thing as '='. All equivalence relations are reflexive, transitive and symmetric. For example 'is the same age as' is an equivalence relation. But Arjun being the same age as Helga does not make them the same person.

The properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity of '=' can be deduced from the above two axiom schemas, but they narrow it down more than just those three properties do.

There is unquestionably a significant difference between average pay of the sexes. It is only whether there is a 'gap' that seems controversial, which leads to long arguments about what a gap is. I suggest that that question can be sidestepped by instead focusing on outcomes, ie what, if anything, do we want to do about the average pay differential.

I would break down the reasons for pay differences into the following three categories:

1. policy differences. For instance, until the seventies it was common for employers to have official full-time rates of pay for a certain job (eg clerk level 4) differentiated by sex

2. non-policy, employer-instigated differences. This is when there is no explicit policy, but decision-makers at the employer tend to give promotions and pay rises to men more readily than to women, given the same performance profile. I would also include in this cases where employers treat women badly with the aim of discouraging them from applying for or retaining higher-paying roles. For instance 'boys-club' cultures in senior management and on boards may make women feel too uncomfortable in those environments to be prepared to put up with it.

3. non-policy, non-employer-instigated differences. This is where the employee voluntarily, without coercion, makes choices that lead to lower pay - eg not applying for promotions because they don't want the stress or longer hours, or choosing occupations that have lower pay, because those occupations appeal to them more.

Type 1 is easiest to address, because it is out in the open for all to see. That is why it has disappeared from most developed countries.

I think most would agree that type 2 is regrettable and we should try to remove it from workplaces. The trouble is that, being non-policy, it is undocumented and thus hard to detect. Most developed countries have anti-discrimination laws that forbid such behaviour, but there is a standard of proof that must be met in any individual case before any redress can be obtained.

We could reduce the amount of type-2 behaviour by toughening anti-discrimination laws, in particular by lowering the burden of proof. the balancing act here is that the more proof standards are lowered, the greater will be the frequency of non-discriminatory employers being unfairly convicted of being discriminatory. I think discussions about this need to be taken jurisdiction by jurisdiction, and take account of the details of each jurisdiction's laws.

Law is not the only available measure though. Consciousness-raising campaigns are another, eg advertising against discrimination, similar to what is done for domestic violence or racism. Again there is a balancing act though, as it is taxpayers' money that funds such campaigns, and there is debate about their effectiveness.

Finally, there is type 3. My impression is that most people are not motivated to try to do anything about type 3, but I think some are.

I would be particularly interested in hearing what people would like done about type 2, and from anybody that would like to change type 3 and how they think that should be done.

I think discussing what should be done about observed average pay differentials is likely to be more productive than arguing over whether there is a gap.

I think we should both be grateful to Laurence Krauss because he provides a subject on which we can wholeheartedly agree, ie that he is an annoying, philosophically shallow, Reductive Scientismist that is best ignored.

I would not agree with classing Hume as a pragmatist. Perhaps you just meant that he was a pragmatic thinker?

Yes that's what I mean, which is why I carefully avoided using a capital P that would imply similarity to Peirce, James and Dewey. I happen to think there are some similarities but it doesn't matter to this discussion whether there are, or how deep they go, and I think it would be a distraction to get into that.

Early 20th century mathematicians weren't trying to prove the soundness of mathematics, they were trying to prove its completeness and consistency of it. But as it turned out, you could only have incompleteness or inconsistency

I know. I just didn't want to use technical terms like completeness and consistency in a discussion that has not been heavily technical thus far.

The argument is only over whether induction is rationally warranted. Hume says it isn't at all, and this entails that his own arguments are not rationally warranted either.

which, being a pragmatist, doesn't bother him. He just assumes the principle of induction as an axiom, and then any arguments he makes are conditionally warranted based on acceptance of that axiom, which is all he, or any sensible pragmatist, wants.

The point is that one has to adopt that principle as an unfounded axiom, and arguments that one can somehow 'prove' the axiom are unneeded and unsound..

Hume's mistake consists in imagining that it ever should have been thought that there could be purely logical reasons justifying inductive reasoning, and to claim it as an interesting insight that there are not such reasons — Janus

My recollection is that Hume was not imagining this himself, but rather writing in response to Rationalists who not only imagined it but believed it possible. It sounds like you are agreeing with Hume that it was not.

he seems to think there is good reason to believe that humans and other creatures habitually expect them — Janus

Are you sure he wasn't observing that humans always have habitually expected them, which is past tense, and doesn't need to use induction.

If Hume's argument were taken to its logical conclusion .... All our discourse would then be thoroughly undermined and we would not be capable of saying anything sensible about anything at all.

No, because we can make the discourse perfectly well just by accepting the principle of induction without insisting on a warrant for it. Remember, Hume didn't say we shouldn't use induction, but rather that it seemed to him to be futile to search for a warrant for it.

We can draw a parallel between Hume and Godel.

In the early 20th century mathematicians, led by Hilbert, were engaged in a program of proving the soundness of mathematics. Godel proved that that was impossible. Did that mean that Godel claimed we shouldn't use mathematics? Of course not! He thought we should, but just that we should not waste our time trying to prove its foundations were sound.

Similarly, the Rationalists in the 16-18th century were trying to prove the soundness of reason and scientific methods. Hume showed that that was impossible. Did that mean that Hume claimed we shouldn't use reason? Of course not! He thought we should, but just that we should not waste our time trying to prove its foundations were sound.

I think that is the mistake you are making, and that Hume also made; is imagining that there could possibly be a logical reason — Janus

Hume imagined no such thing. On the contrary he pointed out that there couldn't be a logical reason, or at least (being a fairly humble fellow) that he had no hope of ever finding such a reason.

as we have no viable substitute at all, that seems to be a pretty good reason to accept induction. — Janus

That is Reichenbach's response, and IMHO it's a good one. Note that it says nothing about how likely induction is to work, just that we have no alternatives that we expect to work any better. That, either alone, or together with my observation that we cannot help but use induction, is enough reason to use it when deciding on actions. But whether that's enough to call it a warrant depends on how strong your standard of warranty is.

Note also that the Reichenbach response relates to deciding on actions, whereas I think Hume was more focused on beliefs, and what warrant we have for them. He is quoted as saying 'I have no reason to believe my dinner will not poison me.' As far as that pure belief goes, Reichenbach's response doesn't help, because it's only about actions. But Reichenbach helps with what Hume is reputed to have said next, which is:

'But I shall eat it anyway'

I haven't changed my position, and I certainly don't blame you if you feel confused. I feel confused most of the time, and I hope nobody blames me for it.

So it would be matchingly unreasonable to now drop the principle. — apokrisis

Nobody has suggested that we drop the principle. Look at the post eight up from here (for some reason I can't link to it), where I in fact suggest the opposite.

That one cannot find a non-circular, logical reason for holding a principle is not a reason not to adopt it.

You said the difference in tense between past and present was crucial - between worked and works.

So what was that about? — apokrisis

We have observations about what worked in the past, and that includes observations that the principle of induction worked in the past. I can see no way of logically deducing from those observations a prediction of what will work in the future- including whether the principle of induction will work in future - without using the principle of induction. Neither could Hume. Neither could anybody else since then.

If the difference in tense is crucial, demonstrate what practical difference it could make. — apokrisis

Because we know what consequences past actions have had, but we do not know what the consequences will be of future actions, or of actions we are currently undertaking but for which the consequences are not yet observable.

In concrete terms, I am prepared to bet, today, on who won the last papal election, but not on who will win the next one.

Crucial difference my arse. Pointless pedantry more like — apokrisis

Really? If you have to resort to sneering your beliefs must be poorly thought-out indeed.

What would (or could) warrant any particular expectation or corresponding course of action? — aletheist

Nothing. The mistake is to expect, or even demand, a warrant. The answer is to act without warrant.

We act according to our nature, which is to assume the principle of induction, without wasting time futilely seeking a warrant for the assumption.

A history of what works. — apokrisis

We have a history of what worked, not of what works. The difference of tenses is critical.

So to adopt the contrary in regards to the future would be as unreasonable as possible. — apokrisis

This supposes we already have a standard for judging what is reasonable and what is not. What is that standard, and where did we get it from?

We have inductive evidence that inductive principles have prevailed to date. — apokrisis

We have observations that inductive principles have served us well in the past. On that I expect we agree.

I can see no way to turn that set of observations into a reason to expect that inductive principles will serve us well in the future, without using the principle of induction itself. And neither could Hume. And neither, to my knowledge, has anybody found a satisfactory answer to that in the intervening centuries.

Inductively, we thus have no good reason to think that the story would reverse itself in the future. — apokrisis

What is the role of the 'Inductively' at the beginning of this sentence? If it means, 'using the principle of induction' then it is assuming the conclusion - i.e. the validity of that principle. If not, I can't see the word contributing anything to the sentence.

I agree we have no good reason to think the process would reverse, just like we have no good reason to think it won't reverse - assuming that 'good' means 'grounded and logical' (and if not that then what does it mean?). We don't have any logical reason to have any expectations about the future, which is the whole problem.

Not really. We would choose it because it works. — apokrisis

That can't be a reason, because we can never know whether it works. All we can ever know is that it worked.

These axioms should be ideally be grounded in the scientific method. — MonfortS26

That sounds like an axiom. That leads us to ask what it is grounded on.

There is no escape from the necessity of having to choose groundless axioms. That being the case, we may as well choose axioms of logic and set theory, like those referred to by Streetlight.

Why choose those? Because in the past they have worked very well for us.

Why should the fact that they have worked well in the past imply anything about how well they will work in the future?

..... enter Hume, and the Problem of Induction.

We can defuse that problem by choosing an Axiom of Induction.

But then why choose that axiom? We could try to say because it has worked well in the past, but that would be circular, as Hume pointed out.

So instead I would say that we cannot help but assume that axiom, because it is innate. We accept as a brute fact the fact that we inevitably accept the axiom of induction.

Having accepted the axiom of induction, we can then justify accepting the axioms of logic and set theory, because they have worked well for us in the past. Having bootstrapped ourselves up in that way, we can go on from there and soon get back to business as usual, including the scientific method.

I agree with you that beauty is well worth discussing and pondering, and that it has at best a partial overlap with attractiveness (meaning an ability of a thing to attract other things towards it). There are attractive things that are not beautiful and beautiful things that are not attractive.

By the way, looking at some of the posts on here, I get the feeling that there is a misunderstanding of what 'white privilege' means, either by me or by other posters.

I don't understand white privilege to be about the fact that I have wealth and an education and come from an unbroken family. There is a correlation of those things with whiteness, but it is loose. There are plenty of whites that are poor or uneducated or from broken homes.

I understand white privilege to be that I can sit on a bus or train, or walk down a street without having to wonder whether a stranger is going to start abusing me and accuse me of being a terrorist or stealing people's jobs or being a dole bludger simply because of my skin colour. From what I've read, white privilege in the US is also about not having to be afraid every time a police officer walks by, that they may search, arrest or shoot you.

In short, white privilege is the freedom from fearing mistreatment by strangers simply based on your skin colour. It has nothing to do with your education or your wealth. So it is true that poor, uneducated whites do have that white privilege. But, as I said above, I think it is stupid and damaging to make a point of that. Everybody has some privileges, but if their overall position is miserable, blaming them for not appreciating their few privileges is ridiculous.

I am very aware of my white privilege, but I have never felt guilty about it. Being brought up RC, I am very prone to guilt, but it's only about choices I've made, and I didn't choose my skin colour.

I think it's important for whites who, like me, have benefited from good education and growing up in neghbourhoods that are not terrorised by gangs, to be aware of their white privilege. However, I think it's very unhelpful to assert that all white people have white privilege. Even if that's true, it is a heartless and tactically foolish thing to say about white people that are economically disadvantaged. Such thoughtless statements only help the cause of populists and white supremacists, enabling them to equate anti-racism with a lack of concern for disadvantaged whites. So, if one feels inclined to repeat the mantra 'Check your privilege', one should be very, very careful about whom one is saying it to. Their being white is nowhere near enough.

As to male privilege, I don't think that exists in the society in which I live. In many societies around the world, being male is an enormous privilege. But in the privileged, educated, progressive society in which I have the good fortune to live, I cannot see that it is any privilege at all. I am very privileged to live in such a society, but no more privileged than the women that also live in that society.

Frankly, hearing people say that theism/religion is a mental illness reminds me of cultural conservatives saying that homosexuality is a mental illness.

I don't think it is anything to be concerned about. In the West, both are fringe views, held by very small groups of people that, thankfully, have very little influence.

The fact that, at the date of writing this, ten out of ten people have rejected the claim, is support for that view.

Before I was born, the universe existed as evidenced through the experience and memory of others. After I die, I'm absolutely sure that the universe will continue to exist. How then does the universe depend on me?

If you had not lived, the universe would have been different both before and after you were born.

Inferential and probabilistic reasons can be given for it. — Marchesk

I don't know what you mean by an 'inferential reason'. If an inference is not inductive or deductive, I don't know what it means. There's 'abductive' but since that involves measuring a conclusion against a set of pre-determined criteria, it just begs the question of the justification for the criteria.

Neither does 'probabilistic' provide a viable alternative. To make probabilistic arguments, we first need a basis on which to assign probabilities to events, and none of the ways I know of to do that would survive Hume's guillotine.

The only justification I have come across for induction is Reichenbach's, which is essentially: 'we have no better alternatives, so we might as well use induction'. Which is fine, but unnecessary, since we will use induction anyway, as we could not do otherwise, being the sort of creatures we are.

I can't comprehend it. It completely goes against everything I know and always took pride in. — Shane

That's because you, and all self-sufficient humans, have evolved to believe it in an unshakeable, instinctive way. There is no escaping the belief. To escape it you'd have to be non-human.

Hume is not suggesting that anybody should disbelieve it. And he said that he continued to believe it, or at least to act as though he did. But he is pointing out that there is no logical support for the belief. Many people are shocked at the realisation that we hold beliefs that have no logical support. But one gets used to it, and continues to live with the belief just as one did before.

Isn't this reductionism? I'm inclined to think it is and also that it's a good argument.

The most common form of reductionism asserts the existence of fundamental particles, each of which exists independently, and says everything is made of them.

Sunyata is like the opposite of that, saying that nothing, not even subatomic particles, exists independently, because everything depends on everything else. Sunyata would thus say that we cannot understand a chair just by looking at the atoms it's made of, or at the wood, metal and artisan. It would say that to fully understand the chair we have to understand the entire universe.

You suggested that no one can speak for another on this issue and I ask you, if not Stella than who?

Annie Gabrielides

But here's the guts of it:

Before we can talk about death with dignity, we need to ensure that all people, regardless of age or disability, can live with dignity. — Banno

Which is just saying that we can never talk about it, because that's a utopian goal that can never be achieved. It reminds me of Bob Hawke's 'No child will be living in poverty' statement back in the eighties. Hawke did some great things and, arguably, poverty receded significantly under his govt, but the goal was certainly not achieved. If we followed Stella's request, the issue would be permanently barred from discussion. Of course we can, and should, deal with both issues at the same time.

In any case, it's a request, not an argument.

So far as I can see, nobody has responded to my point that Stella lived with autonomy and so is not in a position to speak about those that have permanently lost their autonomy. She is an excellent position to speak for the disabled, and she did a marvellous job of that. But that gives her no special role to speak for those with permanent loss of autonomy, as she was not one of them.

I find her conflation of disability with loss of autonomy misguided and unhelpful.