Making mathematical predictions about observations is doing nothing more than saying that if we put two groups of two things together, then we'll have four things. Unless we know something about those things which we are dealing with, then the mathematics with all of its axioms and definitions, is meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're entitled to that view. I think you are taking too wide an interpretation of 'meaningless'. Science is useful and it is also beautiful, to those that understand it. You may not be in a position to find it beautiful but there is no question that you find it useful. If you don't also find it meaningful, be content that it is useful.

So it is wrong to dismiss an activity which is an attempt to understand, as less important, or not as reliable, as an activity which uses clear definitions — Metaphysician Undercover

You are forgetting how that discussion arose. It has nothing to do with dismissing any activity. You claimed that the proliferation of interpretations of QM imply that QM's definitions are nebulous. My response was that interpretations talk about things that QM does not even seek to address, and that they are completely different activities, not that one is more important than the other. To complain that QM does not address the issues with which interpretations concern themself is like complaining because biology tells us nothing about how stars are formed.

I think all sciences have an a-priori metaphysical assumptions about them that guides how they are done — Marty

Even a practising scientist is not in a position to make such a statement, unless they have worked in every scientific field. If you have not studied science at least to tertiary level, and preferably engaged in at least some research, this opinion is simply uninformed.

Science looks for patterns and makes models to describe them. One does not need to postulate a telos to do that, any more than one needs a telos when one looks for interesting shapes in clouds or star constellations. One may overlay a telos on it, if one's philosophical disposition encourages that - and some do. But such an overlay is strictly optional, and plenty don't.

Even amongst the ancients there was a split between those that believed in telos, like Aristotle, and those that did not, like Democritus and Epicurus. One either accepts telos as an axiom or one does not. Hence any proof that relies on teleology should make it clear that it relies on acceptance of an axiom of teleology rather than being presented as a proof that any reasonable person should accept.

Seems like just dismissal to me with how huge Aristotle was for the development of Philosophy. — Marty

Not at all. Nobody is denying he had a huge influence, just as Galen did with Medicine. The fact that medical schools no longer teach Galen's beliefs does nothing to deny his historical importance.

I presume you would not expect physics departments to still teach Aristotle's physics. But the fact that they do not does not belie the fact that his physics was influential right up to the time of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton.

Further, as I've said above, Aristotle's Logic and Ethics are still as applicable as ever and still play roles in real life - his Logic in both philosophy and mathematics departments, and his Ethics in how many people choose to live their lives.

I really don't think any form of science can be done without telos — Marty

The evidence does not support such a belief. Surveys have shown that large proportions of scientists are not theists, or part of any religion (eg here), and hence one would not expect them to believe teleological accounts. Yet they manage to continue to produce inspiring, useful science.

I have no idea what that last statement means. But if you are trying to argue that the definitions in Aristotle's metaphysics are as formal as those in mathematics then I'm afraid I have no interest in engaging with such a notion. Nobody that understands mathematics would agree with that assertion, and that's enough for me. MU has said that it is unreasonable to expect metaphysical dialectics to have the same characteristics of precision as mathematics has, and I agree with him.

All of these have formal definitions, as you well know. Go to the wikipedia page on any of those terms, go to the section entitled 'Definition' and you will find it.

If there wasn't ambiguity as to what the applied terms really meant, there could not be multiple interpretations. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no ambiguity. You are misunderstanding what an interpretation of QM is. That's understandable, as the word is used differently there from how it is normally used.

An interpretation of QM is not about working out what is meant by the things QM says. Those things are beyond question, as all QM does is make predictions about observations. An interpretation of QM is about speculating about the things that QM does not talk about. It is essentially proposing a set of metaphysical hypotheses that is consistent with QM.

It's a completely different form of argument from what you're used to. — Metaphysician Undercover

say rather - 'from what one encounters in science or mathematics'. I am plenty used to encountering that form of argument around here.

I have nothing against dialectics, I think they're fine. It's only when people pretend a dialectic is something it isn't that I take issue. Calling a dialectic text a 'proof', as the OP does, and as some of Aristotle's disciples do, is pretending the dialectic is what it's not, and that is what I am criticising. For all I know, Aristotle may be rolling in his grave at the thought that there are people out there that are saying his dialectics are proofs.

Beginning means that part of a thing from which one would start first. Is that well-defined or is it nebulous? — Πετροκότσυφας

Nebulous. Who is this 'one' to which it refers? What does it mean to 'start from' the beginning? What is the beginning of a triangle? What is the beginning of a wheel? What if different people would start first at different places - then there is no unique beginning, as it depends on who we're asking.

But whether this matters depends on whether you agree with MU that Aristotle's metaphysics texts contain dialectics rather than proofs. If so then definitions do not matter, nor does nebulosity. It's only when someone claims that it's a proof that we need to hold it to that higher standard. So far as I can see, neither you nor MU are making such a claim, in which case there is no disagreement.

Definitions lots of times only make sense to those who have familiarised themselves with the subject of study or when supplemented with examples and other auxiliary comments. — Πετροκότσυφας

Whether a definition makes sense is about whether one sees the reason for it, and how it might be used. That is different from the question of whether something is well-defined. In mathematics one frequently encounters definitions that one can see are well-defined, even though one has no idea (at first) of their motivation or use. It is the understanding of motivation and use that requires lots of reading and practice, not the determination of whether the definition is well-defined (non-nebulous).

Both quantum mechanics and general relativity could be fully defined and all the laws laid out in less than ten pages each, and a mathematically-literate reader could check that the definitions were well-defined, even if she had no idea what the purpose or applicability of any of it was. It's the purpose and applicability that accounts for the other few hundred pages of any relativity or QM text.

My assertion is that Aristotle's definitions are nebulous, not that they are hard to understand. That assertion is based on the observation that definitions that have been presented here (other than in his Logic and to some extent his Ethics) have always been nebulous. If there are any that are not nebulous, it should be able to be presented here in a short post, just as with the definition that a Hilbert Space is a vector space over the real or complex numbers, equipped with an inner product, that is also a complete metric space. For the Hilbert Space, a branching tree of definitions would ensue as necessary for readers that did not know the definition of vector space, real numbers, complex numbers, inner product, complete or metric space. But that tree would terminate in leaves within a few steps and at no stage would there be any concern that any of the terms was nebulous. Readers could see that the terms were all well-defined even though they may have no idea what the purpose of any of them were.

It sounds from this post like you have some particular examples in mind. Can you post them and we'll discuss. My expectation is that the predictions will either be in terms of other words that are equally nebulous, or they will be 'definition by example'. But I am happy to be shown to be wrong.

It is a matter of having an interest in something and having the commitment and perseverance to follow through and develop an understanding of that thing which interests you. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can agree with that. I have not read Aristotle's physics or metaphysics for the same reason that I have not read any astrology texts - because the evidence that has been presented to me about them indicates that the ideas therein are outdated and have no application other than to the understanding of what sorts of things people used to believe a long time ago.

For somebody with an interest in those, it is an excellent idea for them to spend the hours and days necessary to read it and get a sense of what Aristotle was thinking. But I have no interest in it. If I'm going to read translations of Ancient Greek texts for reasons other than historical interest, I'll read Aristotle's logic or ethics, as they have not become outdated.

But it makes no sense to describe an argument that Aristotle or one of his followers makes as a 'proof', when it does not conform to the accepted rules of logic, one of which is that all terms used must be well-defined. 'Getting a sense of what Aristotle was getting at' from reading hundreds of pages can never substitute for a definition, because all those pages can contain is a finite number of examples of how he used a word, and examples - be they ever so many - are not a definition.

When Aristotle speaks about organisms he'll basically appeal to them as acting as totums, as opposed to composites or artifacts. The totum, as opposed to a composite is basically an organism that is self-organizing, self-determining, and functions according to its whole which determine its parts. When we insert such an eye it isn't a part of that process, — Marty

The trouble is that this requires yet another Aristotelian leap of faith, to believe that the word totum means something exact and objective that can be used for reasoning. I wonder whether Aristotle would call a coral, which is a symbiosis between two different organisms, a totum. Or a hive of bees.

If something inserted into the totum is not part of the totum then nearly all of a person is not part of their totum, since, other than the initial two cells that came together to form a zygote, a person is made up entirely of things inserted from outside - food, water, oxygen etc. I wonder how Feser would seek to include food but exclude artificial eyes. Having considered those, one could then consider things like transplanted organs and skin grafts.

I must re-emphasise that I'm not trying to persuade Aristotelians, Thomists or Feserians out of their beliefs. We all make leaps of faith in something or other, so making it towards Aristotle is as good as to anywhere else. I'm just pointing out that the arguments they see as so powerful mean nothing to somebody that is not prepared to take the Aristotelian Leap of Faith. So it would be unreasonable for them to expect the arguments to mean anything to a non-Aristotelian.

Just a classic stock example by Sachs: Take a blind man. It would be the case that a blind man does not have the potency to see anymore, while a man with his eyes closed does have the capacity to see, and in fact a capacity that is furthermore at rest. When the non-blind man opens his eyes, his potential to see is not removed, but is in an active process (Aristotle's word for entelecheia or being-at-work-staying-itself ). In this sense, what we are not talking about something that surprises us or not but something intrinsic to the blind man. — Marty

Would I be correct in guessing that Sachs ia an Aristotelian.

The trouble with so many Aristotelian expositions is that they often use an example rather than a proper definition to explain a term. That might be fine if they were reasoning about the everyday, but it fails completely when they are trying to reason about non-everyday things like the source of the universe, because the example is everyday but what they try to apply it to is not.

When we take the blind man example away from the everyday context it becomes inapplicable, because (as only one example) we can easily imagine the creation of electronic eyes connected to the optic nerve of a previously blind person.

It seems to me that to be an Aristotelian one has to make an act of faith that various undefined terms, like potential, essence, entelechia and eudaimonia (even though I quite like that last one), mean something objective and tangible and can be used in the course of logical reasoning.

The consequence of that is that an Aristotelian argument (and hence also most Thomist arguments) are never going to be accepted by non-Aristotelians because they are not prepared to make that act of faith.

Feser's writing pullulates with such undefined terms, which is OK for him because he has faith, but it is meaningless to an infidel like me.

when you analyze this proposition there is nothing to make the boundaries between one frame and the next. — Metaphysician Undercover

The concept of boundary only makes sense in a continuum. It makes no sense for elements of a discrete set. If time is discrete there is no continuum, so the concept of boundary is meaningless.

If you find this notion difficult, consider another type of discrete thing like minds. What could be meant by the boundary between my mind and your mind?

we experience a continuous time

Do we though? How do we know we don't experience time like a movie, at 24 frames per second (or perhaps, 24,000). I don't think I could tell the difference.

from one state to the next, from Y to Z, time passes.

This is not necessary. Time could be discrete, like the integers, or like popes.

Jorn, what is your opinion of Shoemaker's claim that time without change is possible?

It seems to me that for there to be no change the universe would have to be completely empty - always and everywhere, so no quantum particles popping in and out of existence. If it contains even one photon or particle then there is change, since matter is energy is waves, and waves involve vibration, which is change.

If time without change is only possible in an empty universe, what could it mean to say that time 'exists' in such a universe? It seems an empty notion, which is kind of appropriate.

That's not my understanding of Many Worlds. My understanding is that all the possible different worlds already exist, and we are in either a world where it splits or a world where it reflects. We only get to find out which of those worlds we are in after the split or reflection occurs.

So, interpreting 'potential' ontologically rather than epistemologically, if we are in the 'split' world there is not only 'potential' but 'inevitability' that the photon will split, and if we are in the 'reflect' world there is no potential that the photon will split - it is inevitable that it will be reflected. That goes against intuition and that is why the epistemological interpretation of 'potential' is more natural.

'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent'

Isn't Wittgenstein's famous line an observation rather than an adjuration? Note that he used the word 'must' not 'ought'.

If one cannot speak of it then one is not speaking of it, no matter how hard one might try to do so. It's a bit like 'Those who speak of the Tao do not speak of the true Tao' (or something like that) - to which Alan Watts cheekily adds "... and yet he said that"..

It's "can't", not "ought not".

So is Quietism a decision not to talk of the indescribable because one knows one will be talking nonsense?

If so then my reply is 'what's wrong with talking nonsense'.

Courtesy of Watts again: there was some Zen sage who allegedly said 'From the bathtub to the bathtub I have uttered stuff and nonsense'.

Let's take the many-worlds interpretation as an example. In that interpretation, if the universe is in quantum state S at time t, and it would be consistent with the laws of QM for the event E to either occur or not occur at time t+1, there is at least one world which is identical up to t+1 in which E occurs and one in which it does not. So when we say E is 'possible' or 'there is potential for E to occur' all we mean is that we do not currently know whether we are in one of the worlds where E does not occur.

Do you think Feser or Aristotle would be happy to accept that purely epistemological meaning of 'potential'?

I find it hard to imagine that either Feser or Aristotle meant anything quantum by 'potential' since, to the best of my knowledge, neither of them has trained in quantum mechanics.

If one heads in the quantum direction in trying to define the term, an impassable boggy marsh lies ahead with the welter of conflicting interpretations available - in some of which everything is completely determined so the only role 'potential' can play is an epistemological one..

Thanks for making the attempt. Unfortunately that passage is all about 'actual' rather than 'potential'. I don't find the concept of 'actual' nebulous. It seems quite concrete to me. It's 'potential' that I find nebulous.

I guess I would be one of those who is almost certainly kidding myself

Not possible. You are either kidding yourself or you are not. The 'almost certainly' is an estimate that the majority of people who think they believe in god because of a logical syllogism rather than, for instance, personal experience of her, are kidding themselves. But each of those people who thinks that is either kidding themselves or they are not. I think most are. If you think you're one of the minority, I'm not going to dispute it with you since I know almost nothing about you. You may be right.

An acorn has the potential to become a tree — Marty

I've felt this discussion is lacking a Thomist to defend, or at least elaborate on, the argument. Perhaps you are such a Thomist? If so, you will be providing a useful service, as Thomists that have contributed to discussions in the past are absent here.

My question for the Thomist - be it you or somebody else - about the above sentence, is

"what does the sentence mean, beyond the everyday notion that 'I would not be surprised if this acorn became a tree', and if it does mean something more, can that thing be explained in a non-circular manner, ie without using synonyms for 'potential' like 'can', 'possible', 'may', 'might'.

So, the police need to do a better job of catching criminals. — Bitter Crank

Say rather, they need to do a better job of catching dangerous criminals. Since the US has the highest proportion of its population in jail, it's almost a tautology that its police are the world's best at catching criminals. It's just that most of them are no danger to anybody's body or property, because all they did was take or own some drugs.

Perhaps if the US police spent less time arresting weed smokers and throwing them in jail they'd get better at catching dangerous criminals.

I don't accept 2 and, while I have no strong objection to 1, I do not accept the vehemence with which it is asserted. As usual with these metaphysical 'demonstrations' the whole thing relies on equivocation over undefined terms, and the attempt to use everyday notions outside the scope within which they have any meaning or validity.

First, line 1: What is meant by 'change'? In a practical, everyday situation we know what that means, but the creation of the universe, including time itself, is not a practical, everyday situation. From the block-universe perspective, change does not occur in the 4D block.

Now line 2: What is 'potential'. This seeks to trade on the everyday notion of the words 'possible' or 'can'. But the everyday notion of these words is epistemological, not metaphysical. Again when we move from the everyday to the metaphysical, the definitions no longer work. It is not clear that 'possible' means anything in the context of the universe as a whole, rather than viewed through an epistemological lens. Some worldviews assert that there is no 'can' - everything that happens must have happened and could not have been otherwise.

He then ploughs on using more and more terms that are outside their scope of validity 'cause', 'material', 'corporeal'.

The question is, does Edward Feser reallty think that it is arguments like this that found his belief in God? If so, he's almost certainly kidding himself. If he's like most believers, he believes for entirely different reasons that have nothing to do with Aristotle or syllogisms. Those real reasons are no less valid - in fact in my view they are more so - but perhaps he doesn't want to admit to them because they don't sound as Sciency.

‘Social factors in addition to’ a metaphysical basis would not be reductionist, but denying a metaphysical basis is reductionist. — Wayfarer

Really? For all religions, or just some?

What think you of the metaphysical basis for Scientology?

Is a Christian that denies the metaphysical basis of Islam reductionist?

But, a naturalistic account of religion can't help but be reductionistic, right? — Wayfarer

No, I don't agree to that at all. One can be the world's most spiritual person and yet regard all the world's organised religions as a load of bunk that gained currency through a combination of filling a psychological yearning and the exercise of temporal power.

Indeed I wonder whether somebody like Krishnamurti might fit that description reasonably well, and he certainly wasn't a reductionist.

Dennett is an atheist making speculations about why people are religious but it occurred to me as I read his speculations in that book that they could just as easily have been written by a SBNR person. Maybe they could even have been written by an adherent of a semi-organised but non-anthropomorphising religion such as Buddhism.

I think this is relevant because I think the accusation of scientism or reductionism is thrown around far too readily these days. Claiming without evidence that deeply mysterious things like consciousness must somehow be the product of interactions of particles is scientistic and reductionist. Suggesting that Christianity and Islam may have obtained their extraordinary spread and power because of psychological, sociological and geo-political factors rather than because they contain some deep metaphysical truth is not.

Perhaps you were prejudiced against it by reading that review, which as I said is very low quality (and more like a sermon than a review).

When Dennett is in reductionist mode he is trying to explain away things like consciousness in terms of subatomic particles. I started reading 'Breaking the Spell' expecting that sort of thing, and was surprised to find that there wasn't any. It was more like anthropology, wondering about why people feel religious and how the phenomenon of religion grows to have such a powerful hold on so many people. As I recall it was speculative, undogmatic, and not pretending to be science.

If there was a section that went into battle against arguments for the existence of god, or mounted arguments for her nonexistence, I either missed it or do not recall it. Ditto for sections that purport to explain consciousness or the origin of life.

Huh? I asked for evidence for your accusation that 'Breaking the Spell' is scientistic and reductionist, and you provide a quote from a completely different book.

How is that relevant?

That's simplistic and dismissive. Where has your principle of charity gone?

I don't think you could describe anybody's life work as 'scientistic and reductionist' - not even Richard Dawkins. After all, Dawkins did plenty of actual biology, which has nothing to do with Scientism or Reductionism, both of which are philosophies.

I probably dislike Christian apologists like William Craig as much as you dislike Dawkins but although I find Craig a terrible philosopher, I would not go so far as to dismiss his life work as 'apologetics' or in fact as anything. A person's life's work is a many-splendoured thing. Even Craig has done some things that I would find admirable - becoming fluent in German being one of them.

I repeat that I found 'Breaking the Spell' not at all scientistic or reductionist, in contrast to writings such as 'Consciousness Explained', which were. Unsubstantiated sweeping statements won't change that.

I'm intrigued that Leon W should have taken such a dislike to Dennett's 'Breaking the Spell' book. I borrowed it from the library a few years back and recall finding it surprisingly gentle and non-dogmatic. Perhaps my expectations had been set too much along the lines of fiery anti-religious diatribes, because so many commentators had grouped Dennett with Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris, all of whom are dogmatic and arrogant (although I forgive Hitchens his arrogance because he was also very perceptive and funny).

I didn't find Dennett's book arrogant at all. To me it read like a collaborative exploration of possibilities. I was surprised to find later on that some of his other writing - particularly that on consciousness - is quite dogmatic. I felt that the accusations of scientism and reductionism could fairly be levelled at his writing on consciousness, but not at Breaking the Spell.

Perhaps I'm not remembering the book very well. Can you quote pieces you found particularly scientistic or reductionist? I couldn't see any in the review you linked. Indeed I though it was a sloppy, tendentious review, partly because most of the reviewer's opinions about what Dennett thinks were supported by paraphrases rather than actual quotes.

Multiculturalism is about being open to having multiple cultures within the nation, and celebrating the diversity that those cultures provide. It's about music and language, food and dance, stories, customs and mythology. It has nothing to do with race. So being 'blind to race' does not mean one cannot recognise and celebrate different cultures.

I've already shown that if you really thought them [extreme examples] relevant, you would be in favor of banning the right to own cars and household materials that go into making bombs. [emphasis added by andrewk] — Thorongil

You didn't show that, you claimed it. There's a big difference.

But I think you're right that no resolution is going to be obtained between you and those that don't believe your argument. If it was going to happen, I think one side or the other would have acknowledged the other's point.

Perhaps a more productive strategy would be to submit your argument to a philosophy journal as a paper for publication. If they agree with you that it is an unassailable argument I expect they will be eager to publish it, since it will finally settle a controversial aspect of one of the most hotly debated topics - albeit only in one country,

I desire to protect my life and property.
I possess the natural right to protect my life and property.
My life and property can be successfully protected or not depending on the means I employ to do so.
Successful protection of my life and property depends upon adequate and effective means.
Therefore, I have the right to adequate and effective means by which to protect my life and property. — Thorongil

You've changed your argument. OK, let's consider the new one.

On review, I find that if the last statement means you have the right to some adequate and effective means, it's not necessarily problematic. But it doesn't do anything to justify owning a gun, since, for a start, other adequate means are available, like (as Jefferies points out) security doors and window bars.

It also justifies everybody being provided with a personal, ex-SAS bodyguard, as that is an enormously more effective life protection against these apparently ubiquitous murderers that you fear so much than owning a gun. So I guess we need to all start paying lots more tax so that the government can provide that natural human right to everybody that can't afford to pay for it themselves.

Your defence is not a proof, it's pure rhetoric. Here it is:

If I lose my life or property defending them by one means of self-defense but protect them by another means, then I require the latter to maintain my natural right to life and property.

There is no logical argument there to be engaged. The statement doesn't even make sense. How can you both lose your life and protect it? Is this some sort of hypothetical counterfactual? The 'then' is an unsubstantiated claim, and the rhetoric leaves me cold.

My argument is valid and sound, unless and until you have show one of the premises is false, which you haven't done.

If you really don't understand that the onus of proof is on the one making the claim - which in the case of both the premises is you - then a constructive discussion is not possible.

It's your argument, and you're making the positive claim - that a person has a right to own any object that can be used to protect themself. The onus is on you to prove that claim.

I am not making any positive claim, so I have nothing to prove. I'm just saying that I don't believe your claim.

Why does one need to demonstrate a need for something to be related to one's livelihood in order to own it? That's a bizarre claim.

Sure is. Lucky I didn't make it then isn't it?
Go back and look at the first part of that sentence, of which you quoted only the second part.

It must be nice determining the truth of a claim by referring to what the majority thinks. Nevertheless, I value logic.

Logic stops at the premise. A premise, by definition, is a claim that is accepted without proof, or not, according to how it feels to the reader.

If the premise is derived from a further argument, it is no longer a premise, but a deduction, or theorem. At this stage your line 2 is just a premise, and I don't accept it because it seems unreasonable to me. That's all that's needed for me to logically reject the argument.

If you want to turn line 2 from a premise to a derived statement, you need to provide a proof of it, based on other premises that are more likely to be accepted by others.

That's how logic works.

I bet if I looked in your kitchen cabinets, I could find ingredients to make a bomb. If you own a vehicle, then as you should well know, it can be used to exact a rather hideous death toll. There are lots of other items I could probably find that you own that could be used to commit murder. Even if you own none of these things and live a sparse, ascetic lifestyle like me, most people own items and materials that if used inappropriately can be lethal, things which you do not object to the rightful ownership of.

I don't own a car, and one of the reasons for that is that I agree with you that they are lethal, generally unnecessary, objects.

For a lawmaker to decide whether to legally allow ownership of item X, they will weight up the usefulness of it against its risk. I doubt most people have enough of anything that could make a respectable bomb. Farmers may own large amounts of fertiliser, which could. But society weighs that up against the benefit of being able to grow lots of food, and decides that on balance it should allow that.

These arguments cannot be made for guns. For most people they are not required in order to make a living, and for those that do need it for that, exceptions are made. I would not object at all to a law that required registration of all purchases of fertiliser, with the sale of more than a certain amount to a person in a month being blocked if they could not demonstrate a need for it related to their livelihood.

that's my point. You own things that can be used in significantly dangerous ways that you and no one else objects to the rightful ownership of.

No, I don't own anything that has anything like the lethal potential of a gun. If that's the point of the argument, then it doesn't work.

Other than that, you've merely provided an undemonstrated appeal to the majority in countries outside the U.S., which is irrelevant to my argument.

No. I've pointed out that most people would not accept your premise 2, so your argument, while you may find it personally convincing, is not unassailable.

In fact, it's simply a matter of opinion, as to how one feels about premise 2. Fortunately for me, opinion is generally against that premise.

as owning some of those means could create an unacceptable hazard for the rest of the community - which is the case with many guns. — andrewk

This appears to be your key objection. I don't think it affects my argument

It affects it in that many people (most people, and certainly most lawmakers, at least outside the US) would not accept your premise 2, as it does not prevent you from owning things that create significant dangers to others.

You accept premise 2. That's your prerogative. But your argument will not be acceptable to most people because they would see premise 2 - with the interpretation you have now given it - as unreasonable.

I'll add that you don't help your case at all by linking defence of life with defence of property in premise 2. In almost all countries, the measures that are considered reasonable under law for defence of one's property are a tiny subset of the measures considered reasonable for defence of one's life.

You mean this?

1. I have the natural right to defend my life and property.
2. I have the right to own the proper means of defending my life and property.
3. Firearms are one proper means of defending my life and property.
4. Therefore, I have a right to own firearms.

It's impossibly woolly. What does 'proper means' mean? Does it exclude means that create a danger to the rest of the community, because they would be 'improper'? If so then 2 is acceptable but 3 is not. If not then 2 is unacceptable.

What is the significance of 'the' in 'the proper means'? Usually, use of 'the' implies there is only one means. Perhaps you mean 'any proper means', or perhaps you mean 'at least one proper means'. Who knows?

If 'the' in 2 means 'any proper means' then I see no reason for anybody to accept premise 2, as owning some of those means could create an unacceptable hazard for the rest of the community - which is the case with many guns.

If it doesn't mean 'any proper means' then 4 doesn't follow from the preceding lines.

So with any of the interpretations of the vague words that come readily to mind, the syllogism is either invalid, or it relies on unacceptable premises (is 'unsound').