There isn't much to say about ones private language or a "pain" that one might feel. I think @Banno would disagree about your notion of a private language.

Could you give an example of a private meaning other than a pain or qualia?

But, even then my interpretation of your comment was based on how you worded what you wrote, and how it resounded within the my linguistic structure of my inner world. — Jack Cummins

What is the "linguistic structure of your inner world"?

I'm just asking similarly to the Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein actually explains and even negates this proposition from the Tractatus.

Just what is or what does it mean to be at the limits of one's language?

I kind of have this topic in mind again, and was thinking that if completeness cannot be determined for theorems, then can they be ascertained in complexity?

It would be interesting to look into this as a general proposition.

What do you think, @TonesInDeepFreeze?

So, for you, the examined life, then? — Janus

Yes.

The unexamined life being confusing...and...not worth living? — Janus

Yes

Intelligence being the ability to effectively and productively examine your life (and the lives of others?)? (While appearing not to?) — Janus

Yes, without the last part about appearing not to.

To me this sounds like you favour an enactive philosophy of life, and an active life, rather than a merely contemplative one. — Janus

Pretty much. What's the difference?

And you prefer to think in terms of subjective experience, than analyze and understand your life (and human life) in objective (scientific) terms? — Janus

What makes you think that?

I actually posted the following question to stackexchange:

How do time evolutions occur in the Many Worlds Interpretation?

For example, if I assume that I played the lottery today and will probably not win it tomorrow, then what governs the time evolution of the other world where I won the lottery rather than the one where I didn't win it?

I found Max Tegmark interesting in his mathematical universe and multiverse theory. Then again, it seems remarkable for physicists to think it true that MW's exist when you can simply ask them where do the measurements end and where do they begin. To make the entire universe less intelligible by stating a mathematical notion of determinism with no clear adherence to why I experience this time evolution rather than the other where I won the lottery or Russian roulette game is odd.

Earlier I wrote that the wavefunction collapses, what I should have said is that measurements technically cause another world forming.

From the article:

This scrutiny forced the question that Everett’s thesis had somewhat skated over. If all the possible outcomes of a quantum measurement have a real existence, where are they, and why do we see (or think we see) only one? This is where the many worlds come in. DeWitt argued that the alternative outcomes of the measurement must exist in a parallel reality: another world. You measure the path of an electron, and in this world it seems to go this way, but in another world it went that way.

That requires a parallel, identical apparatus for the electron to traverse. More, it requires a parallel you to observe it — for only through the act of measurement does the superposition of states seem to “collapse.” Once begun, this process of duplication seems to have no end: you have to erect an entire parallel universe around that one electron, identical in all respects except where the electron went. You avoid the complication of wave function collapse, but at the expense of making another universe. The theory doesn’t exactly predict the other universe in the way that scientific theories usually make predictions. It’s just a deduction from the hypothesis that the other electron path is real too. — Philip Ball

This kind of hap hazardous growth of the entire universe would be in only some mathematical abstraction, no? Otherwise some physicist with an axe to grind would claim something about Occam's Razor.

My understanding is that MWI avoids wavefunction collapse. The wavefunction doesn't collapse; rather, everything happens. — fishfry

But, there are certain thermodynamic laws that govern probability distributions even for observers.

If you might mean that entropy is limited in certain branches where less entropy progresses summum bonum, then that might be an interesting way these branches evolve. Yet, there's no grand observer, observing this so it doesn't seem to make sense in general.

So, if branching occurs, then it happens with regard to theoretical constants along with conservation of energy and thermodynamic laws, and then you still end up with the base universe just with branching occurring to maintain the least amount of entropy arising, hence some sort of tautology.

What baffles me is how these worlds occur when a QM observation that is made on a probability distribution that has a local effect such as statistical distributions for low entropic and high ordered states. In other words does a minute variation in a probability distribution cause a branching or how large does the magnitude of the effect is required to be to cause branching?

Preference over what? (Preference refers to at least two items from which we like one more than another.) — Alkis Piskas

E.g, the good, the telos, the dialectical, etc.

Anyway, as I read the topic again, there's also another question that arises: "Value for whom?" The society, the philosopher himself or both? — Alkis Piskas

The philosopher, for himself or herself.

Sean Carroll explains this by saying that the energy splits too. Each world takes with it half the energy of the parent world, so that conservation of energy is preserved. — fishfry

This confronts a pretty pernicious issue as to what or which kind of wavefunction collapses cause this to occur along with the extent of the parent universe splitting to what localized or even global effect(s)?

I've long wondered about what does the MWI branch into?

So what's your point? — 180 Proof

As a methological naturalist, it doesn't seem to me that there's anything structural or non-cognitive about ethics, apart from inherently speaking about human behavior that is concerned about morality or ethics. I'm simply amiss as to why you think that ethics is non-cognitive.

Nice. The language of architecture spoke to him seemingly. Logical form and functionality and all that.

I don't think someone can have an opinion on the value of philosophy as a way of life, if he has not lived such a life and for quite some time. Only philosophers, dedicated to this field of study can talk about this. — Alkis Piskas

It does seem that philosophy as a way of life is important to profess or has value rather than not. Values seem important but are encapsulated in how we spend our time pursuing different ends. Is it really a matter of preference as I think your implicitly stating?

I assume you don't have children or much of an environmentalist?

criteria are used to facilitate, even regulate, discursive practices; they are tools for specific tasks however they are acquired. — 180 Proof

They are indeed acquired. But how?... I would think, cognitively, as in a reflexive manner towards the good which has to be determined through examination or analysis.

And "ought to be cognitive" – why? — 180 Proof

Because it is important that humans posses this knowledge through their own efforts otherwise no thought would be put into why one ought to behave ethically.

If you mean by that as indoctrinated or taught, then I suppose I agree. In the context of this thread, they aren't cognitive as forms of life although when treating philosophy as a way of life they ought to be cognitive and hence my disagreement.

Developing conceptual criteria (or practical method) isn't any more "cognitive" than assembling a toolkit for, say, ripping out & installing a new bathroom. A criterion, as I understand it, is useful for making types of judgments, and not "true" (or "good" or "beautiful") itself. Witty's forms-of-life, no? — 180 Proof

I think your downplaying how hard it is to discover these rules to abide by in life as Wittgenstein would notice when partaking in a forms of life. Or to the matter I doubt the majority of people would be able to come up with the golden rule without hearing it from a parent or teacher.

I also think that aesthetical judgements about the good life are hard to come by as apt or appropriate in most cases. Some formal opinion seems necessary to make them.

Wittgenstein would say that the rules of a language game are implicit in the existing structuralism of the world, and with this I don't have much doubt.

When you say that philosophy is about establishing a criteria through a performative or non-cognitive method, then doesn't that mean that a type of cognitivism is required to formulate such a criteria or method as a way of life?

@Wayfarer ,

This isn't as simple as an acceptance of the good as through observation but was cultivated through the academia and supremely by the noetic faculties of one's mind. Children had to be reared and drilled to see this through their own intellect or noesis and understanding.

What I suppose what we have nowadays is the practice of aesthetical judgment by a unit of value that encompasses axiology. And to drive this home is that we have an idiocy in determining a common consensus of the good nowadays, by this method.

How would an animal or domesticated pig examine their unlived life? — Janus

A pig would just squeal or oink itself out of a situation. A squeaky wheel gets the grease as they say.

Jumping off the deep end, some downtrodden antinatalist folk will say that living itself is painful and ought not be promoted. What kind of life is that?

Personally I'm not attracted to systems and theories and schools of thought and prefer to just get on and do things, knowing full well that we all absorb and employ philosophical ideas (often a kind of mosaic of incoherence) just by living in the world. I have no need to hold truth or grasp eternity and just want the years to go by as pleasantly as possible whilst being of some use to others in a way that satisfies my own standards of virtue. Perhaps this is why 180's notion of philosophy as a performative and noncognitive exercise resonates with me. — Tom Storm

But as per 180proof, one is looking for a criteria to evaluate one's conception of the self with regards to this arising or unpolished method of behaving. Normally people aren't born Zeno's or Buddha's to be so intuitively intelligent to conceptualize such a criteria or a working methodology. Hence, my response to him about dogma and eventually arising egotism.

If you were not living your life how would you become aware of that without examining your unlived life? — Janus

I'm not sure how to go about this. It seems to me something someone would say of an animal or domesticated pig.

Why should morals be a matter of metaphysics? — Wayfarer

Well, yes, isn't this Kant all over again?

I think the short answer is that it involves the requirement to ground morality in something other than one’s personal or cultural beliefs. It involves questions of whether there is a real good, independently of one’s opinions about it, or cultural beliefs about it. And it’s a surprisingly hard question to answer without falling back on ‘I believe that…’ — Wayfarer

Kant could come up with much. But, an intelligent chap might say that utilitarianism does away with this by incorporating axiology into the hedonic calculus of the substituting for "I believe that..." with "It's of preference to do... (xyz)"

In such dialogues, the examination of one’s assumptions, what you will accept to be true, is the basic task of philosophy. It can be presumed not to do that, is to live heedlessly, carelessly, unknowingly. But the key point is, in Platonic terms, this is grounded in an acceptance of a real good, understood as the idea of the good, in harmony with which the philosopher seeks to live. — Wayfarer

But, the concern of the good must come first, no?

I remember having some counselling when I was an adolescent by a pastoral counsellor, who used to keep stressing that, 'You have to lose yourself to find yourself'. But, when he went on further, I found this counsellor's philosophy was about the importance of losing one's own individuality in order to conform. I came to the view that finding one's own pathway, even though it often involves getting lost, or facing obstacles, can be extremely important, as both a psychological and philosophy quest. — Jack Cummins

The examined life seems to me to be about something a 20s person is not concerned about at their age. It seems more aligned with a concern about ones future instead of past nowadays. I would say that the advice you got doesn't necessarily mean that much apart from the need to analyze yourself after being situated in the world after one comes to understand one's place in it. To navigate requires, I think, a need to see past immediate needs and wants, and instead do a cost benefit or even game theoretic analysis. That's how I governed my own life as seeing under the guise of common rationality where I would successfully be able to perform the needs required. Testing for intelligence seems important...

Philosophy's sine qua non "purpose" I've found is both (meta-cognitively) hygenic & fitness-maintaining, that is, to unlearn self-immiserating, unwise (i.e. foolish, stupid ~ maladaptive) habits ... — 180 Proof

I have found this to be true in terms of unlearning distorted behavior and even to the point of constraining wants. But, the way people practice hygienic deeds is mostly egotistical or desired towards some end, for example spending time devoted to enhancing one's self. I notify myself often of the instrumental role of reason and altogether avoid the need to expose myself if possible to altering my way of a modest living.

)I understand philosophy as a performative and noncognitive exercise. Neither "truth" nor "relativism" obtain with respect to it as creating criteria or methods for discernment is a/the basic function of philosophy. — 180 Proof

I see this as a performative contradiction in how to determine those criteria are mostly doctrinal. Unless you mean this as pure egotism?

Yes, but I'm assuming your a little older than the inquisitive few youngsters around here for them to not want to commit mistakes in life and make it a fun one at the same time.

What would you tell them to work on to live an examined life?

I think I left it too straightforward. When living the examined life what ought one be concerned about it? One's place in the world or their intelligence or their wealth?

Or more technically, what kind of analysis or even methodology should a person incorporate when doing this examination? Isn't it really psychoanalysis?

Contemplation seems to be the natural arising thought in regards to the issue. So, what kind of contemplation?

I wallow a lot, have depressions, anxiety, and take medication for them. I used to rant a lot about schizophrenia and somehow no longer feel ill due to the medications. I'm conserved at the moment and am looking forward to moving on from rehab to my next interesting time at another facility.

Perhaps mathematical Platonism will give way to a recognition of maths as another language in which we should look not to meaning but to use. — Banno

What do you mean by that? Seems interesting to say that mathematics could get along well without certain principles governing how we operate in it.

So, in your opinion, when speaking about the ontology of a unicorn, we can say it's a literary fiction. But, how do we classify round-squares?

But, I have a question. What is the difference between Pegasus or unicorns and round-squares?

There are lexical, semantic, and structural aspects of language in expressing being. Neglecting these and applying in any sense meaning as a predicate makes no-sense of the resultant proposition, thought, idea. With square-circle, meaning is not created, only an arbitrary juxtaposition that is itself nonsense. — tim wood

Well, yes mostly. I'm not sure what you mean by lexical, semantic, and structural aspects of language in expressing being, may actually mean? Are you saying that this is just a feature of language?

Square-circles or round-squares are broadly known to be nonsensical strings of words. Where, Pegasus or unicorns aren't as questionable.

@Banno, what do you think?

I don't quite understand. Are you talking about the representative theory of understanding? A la, picture theory of meaning?

Evil as much as it can be an expressed sentiment is a disregard for life.