It's not an issue with mathematics as it may seem. It's an issue with the very notion of possibility theory in systems, such as physics which quite possibly determines states in nature.

Cheers

Ooh, burn! :fire: — apokrisis

I hope not literally. :fear:

The complexity of the world is actually quite scary.

I don't really know. I'm just as confused as you are.

Hegel may have made some sense with dialectical materialism as you alluded to.

Do you mean how does causality as imagined by physics relate to causality as imagined by logic? Do they share the same root or are they antithetic? — apokrisis

Yes, you nailed it. I think this is the fundamental thesis upon which this thread is about.

I don't really have much to say myself at the moment. Just one question, regarding which, where do you think mathematics stands in relation to what you said?

As a child I was already influenced by the philosophy of Plato, which my father bestowed upon me. Never grew out of it, frankly.

Let's go California! :party:

Isn't the rule following paradox, which philosophers still debate to this day, solved by the way the language center of the brain is uniform for many newborn children? I don't see how else one would solve the rule following paradox.

No, this does not make sense for a woman to do the things she does for her child out of a sense of duty. I've heard this argument before and feminist ethicists really would not agree.

The ethics of care stem from a deeper urge than a ratiocination of a derived Kantian categorical imperative towards duty.

Aren't any liberals righteously angry about all this chicanery going back to 2016 and 2020? — fishfry

What happened to Sanders during 2016 was pretty wild. Hands down he would have won, but, the Clinton's wanted it their way and look what we got...

Philosophers such as Kant, JS Mill, J. Rawls, and most likely Nietzsche laid down the foundation of their conception of morality. — L'éléphant

Not to sound snide; but, what about the ethics of care, by philosophers such as Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings? The very centerpiece of ethics has been the role of the mother or teacher in one's life, without which a very crude form of ethics would develop.

I visit x.com, Elon Musk's playground, and the way things stand is something to the matter with how Harris speaks. It's a little troubling that she can't speak with diction at all. It's actually so pathetic in videos of CNN interviews and past debates that I don't know what to say myself.

I honestly thought at one point Nancy Pelosi was the ideal candidate for Democrats.

There isn't much to like about Harris.

Thoughts about Kamala Harris?

:party:

I'd like to further point out a perhaps stronger point against Wittgenstein the 'cognitivist,' with the beetle-in-the-box concept. It would be hard to assume, on the beetle in the box example that Wittgenstein would have been a cognitivist.

Further reading associated with this matter:

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-007-9172-y

Its actually funny that people complain about the DNC and RNC for nominating unlikable and forced candidates. Such things are too important to allow chance or random candidates to get elected.

Yet, as someone pointed out, Trump was a wild card for the RNC in 2016, and still is until he likely is reelected.

On some views, the relevant "form of life," is something common to all humanity. It is something like "what we all share by virtue of being human and of living in the same world." Advocates of this perspective often pay a lot of attention to Wittgenstein's comments on pain. When it comes to pain, it seems to be our natural expressiveness, something we share with other mammals, that is the scaffolding on which language about pain is built. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Interesting. I take it as something that Wittgenstein could not fully elucidate; but, negated the concept of a form of life (by implication) into a private aspect of language, which he denied. Obviously, Wittgenstein was not a cognitivist (there are hints at it, yes); but, rather an early behaviorist at the time, influenced by Russell's own thoughts about psychology.

I find it hard to reconcile (something I consider Wittgenstein struggling with) the comments about the talking lion which we could not or would not be able to understand and the private language argument. What are your thoughts on the matter?

With Schopenhauer, compassion is all-apart of the same manifesting premise. That is to say, if the world is Will, individuated into an illusory version of itself (the manifold beings of the world), then a saintly person is driven from the feeling of "fellow-suffering" of all the manifold beings. That is to say, they can feel this agapic love and then act upon it. The acting upon this feeling is saintly compassion for Schop, and this has the effect of making one less individuated. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I believe Wittgenstein called it the "metaphysical subject." It seems that the act of willing in Schopenhauer's philosophy is mired with a sense of unease about one's state of mind in a world with a Will greater than any other individuated will.

In the fact that you are answering Shawn, I agree. He does seem to be a case of overthinking, living in a basement, wallowing in it (didn't he have a theme of this with his piggy stuff?).. making a sort of cliche out of Schopenhauer only being for the depressed and inert. — schopenhauer1

Yes, well I don't know where you got the idea that Schopenhauer is only for the depressed. Philosophical pessimism does not make one depressed. Correlation does not imply causation.

And then I added in a more "meta" sense of suffering pace Ligotti. That is to say, we are a species that evolved like the rest of nature, but yet is not in a "balance of nature". Where other animals have a form of life that is instinctual, ours is by-far more deliberative, which adds another burden uniquely human. This is what I mean by "forms of life". — schopenhauer1

The Dionysian instincts that the ancient Greeks alluded to are tame in the mind of a human being nowadays. We have aspired towards an Apollonian way of life. By doing so, we have reduced the brute aspect of existence that we once endured, per our evolutionary history. It would be strange to say that the fundamental reason we are unhappy or suffer from boredom is something to be overly concerned about. Existence is becoming more endurable than it once was seems like a common theme amongst academics.

Humans can form narratives to suit any rataionale they want to get to... So if life is supposed to be X, Y, Z, they will develop a story to provide it that rationale. These are all justifications for why we (must) pursue X, Y, and Z. But the fact is that our very ability to form counterfactuals and diverse narratives tells us that we don't have to have this rationale. That it is indeed only a rationale...That we are the species that needs a rationale.. We don't just "do", we know we do and we have provide reasons for why we do. — schopenhauer1

I think you reference an important insight of human nature here. What can be said about this is that science has transformed the way we perceive cause and effect. The Principle of Sufficient Reason or PoSR for short has allowed us to create such a Apollonian world in which we inhabit. Science is another tool or method of understanding how the world works. With a better understanding of cause and effect, we can better situate ourselves in the complexity of the world. What I'm trying to say, that there are things a person can be certain of regardless of whatever rationale we assume. Some rationales may be more truthful than others.

So, with the assumption that some rationales are more true than others, what do you think is true about the lack of concern with ethics, in our world? Is it really ignorance of the good or unrestrained wants and desires that make us suffer?

I'm trying to say that there are various "coping mechanisms" that people use to ignore the notion of suffering in life, and thus the need for empathy in the Schopenhaurian fashion is not even considered. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I believe what you are saying is true and more fruitful to the understanding of human nature, which has been a debate framed in the right manner by Schopenhauer. The issue Schopenhauer brings up, in my mind, is the importance of attitudes, and how they form beliefs or, as you call it, "forms of life."

Any comments on this?

Thanks for posting.

I'm not asking your opinion on "the will to live", rather I am pointing that you are questioning it. And even now, we can debate it, giving reasons for enjoining with it. — schopenhauer1

I am simply questioning whether it is something that can be justified as a reason to operate on, or whether these reasons are brute facts about existence. The facet of attitudes on one's life or arising due to lived experiences, resulting in, dispositions is what I wanted to consider.

Maybe in another thread I would frame the issue about what do attitudes mean to a person; but with respect to Schopenhauer (generally speaking, monotheistic religions are also associated with this tendency, which Schopenhauer did not like or favor) what is the function of an attitude, such as pessimism, in one's life?

You are questioning it right now. Isn't this your answer, the germination of which is in your very inquiry? Why is nature creating creatures that question the "will to live"? — schopenhauer1

If your asking for my opinion or thought on the matter, what I understand about the very will to live is that by most theories it is healthy and good to want to live, and the denial to live from an attitude (for example, "pessimism") is irrational or maladaptive. What are your "meta"-cognitive beliefs about pessimism, and what it may mean to a person?

Thanks for posting.

So yes, in a way, Schopenhauer's compassion for the human condition, and suffering makes sense. — schopenhauer1

I think this is a fair assumption that Schopenhauer wrote his aphorisms with the hope that humanity might benefit from the reduction of pain through aesthetic practices. What I do ponder about is how pessimism is the conclusion that Schopenhauer believes, that would, reduce suffering in the world.

The evolutionary history of humanity points at making tools and practicing some form of empathic concern for those within our sphere of interest. With such an evolutionary history, how can one negate the very will to live that brought us to life through a struggle with nature? Why would anyone want to dispose of one's will to live, and sublimate it with pessimism. In a sense some people unbiasedly might say that it would be irrational to do so.

Thank you for posting.

Magee says in his book on Schopenhaur that his pessimism was more an aspect of his disposition than of his philosophy. — Wayfarer

I don't believe that his philosophy was the result of his upbringing or nurture. Pessimism towards the world that Schopenhauer describes is, to me, still a mystery. I'm hoping someone can help the fly out of the bottle with this one...

Yes, so, just wondering what you would say about why Schopenhauer focused on pessimism as the correct attitude to profess towards the suffering of the world?

I am inclined to hold that the foundation of morality is more deeply rooted in emotional affectivity than in rational deliberation. — Tom Storm

Yes, there's a lot to say about this. Goes way beyond what philosophy can hope to elucidate.

I see. Maybe the ascetic life could contribute to such a 'better consciousness', or at least that is how I interpret it. He did individuate a person or 'ego' into his concern with pessimism being the right attitude. It seems this is an important aspect of the subject at hand.

Vanity and pride? What you are suggesting seems to correspond to sociopathy, which is often so indifferent towards others that vanity and pride may be irrelevant to its experience. Perhaps you are hinting at hedonistic narcissism? — Tom Storm

I was mostly alluding to Schopenhauer's own conclusions on what you call 'indifference' to the situation of the Other. I don't think he was overt about calling empathy or compassion as a unifying force, as that's what I believe is something that many teachers allude to, yet, don't really explain their importance in ethics.

I don't see how there would be a 'proper' way to talk about ethics? This seems rigid. — Tom Storm

Well, I only say that ethics seems to originate from the suffering of others that one may be able to identify with, either through experience or tacit knowledge.

Are you suggesting that our experience of humanity or of being is enough to allow us to be fully are of our common humanity in some way? — Tom Storm

Yes, I believe that through compassion or empathy, people can find a common goal to which they might aspire towards. I believe this was true for Plato, with respect to the injustice of the wrongful death of his teacher.

Do you have reason to believe in moral facts? — Tom Storm

Not really. I'm more in the Hume camp, where people have to have an impetus other than strict rationality to motivate themselves with respect to morality and ethics.

Don't overlook the fact that Schopenhauer accepted there was a mode of existence beyond suffering. — Wayfarer

I haven't really seen anything about the eastern posited higher consciousness. Sorry to say, but it sounds too New Age to ascribe onto Schopenhauer, at the time. Maybe I'm wrong.

I am however aware, as you say, of the pointing out of the belief in the attitude of, especially, pessimism in his work.

Yet, I believe that pessimism should not discourage a person to discuss ethics. To profess pessimism is a step taken too soon by Schopenhauer. Instead a person could affirm the will to live on the grounds that suffering allows one to understand and help one another.

Our experience of suffering is inscribed in a chain of signification that the self, the ego, cannot dominate. — JuanZu

I think from this premise a lot of things or considerations can be derived.

If one equivocates the ego with the self, then I believe most of the tenants of Buddhism can be derived. Yet, I don't believe that the ego and the self are the same thing. Hindu scripture talks about the many avatars that the self can assume in the world. With that in mind, Buddha thought that a common unifying feature of the many avatars of the self, in Hinduism, is the knowledge or experience of dukkha, or suffering.

Schopenhauer talked about the vanity of existence, which I think is the life of the ignorant, who do not understand or perceive the suffering of the world. Yet, he had high notions of what a person should do in light of this moral fact of existence, as @180 Proof put it. I think, that the knowledge of suffering, either through experience or tacit knowledge, should provide grounds to discuss ethics.

What do others think?

Only language-using "sentient beings" seem to do so. To wit:
I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.
— Friedrich Nietzsche — 180 Proof

''Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.''

-Ludwig Wittgenstein

An observational axiom of ethics: suffering – species-specific defects which make individual species-membrrs vulnerable to dysfunction – is the most basic moral fact and thereby knowing how to decrease or increase the likelihood and severity of dysfunction is thereby the most practical moral truth. — 180 Proof

Interesting. I'd like to ask, in correspondence with the OP, whether only through experience can one come to learn, or even know, such basic moral facts?

The way the world seems to be working is that there's some kind of serious deficiency in this regard of being informed of moral facts or truths.

adaptive habits (i.e. virtues) — 180 Proof

To equate habits that are adaptive with virtue seems to me a little too Aristotelian or even too dogmatic in terms of right conduct and proper belief. Yet, what examples or comparisons (sources) can you provide with adaptive habits equaling virtue?

Well well well, Trump appears messianic at this point. Frankly he is becoming the right's Jesus figure.

I appreciate the article. It seems like the economics for synthetically grown meat is still in its infancy. I hope for it to be a catalyst for cheaper food that doesn't entail slaughterhouses of livestock. Some of those videos of what goes on there really can have an impact on a compassionate person.

Synthetic meat is something that hasn't yet flourished in economies yet. Imagine McDonalds making $1 hamburgers with synthetic meat. Imagine the astronomical profits! :cool:

A real world example is often hard to parse into material implication -- sometimes, yes, but sometimes it's hard -- the conjuncts of disjuncts, while they can be claimed, is even rarer :D

Though after we dismiss "B and not-B" as always false, we can see that the truth of the proposition will only rely upon A, since "implies" is logically equivalent to "not-A or (B and not-B)", and the truth of a disjunct is true if one of the propositions is true -- so if not-A is true then it is true, and if not then it is false -- since not all results in the truth-table are false it is not a contradiction. — Moliere

In epistemic logic, such cases are known as known known's, known unknown's, and unknown unknowns. Yet, there are examples of making false inferences like unknown known's that would describe such a situation arising in epistemic logic...

Thinking in terms of a Venn diagram, you could have many points of congruence or intersection between sets and be able to say something along the lines of what your previous post meant.

Can anyone think up a real world example where you would point out that A implies both B and not-B except for saying something along the lines of:

"A implies B and not-B, therefore clearly not-A." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Fuzzy logic/Many-valued logic...