Is God a solipsist? I'm returning to this thread after almost a year.
I have come to the conclusion that God is the only true solipsist. However, given that God can do anything imaginable and unimaginable (omnipotence), there is a way to counter her solipsism. I am going to utilize a naive understanding of epistemic logic to this goal of showing that God is both a solipsist and not a solipsist. I welcome anyone to comment on the coherence of this pseudo-proof, which I am working on formalizing. This will be an informal proof of showing that God is capable of being a solipsist and not a solipsist, both at the same time.
Now, given that God is omniscient, and knows everything since she is one and the same with the world itself. The world is everything that is both the case and not the case. By "the world" I intend to mean, that God inhabits every possible world that may or may not be actualized.
The hinge proposition that allows me to assert that God is a solipsist is the following: "A solipsist cannot doubt". Now, given this proposition, the implication is that a solipsist cannot doubt due to living in a world full of certainty. Where there is a certainty, doubt cannot arise. Furthermore, given certainty, this implies epistemic closure, which any skepticist would decry as heresy. However, omniscience implies epistemic closure in any given set of world'(s) or singular world.
The flipside is reconciling omnipotence with omniscience. If God is indeed a solipsist, then she cannot doubt per the above. Yet, God is omnipotent. So, how does one, in some sense, escape the boundaries of absolute omniscience, or epistemic closure? The answer is that God is not an individual agent since she is equated with the same knowledge of inhabiting every possible world. Thus, God's knowledge is not limited to one possible world; but, an infinite many. Thus, God has the ability to expand her knowledge to infinite many possible worlds.
Thus, I conclude, and this is the important part, that if God is equated with the sum total of all possible worlds, then she is still a solipsist. Therefore, either God is a solipsist under this assumption or the other alternative, that God transcends the world in an unimaginable, unspeakable, and ineffable sense and is not a solipsist. Or to put this more succinctly, God cannot attain (absolute) epistemic closure, given that this would imply solipsism.
Any thoughts, criticisms, and questions welcome.