3) In terms of the larger issue of empty names, the original question merely asked how supposed empty names can have meanings. One possible way they can have meanings is under a correspondence theory of truth, according to which, strictly speaking, the truth value of any such name will always be false because there is no such actual thing in the world like "Pegasus" or "santa claus". (I take it generally that a consequence of any correspondence theory is that there are really only two possible meanings for any proposition: true or false) — Mentalusion
Yes, I'm assuming a correspondence theory. I'm not sure how it side steps any questions though. — Mentalusion
No, I actually think this is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover
I hope the idea of fixing the reference as opposed to actually defining one term as meaning the other is somewhat clear. There is really not enough time to go into everything in great detail. I think, even in cases where the notion of rigidity versus accidentality of designation cannot be used to make out the difference in question, some things called definitions really intend to fix a reference rather than to give the meaning of a phrase, to give a synonym. Let me give an example. 7t' is supposed to be the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. Now, it's something that I have nothing but a vague intuitive feeling to argue for: It seems to me that here this Greek letter is not being used as short for the phrase 'the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter' nor is it even used as short for a cluster of alternative definitions of 7t', whatever that might mean. It is used as a name for a real number, which in this case is necessarily the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. Note that here both ' 7t" and 'the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter' are rigid designators, so the arguments given in the metric case are inapplicable. (Well, if someone doesn't see this, or thinks it's wrong, it doesn't matter.) — Kripke pg. 60
That is the way that PI is written, scattered and not formed into a coherent whole. If a companion provided us with a coherent whole it would be a faulty interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover
I am thrilled to hear that you are taking a proactive position and not a reactive position to the real burdens you are bearing in life. — ArguingWAristotleTiff
So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator. — creativesoul
Again, I see Kripke here as setting up a decent modal grammar for English, by interpreting his more formal modal logic in English. — Banno
Hmm, so basically through continuing through the developing a relationship, but must have love in order to do so. Right? — Waya
So the question is, are "soul mates" born to fit each other, or can this be developed through time and communication? — Waya
I think of possible worlds as being stipulated: that is, we set them up as we want them to be. hence,
A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it. — Banno
I haven't read much else though, so I'll investigate. — Janus
The question of essential properties so-called is supposed to be equivalent (and it is equivalent) to the question of 'identity across possible worlds'. Suppose we have someone, Nixon, and there's another possible world where there is no one with all the properties Nixon has ill the actual world. Which one of these other people, if any, is Nixon? Surely you must give some criterion of identity here! If you have a criterion of identity, then you just look in the other possible worlds at the man who is Nixon; and the question whether, in that other possible world, Nixon has certain properties, is well defined. It is also supposed to be well defined, in terms of such notions, whether it's true in all possible worlds, or there are some possible worlds in which Nixon didn't win the election. But, it's said, the problems of giving such criteria of identity are very difficult. — Kripke pg. 42
SO the point here is that what is a priori are things we know; it's an epistemological notion.
But that necessity is a metaphysical notion - it's necessary if and only if it is true in all possible worlds.
SO there is no simple relation between the two. — Banno
As Ashleigh Brilliant says (paraphrased): My biggest problem is what to do about all the things I cannot do anything about — Janus
Yes, but it often seems to be somewhat patronizing, to come from a sense of superiority as though "We know better". — Janus
Perhaps it is a bit tedious, but to steal from Wittgenstein, all we have done so far is to put the pieces on the board; the game hasn't quite started yet. — Banno
I wonder whether, given the immense diversity of human nature, one person's harmony of the spirit is not another person's disharmony. — Janus

Yes, they do generally seem to be rather restricted in their behavior and their moral attitudes to the human behavior; particularly in regards to homosexuality, the pleasures of the flesh, forms of entertainment, intoxicants, partying hard and so on. Of course, I have no doubt there are exceptions! — Janus
I think enlightenment is really just being yourself, being relaxed and living in the present. — Janus
I am extremely doubtful about the veracity or even coherence of the common notion of enlightenment as some kind of esoteric, higher, objective knowledge. — Janus
You can say that a name rigidly designates an object. — Snakes Alive
