I hope this clarifies the issues we've been having about states of affaris and atomic facts, @Srap Tasmaner

I'm going to upload the companion I'm using, which is excellent. Anyone else welcome to refer to it too, as we go along. Any other companions welcome.

And so do I, when compared with the banal, colorless, uninspiring ceremony that replaced it. — Ciceronianus the White

So, the Roman Catholic Church has lost it's mojo or what? :lol:

Logical space contains propositions connected by logical operators. When those propositions are facts, logical space is the world. The truth or falsehood of a (atomic) fact changes nothing else in logical space - that is, they facts are independent one of the other.

SO logical space is a grammatical system. Substance provides the interpretation of that logical system. That interpretation is in the form of facts. — Banno

I'm in agreement here. I just wanted to highlight that there is no infinite regress here, which presupposes substance in the form of atomic facts composed of objects (or vice-versa), meshed together giving rise to facts through the structure of logical form, which all takes place in logical space. So, in every possible world, objects obtain (are existent to use W's terminology) equally, and all propositions are equal in merit (jumping ahead a little).

SO, do we now move on to logical form or facts? I feel as though we've covered facts already so many times... We can also mention modality, which Wittgenstein talks about a little in terms of what is possible and necessary.

Edit: Rejigged the wording a little.

So I want to say it's the former, the atomic facts themselves, obtaining or not, that are the elements of logical space. — Srap Tasmaner

Sorry for being ambiguous. I meant to affirm the former you're talking about.

Are the elements of logical space obtaining and non-obtaining atomic facts, or are the elements of logical space the obtaining and the non-obtaining of atomic facts? — Srap Tasmaner

As far as I understand, Wittgenstein uses the terms existent and non-existent, so we might want to stick with that; but, yes-I think so.

Cool!

Thanks for the insightful comment. I really like the Buddhist slant, though, that wasn't my intention in posting the OP. But, I guess it can make sense in this light.

What do you mean by that last part? I'm unsure.

Have to disagree. It is exactly by being our own exterior observers that self deception becomes possible. — unenlightened

How does one attain this state of mind, oh wise one? :cool:

The real danger is not that it will bite anyone, but rather will make yours and my ignorance obvious. — tim wood

:sweat:

One among other Trump ideas that fully show what kind of blissfully ignorant idiot he is. Like his proposal to Macron that France should exit the EU to get a trade deal with the US and that Russia and the US should create a joint task force to counter hackers and cybercrime. — ssu

I'm telling you its early stage dementia. I doubt he consults his ideas against any advisers.

The structure of an atomic fact is something contingent: it is the fact that its constituent objects are actually combined in the way they are. The atomic fact’s form is quite different: it is (as it were — the reason for this caution will have emerged by the time we have reached the end of the book) the fact that the constituent objects can be arranged like that. This latter ‘fact’ — the form of the atomic fact — clearly has its roots in the form of the constituent objects, since ‘objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs’ (2.014). So there can only be a fixed form, common to all possible worlds, if the objects whose form is the root of the form of atomic facts are also common to all possible worlds. This is why substance is both form and content. It is form, because the form of atomic facts — the possibility of there being such facts — is what is common to all possible worlds. And it is content, because the form of atomic facts is carried in the form of their constituent objects, so there must be things as well as forms, if there are to be the appropriate forms. Hence Wittgenstein says:

2.026 Only if there are objects can there be a fixed form of the world.

2.027 The fixed, the existent and the object are one.

I'm quoting at leisure from the Routledge companion to the Tractatus. Sorry.

And finally,

2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.

2.0212 It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true or false).

Think about it in Kantain terms. There cannot be objects or facts or things without logical space.

2.025 It is form and content.

The thinking here is something like this. There must be something common, something constant across all possible alternative scenarios. This is (at least close to) what is known traditionally as substance. But what is actually required, according to Wittgenstein, is a common form. What might be meant by ‘form’ here? The notion of form has already been introduced in the idea of the form of an object: it is the ways in which that object can combine with other objects to form atomic facts. Wittgenstein introduces a related notion in connection with atomic facts:

2.032 The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact.

2.033 The form is the possibility of the structure.

Form and content become the substance of logical space. (sorry, other way around)

Kindly show how Godel's undecidable proposition has anything to do with anything other than just itself. — tim wood

By extension doesn't it apply to all formal systems? I'm sorry; but, asking for proof would be a monumental task.

2.021 Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot be compound.

2.024 Substance is what exists independently of what is the case.

A substance is something which remains the same thing through change, although change is ambiguous here and rather irrelevant according to Wittgenstein. Substance is what is constant across all possible differences in the atomic facts.

What do we find in logical space? — Banno

Substance.

Been away for a few days, so I'll try to get back into this.

We're going to work on logical space some more? — Srap Tasmaner

Glad you're back.

It's a crapshoot. Do you think we need a companion to help guide us? As I'm reading the Routledge one provided in the first page of this thread, I feel like it can only help us along the way.

Sorry, @Srap Tasmaner; but, I'm at a loss here as what to say. I'm reading the companion provided by another member here, that seems to clarify all these issues. I'm somewhat slow to read it, and it's taking a lot of time to cover everything up until picture theory of meaning.

It's a really good companion, from what I gather. If you're interested in it helping us guide through the Tractatus, let me know.

[disregard]

Proofs within P are perfectly good - no need for "extra-systematic appeals" to anything. — tim wood

Yes, but, when one goes about trying to prove truths within any sufficiently complex formal system, then one will run into cases where such proofs are unobtainable within that very formal system, according to Godel. Hence, a new extra-systematic system must be incorporated, and hence, monism fails, and pluralism prevails, or even instrumentalism.

But then maybe I misunderstood you, maybe you want to ask the "ontological" question about logic; whether logic(s) "reflect(s) reality", or something like that? If that is accepted as a coherent question, then I suppose the question as to whether there is more than one logic which reflects reality could be asked. Is it a coherent question, though? — Janus

Yes, that was the question. I'm not sure how one goes about proving or surmising it. Hence, why I brought up Godel. Is this one of those, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one ought remain silent, moments?

Yes, it's a meaningless claim to make in totality due to Godel's Incompleteness Theorems. I think.

One thought that bugs me is that if Godel disproved the internal consistency of any finite logical system to be self proving, and thus requires extra-systematic appeals to another logical system to validate proofs or wff statements. If, so, then we are indeed left with, I think, either instrumentalism or local pluralism. Asserting monism in this case is possible, but meaningless.

Yes?

What does "correct" mean in relation to logics? — Janus

Yes, I take it as internally consistent here, and if that follows, then true and valid.

There is certainly more than one kind of logic. — Janus

Yes, there is, what's your point?

A logic is a methodology of thought, and it would not seem to make sense to say that you could have a methodology without internal consistency. — Janus

According to the instrumentalist yes, and global pluralist.

If truth is the criterion of "correctness" then you would need to explain what it could mean for a logic to be true. — Janus

Internal consistency does that for you, or 'logic takes care of itself'.

So I would agree that the notion of correctness is inappropriate if correctness is understood to be equivalent to truth, but it would not seem to be inappropriate if correctness is understood to correspond to internal consistency. — Janus

Both go along together I suppose, depending on whether your a monist, pluralist and even an instrumentalist. So, yeah, we're talking about tautologies. I think this is me speaking as a monist.

I would say pluralism is the right choice, and that pluralism is not inconsistent with instrumentalism, because a logic would fail to be instrumental if it lacked methodological consistency. — Janus

I agree.

Although having said that instrumentalism is right only insofar as it rejects the idea that correctness means truth. If it accepts that correctness means methodological consistency then it is false to say that the notion of correctness is inappropriate, even though to say under that assumption that correctness is appropriate would seem to be a trivial truism. — Janus

Not that trivial. Again, speaking as a monist, I think.

It ain't the same America you grew up in or where you grew up. Take that as empirical evidence if you'd like.

Not entirely objective; but, rational enough to not fall into a highly exploitable trait that Republicans seem to posses of being frightened of big government, enough so that they take stuff like, "Obama was a Kenyan Muslim out to destroy America" as having some substance...

Do you even read the comment sections on facebook, which was now undeniably exploited by some intelligence agencies (Russian GRU, according to the latest indictments of the Mueller investigation), to stoke fears to unseen levels, among an already frightened and paranoid electorate of the US population.

Susan Haack - Philosophy of Logics

Hmm, if a moderator could please re-include "Monism" into the poll, for some reason it got left out.

Thanks.

In a last ditch effort to silence those who fail to see the wisdom of your tired criticisms, you decry the truth as trolling. Nope, Trump's victory was in fact huuuge, devestating to his opponents, and it will shape politics for generations. — Hanover

I'm not silencing anyone here, Hanover, common. I'm just stating the fact that you keep on bringing that fact up as if it was some punchline itself serving as a form of some argument to your opponents who disagree with you on matters pertaining how he won the election or at least why and how he did it. You just assert that he did, and that's that. If I'm not mistaken this is some logical fallacy, no?

At this point you can only consider pointing out that fact as tantamount to trolling...

Uhh, hurr durr, the mayor of London is an Muslim that hates me, durr.

Ooo, gotta hold him to his word for once. Let's see how that pans out.

I wanna see Trumpo pull a fake news on this one. It also is good due to being right before his meeting with Putin.

Most likely, I think.

Yeah, but no allegations of Americans aware they were cooperating with Russian GRU military personnel...

We must go back to the island, Jack!

Put down the crack pipe.