(but with the numbers of ICBM's available, combined with traditional bombers and nuclear armed subs, MAD is probably more guaranteed than ever before) — VagabondSpectre
Hardly. Regional wars have been going on continuously since the beginning of the atomic era. It isn't obsolescence that has prevented nuclear war from happening, it's mutually assured destruction. — Bitter Crank
Are you sure they are copying technology? Their missile development is pretty slow and steady for working from specs. They probably did get some basics from either China or the Soviet Union on nuclear technology, but again, the rate of development doesn't seem to be that rapid. — Bitter Crank
Is NK a threat? Well, sure they are. If they can miniaturize a reasonable-sized nuclear weapon so that it would fit on top of a reasonably powerful missile (intercontinental or not), and since they already have submarines that can launch a missile, and even if they can land one bomb successfully in the US, say on Washington, D. C., or Los Angeles, I think we would rather seriously resent having that happen. — Bitter Crank
Of course, we do have absolute superiority over NK, but NK is very, very close to Russia and the PRC. My guess is that both Russia and China would rather seriously resent us having bombed to smithereens a country on their borders. I don't think SK or Japan would be thrilled about it either. — Bitter Crank
Another central idea presented in the Tractatus is the truth-function theory. This theory goes hand-in-hand with the picture theory. "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (T. 5)." Therefore, if you are given all elementary propositions, then you can construct every possible proposition, which fixes their limits (T. 4.51). My understanding is that this sets the limit of language, or sets a limit to what can be said. — Sam26
But what I tried to explain, via the analogy with cryptographic key exchange, is that it still enables fruitful communication with others possessing their own private colors, via mixing with the correct public shared color. — ernestm
Of course, there is no necessity for that either, and one can see a lot of philosophers these days falling into rather depressive solipsistic skepticism. — ernestm
Wittgenstein actually is telling you that everything you ever thought was truth in your entire life could be wrong. It does take a little time for that to sink in. — ernestm
"mirroring" would presume that we carve nature at its joints when we form true propositions — Marchesk
Here's the problem. Wittgenstein goes on to assert the validity of pictures depicting reality, without specifying what criteria are being met to accurately or correctly depict reality. It's not a matter of semantics as to what degree are we 'accurately' or 'correctly' depicting reality because if the assumption that either a picture is in accordance with reality (the state of affairs of being 'True') or is not in accordance with reality (the state of affairs of being 'False'), because we are already making the assumption that what we are saying is 'True' as opposed to being 'False' when talking about pictures of reality (or the representation of states of affairs in reality via the use of elementary propositions, eg. names). Otherwise, if we can't specify the meaning of "correctly" or "accurately" in this context, then sad to say the whole thing is nonsense.I do think there is something to the idea that propositions picture reality, or mirror reality. The problem is that philosophers are always trying to find a precise definition that explains what correspondence means, and precision is not always possible or needed. I think we generally understand what it means for a painting to picture reality, and in many of the same ways we generally understand what it means for a proposition to mirror reality. Is it a model that fits every instance of a proposition? No. — Sam26
From your post "Wittgenstein: The Tractatus Post #5".According to the Tractatus a proposition pictures reality, so if we are to understand a proposition that refers to unicorns, it is because the proposition displays a picture, and that picture either matches up with reality or it does not. If it correctly mirrors reality, then it is true, if it does not mirror reality, then it is false. — Sam26
To me, modal logic looks, well, unnecessary. Or, to be sharper, what does modal logic make possible that was not possible before? — tim wood
But this all pushes for a closer look at your original question, "Thus, is there any valence to logical truths or conditions?" — tim wood
In the link you provided, valence seems to be about the words that can be meaningfully connected to verbs (maybe I got that wrong - please correct!). It seems a miss-application, then, to try to apply valence to logical truths or conditions (what, actually, does "conditions" mean in this context?). — tim wood
An example of the problems that arise absent preparatory groundwork is that I think of logic as being contentless, merely manipulations of symbols under arbitrary rules of manipulation. And some manipulations seem useful; some more than others. How does valence work with symbols? And so forth.... — tim wood
I think what you are interested in, if you truly mean valency as it is defined in chemistry, is some kind of weighted probabilistic logic. — ernestm
So the first rule is that philosophy club shall be anarchic or perverse? — unenlightened
