But not only about the world. After all, although the world is everything that is the case, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. So, there are things about which we cannot speak
The Tractatus is also about that of which we must be silent, despite saying nothing on the topic.
The Investigations is also about that silence.
Wittgenstein realised the limitations of the Tractatus, resulting in the Investigations; which starts with a critique of the approach taken in the Tractatus. The Investigations lays out the background of language against which a work such as the Tractatus must take place; and shows it to be a word game; in the process Wittgenstein makes use of analytic tools showing the limitations of philosophical enquiry.
He turns the Tractatus, and other philosophical systems, into parlour games. — Banno
This would be considered a category error even by Wittgenstein. Facts aren't true. Truth is a property not of facts, but of propositions. — Agustino
This is merely a cop-out. I went through your argument and showed you why your premises don't stack up, especially on Wittgenstein's premises. — Agustino
Circularity isn't the only issue. Meaning doesn't require truth to have meaning at all. Truth is a property of propositions. Propositions are true if they represent an actual state of affairs. Propositions have meaning even when they are false. The only time when they lack meaning is when they are tautologies or contradictions - then they are nonsense. — Agustino
No. They obtain their meaning from the relations they portray between objects as being the case. If this relationship is identical to the one found in the world, then they are also true. But the meaning is the picture they create - whether that picture is true - ie corresponds to the facts - is a different story. — Agustino
Why would an argument be required? "Outside is raining" doesn't require a grounding argument/reason at all to be true. All that is required is that such a situation obtains in the world. — Agustino
Quaint to say for an admirer of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was thoroughly anti-Platonic. — Agustino
I'm not sure. — Heister Eggcart
When you say it 'should not' be used in ordinary language, do you mean the meanings expressed in sentences using 'nothing' should not be expressed at all, or that those sentences really mean something else, and, ideally, people should alter their usage to reflect that? — csalisbury
Really?! You're willowz?! I remember that guy. — Sapientia
My point is that the answer to the question in the OP is that the question itself is grammatically erroneous; with the corollary that facts are not the sort of thing that can be true or false. — Banno
It is asking the correct use of the word 'fact' — Banno
Facts, philosophers like to say, are opposed to theories and to values, they are the objects of certain mental states and acts, they make truth-bearers true and correspond to truths, they are part of the furniture of the world.
Although it seems ... obvious to say, "Truth is correspondence of thought (belief, proposition) to what is actually the case", such an assertion nevertheless involves a metaphysical assumption - that there is a fact, object, or state of affairs, independent of our knowledge to which our knowledge corresponds.
