"In what way is someone dead in a different way if they are not born than if they have lived and died?" — SolarWind

I already explained my contention in what you quoted. — schopenhauer1

That is pathetic. When someone is at a loss, they refer to an ominous have already explained.
The status "not born" and the status "already dead" should be the same (in this moment).
You didn't go into the rest with the exit-pill either.

"Suppose there were a pill that killed instantly, should parents be allowed to bring children into the world if the children were allowed to take that pill at any time?

Surely that would be in accordance with your logic?" — SolarWind

No, procreation isn't justified with faster ways to commit suicide. It's like a game that you start for someone else, and death is an escape. The very fact that you have to do this harm of death, is enough reason not to start the game for that person. It is quite presumptuous to assume, "Well, you'll just endure it.. death is your only option". Something wrong about that. Never existing and existing and then dying are two very different cases. — schopenhauer1

In what way is someone dead in a different way if they are not born than if they have lived and died?

If a child is born with the exit-pill and it is happy, then it will not take the pill, if it becomes very unhappy, then it can take the pill at any time and is dead in a second, as if it had never been born.

It is about the parent making the decision that affects someone negatively. Don't do it. — schopenhauer1

Suppose there were a pill that killed instantly, should parents be allowed to bring children into the world if the children were allowed to take that pill at any time?

Surely that would be in accordance with your logic?

There is no metaphysical entity that exists prior to its birth. — schopenhauer1

Let's assume that's true.

Children often say to their parents, "Why did you give birth to me?". The parents might reply, "What would you be if you had not been born, would that be better or worse?"

This is obviously a comparison of existence with non-existence. In this comparison, non-existence does not win over existence, but the comparison is invalid.

What is wrong with my argument?

So did you read the two reformulations that I wrote below this? I purposely added that in anticipation of this kind of objection. Benatar takes a view that prevention of harm is always good, even if there are no subjective entities to know this. The reformulations below this reformulate this for people who do not have this point of view of the absolute "goodness" of "no harm". — schopenhauer1

Of course I read it. Nevertheless, everything depends on the evaluation of self-non-existence.
If self-non-existence is like hell, then you save someone from that hell by bringing him into life.

A personal question, how do you imagine death, are you afraid of it?

2) There is no rebirth. Then one is non-existent before and after life. One compares existence with non-existence. This comparison is impossible. Mathematically speaking: Is 42 greater or less than 0/0? — SolarWind

No, not exactly what's going on. One way to answer this is the Benatarian Asymmetry argument.

Essentially his idea is that if there is no actual person, not experiencing good is neither good nor bad (as there is no "one" to be deprived). It is neutral. — schopenhauer1

In this "neutral" lies the problem. If death is self-non-existence, how are we to imagine it? Seeing nothing and hearing nothing? But the perception of blackness and silence is also a perception. One has to imagine this perception away too.

It is not the same as a dreamless sleep, because one can speak of that after awakening. Personally, I find the indefinable self-non-existence frightening and not neutral.

@all: This question is easy to analyse, but probably impossible to answer.

1) There is rebirth, then you have to compare the probabilities of what the child will be reborn as, because life is always lived. Do I give the child better or worse conditions than the average?

2) There is no rebirth. Then one is non-existent before and after life. One compares existence with non-existence. This comparison is impossible. Mathematically speaking: Is 42 greater or less than 0/0?

How to continue?

Are there people here who think everything is physics?

Please show your world view.

@TheMadFool

You simply compare the set {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} with the set {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}, where the star indicates which life you would live in the corresponding world.
It is possible that the persons are materially identical in pairs, i.e. A* =(material) A, B =(material) B, ... , Y =(material) Y, Z =(material) Z*. So {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} =(material) {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}, but of course also {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} <>(total) {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}. — SolarWind

I do not compare A with Z, but A with A* and Z with Z*. And of course I consider not only the body but also the memories. The memories are stored physically, of course, and belong to the material world.

If physicalists don't answer to feelings/qualia, you just admit that physicalism is incomplete?

Compatibility is not enough. That 3 times 3 is 9 does not contradict the world formula, but it does not explain it either.

Physicalism, as epiphenomenalism, certainly does not contradict the first-person perspective, but it does not explain it either.

How, please, does a feeling arise from four forces, how many atoms does it need at the very least, does the C-virus also have feelings?

These are all questions I like to pummel physicists with.

Well, your thought experiment shows only that if you assume dualism at the outset, then dualism is what you will conclude. Same with identity thought experiments: they need not pose problems for physicalism unless you have already assumed that they do. — SophistiCat

I can simplify the thought experiment even further. Let us assume that physicalism is true. Then the description of the world would simply be the particles and fields. Some form living beings.

Nowhere in this description is there any mention of which living being you are.

The pointer is missing.

More importantly, these thought experiments are (in)famously controversial; they are the opposite of an argument. If anything, their controversy suggests that there may not be objectively right or wrong answers to the questions that they pose. — SophistiCat

The teletransporting / copy-beam thought experiment shows that it is unclear what the objective solution is, not that there is none.
Both the beaming and my thought experiment show the same thing: physics has an explanatory gap with personal identity => physicalism is incomplete.

I suppose one could say that every brainstate is me? So as you say, as I forget my name, there will be a brain state that correlates with it. — DoppyTheElv

How is the brain state defined? Let's assume that a super technology makes it possible to replace every neuron with a functionally identical chip and turn your brain into a computer.

Would you then be that computer or would you be dead and the computer would just claim to be you?

In set theory, these would be the same set. Your insistence on a difference nonetheless is precisely the circularity in your argument. This is not a subtle point. — Kenosha Kid

Let's assume that reincarnation is true.
Would it make a difference to you which creature you were reborn as?

The brain changes every moment you learn or forget something => you are another person every minute.

Please explain how you can be identical with a dynamic object.

When you go to the toilet, how can you say you are the same person afterwards as before?

Afterwards you are lighter than before, so you cannot be identical with a body.

As others have pointed out, you postulate a difference between materially identical worlds, then conclude that these materially identical worlds are different thus dualism. Your conclusion is in your premises: a circular argument. — Kenosha Kid

No, it isn't. It is simple set theory.

You simply compare the set {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} with the set {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}, where the star indicates which life you would live in the corresponding world.
It is possible that the persons are materially identical in pairs, i.e. A* =(material) A, B =(material) B, ... , Y =(material) Y, Z =(material) Z*. So {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} =(material) {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}, but of course also {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} <>(total) {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}.

See it as a proof of contradiction.

As already mentioned, the worlds should not exist simultaneously, but alternatively. Thus the question does not arise "where" these worlds are.

A simple question: Would it make no difference to you whether you lead your current life or the life of another person, for example George Clooney, of course including his body and memories?

It is incredible how such a simple proof can be so misleading. Two ideas are compared. Can two ideas be identical or only the same? It does not matter.

The central assertion of my proof is: WA = WZ (physical), but WA <> WZ (total), therefore something unphysical must exist.

If these are parallel worlds that are identical, then they have the same "histories", and person A in one world would have the same memories and history as person A in the other world.

Of course they are identical. This is the core of the proof, it is not a bug, it is a feature.

More formal speaking you compare world A = ({A,B,C, ... ,X,Y,Z} living as A) with world Z = ({A,B,C, ... ,X,Y,Z} living as Z).

What about the space each world occupies? is it also identical for both worlds?

You compare two visions. They are not beside each other. They are alternatives. And they are not equal. It plays a role being one person or another. Don't you think so?