I borrow Sellars' terms because I think it's a useful distinction, but aside from that, I'm not a fan (nor do I dislike him), and he has not he been an influence on me, despite his important contributions in epistemology.

Do you think their interrelationship important enough to work out a detailed characterization? — ucarr

That's a very hard question. It seems to me that, if I look at any ordinary manifest object, whatever science can tell me about it, falls considerably short of my experience of that object. I assume this points to our rich cognitive constitution and how much it adds to the world itself.

Given this, I don't think that a detailed characterization can be given: one can always add more aspects of experience (phenomenology) to a manifest object.

When possible, the way we are happens to coincide with some aspects of the way the world is, when these interact, we have a possible science. If not, we don't.

Skepticism, as I'm using it here, means withholding judgment on principle until rational examination (and possible experimentation) are conducted. Accordingly, examination evaluates skepticism just as it evaluates truth claims. — ucarr

This sounds to me like reasonable skepticism, so, I have no reason to disagree here.

Is the distinction to the effect that manifest ontology = via the senses and scientific ontology = via reasoned understanding based upon experimentation? — ucarr

No. Although it is tempting to put forth such distinctions, as it looks neat and saves us from doing more work, I don't think it holds up.

There is plenty of understanding and experimentation done in the manifest image, and the scientific image ultimately rests on whatever sense data tells us about the phenomena of the world.

If you are skeptical to some degree, do you ever apply it to your manifest ontology? — ucarr

Depends on what you mean by skepticism in terms of scope and depth. A healthy does of skepticism is good, but figuring out what "healthy" amounts to is not easy.

Anything stronger than that would be self-defeating, and there are no definitive answers against skepticism, even after thousand of years.

It's a good question.

It doesn't really have a label per se, recognized as such by most of the historians of philosophy, save for Arthur O. Lovejoy, nevertheless, Chomsky, who knows about the classics of this period (17-19th century phil.) referred to it as "rationalistic idealism."

He has in mind Descartes and the Cambridge Neo-Platonists, Henry More and particularly, Ralph Cudworth.

Virtually unknown today, but, quite persuasive, IMO.

Sure. But the plucking can happen by something "external", say, seeing a stone, or a hallucination of a stone.

The actual object need not be in the world, for us to react to it the way we do.

Well, as presented by Lucy Allais (it's a long quote to quote by hand at the moment), it seems to me that a Cartesian account of perception is correct, over Kant's actually. The thing is, Kant attempts to show how perception usually happens in ordinary life.

But the principle of perception is better explained by a Cartesian framework: what matters is what the subject reacts to, now what's happening in the so called external world.

But Idealism got a bad start by being usually associated with Berkeley, in denying the existence of a mind independent world. It need not be that at all.

Sure, Kastrup may argue differently, but, he's not convincing, I don't think.

Ah, then it is a good point.



Ah well, if its behavior, then, that's a different thing. But behavior can be very misleading, in terms of, not confusing the data (which is what behavior is) from the theory (that which causes the behavior).

Oh, that's interesting. It looks tricky to me, because, why use consciousness when intelligence can be way more efficient?

That's probably true. The issue then become, to what extent is it intelligible to create a separation between consciousness and intelligence?

Because if these aren't thought about carefully, we might attribute a lot of intelligence to almost all living creatures. And that's tricky.

I think the problem here already lies in the premise, that consciousness is a kind of AI. Or that it could be somehow transcribed to AI terms and relevant technology.

It seems to me that this is the immediate stumbling block. Brains are biological organs that have gone through billions of years of evolution. Machines, are things people do, and are much less sophisticated (by far) from anything that could be done with any technology.

There's also the issue that there are no machines in nature, we could choose to think of nature as a machine, but this would be misleading taken literally.

As for the general question, I think we don't know anywhere nearly enough about experience to even know where to begin on how to create consciousness. And we likely never will, given our cognitive limitations as natural beings.

Piranesi - Susanna Clarke

Sure insights come in all shapes an sizes. But I'm guessing the OP had in mind the deeper kind of insights, which, for me at least, are difficult to verbalize merely because many experiences cannot be put into words in a way that renders them intelligible.

But aside that, yes, other kinds of sensations and perspectives can be described rationally.

The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume II by Descartes

The Kind Worth Killing by Peter Swanson

Not just the US, if that makes you feel better, Europe too. Send as many weapons as possible, care virtually nothing about diplomatic negotiations (minus France, and initially, Germany) and let the war continue as long as possible.

With the Republicans, it's a gamble. If Trump wins again, maybe? Then again, you've surely seen comments by members of the House saying to "call Putin's bluff". Yeah, ok. Neither party is good here at all.

If they cared about Ukrainian lives prior to the war, they would have agreed to implement the MINSK II agreements, and avoid all of this, which has been warned about for decades now, never mind Putin.

It is despicable, but it is also a fact. That's how power works.

The point, so far as the US is concerned, is to weaken Russia as much as possible, paying for it with Ukrainian lives, not just dollars.

Nevertheless, this might well be a game of who "blinks" first. Either there is a miscalculation and Russia goes crazy, or it exhausts itself and demolishes all of Ukraine and decides to leave. It's not a good gamble.

But you are correct. The US (nor any major country, let's be honest) cared about Ukraine, until this war happened. Now they are getting the support victims should get.

But as soon as the objectives are completed, I don't think the US (meaning the military and the high echelons of power) will care much about Ukraine.

Hope I'm wrong.

Which is all very good. But who supplies most of the weapons in NATO? Who controls the vast majority of budget in NATO? It's not Europe. This article does not show how Europe should proceed to become "autocratic".

One thing is to follow the remarks made by Merkel, that Europe should have it's own defense and foreign policy. That makes sense.

But that's not what Europe is doing, it's simply expanding US controlled NATO, by rendering countries with less control of whatever foreign policy they had.

"...but a moment of the brutal attempt to change our entire geopolitical situation. The true target of the war is the dismantlement of the European unity advocated not only by the US conservatives and Russia but also by the European extreme right and left – at this point, in France, Melenchon meets Le Pen."

What the hell is he talking about?



Yeah, saw my mistake and changed it right away. It is a misleading subtitle nonetheless.

I sometimes find him entertaining. But he is not a serious scholar, there are many instances of pretty BAD scholarship in his work, with very sloppy reasoning, which should put one on guard.

Interesting that in the subtitle, "We need a stronger nato", is very badly argued.

I don't know. I don't think nuclear annihilation is worth it, even if it may come off as cowardly.

One of his worst articles in a long while.

Thanks for sharing.

That is quite remarkable. Not that I should be surprised, what with all papers submitted at the pressure to publish or perish.

It's a (very) slight relief to know that there is non-sense everywhere, though, much harder to formulate in the hard sciences.

But still, surprising. Thanks for bringing it up, will have to make sure to take a good look at it later.

I think the issue is here is that the topic is made to be more complex than it is, often with good reasons. When it comes to matters of will in general, and especially free will, we are utterly in the dark so far as science is concerned - though this has been and will continue to be, fiercely disputed..

I think the difference is simply this: there is an immediate, recognizable difference between, say, raising your arm now (go ahead and do this) and having someone else lift it up for you. Likewise with moving your leg and having a doctor hit it with a device that causes a muscle reaction that results in movement.

We can then set up elaborate exercises in which we consider a person being in prison vs. being free in a city, etc., etc.

Sean Carroll, who I believe is compatibilist, nevertheless makes a good point. Suppose you steal some money off a cash register or do something else which is wrong. If determinism is true, then, strictly speaking, the cause of you stealing the money is directly related the big bang and the laws of physics than then developed.

Most people chuckle at this, and rightly so. But we could not have a functioning society without at least considering it real (even if, somehow, someone can prove it to be an illusion).

It's a very interesting question. I agree that they can (but it doesn't mean they will) produce insight, but it's not the type of insight that can be expressed rationally. Granted, if one does not wish to pass off as a mystic, then the safest thing to say is that they can show you how powerful the mind is, in a manner which is not as common otherwise.

I've tried to write down these feelings of elation, the result was the same as you described. But as that old joke goes, based on real life events, a person once had an insight while on laughing gas. When they sobered up and saw what they wrote, it was gibberish.

Does this mean that the insight did not occur? I don't think so. It's just very hard to convey these things to other people with words. This is why people write novels about love or hate or anything else.

The issue is that the best way to express ones ideas to another person, is to do so with reasons. And reasons, much more often than not, require sobriety (or at least non-extreme intoxication.)

The alternative is to write a novel, as I said. But few can be bothered to do that.

The usual way of speaking about the world is in terms of a "physical world", because there is more to the universe than matter.

But the word "material", or even "physical", does not matter much, it's a terminological preference. What matters is whether there is an external world or not, this is irrespective of the terms used to describe the stuff of this world.

We add conceptions to the representations in the naming of them, sure...red, loud, rough, etc., a veritable plethora, but I’m not sure we add color, sound, or texture to general intuitions. I rather think these are given to us merely by the mode of receptivity having the capacity for it. Why have ears if not to hear sound? — Mww

I believe the gist of the issue is that of "receptivity". Although it is, in a sense, true that we are receptive to these properties of the phenomena, it is nonetheless misleading, in as much as hearing, seeing, touching are active capacities, they just don't feel active, because they are unconscious or sub-conscious.

If they're not active, then we lose them: people go blind, deaf and so on.

How does the fact we add to the world weaken Collingwood’s metaphysical scheme? I thought his metaphysics was predicated on “thinking scientifically”, same as Kant. You must have meant something else by adding to the world. — Mww

I had in mind his claim that metaphysics is about "absolute presuppositions". I think it is more than this. It goes beyond statements about what we presuppose to actual experience. Then again, I may be misreading his project.

Plenty of figures claim "scientific" metaphysics, like Peirce or Russell. Those are good. But once we get to Quine and beyond, no, thanks.

metaphysical reductionist — Mww

Not sure what this means.

is that there are mind-independent attributes of the environment which are perceived or cognized in various similar ways by other animals as well as humans. — Janus

In some respects yes. One property that seemingly most minds do, is attribute a permanent existence to objects in experience. In reality, we know that these objects change all the time, but we don't perceive them in this manner.

We must accept solidity as a fact of our experience of the external world, which seems to have such a property. The rest is more difficult to pin out, because I see them as forms or organizing stimulus, rather than the world per se. Although the world is the one providing the stimulus. It's a kind of receding object.

Sorry, my thinking goes way down at this time of day... :)

I think the most plausible explanation is that there are real mind-independent "structures" that constrain the ways we perceive things. We can't say what they are completely "absent us", because anything we can say is not absent us. — Janus

Yes, there are structures. I think so too. The nature of these structures are hard to decipher, I think. Even though we manage to navigate the world somehow, it's not trivial.

I do think there are things absent us, we cannot merely think the world to completion, because we don't have enough relevant data. Hence the need for further experience, and science and experimentation.

only to their representations. — Mww

Yes. Thanks for the correction.

Objects do things to us, by the affect they have on our sensibility, which gives us those representations. This is how they individuate themselves, by affecting us differently. If we did things to objects, there wouldn’t be any ding an sich. — Mww

Here it becomes tricky. Yes, objects-as(the grounds of)-representations do things to us - provide stimulation. I would stress that the effects given by the representation is extremely slight given the richness of the reply we offer said stimulation.

Well, I mean, we do add colours, sounds and textures to the representations (which are anchored to objects as things in themselves). So we do do something to them, or we attribute said properties to the effects objects have on us as representations. But the thing in itself remains postulated.

But all that aside....what would a list of these problems entail? — Mww

I mean, it could be a Collingwood-esque presupposition, things in themselves that is. Not everybody buys it as you know. I do, in a modified form.

Well, it's not anything too revelatory at all, but this entails that we add much more to the world than what we otherwise would normally assume. If one can appreciate the scale of this, then the very scheme which Collingwood elaborates as being "metaphysics", seems to weaken.

Because I take metaphysics to be about the world, but it turns out we can say very little about it.

.what would the function of intentionality be, such that the absence of it makes the system untenable at best, and thought impossible at worst? — Mww

I'm not clear on the function. We know too little about the nature of mental processes. A guess would be, it gives further stability to world, and helps anchor thoughts to representations, which would otherwise not be differentiated properly.

What is the result, or, what is its contribution to the system? — Mww

Again, my guess is stability and facilitating the process of thinking.

How do you feel about equating individuation with conceptualization? — Mww

I would say that individuation is part of the conceptualization we use to navigate the world. Individuation, much like the continuity of representations, and the stability representations seems to have, are facts of our cognitive make up.

Strictly speaking, your dog sees phenomena which he can't pass through, we call it a "WALL" or a "STEP". If the object can be moved by a certain motion and then pushed or pulled, we call that a DOOR.

The best I can guess, is that a dog puts together an association of ideas: something like PRESS, PULL and the the idea of an OPEN AREA: the garden or the street, etc.

They lack linguistic concepts, so I have to assume that whatever goes in inside the skull, is an extremely watered down version of what we do.

Yes, I think most animals have an idea of orientation, which is why many newborn animals don't jump off a nest or off a table as soon as they're born, or why sea turtles known exactly where to go as soon as they are born.

So, It seems clear to me that our differentiation of objects cannot be arbitrary or entirely dependent on us. — Janus

I agree that it is not arbitrary: far from it. The "entirely dependent" part is very tough. It depends on what we assume the object must have, absent us.

What I would stress is, regardless of the world, what matters is how the creature reacts to the stimulation, more so than the actual world: moths flying to lamps (instead of the moon), dogs mistaking toys for food, tigers mistaking mirrors for other tigers, etc.

Granted, I am giving examples of deviation from the norm, but what I think this shows is animals react to stimulations, regardless of if the trigger is the one the animals thinks it is.

You can reply that the tiger is reacting to a property of the mirror and the moth to a property of the lamp. And in a sense it is true, yet we would not want to say that a mirror is another tiger, nor a lamp the literal moon. So we may say certain properties of light, are mind-independent.

That' the difficult area for me.

I think we experience space and time, extension and duration, and we also experience materiality, simply in being embodied, So, they all presuppose one another; they are codependently arising, as the Buddhists say. — Janus

Yes, that's what I'm trying to get as. Having read the CPR, it seems to me that the "the a-priori sensible intuitions", include more than space and time. Schopenhauer adds causality, I think something along the lines of what you mention is more on the mark.

For even if we assume these to be true (which I think they are), if we lacked say, embodiment or continuity in consciousness, space and time would be moot.

Granted, Kant likely says that these other things mentioned are explained by some other faculty we have, but, I'm not convinced that space and time exhaust these intuitions.

If that were so, how would we explain the fact that, when in front of one or the other no one will disagree as to which they are looking at? — Janus

Because people make that judgment as to what a mountain or a plain is, and we share the same cognition (as dogs do with other dogs and birds with other birds, etc.), so there is no reason why they should disagree.

In the world absent us, there is no differentiation, nature doesn't care. Or so it looks so to me.

Not sure why we would need to individuate objects when they individuate themselves and we merely recognize the differences. — Mww

I don't think this is the case. That's something we do to objects. There is no reason to think that absent us, there is any difference between a mountain and a plain, yet we clearly distinguish these.

I'm aware that speaking of mountains and plains absent people is speaking of "things in themselves", nevertheless, I think the thought experiment can be done as an illustration, while not denying the very real, insurmountable problems, associated with things in themselves.

I mean....it’s logically possible all objects are exactly the same in themselves, but if they are we can’t explain why we don’t perceive them all as possessing the exact same uniform identity. — Mww

That's what Schopenhauer thought, that it made no sense to speak of thingS in themselves, but the thing-in-itself. Doesn't mean he's right, of course, but it sounds persuasive to me.

Probably why Mother gave us multiple sensory devices, to prove to ourselves objects are individuated already. — Mww

Sensations do not give us reasons to invoke individuation, that's what the intellect does.



Ah, well, could it be that intentionality is the continuation of intuition, say, it's conscious aspect? The point of intentionality as I see it, is that it can't be eliminated from thought.

Neither can intuition be eliminated from our cognitive constitution, without us losing the ability to make sense of the world we have.

I am blurring the lines here between conceptions and absolute presuppositions, I'm aware of this.

Nevertheless, along with space and time, I cannot imagine consciousness (experience as I prefer to call it) without intentionality. If we lacked this capacity of our experience being directed at objects, there would be no way for individuation of objects in our conception of them.

It's not clear to me that say, Kant's comments about intuitions are the same or different from intentionality. They appear similar to me, but am not sure yet.

Nevertheless, I think such a component must be a factor in the possibility of objects, otherwise we would be stuck with entire "landscapes" (so to speak), instead of objects.

Put in another way, if you remove it, you can't even state presuppositions being about anything.

Intentionality seems to me to be an active component of cognition, which cannot be done away with. But this may be my own peculiarity.

That's fair enough.

I think that by now, intentionality in general should also be such a presupposition as well.

Yes, that was not the correct phrasing. I'm talking about actual real life, everyday affairs. How could we tell that space and time are a priori without something else that allows us to put them to use?

A rough analogy would be, we have eyes, which allow us to see colours. Nevertheless, if we are in a locked room (since birth) so dark we cannot even make out anything at all, we can't well say that we see colours until we get out of the room.

The potential for colours is there, but not triggered unless there is appropriate stimulus.

Perhaps something akin to this would happen in the case of space and time being a priori, absent an environment that allows us to put these into use.

I used those terms in that post broadly, attempting to point out that without something in the world to contrast with out experience, it would not be evident that we could tell that space and time were a-priori.

Strictly speaking yes, "stuff" and "matter" are different things. But to signify something that is independent of us, these terms can be used loosely to point out this general idea.

I anticipate a lot of interesting exchanges, though this may be my imagination going rampant. I agree, pre 1905, space and time were absolute presuppositions. But then I wonder, in manifest experience, would we be able to isolate space and time absent stuff (matter, substance, etc.)?

We need space and time to access matter, but without matter, I don't see how space and time, innate as they are, could be exhibited. Perhaps matter, alongside being presupposed by space and time, allows us to discover that space and time are a priori.

For if we had no empirical world to use these faculties, I don't see how anything could become manifest as a priori or as being formed by our experience.

Yeah, I’ve occassioned on the phrase a time or two myself. Loaded with subtleties, I must say. — Mww

Indeed. I wonder if modern physics and also astronomy, might play an important role in reconceptualizing what possible experiences could be conceived as.

Very soon, I could start a thread on these things. Or, we can keep it private.

I'll leave the option open to you.

I’ll wait for something to actually qualify as an absolute pre-supposition, which a metaphysics of anything, would surely demand. — Mww

The only thing that would be required given the constraints of the thread would be the pre-supposition that everything that is, is made of matter.

In other words, given the limitations of the thread, there cannot be something which is not matter, in any possible experience (dammit, I wonder were I got that phrase from?).

Nevertheless, this as an absolute pre-supposition, does not say a lot. Because even back then, they still did not know what does not count as "matter", aside from stipulations (mind is not matter, etc.).

Amen man. :clap:

Thanks for sharing that beautiful review.

I can handle tough, I think. But not boring (for too long anyway).

Hopefully we could exchange some further opinions on several novels some time.

I have heard of Night Watch, but have not read it.

If you want a mixture of Russian culture with Buddhism, I think you might very well like Viktor Pelevin's Buddha's Little Finger, it's very philosophical. I have to re-read it again, but I remember being quite impressed.

I will have to check out the Dublin Murder Squad, the name sounds interesting.

Back then I'm not sure if they even calculated how much of the universe was knowable.

But the point you bring up, is extremely important to stress.

Although it is absolutely breathtaking that we have managed, as rather special creatures (given unique properties not found in other animals) to understand a portion of the universe, the overwhelmingly majority, we do not know.

And it's not even clear that these remaining things should be considered "matter" and "energy".

It's a way to learn about Japanese culture that is entertaining. The book was pretty good, she knows Japan very well. But there are others that are much better, by Japanese authors.

Mostly murder-mysteries, with some exceptions.

Despite most people's intuition on this topic, I don't think the topic is trivial.

In fact, far from it. But the fact the it isn't trivial does not mean that it doesn't have an answer.

I disagree. If the universe can not be understood, science is pointless. — Clarky

We come up to the point raised in the title of the thread: the metaphysics of materialism. If you say that studying the universe as was done in 1905 is metaphysics - that's fine. Though I doubt scientists then thought they were doing metaphysics.

They were doing physics. They study what we still call "matter", but beyond that name, I don't see a metaphysics. They studied the universe, call it whatever you like. The results won't vary if you call matter, "immaterial" or "mental", as you seem to agree.

I should've emphasized that I have in mind intuitive understanding of the universe, which was the goal of the great scientists/philosophers of the 17th century onward. This has been dropped, even before 1905.

But if by understand you mean "theoretical understanding" - then we do not disagree, and happily, science has a point. Understanding is a complex topic in its own right.