Sure, I agree, but I must grant "powers" (to use Locke's vocabulary) to the objects, such that they cause in us experience so and so, repeatedly. These "powers" are only considered as such, for creatures with experience, of course.

Thus the same structure causes two different (or many) "realities" to different creatures. But if I don't postulate a structure behind the experience, I'm forced to say that I'm causing my own experiences of objects.

But that says nothing about whether the actual structures would remain; and that is all I've been claiming. — Janus

:lol:

I enjoy arguing with you and @Mww, because, so far, it's always been pleasant we may agree to disagree without feeling mad or anything.

I don't think I've disputed that structures remain. We agree here.

What do you gain by saying "actual" structure? I ask because, I could imagine another intelligent being, conceptualizing the same thing, in a way we would not. For example what we call a "pond", could be bed to that creature.

The same structure causes us to see a pond, causes an alien to see a bed.

Well, if a previous culture was gone, and we recover it, we reconstruct (or attempt to) what we think their symbols meant, that's granting the point that the culture we retrieve is human (like-us), otherwise, I'd be skeptical that we could make much sense of what it left.

Why would there have to be creatures with "these concepts" in order for physical structures in various forms to exist? — Janus

No, I don't doubt that some kind of structure remains. But I think a structure can only make sense to a creature that makes sense of it. I can't well say that a physical structure makes sense to itself.

It very likely exists it some manner, I don't doubt that, but what can be said of this existence, absent people is very little.

For instance, I don't think a feline creature or an insect, would make sense of a building, and if the only creatures that remained after a nuclear holocaust were insects, then there'd be very little world to speak of, it would be something like an undifferentiated mass, with places to go to and maybe some food.

Say humanity was instantly and totally wiped out somehow; you don't think all the buildings, roads, furniture, cars and so on would remain? — Janus

Something would remain, yes. That's the belief in the external world.

But what would remain would not be "buildings", "roads", "furniture" nor "cars". They would be "things", or some other very general, abstract term.

I very much doubt another creature has these concepts, nor knows what these things are.

OK. :ok:

then have the gall to suggest that the world is incomprehensible because of that. It's incrediblely unbelievable. — StreetlightX

No. The gall is suggesting that mere animals can understand everything. We've gotten rid of God in most philosophy, but the idea of being all knowing still persists.

As far as I know, in a mere 300-400 years, our innate, inborn given natures have not changed. I may be wrong in that, we may have advanced conceptually by leaps and bounds, but the evidence suggests babies and children have the intuition that Descartes had about the physical world.

We can't get rid of our intuitions. You can't tell me you don't see the Sun rising in the east and setting in the west even if we know the Sun does no such thing, we can't help but see it.

Like I said, imagine a post-scholastic Chomsky saying: "we don't know how essence, or attribute, or mode, or [insert outdated vocabulary which no one uses anymore here] works, and it's unlikely that we will ever know. We'll just likely 'move on'!". One would laugh. One does laugh. — StreetlightX

Let's translate then. Essence to fundamental, attribute to property and mode to way of acting.

What's fundamental to matter? Many things, but if you want to be strict, you can say quantum fields, everything else is an illusion. That seems to leave out a lot of fundamental stuff, oh well.

Property. Can you explain to me how a photon turns to the colour we experience when we see an apple or the sky?

Way of acting. Depends on how it's applied, it seems to me that's what we study, how matter acts, not knowing what it is.

Laughable is the folly of creatures who think they have no limits. Literally.

"It has become standard practice in recent years to describe the problem of consciousness as “the hard problem,” others being within our grasp, now or down the road.I think there are reasons for some skepticism, particularly when we recognize how sharply understanding declines beyond the simplest systems of nature."

p.177

"History also suggests caution. In early modern science, the nature of motion was the “hard problem.” “Springing or Elastic Motions” is the “hard rock in Philosophy,” Sir William Petty observed, proposing ideas resembling those soon developed much more richly by Newton. The “hard problem” was that bodies that seem to our senses to be at rest are in a “violent” state, with “a strong endeavor to fly off or recede from one another,” in Robert Boyle’s words."

178.

"The “hard problems” of the day were not solved; rather abandoned, as, over time, science turned to its more modest post-Newtonian course."

179.

Very arrogant...

Unless one thinks that mysterianism is either 1) not true in principle or 2) The we don't know yet argument, which misses the point the article is establishing.

Option 1 , suggests that we have no limits in principle: we can know everything there is to know, we just have to work hard enough at a problem. That removes us from biology and nature.

Aside from not understanding (intuitive understanding) how gravity works, we can point to other obvious mysteries: free will, how the world produces qualia, creativity in ordinary language use, imagination, how matter can think and so on.

One can deny free will, to make it less problematic, though no one alive would accept the practical consequences of denying such a thing. One can deny we have common sense intuitions, because we aren't biological creatures.

The we don't know yet, sure, a lot too. We don't know what dark matter/dark energy is, we could find out, or we could not. We don't know if the universe had a beginning or if it is eternal, we could find out, or not.

I think the arrogance is in the opposite view, that we can know everything, that's a theological view of human beings. We should be grateful that we can do what we already can.

It's now part of a book called What Kind of Creatures Are We? which speaks of different topics concerning human nature, it begins with an essay called What Can We Understand? What is Language? and What is the Common Good? ending up with this one.

Since I've read this essay, many, many times, I don't find it confusing, though it can be dense given how much he cites. If you have a more specific question, maybe I can help out. But I think the point here is to show how we've had to lower the standards of intelligibility in human enquiry, because we know much less than we thought.

I cannot be grateful enough to Magee, he set me forth into philosophy, without him, I wouldn't have been were I am.

He points out that the problem with empiricism or "transcendental realism", is that it "mistakes an epistemology for an ontology". He's right.

But that doesn't see that even the scientific picture is also a construction (vorstellung, vijñāna). Which is not to say that it's false or untrue but that its limitations need to be recognised. — Wayfarer

It seem probable that science is the intersection between our cognitive faculties (a science forming faculty) and some aspects of the mind independent world: it's interesting to note that the most direct avenue we have for our best science, physics, is mathematics.

And you know of Russell's quote here.

It's easier, cognitively, less taxing - to say those things I see, are out there, in a way not too dissimilar to what they appear to us. It's less confusing. The alternative, that these things are overwhelmingly (but in my opinion, not exclusively) a product of us, is really hard to grasp, I think.

Actually, I remember posting this recently, I'll repost it here, it struck me as a very nice quote from Hume, proving your point. Putting aside the dualism implied in the quote, for Hume, free will, is clearly a mystery:

"Is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body; by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered, by a secret wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit; this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension."

- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Exactly!

He tends to rely on quoting others, we interpret if we think he agrees with the person he's quoting.

Me personally, as I read this essay and say, Locke and heck, how I experience ordinary life it's pretty obvious to me (though I may be peculiar here), I don't have a clue how a colourless photon could create colour experience, or how sound waves could be interpreted as music, etc.

I mean, I know the phenomena happens, I can see the evidence. I can make no sense of it.

does not entail that things are mind-dependent. — Janus

Do you have in mind ordinary objects (tables and chairs) or scientific objects (atoms and electrons)?

I think there's a case for mind dependence on both, it just so happens that in the latter case, there is a chance convergence between out mental constitutions and the external world.

But I would not understand what you would mean to say that something like tables and chairs are in any way mind independent.

But in another and more important sense, our knowledge of it is dependent on our mind and on the capacities of the human cognitive apparatus and the categories of the understanding. Insofar as we know the world, that world - the world as it appears to us - is all that we ever know. — Wayfarer

That should be uncontroversial.

I mean, what other option is there? Unless we attribute actual cognition to the world.

I would tend to agree, idealism or physicalism, to me, are essentially a terminological quibble in terms of the actual state of affairs.

A whole different can of worms would be, say, realism (of any kind) vs. eliminitavism, I think that much has substance.

I see your point, and acknowledge that the question is not decidable (that of the mind-independence of things), but I'm obsessed with it, particularly the variant of "things in themselves", but the onus would be on me to show why this matters or should matter.

I agree that phenomenology can be very useful. And although Husserl is frequently referred to (likely correctly) here, I think Sellar's distinction between "Manifest" and "Scientific" images is actually quite important.

But I see your point, I'm not arguing against it, I guess its related to temperament.

Yeah, the problem would be in knowing how much mind-dependence to attribute to different aspects of the world, as in, obviously other animals would exist and have to be so "minded", but when we get to lower organisms or rocks, there are significant problems here in terms of what sense it makes to say that such things have an independent existence. I'm not saying they don't, I'm agnostic here, I think there's something there, but it's nature is unknown.

I see your point about performative contradiction. It's an extremely obscure territory to me.

In any case, thanks for sharing, interesting thoughts.

This isn't an attack or anything, but, since I'm roughly a Schopenhauerian, can you tell me or if not, share a post in which you say why you think he's wrong or in what parts?

I'd be interested.

Chalmers' says a lot of things, but I wouldn't be surprised if he accepted this formulation.

It may be abandoned in terms of being called the "hard problem", much like gravity's (or motion more generally) non-mechanistic effects had to be accepted: we'll have to accept the fact that matter thinks, without knowing why.

That's not to say that gravity or consciousness aren't "hard problems", they are. On this view, there are many hard problems in science and human understanding more generally.

Correct. That was poorly phrased, we can say that Newton's laws work on certain scales,

Einstein's "happiest thought" was essentially a thought experiment that helped him begin to develop a new theory, I doubt he had Newton is mind.

https://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Realistic-Monism---Why-Physicalism-Entails-Panpsychism-Galen-Strawson.pdf

pp.20-24 is the part you'd be interested in, top 3rd of pp.20: "What about the emergence of life?"

To save you much terminological hassle: E means "experiential", NE means "non-experiential".

Experiential is basically consciousness.

Non-experiential is everything that doesn't have experience: a table, a rock, wood (maybe), dry paint, particles, etc.

The topic of the bacterium is very interesting, my intuition doesn't reach that far, but I could imagine a very elementary reaction that could be an extremely rudimentary experience.

Sure! If you are interested, I can see if I can find you an article - or a part of an article - in which Strawson talks about the problem of life in relation to panpsychism.

The gist of it was (if I remember correctly) that all of "life" could be explained by our physics, chemistry and biology, but this still does not touch on the topic of experience at all.



Very astute concision.

Maybe I'm not as well versed on this topic matter; still, I don't find a necessary conflict between the idea of panpsychism and the idea of radical emergence: e.g., even if panpsychism, there would yet be a radical enough emergence of life from nonlife. Any idea of why the two would need to be contradictory? — javra

Strawson postulates panpsychism as necessary because emergence cannot be brute or "radical": there must be something in the phenomena by which new properties arise as they do (in this case consciousness or experience), otherwise it would be a miracle every time a new property arises in nature.

Since Strawson takes experience to be the most obvious physical fact of existence (Strawson's materialism makes him say that everything that exists is physical, he means everything), the basic building blocks of nature (he calls them "ultimates": maybe they are strings, or quantum fields, whatever they may be), must either constitute or realize experience.

There must be something, proto-experiential or experiential at bottom, or else experience is a miracle.

Chomsky takes the case that "radical emergence" is a common thing, such as when molecules combine to give rise to liquids. He says that liquid obviously emerges, but we don't know why. We have a theory for it, but we don't intuitively understand it.

So in the case of experience, Chomsky cites Priestley and says:

"Priestley rejects the conclusion that consciousness “cannot be annexed to the whole brain as a system, while the individual particles of which it consists are separately unconscious.” That “A certain
quantity of nervous system is necessary to such complex ideas and affections as belong to the human mind; and the idea of self, or the feeling that corresponds to the pronoun I,” he argues, “is not essentially different from other complex ideas, that of our country for example.”

p. 193

So there is something about physical stuff that leads, in very specific configurations, to experience, but we don't know what it is. Strawson thinks there's experience at bottom.

But what about relativity? Isn't it built on thought experiments that were later verified? At least some of our native reason works? — frank

Yeah. Einstein understood that Newton's laws could only go so far, it had problems it could not account for, such as the orbit or Mercury.

So Einstein's theory is better for many aspects of astronomy, including say, GPS. Though Newton's laws work pretty well for objects here on Earth.

That is correct. Chomsky, in this and other articles, thinks that Strawson's construction of materialism is one of the few that makes sense, given the definition and the claims made by the philosophy.

Stoljar too, to a lesser extent.

But, Chomsky doesn't agree with Panpsychism, because he believes "radical emergence" to be part of normal science.

Yes. Failing him and Hume, Locke, Priestley even, much later, Russell and many others.

Our common sense understanding doesn't reach into the depths of nature, but it was assumed to be true in some form, until it was proven false.

Now it may be easy for us to say "that's obvious", well, I don't share that. I don't think many of us (or any) would have come up with his equations and theory.

That the world doesn't make sense to us - in principle - was a big deal. But you still hear people talking about "materialism" and Newton's "mechanistic understanding" that was only disproven with QM.

That's the opposite of what happened, Newton overthrew materialism, and it has only gotten stranger since - further removed from common sense.

These are from the essay.

Yes and no.

Yes in so far as scientists don't worry about a theory making intuitive sense, for example QM and Feynman's quote about it. Of course, we can argue about which interpretation is more reasonable: Many Worlds, Copenhagen, Relational, etc.

No in so far as common sense understanding (folk understanding) is innate as linked in the post directly above yours.

A bit more on intuitive understanding:

https://cprtrust.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/COMPLETE-REPORT-Goswami-Childrens-Cognitive-Development-and-Learning.pdf

"Naïve or intuitive physics, rooted in the perception of objects and events, in general yields
reliable information about the structure and action of physical systems. However, in some
cases naïve physics gives rise to misleading models of the physical causal structure of the
world. For example, most children (and adults) employ a pre-Newtonian, ‘impetus’ theory
of projectile motion (for example Viennot 1979). Each motion must have a cause, and so we
think that if a ball is dropped from a moving train, it will fall downwards in a straight line.
In fact, it will fall forwards in a parabolic arc (Kaiser et al. 1985), as the moving train imparts
a force (Newtonian physics). "

- p.6

On Mysteries:

"Newton largely agreed with his scientific contemporaries. He wrote that the notion of action at a distance is “inconceivable.” It is “so great an Absurdity, that I believe no Man who has in philosophical matters a competent Faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it.” By invoking it, we concede that we do not understand the phenomena of the material world. As McMullin observes, “By ‘understand’ Newton still meant what his critics meant: ‘understand in mechanical terms of contact action’.”To take a contemporary analogue, the absurd notion of action at a distance is as inconceivable as the idea that “mental states are states of the brain,” a proposal “we do not really understand [because] we are still unable to form a conception of how consciousness arises in matter, even if we are certain that it does.” Similarly,Newton was unable to form a conception of how the simplest phenomena of nature could arise in matter—and they did not, given his conception of matter, the natural theoretical version of common-sense understanding. Locke and others agreed, and Hume carried that failure of conceivability a long step beyond by concluding that Newton had restored these ultimate secrets of nature “to that obscurity, in which they ever did and ever will remain”—a stand that we may interpret, naturalistically, as a speculation about the limits of human cognitive capacities."

p.171

On Explanations:

Newton’s famous phrase “I frame no hypotheses” appears in this context: recognizing that he had been unable to discover the physical cause of gravity, he left the question open. He adds that “to us it is
enough that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea.” But while agreeing that his proposals were so absurd that no serious scientist could accept them, he defended himself from the charge that he was reverting to the mysticism of the Aristotelians.His principles, he argued, were not occult: “their causes only are occult”; or, he hoped, were yet to be discovered in physical terms, meaning mechanical terms. To derive general principles inductively from phenomena, he continued, “and afterwards to tell us how the properties of actions of all corporeal things follow from those manifest principles, would be a very great step in philosophy, though the causes of these principles were not yet discovered.”

p.172

That's about as far as I'll go, if you are interested then read on, if not, don't.

Sure. I mean most organisms that ever existed and still exist are very simple structures, lacking perception and reason. It seems as if intelligence, on the whole, is not good for survival, mammals tend to do much worse than bacteria.

I didn't mean faith in God. Having discovered that our ideas can be insufficient (as with gravity), we have to live with the possibility that out present common sense ideas are limiting our ability to know the truth. I don't know what to call that state of mind. You're right, faith isn't the word. — frank

I'm guessing that our intuitions do not go beyond what is needed for survival, so we can make sense of a prey chasing us or seeing an apple fall or guessing how far one would need to throw an item to hit a predator, etc.

Luckily, we managed to develop a science forming faculty, which allows us to create theories, which differ from common intuitions.

It's connected to the idea that the world can be fully known - completely, "in itself". It's not mentioned in this article, but one can point to Leibniz and others, who thought we could exhaust the truths about the world by paying careful attention to the phenomena we see.

I don't think it has much to do with faith, anymore, God doesn't figure in modern science. We try to put forth the best model we can, and when we create a model, we obviously have to set aside many phenomena that don't fit into this model.

Of course, it's remarkable that mere creatures like us could have any theories at all. There's nothing in evolutionary theory which would predict that we should be able to do any science at all. So it's amazing that we can do some of it, with significant depth.

Different people have different ways of approaching science. I think the issue here is one of having different takes on intuition. If you say General Relativity is more intuitive than mechanistic materialism, then we slightly differ in common sense understanding.

the world is the world. The modern version of this nonsense is asking whether "if the universe is a simulation" — Saphsin

It's very obvious know, with 300 years of accumulated knowledge.

I can only give you what I understand his view to entail. The point of this thread is to discuss the text.

Not for me to explain it in his words - for that you should read the text.

If you're not convinced by the outline, and think these are ramblings, then skip it.



Thanks. I spend a lot of time on it, part of my thesis after all. Also many emails and even a meeting.

But regardless, he is pretty straightforward. Some people don't like the idea, for some reason, that there are things we can't understand.

Oh well.

Exactly. The point is simple. We are biological creatures, like all other biological creatures, we have a nature. Dogs have a nature, birds have a nature, humans too.

Many things birds do, dogs cannot and vice versa.

Our mental capacities are also a product of natural evolution and biology. So there's two options:

Either we are capacitated with certain scopes and limits (this is needed to have a nature - if we had none, we would be a structureless "creature") which include our mental powers.

Or, we have the capacity, through hard work, to understand everything - because apparently the mind is not subject to biological constraints.

As he says somewhere, we have to distinguish "infinite" from "limitless". English is infinite. But it is not Greek. We can picture or imagine infinite things, it does not follow that we can imagine everything that there is in nature.

In any case, I'm off for the night. Thanks for posting that.

As I read him, his approach tends to be straight forward, he's always called it "common sense", and thought the term can be misleading, it's a good way to approach him generally. Understanding and explanation are related.

For him, as a scientist/philosopher, understanding is approached via "methodological naturalism": one studies all aspects of nature the same way, as a biologist studies digestion, so a cognitive scientist studies the mind.

The goal of scientific enquiry is to be able to provide a theoretical account or principle, usually as simple as possible but no less, from which predictions and observed phenomena can be accounted for - under the theory.

On this view, an explanation would be what is predicted from the theory. If the theory of General Relativity predicts that light will bend a certain way given how the sun interacts with a planet, then if the light bends in the predicted way, this counts as an explanation and is understood to follow from the theory.

How, with straight faces, can 'mysterians' even feign any confidence in – let alone understand – their own 'mysterianism — 180 Proof

He cites Hume, Locke and Priestley (among many others) who were wrestling with Newton's discovery of gravity. Prior to Newton, roughly from Descartes until Newton, understanding was taken to mean intuitive understanding: if a billiard ball hits another billiard ball, the cause was a direct contact.

On the old view of understanding, direct contact was how the world worked. It makes sense "folk psychologically" - to use that term.

Under this view, the material world, was understood as being a big machine, not unlike a clock which could be built by an artisan. The problem was that this manner of intuitive explanation, did not reach the domain of mind, specifically the creative aspect of language use which Descartes thought could not be recreated through an automaton.

Newton essentially believed this view, that the world was a clock-like machine. Only that when he discovered gravity he realized that the universe did not work like a machine, there is no direct contact. As Newton says:

"It is inconceivable, that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else, which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact.... is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it."

By "philosophical", Newton meant what we today call "scientific."

The world does not follow our intuitions. We now strive to get explanatory theories that explain aspects of the world, we no longer seek to understand the world itself, as Chomsky points out in the article.

So by "mysterian" (not a term he likes for himself), or "common sense", he simply means that there are aspects about the world we don't understand, given the creatures we are. Our intuitions mislead us into the nature of the world.

The mischievious thought that occurs to me is that perhaps what's being shown here is that matter is basically unintelligible — Wayfarer

That's actually not far from being the case, in fact it's a plausible reading of this paper.

About the world being unintelligible, in some sense yes: Chomsky mentions Wheeler's "It from Bit", which is a kind of idealist position. So it's an option for him.

I would agree with you that Chomsky at times is focuses on science for many philosophical positions, I'm more liberal and like ordered speculation so...

Getting through it but it's a dense paper. I'll read some more later. — Wayfarer

Your thoughts are always welcome.

I don't think he's advocating for "mysterianism" or mysticism. He's simply saying we have limits in our capacities to understand the world, and while we may not know exactly what they are, there are many hints. We seem to progress in some domains and hit brick walls in others, historically. — Xtrix

You're right to point that out. He always calls it "common sense", which is perhaps the one thing I'd disagree with him. Not because what he's saying is crazy, it's just that it to me it seems that such a designation can cause others to think that they're not being common sensical.

I think he should say he a "rationalistic idealist", as he labels Cudworth. Or a modern Cartesian.

The thing is that the name "mysterianism" has stuck, so, might as well use it.

So qualia is just like gravity in that we know about it, but can't explain it. For gravity, a paradigm shift was required to begin explaining it, but Newton didn't realize that. — frank

Hmmm. In a certain sense, though qualia wasn't a problem for them, in terms of how it is a problem for us in so far as it figures in the "hard problem".

Locke and Hume take them as properties of objects, given properties, obvious properties, forming part of our simple ideas or simple impressions.

Priesteley concludes, in essence, that we don't know enough about matter to say that matter could not be said to have mind, in certain configurations: any arguments to the effect that mind must be immaterial or non-physical is made out of ignorance, because we don't know enough about matter to say otherwise. That includes qualia, clearly.

If we transport Newton to our time, would he say rational people would reject qualia for lack of a physical explanation? — frank

I've read Priestley, Locke, Hume's Treatise and some Reid. The very clear impression I get from all of them, without doubt, is that qualia exist and are as obvious as anything we can know.

Locke very clearly says that we don't know how objects' powers could possibly cause us to see yellow or have taste.

They wouldn't reject qualia at all, they fully and obviously accept them, but admit that we don't know the explanation for them, it was obvious to those mentioned, perhaps with a slight qualification from Reid, though nothing big.

Thanks for this. There are many people who dislike Chomsky and perhaps will not engage with this in good faith. For my money, Chomsky is likely to be better informed and smarter than possibly everyone on this forum. We can't readily ignore what he says. I have seen his talks on this subject several times and subscribe low-rent mysterianism myself. When I get some time, I will attempt to read this and understand it, which may be somewhat more challenging. — Tom Storm

I think so too.

His views should be taken quite seriously as his breadth of knowledge is considerable.

Having said that, of course one if free to disagree and argue. So, no worries about the reading, give it a try, ask about any doubts - if they arise - and just enjoy.

No time pressure for this type of thread.

I should say, I appreciate the feedback and thought put into your answers, even if I disagree with some of it, you certainly posing good questions. Just wanted to say that.

Chomsky sees knowledge of what’s “really there” as grasping the deep principles at the fundamental baseline, what you call intuitive knowledge. — Saphsin

Well, towards the end of the essay, he ends up by quoting Wheeler's "It from Bit" doctrine, but doesn't signal if he accepts or rejects it.

but I have a hard time seeing if Newton was brought to the future, that he would not see it as a closer clarifying answer to what confounded him about Action at a Distance, it became less mysterious so to speak. It helped narrow our view about the nature of phenomenon, and that counts as an improvement of our knowledge of what’s “really there” as far as I can tell, and on the way it continuously redefines what we understand as physical/material. — Saphsin

Arguably, one can say that General Relativity is more "intuitive". One example would be that, we all feel time differently. What for me seems like forever as I'm in pain, for you passes in seconds as you stroll in the park - and yet only a minute passed for both of us.

In other respects, GR is not intuitive. I don't have the intuition that a body "shapes" the space time around it, it seems to me as if a body is simply there and space and time are around it. Which is strictly speaking false.

The intuition here, the one Descartes and Newton believed in (and the one which seems to be innate in us), is mechanistic materialism, the view that the world functions like a giant clock. The idea was that if someone could build something, that thing was understood.

Crucially, contact is needed from one body to move another body. This direct contact doesn't exist in nature. And in QM, you have people even questioning if causality exists.

The world is not continuous, we’re made of discrete atoms, spacetime is an entity and not just a construct of the mind as Kant thought. That this doesn’t count as knowledge of physical mechanisms if we don’t grasp causation all the way down strikes me as a rather extreme reductionist view of Chomsky’s. — Saphsin

The important part, I think, is that he's quoting Newton, Locke, Priestley and Hume and seems to agree with them in so far as the world not making sense in relation to our common sense, mechanistic intuitions.

I don't see him arguing for reduction, though he talks about the case of chemistry and QM.

Absolutely, it is knowledge of phenomena. The argument would be that we don't grasp causation in a simple case of a body moving (Newton didn't as quoted), never mind deeper principles.

Our intuition seems to be that of constant conjunction, as Hume pointed out, there's probably more than this to causation, but we can't prove it.

but to suggest that answering more and more of these small subquestions doesn’t give you a new perspective of those big questions, even redefining the big questions, is a claim that’s really odd to me. — Saphsin

That's not particularly relevant to the bigger picture.

You're right that we can get a bunch of data from all these fields and learn a lot, but we no longer have any intuitions about how the world works. Action at a distance was inconvenible to Newton because it wasn't materialistic, but now General Relativity and QM is even less materialistic in this sense, as it's much further removed from common sense understanding.

Yes these are technically examples of our limits of knowledge, but I don’t think that says much about our cognitive constraints, and definitely not generalizable to extent that it tells us lessons on where to pinpoint our limitations on answering some completely different question. — Saphsin

Sure, much of evolutionary evidence we just can't get given the paucity of the fossil record, so in this regard we can't answer certain questions, though this doesn't speak directly about constraint.

The example Chomsky uses in this article is about the "creative aspects" of language use, which interested Descartes and his followers, which don't appear to be within reach of scientific enquiry.

I can't speak of the technical aspects of linguistics, but I'm sure there are other, useful approaches not covered here.